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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of intellectual property, or ideas protected by patents,
copyrights, and trademarks, has been around since at least the 13th
century. 2 However, it is only in the last decade that "piracy," or the
illegal copying and selling of copywritten or patented material, has become
a contentious issue in trade negotiations between the nations of the
Northern and Southern Hemispheres.3
In surveying the literature from both perspectives, the possibility
arises that each side might be using a word denoting a different meaning to
either side. Each party's comprehension of that word carried with it a
context gathered from hundreds or thousands of years of history. Could it
be that the objective meaning of the word is being lost in the translation?
And if that is the case, then it means that the parties have very little hope
of ever coming to a mutual understanding. That word was "property,"
and more specifically "intellectual property."
For example, there is a story of an American and a Japanese
executive who were locked in what seemed to be an unending round of
business negotiations. Thinking that he was finally making headway, the
American asked the Japanese whether they were "thinking along parallel
lines." The Japanese executive seemed to agree. Later, when the deal
collapsed, the American turned to the Japanese and asked with some
exasperation, "I thought you said we were thinking along parallel lines."
The Japanese nodded, saying, "parallel lines never meet."
The purpose of this article is four-fold. First, this article will
examine whether the word "property" means the same thing in Northern
and Southern contexts. Second, to establish whether such a difference, if
any, is causing a linguistic disconnect in the intellectual property piracy
debate between the Advanced Industrialized Countries (AICs) and the
2. During the 1460's, the Venetian senate awarded the first privilegi (limited monopolies)
in copyright. A short time later, in 1474, that Senate passed the first modem-style patent law.
Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda's Thumb: Patent's Copyrights
and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 51 (National Resource Counsel) (Wallerstein
et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS].
3. In 1984, for the first time since before the first World War, the United States had a net
negative balance of trade, and as intellectual property comprised a greater part of the Gross
National Product, the issue became one of vital national interest. Foreign Investment: Foreign
Holdings in United States Increase Eleven Percent, United States Direct Investment Abroad Up by
Nine Percent, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 872 (July 2, 1986). See also John Burgess, Fighting
Trespassing on 'Intellectual Property'; United States Tries to Prevent Overseas Copying of
Everything From Music to Microchips, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1987, at HI (quoting Senator
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.). "Intellectual property issues have become central to congressional debate
on trade policy." Id.
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Newly Industrialized Countries and the Lesser Developed Countries of the
South.4 Third, if such a "cultural disconnect" exists, to determine whether
it, or economic self-interest, is the true motive behind piracy.5 Finally, the
conclusion will argue that the problem of intellectual property piracy is but
a symptom of a larger crisis: that of North-South economic disparity. It
will also be argued that the piracy problem, to be best understood and
dealt with, must be looked at using a multi-disciplinary approach.
Initially, there will be an examination of the Anglo-American
concept and definition of property. Using this as a basis of comparison,
there will then be an examination of the definitions of property from
cultural perspectives of some of the regions where intellectual property
piracy is most widespread.6 Specifically, there will be a brief examination
of property beliefs from the Confucian, Shinto, Buddhist and Islamic
perspectives. There will also be an examination of whether there are
4. WILLY BRANDT, NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL 31, 32 (1981). In a
report, chaired by former West German leader Willy Brandt to the Independent Commission on
International Development Issues, Brandt divided the North and South into two general camps:
the North (the Advanced Industrialized Countries) is comprised primarily of North America,
Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan; and the South (the Newly Industrialized
Countries and the Lesser Developed Countries) is comprised primarily of South and Central
America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Levant, and the poorer, non-aligned nations. At the time of
the Report's publication in 1980 there existed a third classification, the Second World, comprised
primarily of the Communist Bloc Nations. Id.
5. Each year the United States Trade Representative (USTR) solicits United States
exporters for reports of their losses due to foreign government practices (e.g. failure to make or
enforce intellectual property protection laws). The USTR then confirms the losses with its own
investigation. If it finds that the foreign government, through design or neglect, is encouraging
intellectual property piracy, the USTR will take further action. The vast majority of piracy takes
place within Newly Industrialized Countries and Lesser Developed Countries. For instance, in
1994, Ambassador Micky Kantor, the USTR, identified 37 trading partners as posing the most
significant problems regarding the protection of United States Intellectual Property rights. He also
announced placement of six trading partners on the "priority watch list," or the list of those
nations which allow or even encourage the unauthorized copying and sale of United States
intellectual property such as the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Thailand
and Turkey. Also, he announced that nineteen other countries had been placed on the "watch
list", the list of countries whose copying of United States intellectual property was not as
egregious as that needed to be placed on the Priority Watch List: Australia, Chile, Colombia,
Cyprus, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Spain, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Four of them -- Egypt, El Salvador,
Greece, and the United Arab Emirates would be subject to out-of-cycle reviews to determine
whether the past problems or practices had been remedied. Ambassador Kantor also noted
concerns with continuing or prospective problems in Brazil, Canada, Germany, Honduras, Israel,
Panama, Paraguay, Russia and Singapore, which were not included on the Special 301 lists.
Imports of Certain Plants, Nursery Stock, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 18 (May 4, 1994).
6. Some of the most brazen and egregious losses to piracy come from countries in the
Pacific Rim and Middle Eastern countries. William E. Schmidt, Daily Briefing: Bootleg Tape
Trade Booming in Cairo: Copyright Violation Rife in Developing World, S. F. CHRON., Aug.
19, 1991, at A4.
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cultural differences in meaning that could justify the belief that what we
call piracy is simply the South's form of benign technology transfer.
Intellectual property piracy occurs in almost every country,
regardless of economic or social grouping. However, only the Confucian
and Islamic systems have been concentrated on for the following reasons:
(1) some of the most egregious piracy of United States/Northern
intellectual property comes from those nations with Confucian, Buddhist or
Islamic cultural backgrounds ;7 (2) other regions, such as South and Central
America, share Roman Catholic roots with the West and thus, to an extent,
do not pose a cultural defense against piracy on the same order as Islamic
or Confucian regions;8 (3) Confucian, Buddhist and Islamic beliefs are still
enigmatic to the average Westerner; (4) piracy within and among the
AIC's can be attacked using the well-developed enforcement mechanism of
the national court systems, 9 an option foreclosed in the South where it is
often the national government encouraging piracy; and, (5) while other
countries with systems markedly different from that of the European West
are also sources of intellectual piracy, such as India (Hindi), and the
former Soviet Union and Communist Bloc (Marxist), they are beyond the
scope of this paper. Within the short span of a few years, "Westerners"
will comprise a mere 700 million out of a global population that may swell
to 9 or 15 billion souls.o Ignorance of the beliefs of such a vast number of
people can only be a disadvantage to the Western intellectual property
rightsholder.
7. Id.
8. INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise H.
Bernal eds., 1994) [hereinafter FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS]. But see POPE JOHN PAUL II,
CENTESIMUS ANNUS 33-34 (1991).
9. For example, the new TRIPS agreement, and the earlier Paris and Berne Conventions:
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) provision in the World Trade
Organization (WTO); replacing the GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNCIW/FA (1991), Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods
(Annex II); the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature
March 20, 1883, T.S. No. 379, as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 24 U.S.T. 2140, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 (providing patent and trademark protection); and the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berne Copyright Union Item A-i Berne Convention,
Additional Article and Final Protocol, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 3 UNESCO Copyright
Law & Treaties of the World (providing copyright protection).
10. Stephen Budiansky, World Report: 10 Billion for Dinner, Please, U.S. NEWS &




How is it that the mere copying of Northern ideas has become an
issue of such importance to the North, and to the United States in
particular? The short answer is that intellectual property has surpassed all
other categories of trade in importance to national economic well-being,
both North and South." For instance, just after World War II intellectual
property comprised less than ten percent of all United States exports. At
that time, progress and a nation's strength were measured by the number
of planes, trains and automobiles that its factories churned out. As the
West, later joined by Japan, entered the information age, the proportion of
intellectual property in United States exports surged. First, to twenty-five
percent, later to thirty-seven percent, and currently, up to well over fifty
percent. 12  Labor intensive industry moved offshore to Third World
countries to take advantage of cheaper labor. 3 In a nutshell, intellectual
property has become the modern "wealth of nations."' 4 This is especially
true for the United States, which spent $25 billion in 1992 on basic
11. Richard P. Rozek, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Research and
Development Decisions and Economic Growth, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 31, 40 (F. Rushing & C. Ganz Brown
eds., 1990) (citing Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property, Technology and Economic Growth, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, 17, 19 (asserting that forty percent of the growth
in per capita GNP in the United States from 1929 to 1957 has been attributed to technological
change)).
12. FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS: THE BATTLE TO OWN THE WORLD'S
TECHNOLOGY 7 (1994). Warshofsky maintains that in 1947 intellectual property comprised just
under ten percent of all United States exports. "In 1986," he states, "the last year that the United
States government compiled that statistic, the figure had grown to more than thirty-seven percent.
Today, the best estimate is that intellectual property accounts for well over fifty percent of all
American exports." (citing U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
(1951); U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. EXPORT AND IMPORT TRADE, Report
FT990 (Dec. 1986)).
13. Rochelle L. Stanfield, Strains in the Family: America in the '90's, 23 NAT'L J. 2316
(1991).
14. WARSHOFSKY, supra note 12, at 3. See also Economic Outlook for 1993, Hearings
Before the Joint Congressional Economic Committee (Statement of Senator Bennett), Fed. News
Serv., Jan. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws file. Senator Bennett
commented on how intellectual property has radically changed the nature of wealth creation in the
developed world:
I find it significant that the richest man in the United States now is Bill Gates who
owns no huge factories or ranches, no tremendous commercial enterprises that we
would think of 50 to 60 years ago. It all comes out of his head. And the intellectual
product has made him the richest man in the United States, not the physical product of
a steel mill or an automobile factory. And I think that's a demonstration of the kind of
structural differences that we have.
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technological research-ten times more than any other country. Ninety
percent of knowledge in the sciences has been generated in the past thirty
years, and is projected to double in the next fifteen years. With the
accelerating pace of technology, product life-cycles are becoming shorter
and shorter, giving the creators of intellectual property smaller "windows
of opportunity." This allows them to recoup their increasingly expensive
cost of research and development (R&D). 5
A. THE NORTH AND THE SoUTH
Political observers have divided the world into the "North" and the
"South," with economic classification corresponding roughly with
geophysical positioning relative to the equator. Northern countries are
generally characterized as wealthy, industrially, and technologically
developed. These countries have stable, low, or even negative population
growth rates, and well-educated, but older, populaces whose average life
expectancy is about seventy years of age. Countries of the South, also
known as the Third World, or Developing World, differs in almost every
respect. Painting with a broad brush, these nations are usually
characterized as being heavily laden with foreign debt; have little or no
domestic industrial or technological base; and have young, burgeoning
populations who have little or no education and suffer from widespread
disease, hunger, and poverty.' 6 Even within the South itself, there are
growth disparities. There are the Newly Industrialized Countries, such as
the Asian "tiger" countries, which are industrially and technologically
backward, but are enjoying explosive growth. Next, there are the Lesser
Developed Countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, many of whose
economies have gone from bad to worse. Fourth and Fifth World nations
are those "basket case" nations whose national governments have failed
utterly. Rwanda, Somalia, the Sudan, and Lebanon are some recent
examples of "basket case" nations.
B. Intellectual Property: Who is Making it-and Who is Taking it?
The Northern AICs account for ninety percent of the world's
patents 7 and carry out ninety percent of the world's trade in technology.' 8
15. Bruce Merrifield, Sectoral Views: The Federal Government, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS,
supra note 2, at 215.
16. BRANDT, supra note 4, at 32.
17. David M. Haug, The International Transfer of Technology: Lessons that East Europe
can Learn from the Failed Third World Experience, 5 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 209, 212 n.20
(1992) (citing PETER NANYENYA-TAKIRAMBUDDE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1980)). A 1980 United Nations report estimated that industrialized
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In contrast, the poorer nations of the South' 9 produce little or none of their
own technology, but account for over seventy-five percent of all piracy.2'
About a quarter-century ago, the stamp "made in Hong Kong,"
was shorthand for a cheap and poorly-made product, usually a copy of
something invented in the West. At worst, piracy was a mere nuisance to
American and European producers of musical recordings, computer
software, pharmaceuticals, books, designer fashions, high technology, and
the like. However, copying is no longer just a nuisance. Western
rightsholders are angry and are taking affirmative steps at protecting what
countries spent between sixteen and seventeen times more of their gross national product on
research and development than did developing countries. UNCTAD, Formulation of a Strategy
for the Technological Transformation of Developing Countries, UNCTAD Doc. TD/B1779 (1980)
[hereinafter UNCTAD]. The report also stated that developing countries held only one percent of
the world's patents, and that those underdeveloped countries with patent systems issued 84% of
their patents to foreigners. Id.
18. MICHAEL BLAKENEY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 57-58 (1989).
19. Intellectual Property: China, Turkey, India, Brazil Faulted for Inaction on Intellectual
Property, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA), at D5 (Feb. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Intellectual
Property]. Affected United States industries/rightsholders, such as the International Intellectual
Property Association (IIPA) which represents motion picture, sound recording, computer
software, and publishing industry associations, and the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), submitted their findings as to the most egregious copiers of
United States intellectual property. They nominated Brazil, Greece, India, Korea, the
Philippines, the Russian Federation, and Saudi Arabia. Russia and Brazil were recommended for
listing on the "priority watch list." PhRMA nominated Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Thailand, and the
United Arab Emirates to be named as priority watch list countries. The IIPA recommended that
the following countries be placed on the USTR's watch list: Bahrain, Bolivia, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Taiwan,
Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. While Japan posed increasing problems,
particularly in failing to protect biotechnology, China remained top priority. While the list here
is not exhaustive, the regions covered were primarily Central and South America, Russia and the
Newly Independent States, the Middle East, the Far East, and Central Asia. Id.
20. Mahmood Saberi, USA: US Lost $4 Billion Last Year Due to Piracy, Saudi Gazette,
MONEYCLIPS, Nov. 3, 1993 (quoting United States government sources stating that "more than
75 percent of the piracy is found in developing nations and the newly industrializing countries in
Asia.") Saberi further quoted Eric Smith, Executive Director of the Washington-based
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) as stating that outside of Asia the IIPA's
biggest areas of concern were "in Eastern Europe, Russia and the Mid-east. 'We are really
concerned about the Gulf states.'" Id. See also Thomas Mesevage, The Carrot and the Stick:
Protecting United States Intellectual Property in Developing Countries, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 421 (1991). This article discusses why North-South piracy is so problematic.
While piracy still occurs between the Northern producer nations, a substantial body of laws and
practices provides a remedy to the patent-holder, whereas piracy committed within the newly
industrialized and lesser developed countries, who have sometimes made it a part of their
developmental policy not to afford intellectual property protection, oftentimes do not.
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is theirs by right. 21 They argue piracy is dangerous, causing them severe
economic harm, and constitutes outright theft.
Piracy is "dangerous" because consumers will buy a product under
the assumption that it is an original, and has been subjected to rigorous
quality control and governmental testing. Pirated copies have killed or
caused severe injuries. 22 For example, pirated aircraft engine parts' and
automobile brake parts have failed suddenly under stress.24 Fake
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, packaged just like the real thing, but
crudely mixed in Third World countries, have caused death and
paralysis .'
Piracy is also causing nations that are net producers of intellectual
property severe economic damage .26 For instance, in 1985, for the first
time since before World War I, the United States had a net negative
balance of trade. That trade deficit has swollen from $122 billion in 1985
to an estimated record high of $200 billion in 1995.27 According to the
21. Stuart Auerbach, GAT's Global Stakes; Issues Are Complex, Crucial in Montreal,
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1988, at HI (writing that "the United States, the European Community
and Japan have joined to seek stiff trade rules against piracy of products such as books, software
and pharmaceuticals that are protected by patents or copyrights," despite remaining at
loggerheads with regard to national agricultural subsidies).
22. Nick Williams, Media & Marketing: Pirates Bag a Deadly Haul, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Sept. 5, 1990, at 27.
23. The Federal Aviation Administration announced the grounding of 6,000 small aircraft
due to "bogus" engine parts which had caused motors to fail in flight. The parts had been
imported from Germany, but the authorities were attempting to find out who actually
manufactured the "poorly fabricated" parts made with "inferior material." FAA Orders 6,000
Small Planes Be Grounded, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 18, 1995, at A3.
24. Frank Viviano & John Eckhouse, The New Era of Pirates Worldwide Trade in Fake
Goods, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 1991, at Al.
25. Gary M. Hoffman & George T. Marcou, Outposts-Law and Society; Who's Stealing
America's Ideas?, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1989, at C3. While the copying of pharmaceuticals is
comparatively easy, pirated goods are not made to the same quality standards nor required to pass
safety standards associated with original Western-produced drugs and technology. Unauthorized
imitations of amphetamines and tranquilizers have been blamed for deaths and paralysis, and a
counterfeit fungicide led to the loss of 15 % of the coffee crop in Kenya.
26. Ronald E. Yates, Far East Offers Friendly Ports for Product Pirates, CHIC. TRIB.,
Nov. 12, 1989, at B1. According to Yates, in 1989, America [was] suffering from a $130 billion
trade deficit with most of the world. And more than 80 percent of that imbalance [was] with
Asian trading partners where intellectual property pirates [were] pushing the United States trade
picture deeper and deeper into the red. Id.
27. Foreign Investment: United States Net Debtor by $107.4 Billion at End of 1985,
Commerce Department Reports, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 872 (July 2, 1986). However, the
United States trade deficit started a few years earlier, skyrocketing along with the increasing
popularity and ease of piracy: 1981 - $27.97 billion; 1982 - $36.45 billion; 1983 - $67.08
billion; 1984 - $112.51 billion; 1985 - $122.15; 1986 - $144.34 billion. INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, 1987 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS 69. The 1994 deficit stood at
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estimates of the Congressional Economic Leadership Institute, sixty
percent of that deficit can be attributed to piracy.2 The cost to the United
States has been the loss of tens of billions of dollars in sales and hundreds
of thousands of jobs each year. A 1984 International Trade Commission
report estimated United States losses in 1982 ranged between $43 billion
and $61 billion and 131,000 lost jobs in five industrial sectors alone.29
The hemorrhage of United States jobs has continued to grow. In 1994, the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), Ambassador Micky Kantor,
told Congress "for every billion dollars of United States goods exported
annually, 16,000 to 17,000 new domestic jobs are created. "1 "These
jobs," he continued, "generally pay seventeen percent more than the
average United States wage." 3' If these figures are correct and the
corollary may be properly applied, this means that last year the United
States lost 3,400,000 well-paying jobs due to its trade deficit. Applying
the Congressional Economic Leadership Institutes' estimates to the
USTR's assertion means that in 1995 the United States lost 2,040,000 jobs
directly to piracy.
$151.1, while the 1995 trade deficit is predicted to rise to a record high of $200 billion. United
States Trade Deficit: Trade Deficit to Rise to Record, Economic Analyst Predicts in Study, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA) at D6, (Apr. 26, 1995).
28. Piracy of United States Intellectual Property Rights, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 134
(Jan. 23, 1991).
29. Then United States Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter told reporters that the United
States Trade Commission had found that 431 United States companies suffered aggregate
worldwide losses of more than $23.8 billion in 1986 due to inadequate intellectual property
protection. In his 1988 United States International Trade Commission report, he stated that
exports of intellectual property from the United States have doubled in the past decade and now
represent more than a quarter of United States exports. Extrapolating these losses to the entire
national economy, Yeutter placed the total losses between $43 billion and $61 billion. A 1984
ITC report on the effects of foreign product counterfeiting estimated that 131,000 United States
jobs in five industrial sectors were lost in 1982 due solely to foreign product counterfeiting and
similar practices. Major offenders targeted in the report were Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Critics assert these figures to be inflated, or at
least, suspect. For instance, software whose market price in the United States was $400.00, but
sold at the pirated price of $1.50 in Singapore, was considered to be a flat $400.00 loss. Critics
charge that it would unrealistic to expect a sale to be made in a Third World country at that price.
Whichever side is correct, it is still true that United States rightsholders are enduring significant
losses to Third World piracy. Intellectual Property: United States Firms Lose Billions Annually
to Foreign Piracy, ITC Intellectual Property Study Finds, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 290, (Mar.
2, 1988).
30. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: The Benefits of the Uruguay Trade Rounds,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Mickey Kantor, Ambassador, United States Trade
Representative.)
31. Id.
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C. Piracy a Zero-Sum Equation
The concept of free trade is not figuring out new ways to slice the
global economic pie, but to make it larger through the functioning of
economies of scale and comparative advantage. However, some studies
have shown piracy is a zero-sum game in that the Northern loss is directly
tied to a pirating nations' gain.32 For example, in 1989 when the United
States trade deficit was a "mere" $130 billion, more than eighty percent of
that deficit was with Asian trading partners who simultaneously were the
worst pirates of United States intellectual property.33 This comes as no
surprise when it has been the declared national policy of many of the
pirating nations to acquire Western technology and know-how.34
Japan is one of the most successful examples. Its meteoric
technological rise was not based on Japanese innovation, but on the
copying of Western ideas. During the late 1970's, the United States spent
$50 billion each year on research and development. One commentator,
Teresa Watanabe, states the total price Japan had to pay for the Western
technology it needed to transform itself from a nation of ricepaper and
bamboo to transistors and skyscrapers was a bargain-basement $9 billion.35
This is not merely the product of terrific bargaining. Japan has carefully
orchestrated its economy to keep out foreign imports while encouraging
the copying of Western technology.36 Watanabe goes on to argue Japan
32. Peter Engardio et al., Asia's Wealth: It's Creating a Massive Shift in Global Economic
Power, Bus. WK., Nov. 29, 1993, at 100. See also Joel Kotkin, Clinton's Task: Adjust to Third
World's New Clout; Trade: Policies Obsessed with Western Europe and Japan Won't Prepare Us
for Future Economic Rivalry with China, Mexico and India, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, at M2.
33. Yates, supra note 26.
34. J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection: An
Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 209, 215 (1987) (asserting that many of the worst
infringers of Northern intellectual property are those countries demonstrating robust, if not
explosive, economic growth benefits directly associated with their copying of Western know-how
and technology). Frame states,
Given these traits, it becomes increasingly difficult to accept arguments by [Newly
Industrialized Countries] that they are weak, helpless actors in the international system
who need special protection. In the intellectual property arena, these countries are too
big to be ignored. Their disregard for intellectual property protection has significant
consequences.
Id.
35. Teresa Watanabe, Japan Sets Sights on Creativity, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1990, at Al.
36. Lawrence Chimerine & James Fallows, Japan Deserves a Tariff, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1995, at A15. Chimerine, chief economist at the Economic Strategy Institute (ESI), discusses
how Japan keeps foreign goods out, pointed out that studies by the ESI and other research groups
estimate that if Japan's markets behaved like those of other industrialized countries, Japan would
import up to $200 billion more in goods each year than it does currently. Of that figure, almost
$50 billion would have been imported from the United States. See also Intellectual Property:
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did nothing different than what the United States did in copying European
technology in its early years. However, Watanabe ignores the substantial
change in the nature and importance intellectual property has taken on
since that time. Meanwhile, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand have
emulated Japan's strategy. Their technological and economic advances
can also be traced to their piracy of Western technology."
D. Pirates Continue to Enjoy Generalized System of Preferences
Benefits
In an effort to assist the development of many of the world's
poorer countries, the United States grants them preferential tariff treatment
under its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). GSP's help some
nations more than others, and some of the same nations which benefit the
most under the GSP also happen to be some of the worst offenders of
piracy and unfair trade practices."a Furthermore, the worst hit industries
can trace much of their damage directly to those nations with which the
United States has had significant trade deficits.39 Taken from a Southern
perspective, piracy is a cheap and effective way of gaining new technology
and driving economic growth. However, this ignores the likelihood that
Western nations producing intellectual property will move to protect their
vital interests,' and it also ignores the long-range damage state-supported
piracy causes to trade relations.4
China, Turkey, India, Brazil Faulted for Inaction on Intellectual Property, Int'l Bus. & Fin.
Daily (BNA), at D5 (Feb. 15, 1995). "The largest losses to United States firms are in Japan,
where piracy cost legitimate producers $1.26 billion." See also Intellectual Property: Industry
Presses United States to Act Against 36 Countries for Copyright "Piracy," Int'l Bus. & Fin.
Daily (BNA), at D3 (Feb. 22, 1994)(aggrieved United States rightsholders called for United
States government action against Japan "because of huge losses due to software piracy; possible
changes to its copyright law, which could significantly weaken protection for computer programs;
and discriminatory treatment of United States record companies"). Industry leaders also cited
their losses to copyright infringement in Japan in 1993 as totaling $952 million. Id.
37. Thomas N. O'Neill, Comment, Intellectual Property Protection in Thailand: Asia's
Young Tiger and America's "Growing" Concern, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 603 (1990).
38. James W. Peters, Comment, Toward Negotiating a Remedy to Copyright Piracy in
Singapore, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 561, 577 (1986).
39. William P. Alford, Intellectual Property, Trade and Taiwan: A GAIT-Fly's View,
1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 97, 99 (1992).
40. American concerns are only heightened by the fact that its lead in technical innovation
is slipping. John Eckhouse, CEOs See United States Losing its Edge in Technology, S. F.
CHRON., Mar. 15, 1990, at Cl.
41. Burgess, supra note 3, at HI. In Southern eyes, the ends of piracy justify its means.
But the anger and ill-will that piracy causes is now becoming apparent. Burgess writes:
These days the United States is increasingly less willing to listen to arguments that the
quest for development and a dignified standard of living legitimizes such behavior.
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The production of intellectual property by the North and its
abduction by the South has resulted in an acrimonious debate between the
Hemispheres with the North accusing the South of outright theft and
demanding improved protection of their intellectual property. Conversely,
Southern nations recognize the absolute necessity of the transfer of
technology from North to South in order to survive, much less to join the
ranks of developed nations. Yet, the Southern nations are unable to pay
the market price of the technology they need.42
When confronted, poorer nations of the South have offered by way
of explanation that Northern intellectual property conventions are
"culturally biased," favoring Western needs and encouraging development
of technology unsuited to their particular situations.43 They have also
justified the pirating of Northern intellectual property by arguing: (1) the
North is imposing its own concepts of property on them;" (2) intellectual
property is really the common property, or heritage, of mankind;45 (3) the
North is really attempting to prevent the South from obtaining
technological know-how and thus keeping them from joining the ranks of
the developed nations;' and, (4) they are poor and must have Northern
technology out of necessity.47
"That's really an indefensible way to run a society," declared [then-USTR Clayton]
Yeutter. I don't see how any nation in the world can defend piracy as a means of
keeping consumer costs down.
Id.
42. BLAKENEY, supra note 18, at 57-58, (attributing 87.5% of per capita growth of income
in the United States in the first half of this century to technological progress and the remainder to
the use of capital). Conversely, deprivation and poverty suffered by developing countries
attributed "almost entirely" to their technological dependence upon the West. Id.
43. D. SILVERSTEIN, PATENT PROTECTION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRODUCING AND
TRANSMITTING KNOWLEDGE 12 (1986).
44. Peters, supra note 38, at 587.
45. HELENA STALSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES
COMPETITIVENESS IN TRADE 48 (1987). Stalson writes, "[u]nder a vaguely defined principle
that knowledge is the heritage of all mankind, they claim that protection denies them the ... social
and industrial contributions of patented products because they are available only at prices they
cannot afford and under conditions that violate their sovereignty." d.
46. Ronald E. Yates, Winds Turn Against Product Pirates, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1989, at
B1. Yates notes that despite the United States having success in forcing many of these pirate
nations to enact and enforce intellectual property protection laws,
[T]here remains residual resentment and resistance over American efforts to wipe out
Asia's notorious pirate dens. Many officials and businessmen in the region's newly
industrializing economies continue to see the United States anti-piracy crusade as little
more than an attempt to maintain America's technological and creative advantage while
keeping them at a competitive disadvantage.
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How valid are these Southern arguments? More specifically, are
their arguments sincere when their concepts of property are different from
those of the North? In the alternative, are they using so-called "cultural"
defenses as a smoke screen to justify taking the ideas of the North without
paying for them?
One commentator on the North-South intellectual property debate,
Frank Emmert, framed the issue in this way: The question is "whether
intellectual property is really a Western concept, foreign to the culture of
many Newly Industrialized Countries and Lesser Developed Countries,
which has simply been forced upon them by the [Advanced Industrial
Countries] for egotistic economic motives. 48
IIl. DIFFERENT CULTURES-DIFFERENT MEANINGS BETWEEN
NORTH AND SOUTH?
Black's Law Dictionary defines "property" as:
[O]wnership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a
thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to
possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from
Id. He cites other examples:
In Taiwan and South Korea, especially, United States demands for intellectual property
rights protection are sometimes assailed by the media as examples of United States
meddling... South Korea's often vociferous anti-American students say United States
intellectual property rights policies are an attempt to withhold critical technology and
information from Koreans. In Taiwan, officials of the Interior Ministry told Chinese
reporters recently that revisions in that nation's newly drafted copyright law were
"made under duress" from Washington.
Id.
47. ROBERT BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: ISSUES AND
CONTROVERSIES 28 (1987).
48. Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round-Negotiating Strategies of
the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1357 (1990); see also Clive
Crook, Nothing to Lose But Their Chains, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1990, at 34, 35. Crook took
an approach sympathetic to the Southern Hemispheres' perspective:
Many producers in Europe and America complain that their patents, trademarks and
other [intellectual property] rights are infringed in foreign markets, especially in the
developing countries... Companies in rich countries often imply that all such disputes
over intellectual property are a straightforward matter of piracy or theft ... This debate
goes on within the industrial countries; yet, in their dealings with the Third World,
companies regard the conventions agreed at home as self-evidently correct for
everywhere else. It is not at all obvious that the developing countries are obliged,
either morally or for the sake of sound economics, to meet the rich countries'
demands.
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interfering with it ...to denote everything which is the
subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal; tangible or
intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything
that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up
wealth or estate.49
Holders of United States intellectual property rights (rightsholders)
and American negotiators assume that this definition of property is
universally understood. They also assume that it is widely understood that
an idea, expressed in the form of an invention, a song, a story, or as
computer code, may also be called "property" (i.e. "intellectual
property"). Assuming arguendo, the human concept of ownership of a
"thing" transcends all borders, United States negotiators have encountered
markedly different mindsets when dealing with concepts of private
ownership of things in relation to principles of "just" distribution. 0 Alan
Greenspan noted this difference of societal values and economics,
particularly with reference to the mindset often found in Communist
nations, such as the People's Republic of China, North Korea and Cuba,
and former Communist nations, such as the former Soviet Union and the
Newly Independent States of Eastern Europe, stating, "[m]uch of what we
took for granted in our system and had grown to assume to be human
nature was not nature at all, but culture. ,5
49. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 845-46 (6th ed. 1990).
50. POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 8, 33-34 (1991). "Western" concepts of just
distribution vis-a-vis property rights are themselves not uniform. The Western concept of
property right, as discussed in this paper, essentially follows the "Labor-Desert" theory
propounded by the Greek Stoic Cicero, and echoed in Justian's Institutes, English Common Law
and Natural Law as defined by the Founders of America's Constitution. Challenging the concept
that property rights are a natural and absolute right, are those of the Roman Catholic Church, as
embodied Pope John Paul II's encyclical: the Centesimus Annus. The Pope argues that the need
for profit should be subordinated to the needs of the common good. On that basis he argues that
the AIC's have a moral obligation to unilaterally transfer wealth to the poorer nations. Id.
51. Alan Greenspan, Thoughts About the Transitioning Market Economies of Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. I n.3 (1993) (citing Robert
Wuthnow, The Moral Crisis in American Capitalism, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar. 1982, at 76
(discussing the interrelation between societal values and economics)).
The Free market system pervades the United States view of the world. Not only does
the system connote the exchange of goods and services at prices determined by levels
of supply and demand, but it also shapes basic values and conceptions and takes on
moral meaning . .. Whether we acknowledge it consciously or not, the market
influences our basic values, helps shape our suppositions about reality, and figures
centrally in our tacit assumptions about daily life. We invest the market with moral
importance and associate it with many of our most deeply held beliefs. In fact, the
market system is so inextricably woven into our view of the world that any threat to
the market endangers not only our standard of living but, more importantly, the very
fabric of our society.
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Simply stated, Western ideals are centered around the free market,
individual "rights" and the concept that profits are the just reward for
labor expended in creative endeavors. Other systems prevalent in the
South, such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam, are more communally
oriented. Under these beliefs, wealth should be shared within society and
distributed more or less equally.
IV. COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. Producing Nations: The North
Are property and intellectual property, as Emmert and Greenspan
have mused, simply Western concepts? An examination of at least some
of the cultures involved in the North-South intellectual property debate is a
necessary first step in the questions' resolution. As noted above, the vast
majority of innovation and trade takes place within and among the AICs.
Although far from exclusive, a list representing what is meant by "AIC,"
includes the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized Nations-Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States. 2
With the exception of Japan, 3 the AICs generally share common Greco-
Roman philosophical backgrounds.54 Even Japan, which is principally
Shinto-Buddhist-Confucanist," has been heavily influenced by Western
Civil Code law since the 1860's and has been "Americanized" to a certain
Robert Wuthnow, The Moral Crisis in American Capitalism, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar. 1982, at
76; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
52. The Group of Seven major industrialized nations are Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States. 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 200 (Jan. 25, 1995);
see also Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property:
Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285 (1989) (listing as developed
countries, the United States, the European Community, Japan, Switzerland, the Nordic countries,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and some of the ASEAN nations).
53. Daniel Garner, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round, 3 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 51
n.122 (1990).
54. See generally CHARLES P. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD (2d ed.
1994) (tracing roots Roman laws from ancient Babylon, Chaldea, Egypt, and Greece and
influence on European, Anglo-American, Islamic, and even the Japanese systems of law).
55. 4 WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA Of THE NATIONS: ASIA & OCEANIA 206 (8th ed.
1995) (describing Japan as predominantly Shinto and Buddhist, or both because as the
philosophies are not mutually exclusive and may be followed concurrently) [hereinafter
WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA]. Underlying these philosophers is the Confucianist ethical
system, originating iri China, which has had a strong influence on Japanese society and has
provided the underpinnings of some characteristically Japanese attitudes. For example, the
respect for elders and authority figures ("filial piety"), subordination of the wants and needs of
the individual, and the central importance of the welfare and dignity of the extended family
("clan").
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degree since the end of World War 11.56 However, Japan is still
Confucianist and a resentment and resistance against further westernization
is growing." It defies easy classification, and lumping it in with the West
simply because of its full industrialization and geographic location would
be a mistake. Japan will be covered in more detail below.
1. Property and the West-Historical Background
The definition of "property" in any society is shaped by its
historical, cultural, legal, and religious backgrounds. The United States is
no exception. America's legal, religious, and property concepts have been
shaped by a combination of its own experiences, the English common
law,58 the Judeo-Christian faith,59 Roman Civil Law, and Natural Law.'
The Western concept of property, traced back to an early point of origin,
will show that it is closely associated with the philosophy of natural law
"rights" developed by the Greek Stoics and later by Roman philosophers
and jurists.6 For example, the "Labor-Desert" theory, arguably the very
embodiment of modem Western property belief, holds that man has an
inherent right to property when he has added value to something
previously owned by no one else.62 The Roman/natural law roots of this
56. See generally Harumi & Makoto Kojo, The Legal System of Japan, in 2 MODERN
LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 2.70.10-13 (1989) (explaining how Japanese law was suddenly
"westernized" during the 1860's). The customary law of the Tokugawa period was. discarded and
replaced by the French, and then later, by the German Civil Code. The Mejii Constitution was
adopted in 1889 and modeled after the Prussian Constitution. In 1946, the United States
Occupation Forces drafted a new constitution for Japan. The Japanese cabinet adopted it in 1947
after making certain changes. The effect of the new constitution was to strip divinity and thus
sovereignty from the Emperor. Also, Shinto was abolished as a State religion, the freedoms of
speech and religion were guaranteed, and the use of military force as a means of settling
international disputes was renounced. While Japan's legal system may have been
"Americanized," their economic philosophy seemed to be guided more by Hegel and Friedrich
List than by Locke. See generally JAMES FALLOWS, LOOKING AT THE SUN: THE RISE OF THE
NEW EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEM (1994).
57. Terry W. Schackmann, Essay: Reflections in a Rock Garden: A Civic Commitment to
International Understanding?, 42 KAN. L. REV. 531, 532 (1994).
58. See generally W. W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND
COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE (2d ed. 1965).
59. Genesis 15:7, 17:8, 34:10; Acts 2:45.
60. See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional Law to Natural
Law Concepts, 25 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 258 (1949).
61. Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187
(1992).
62. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 133 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the
Labor-Desert theory).
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belief are shown in Roman works written almost 1,500 years ago.63 F.H.
Lawson, an Oxford scholar of comparative law, excerpted translations
from Justinians' Corpus Juris Civilis (529-34 A.D):64
The savage who hollows a tree, inserts a sharp stone into a
wooden handle, or applies a string to an elastic branch,
becomes in a state of nature the just proprietor of the
canoe, the bow, or the hatchet. The materials were
common to all; the new form, the produce of his time and
simple industry, belongs solely to himself. His hungry
brethren cannot, without a sense of their own injustice,
extort from the hunter the game of the forest overtaken or
slain by his personal strength and dexterity. If his
provident care preserves and multiplies the tame animals,
whose nature is tractable to the arts of education, he
acquires a perpetual title to the use and service of their
numerous progeny, which derives its existence from him
alone. If he incloses and cultivates a field for their
sustenance and his own, a barren waste is converted into a
fertile soil; the seed, the manure, the labour, create a new
value; and the rewards of harvest are painfully earned by
the fatigues of the revolving year.65
This natural law property belief reflected an individual right to property,
rather than a collective right to property, and expressly excludes those who
do not contribute to the addition of value from sharing in the fruits of the
labors. This is the essential difference between the Northern and Southern
philosophies regarding property.
2. What Is "Natural Law?"
Websters defines natural law as "(a) rules of conduct supposedly
inherent in the relations between human beings and discoverable by
reason; law based upon man's innate moral sense: contrasted with statute
63. SHERMAN, supra note 54, at 114. Codification of the work took place in the Eastern
Roman Empire, Constantinople, between the years 529-34 A.D. Flavius Anicius Justinian's
reign, from 527 to 567 A.D. was long and prosperous. Rome almost reached her old outward
boundaries, which was lost earlier to Teutonic invaders. Since 391 A.D. Christianity had
become the state religion and all heathen cults were forbidden. See HERMANN KINDER &
WERNER HILGEMANN, THE ANCHOR ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY 103 (Ernest A. Menze trans.,
1964).
64. THE ROMAN LAW READER 32 (F.H. Lawson ed., 1969).
65. Id. at 32 (emphasis added); see generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectual
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
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law, common law; (b) a law of nature ... ; (c) laws of nature, collectively.
.66 Discussion of natural law dates back at least to Aristotle, who
stated that the term natural refers "to those rules which can be known to be
correct and binding in virtue of their own nature; rules that are 'natural' in
this sense contrast with the arbitrary dictates which those in power may
happen to lay down."67 Commentators have grappled with the problem of
describing precisely that concept of justice which was immutable and true
for all periods and all civilizations.6" Simply, natural law and natural
rights were deemed to be those that no king or Government could deny
and still justly rule. English common law jurists, and later their American
counterparts, would offer their own definitions.
William Blackstone, author of the Commentaries on the Laws of
England (1765-69) and a great influence on early American law, asserted
that the "absolute" rights of man are "the right of personal security, the
right of personal liberty, and the right of private property." 69 Similarly
Justice William Story spoke of the "fundamental right" to property. 0 "We
call those rights natural, which belong to all mankind and result from our
very nature and condition. Those rights are a man's right to his life,
limbs, and liberty [and] to the produce of his personal labor." 7' Thus, the
concept of the sanctity of private property was central to the Greco-Roman
and, subsequently, the Anglo-American concept of natural law. The fact
that "ideas" were embraced within the meaning of property would become
enshrined in the United States Constitution72 and in the intellectual
property protection laws of Northern countries.73
66. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1197 (2d ed. 1983).
67. See ARISTOTLE, V NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 131-33 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
68. "Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes et
omni tempore, una lex, et sempiterna et immortalis, continebit." [There will be not different laws
at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable
law will be valid for all nations and all times.] 3 M. CICERO, 210 DE RE PUBLICA (C. Keyes
trans., 1928).
69. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 125.
70. Id.
71. Joseph Story, Natural Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 150-58 (F. Lieber ed.,
1836), reprinted in JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
314 (1971).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73. See generally PETER GROVES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE INTERNAL
MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993).
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3. Roman Natural Law Derived From The Greek Stoics
The demands of governing an Empire, rather than an ever-
expanding city, forced Roman jurists to respond with a total revision of its
laws.74 About 146 B.C., Rome defeated Carthage and Greece.75 While
Rome may have been an enemy and conqueror of Greece, Roman jurists
and philosophers greatly admired the Greek culture. The Romans
embraced Greek Stoicism, particularly those aspects which urged self-
denial, austerity and righteous simplicity; ius naturale, or "natural law,"
and ethics.76 From that point on, all enactments of Roman law would be
weighed against the immutable truths and requirements of natural law. 7
For example, the Roman Senate would look for guidance in the words of
Cicero, the first Stoic, who said of natural law: "There is a true law, a
right reason conformable to justice, diffused, through all hearts,
unchangeable, eternal, which by its commands summons to duty, by its
prohibitions deters from evil. Attempts to amend this law are impious, to
modify it is wrong, to repeal it is impossible.""
An assertion of the overwhelming rectitude of natural law was not
simple "Greco-Roman-Centrism." In this Golden Age of law-making,
Rome had established trade with, or was engaged in warfare against, most
all countries bordering on the Mediterranean. Its trade relations extended
eastward into India and China, as far north as Germany, and southward
into Africa. Roman jurists, praetors, collected laws common to all
nations, incorporated them into the law of nations, ius gentium, and
reasoned that the commonality stemmed from universal rational principles
and universal truths hence "natural law. 9
4. Roman Property Law
In the early years of Rome,' regulation of the exchange and
ownership of property fell to the discretion of the Kings and unwritten
74. Rome (753 B.C.-1453 A.D.) existed initially as a city under Kings, and then as the
Roman Republic. Rome became an Empire with the unification of Italy and Rome under
Augustus (27 B.C.). SHERMAN, supra note 54, at 29, 43, 172.
75. KINDER & HILGEMANN, supra note 63, at 85; see also Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt
Servanda: A Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 405 (1994).
76. SHERMAN, supra note 54, at 58.
77. Id. at 59.
78. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, iii, 23; DE LEGIBUS i, 6, ii, 4; quoted in SHERMAN, supra
note 54, at 59.
79. SHERMAN, supra note 54, at 38-59.
80. Legend has it that Rome was founded in 753 B.C. by twins Romulus and Remus, who
were raised by the she-wolf Aeneas. KINDER & HILGEMANN, supra note 63, at 73.
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customary law. Finding this intolerable, the plebeians demanded a written
set of laws. The Tribune Terentilius Arsa responded to their demands by
dispatching a group of commissioners to Hellenic Greece and charging
them with the mission of studying Greek law. Upon their return, ten
magistrates, the decemvirii ("the ten men"), were appointed to reduce what
they had learned to writing. The result was the laws of the "Twelve
Tables," which were displayed in the Forum (450-449 B.C.). For the first
time, Rome had a written law, some of which dealt specifically with the
ownership and conveyance of property. Roman property law was
borrowed from previous codes and was gradually updated."' Much later,
under Justinian, Roman law would be further refined and codified in such
works as the Institutes of Justinian, the Pandects, and the Corpus Juris
Civilis.2
5. Influence of Roman Law on Western Systems
The Institutes of Justinian became the common source of the
fundamental ideas of Anglo-American legal thought as well as Continental
European jurisprudence. 3 Many of the basic principles underlying the
Anglo-American laws of admiralty, wills, contracts, easements, liens,
mortgages, and adverse possession would all be handed down from Roman
law.8 Roman law would survive the fall of Rome in 1453 A.D.' and find
its way into the legal systems of Europe, North and South America, the
Middle East, and the Far East.M For example, the legal doctrine or saying
that "a man's home is his castle" was of Roman, rather than Angle-Saxon,
origin.87 Blackstone, for instance, followed the structure and content of
Justian's Institutes in his Commentaries. For example, his section on
"property," like that of the Institutes, did not entitle the section as
"property," but as "things." 88  "Things" were property rights, both
corporeal and incorporeal, including patent rights. 9
81. SHERMAN, supra note 54, at 34. Sherman notes that Rome, Founded in 753 B.C.,
borrowed many of its legal concepts from Babylon by way of Egypt and Greece, and therefore
'must not be treated lightly or with disdain."
82. SHERMAN, supra note 54, at 114-25.
83. Id. at 8-9.
84. Id. at 386-405.
85. KINDER & HILGEMANN, supra note 63, at 207.
86. See generally FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 8.
87. THOMAS E. SCRUTTON, THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN LAW ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND (1985).
88. ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW & COMPARATIVE LAW 175 (1991).
89. DALZELL CHALMERS, STUDENT'S GUIDE TO ROMAN LAW 47 (1994).
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Many of the nations of continental Europe either directly adopted
the Roman Civil Code9° (Italy, 1 1th and 12th centuries;9 France, 16th
century; and Germany, 19th century) 92 or some variation of it. 93 Even
England, where the common law and the court systems were well
entrenched, staunchly resisted what was considered to be "foreign" law 94
would eventually engraft many of the natural law principles, including
property concepts, into the common law. Thereafter, when the American
colonies were founded, common law/natural law would follow. 95
6. Roman Law, Natural Law, The United States Constitution and
Property
Natural law eluded the resistance of common law courts to the
direct adoption of civil law through the interpretation and study of the
classics.96 Thus, even though civil law was not adopted directly, many of
its concepts found their way into the English common law indirectly under
the aegis of natural law. For example, King John I was forced to sign the
Magna Carta and thus obey the "ancient law," (i.e. natural law) and to
certify the right of the Barons to resist the abuses of the feudal privileges.
The Magna Carta would become the "Bible of the Constitution. "97 The
influence of natural law over English law would be seen again under the
reign of Edward III, where confirmations of declarations were followed
with the warning that any statute passed in violation of the Magna Carta
was "soit tenuz p'nul" (null and void). 9' Thus, natural law served as a
check against unjust rule under the English system. Natural law, so
intertwined with "common law," became the basis of judicial review of
acts of Parliament. Lord Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas,
recognized the judicial custodianship of the common law/natural law, in
his dictum in Dr. Bonham 's Case:
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the
common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an
90. WATSON, supra note 88, at 1.
91. THE ROMAN LAW READER, supra note 64, at 165.
92. Id. at 168.
93. FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 8, at 49.
94. SHERMAN, supra note 54, at 407.
95. Corwin, supra note 60.
96. Id. at 260.
97. KINDER & HILGEMANN, supra note 63, at 161.
98. Id.
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Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common
law will controul it and adjudge the Act to be void .... 99
The procedural protection of natural rights asserted by Coke was
reinforced by the substantive protections asserted by John Locke. In his
1689 Second Treatise on Government,'0° Locke espoused the natural rights
of the individual of "life, liberty and estate," and provided the theoretical
justification for the division of the powers of state into the legislative and
executive branches.' The ultimate check against tyranny would be the
people's right of revolution."° Locke also asserted that property in nature
was given to man by God, but that man gained ownership of things by
exerting labor and converting nature into something useful. 0 3
Natural law would be carried across the sea to young America,
where the founding fathers used it as a basis for the Declaration of
Independence, the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Some
familiar examples: "[w]e hold these truths to be self evident that all men
are ... endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights ... life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; " " the rights of free speech, to own
and bear arms, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, as
enshrined by the first, second and fourth Amendments to the United States
Constitution; and "[riesistance to tyrants is obedience to God," as
expressed by Benjamin Franklin.
7. Constitutional Consecration of Private Property: Encouragement
of Creativity
Up until the time that the inalienable right to property was
enshrined in the United States Constitution, the concept of a property right
that applied to all classes, and not just aristocrats, had only been
recognized as a moral right through religious institutions, or at the
sufferance of the reigning sovereign. One commentator, Henry Weaver,
99. Corwin, supra note 60, at 262 (citing 8 Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610)).
100. Locke formulated the labor theory in this treatise. To enjoy goods, an individual
must exert labor upon them. This labor "adds value" to the goods. The value added by the
individual bestows property rights upon the laborer. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 208-09 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988).
101. KINDER & HILGEMANN, supra note 63, at 269.
102. Corwin, supra note 60, at 262.
103. See generally LOCKE, supra note 100, at ch. V.
104. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
[Vol. 2:307
1996] Vaughan 329
stated that because of the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment,0 5
for the first time in history, "the right to own property was to be given full
legal recognition and was to be extended to the humblest citizen, without
reference to class distinction, social position, or status of birth. "'06
With property finally being recognized as a fundamental right,
the Founders also moved to provide protection for intellectual property.
Their reason was "to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts." 07 Article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution, also known
as the "intellectual property clause," provides: "The Congress shall have
the power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries. "°0
8. Property
Once enshrined in the Constitution, it remained for the legislature
and the court system to define and enforce property rights. An early
example of the high value the United States placed on property rights was
the case of Wilkinson v. Leland."'9 This 1829 Supreme Court case dealt
with a Rhode Island statute which had the effect of taking something from
one private individual and then giving it to another. The statute was struck
down as an unconstitutional "taking." Attorney for the Defendants in
error, Daniel Webster, spoke:
105. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall .. be deprived of... property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
But what was "property"? The Founders provided guidance in the Fourth Amendment. "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Thus, property in
writings were protected as well. It would have made little sense for the Constitution to protect
'papers" but for the ideas committed to them.
106. HENRY G. WEAVER, THE MAINSPRING OF HUMAN PROGRESS (1947). As late as
1776, no one in the civilized world with the possible exception of a noble, could call even "so
much as a pigeon" his own. Id. A distinction is thus drawn between a moral right and a legally
enforceable right.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have the power . . . to promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." While protection would be
granted American inventors, the United States in its early days, along with many of the Nations
of Europe, had no qualms in "pirating" the inventions of the rest of the developed world. See
generally Dru Brenner-Beck, Do As I Say, Not As I Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 84 (1984).
It was only after the major producers, England and France, forced the issue onto pirating nations
such as Holland, Belgium, and the early United States did the first international protocols, such
as Berne and Paris Conventions, come about protecting intellectual property; much as the United
States is now forcing the issue onto pirating Third World nations.
108. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
109. Corwin, supra note 60 (citing Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829)).
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If at this period there is not a general restraint on
Legislatures in favor of private rights, there is an end to
private property. Though there may be no prohibition in
the Constitution, the Legislature is restrained . . . from
acts subverting the great principles of republican liberty
and of the social compact."'
Also present, but speaking for the Court, was Justice Story. He
stated:
[T]hat government can scarcely be deemed to be free
where the rights of property are left solely upon the will of
a legislative body without any restraint. The fundamental
maxims of a free government seem to require that the
rights of personal liberty and private property should be
held sacred."'
9. Latent "Psychological Baggage"
Whether they are conscious of it or not, Western rightsholders and
negotiators carry with them this natural law mindset, that is, of what is
"right" and "just."1 2  Possibly the individual Western negotiator sitting
across the table from a Southern representative has never heard of
Justinians "savage" who became owner of something by way of his labor,
nor might he have heard of the "Labor-Desert" theory. But it is the rare
Western businessman or Trade Representative who does not share the
belief "this is mine because I made it" or more to the point, "taking
something without paying for it is theft, pure and simple."113
His Southern counterpart, however, raised in a Buddhist,
Confucianist or Islamic society may very well have a very different
concept of what is right and just. Whether the negotiating parties
understand and sympathize with each other's cultural beliefs is one thing;
but if they are unaware of each other's cultural meanings associated with
property rights, it is something else. If that is the case, then the parties are
confronted with a cultural-linguistic gap. If both parties are unaware of
this gap, the possibility of meaningful communication, and agreement are
very slim indeed. The resort to power politics is likely.
110. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 646.
111. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 646.




10. Intellectual Property Same as Property?
Before segueing into an examination of Southern perspective, one
last relevant question must be addressed. Is there any difference between
property rights in a tangible "thing" and in intellectual property? If there
is, the key difference would be an inventor's property rights are not
absolute." 4 Intellectual property rights, whether in the form of a patent,
trademark or copyright, are limited monopolies granted by a government
only for a certain period of time." 5 Allowing the inventor to benefit from
the profits of his creation by recouping his investment costs and to earn
profits for his diligence encourages creativity and encourages the
dissemination of new technology. To allow an inventor, or a buyer of a
patent right, to keep his invention secret indefinitely would defeat the
purpose of dissemination of new processes or technology. For this reason,
patents, trademarks and copyrights will eventually pass into the public
domain. For example, United States patents will expire after a term of
seventeen years, but under the new World Trade Organization agreement,
the term will be twenty years." 6  The Western concept of property
encompasses intellectual property rights, but its term has been limited for
the policy reason mentioned above." 7 Now, to the task of examining the
concept of "property," intellectual or otherwise, from a Southern
perspective.
B. Pirate Nations: The South
1. Being Specific-Identifying Pirates
Which countries in the Third World are pirating Western
technology, what philosophies do they adhere to? Part of the answer is
given to us each year in a statement released by the United States Trade
Representative (USTR). The USTR uses the "Special 301" trade law to
identify and then impose trade sanctions upon those countries which
provide inadequate protection to United States intellectual property.'
114. Mesevage, supra note 20, at 434.
115. See generally Howard I. Forman, Two Hundred Years of English and American
Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law, 1977 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. L. SYMP.
116. PAUL GOLDSTEIN ET AL, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND
PATENT: SELECTED STATUTES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 251 (1994).
117. J. H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and
Risks of a GAT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 775 (1989) (asserting that
intellectual property is a property right just like any other property right, or in a narrow sense,
even a human right).
118. Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 301; 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20; Trade and
Tariff Act of 1974, § 18 (added to the 1974 Trade act by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
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Affected United States industries, such as the International
Intellectual Property Association (IIPA), which represents motion picture,
sound recording, computer software, and publishing industry associations,
and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), submit their findings to the USTR to conduct trade negotiations
with the named countries. If the USTR should find that the intellectual
property rightsholders' grievances have merit, the United States may
impose tariffs or countervailing duties on the infringing countries' imports.
Generally, the USTR's listing" 9  is incremental. "Special
Mention" the lowest level, is for those countries that are still "on the radar
screen" for concerns about their intellectual property protection regimes,
but not to the level where the USTR is ready to impose trade sanctions.
"Watch List" is for more serious infringement. "Priority Watch List;"
and ultimately, "Priority Foreign Country" for the most egregious
offenders, who may also be subject to an "out-of-cycle review."12
2. United States Rightsholder's Accusations
On February 13, 1995, United States rightsholders (the IIPA and
PhRMA) submitted their findings to the USTR as to the countries they
alleged were guilty of intellectual property piracy 2' and asked that, among
others, 2 Indonesia, (Islamic) 123 Singapore, (mixed Buddhist-Christian-
Islamic-Hindi) 24 Turkey, (Islamic)" z and China (Confucianist-Marxist) 26
be named as priority foreign countries. 127  Altogether, the IIPA charged
Act of 1988). Requires the USTR to identify those "Priority Foreign Countries" which "deny
adequate and effective protection to United States intellectual property or deny fair and equitable
market access to United States' persons who rely on such protection". Id.
119. Intellectual Property, supra note 19. Under Special 301, USTR identifies as priority
foreign countries those nations that have the most serious problems in protecting United States'
copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and other intellectual property. The priority watch
list is the second tier of intellectual property offenders, and the watch list is the third tier. A




123. WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 55, at 147.
124. Singapore, although ethnically 76% Chinese, has a diverse religious landscape: 28%
Buddhist, 19% Christian, 18% nonreligious, 16% Islamic, 13% Daoist, 5% Hindi, and 1%
"Other." FEDERAL RESERVE DIVISION LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SINGAPORE: A COUNTRY
STUDY xiii-xiv (Barbara L. LePoer ed., 1991).
125. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC: ATLAS & YEARBOOK 1995, at 275 (48th ed.
1995) [hereinafter 1995 ALMANAC].
126. Id. at 166.
127. Intellectual Property, supra note 19, at D5.
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forty-two countries, plus the former Republics of the Soviet Union, with
causing billions of dollars in losses to copyright-dependent industries in
1994. Of those countries, the IIPA suggested that the USTR list twenty-
four on the priority watch and watch lists. The IIPA representative
stressed that China's trade practices made it a "top priority" and that
Turkey, "of all the countries that have been cited on Special 301 lists since
1989, has done the least to address United States concerns. "128 The IIPA
and PhRMA recommended that Korea, (mixed Buddhist-Confucianist-
Christian) 129 China, and Thailand (Confucianist-Buddhist) 30 be listed on
the USTR's Priority Watch list, along with the Islamic nations of Egypt,
Indonesia, 13 Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
For Watch List recommendations from the Buddhist/Confucianist
countries the rightsholders named; Taiwan (mixed Buddhist-Taoist-
Christian), 3 2 Thailand, and Japan (mixed Shinto-Buddhist-Confucianist) 33
Of the Islamic nations, the IIPA and PhRMA named Bahrain, Pakistan, the
United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia. 34  Fifteen other nations were
nominated to be listed under the "Special Mention" list. Among those
listed were Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam (mixed Buddhist-Taoist-
Christian-Animist-Marxist), 35 Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, and
Qatar (Islamic).
3. The United States Trade Representative's Responses
On April 29, 1995, Ambassador Kantor released his latest Priority
Watch and Watch Lists. Citing "substantial progress" in foreign
governmental responses to American pressure for increased intellectual
property protection, the USTR declined to name any nation as a "Priority
Foreign Country."136 Ambassador Kantor did, however, name eight
128. Id.
129. 1995 ALMANAC, supra note 125, at 217.
130. Marut Bunnag & Preben A.F. Aakesson, The Legal System of Thailand, in MODERN
LEGAL SYSTEMS CLCLOPEDIA 9A.30.8 (1989).
131. WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 55, at 147. Indonesia is 87% Islamic,
10% Christian, 2% Hindu, 1% Confucianist/Buddhist, and 1% tribal religion.
132. 1995 ALMANAC, supra note 125, at 270.
133. WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 55, at 206.
134. Islam is the official religion of Malaysia, even though only 53% of the population
follows that theology. Other Malaysians follow such religions or philosophies as Hinduism,
Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, or Animism. Id. at 302.
135. 1995 ALMANAC, supra note 125, at 290.
136. On April 29, 1995, the USTR released his latest Priority and Watch Lists, citing no
country as a "Priority Foreign Country" due to "substantial progress" around the world in
intellectual property protection, particularly in those countries that had earlier allowed unchecked
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countries who "allow[ed] or even encourag[ed] the unauthorized copying
and sale of United States intellectual property" to the Priority Watch List:
Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Brazil, and Greece; these first five also
being subject to out-of-cycle review.' 7 Three others were also named on
the Priority Watch List: India, Korea and the European Union (the EU
was named due to discriminatory public telecommunications policies, i.e.
the television and movie local-content quotas which it has recently
enacted).'38
Twenty-four other countries were named to the less egregious
"Watch List:" Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, the United Arab
Emirates, China, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela,
Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Italy, Canada, and South
Africa. Furthermore, Argentina, the UAE, Indonesia, and South Africa
were listed as being subject to additional review.139
V. THE SOUTH: COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
Turning South, most of Asia follows Confucian beliefs, 1" while
approximately another one-fifth to one-sixth of the world's population are
adherents of Islam. 4" Thus a sizable majority of the world's inhabitants
come from a background very different than that of the Northern nations.
A. Southern Viewpoints
James Peters, a Western commentator, in his exploration of the
root causes of intellectual property piracy in Singapore takes note of these
different backgrounds:
piracy to run. Ambassador Kantor did name eight countries to the Priority Watch List: Brazil,
Greece, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey; which were subject to out-of-cycle review, as well as
three others: the European Union, India, and Korea. The EU was named to the Priority Watch
List due to European discriminatory public telecommunications policy. Twenty-four other
countries were named to the less egregious "Watch List" Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan,
the United Arab Emirates, China, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela, Poland, Romania, the
Russian Federation, Italy, Canada, and South Africa. Argentina, the UAE, Indonesia, and South
Africa are subject to additional review. Intellectual Property: No Countries Cited as Priority




140. Frank Viviano, When Success is a Family Prize: Why the Children of Asian
Immigrants Become Our Academic Superstars, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 1989, at 7/Z1.
141. Steven D. Jamar, The Protection of Intellectual Property Under Islamic Law, 21 CAP.
U. L. REV. 1079 (1992).
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Several legal theorists have challenged the effectiveness of
imposing Western legal concepts on non-[W]estern
cultures. While concepts of property law are not
universally accepted, the concept of intellectual property is
even further removed from non-Western systems. Writers
from developing countries have been quick to criticize the
imposition of European law on Asian and African peoples.
R. P. Anand, a well-known commentator, argued that
"international law can win the respect of the new states
only if it reflects the attitudes toward law and justice that
correspond with the attitudes held by these countries in
their own cultural backgrounds."' 42
An example of cultural background that Mr. Anand speaks of
comes from Mr. Kyung-Won Kim, the South Korean Ambassador to the
United States during 1986. In this case, the background is Confucian.
Ambassador Kim was referring to a recent round of talks between the
United States and South Korea culminating in the forcing open of the
Korean market to American goods and increased protection for United
States intellectual property in Korea. Ambassador Kim stated:
"[h]istorically, Koreans have not viewed intellectual discoveries or
scientific inventions as the private property of their discoverers or
inventors. New ideas or technologies were "goods" for everybody to
share freely. Cultural esteem rather than material gain was the incentive
for creativity.""'
Other countries in the Far East which have strong Confucian
underpinnings reflect much the same opinion. Ronald Yates, columnist for
the Chicago Tribune, in presenting the idea of intellectual property to
entrepreneurs in such countries as South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore, met with the same response. He said, "in the
Confucian societies of Asia, imitation and reproduction of ideas, art and
scholarship are considered a token of honor and respect. Americans, they
insist, should be flattered."'" Many seemed bewildered as to why
Americans were so obsessed with those who copy technology, art and
ideas. Said one Taiwanese patron of a "video parlor" where pirated
American films were shown, "[i]t seems selfish to me . . . Don't
142. Peters, supra note 38, at 586 n. 179.
143. Kyung-Won Kim, A High Cost to Developing Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1986,
at 2. Apparently the Koreans viewed the talks to be an example of the American use of its
overwhelming economic might to wring concessions from a smaller and weaker trading partner
and greatly resented United States bullying.
144. Yates, supra note 26.
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American movie companies earn enough money already? Why are they so
angry about people who are just trying to earn a living?"" 45
In the Islamic countries, where piracy of Western ideas has been
rampant, the explanation given has been "[t]he prevailing Islamic approach
to copyright has been that there should be no obstruction to the duplication
of original material since the most widespread dissemination of knowledge
is for the good of all."'" Under Islam, this concept of "for the good of
all" or "wealth sharing" is required and is known as zakat (sweetening).
Not to be confused with the voluntary and good-for-the-soul giving of alms
to the poor sadaqah; zakat is a required 2.5% contribution by every
Moslem to the state for distribution to the less fortunate, 47 as every
Believer is enjoined under the Shari'a (the Divine Law) to be his brothers'
keeper. 48 Such are the gists of the cultural arguments. While there are
other arguments, such as those mentioned in the introductory section, they
are beyond the scope of this paper.
VI. PROPERTY AND CONFUCIANISM
A. Intellectual Property Piracy and the Far East
Early in 1995, the United States and the People's Republic of
China (PRC) arrived at the brink of a trade war. The United States was
threatening to impose 100% import duties on more than $1 billion of
Chinese imports. 49 Ambassador Kantor cited as a major reason for the
threatened sanctions, the one billion dollars the United States lost each
year to Chinese intellectual property piracy. As evidence, the USTR
pointed out the fact China had long known about, and allowed to operate,
twenty-nine plants in its Southern provinces which produced seventy-five
million pirated compact discs (CDs) each year. For its part, the Chinese
government threatened countersanctions, refusing to be bullied by the
United States. Eleven days of round-the-clock negotiations later, the PRC
relented, promising to enact and enforce new laws to protect United States
145. Yates, supra note 26, at 1.
146. Simon Buckingham, In Search of Copyright Protection in the Kingdom, 11 MIDDLE
E. EXECUTIVE REP. 5, May 1988, at 11.
147. Ism'il R. AI-Faruqi, Moments of the Religious Life, in THE WAYS OF RELIGION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 139 (1993).
148. KORAN 11:270-273, VIII:73.
149. Kathy Chen, United States, China Resume Negotiations in Effort to Avert a Trade
War, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1995, at All.
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intellectual property. 50 Commentators caution that we may have declared
victory too soon.151
A similar confrontation and agreement in 1991 yielded little in the
way of concrete results. If nothing else, United States' losses to piracy in
China soared.5 2 The United States' problems with intellectual property
piracy do not begin and end with the PRC. Some of the worst offenders
are our major trade partners in the "Tiger" countries of the Pacific Rim. 53
For instance in 1994, the United States Trade Representative placed Japan,
South Korea and Thailand on his "Priority Watch List," as being, among
others, the primary offenders of United States' intellectual property
rights. '54
B. Confucianism as a Cultural Defense
The Oriental reaction to the United States defending its intellectual
property rights has ranged from bewilderment to rage. 115 Writers familiar
with the region pose as a defense the Confucian belief that ideas should be
freely transmitted and are not "property" subject to ownership.1 -6
A good example of Asian reaction is when commentator William
P. Alford lectured on intellectual property in January, 1991, at the
National Taiwan University to an audience of officials, professors,
lawyers, and other experts in, or interested in, intellectual property.15 7
Alford expressed his concerns about American policies asserting
intellectual property rights. He also discussed the actions taken to defend
them against piracy in Far Eastern countries. Alford described the
reaction of his Taiwanese audience to be as "one of enormous anger.
Terms like imperialism, traitor, and the like flew, not at me, but at the
150. Helene Cooper & Kathy Chen, China Averts Trade War with the United States,
Promising a Campaign Against Piracy, WALL ST. J., Feb 27, 1995, at A3.
151. Id.
152. Compare losses cited by the USTR. Craig S. Smith, United States Says China Moves
to Ease Trade Dispute-Bejiing Lists Steps to Guard Intellectual Property, Vows to Fight Pirates,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1995, at A3; Yates, supra note 46, at IC. Yates lists figures of United
States losses to Chinese IP piracy at $135 million in 1984 and $436 million in 1989. Id.
153. Alford, supra note 39, at 99.
154. Intellectual Property: USTR Delays Citing China, India, Argentina Under Special
301 Law, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 18 (May 4, 1994).
155. John C. Lindgren & Craig J. Yudell, Articles Protecting American Intellectual
Property in Japan, 10 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 3 n.2 (1994) (citing Advanced,
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American government and at Chinese citizens involved in representing
foreign intellectual property holders." 58
Is this "cultural defense" a valid one, or merely a smoke screen to
justify the theft of billions of dollars each year of Northern intellectual
property?'5 9  To address this question, this section will first briefly
examine what Confucianism is, against a historical backdrop, and then go
on to examine property rights, and intellectual property rights, in China
and other countries whose culture has been greatly influenced by
Confucianism.
C. A Brief Exploration of Confucianism
Confucius is the latinized honorific Kung Fu-tsu (Master K'ung),
referring to the philosopher K'ung Ch'iu.'" Confucius was born in the Lu
nation-state and eventually wrote The Analects (Lyiin-yuu) in which he
propounded a belief system that stressed it was man's nature to be moral.
Confucius' concept of Heaven (T'ien) was not so much a God-figure (Ti-
Tien) who had an identity and will, but rather, existed in a naturalistic
sense. '6 Tseng Tzu, a pupil of Confucius, summed up his master's
teachings: "[t]he Way of our Master is none other than conscientiousness
(chung) and forgiveness or altruism (shu). " 62 This was further extended
by the concepts of "human-heartedness" (Jen), "righteousness" (yi) and
"filial piety" (Hsiao).63 Confucius also professed the belief that society
should be guided by the Rules of Propriety (li). The i was roughly
analogous to the Western concept of natural law.'
Unlike the Western concept of natural law, however,
Confucianism embraced the "five cardinal relationships," a hierarchical
order where each accepted his place in society and strove to maintain
peace and harmony. The five relationships were between ruler and
subject; father and son; husband and wife; elder and younger brother; and
older and younger friend. Zhongshu Dong elaborated on these
relationships. "The Three Cardinal Guides: . . . Ruler guides subject,
158. Alford, supra note 39, at 160.
159. Yates, supra note 26, at B1.
160. William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? Implications of Roberto Unger's
Uses and Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEX. L. REV., 915, 938 n.183 (1986).
161. HYUNG I. KIM, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE WEST: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 30 (1981).
162. Id. at 30.
163. Id. at 31.
164. Id. at 57.
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father guides son, and husband rules wife." 65 This hierarchy would
remain central to Chinese thinking for the next 2,000 years and served to
justify and embed authoritarianism from the family clan level up to the
Emperor himself. 1
66
One attained one's rank in life by way of destiny. Thus, one's
rank, or lack thereof, had been ordained, and was therefore natural and
moral. Natural law, or the natural order of things was known as the
Mandate of Heaven (T'ien Ming), and Ming itself translated as "fate,"
"destiny," or "mandate," which is akin to fate, as in the Arabic expression
"Imshallah" ("if Allah wills it so"). Indeed, the Emperor ruled under the
Mandate of Heaven, that is to say, the Emperor ruled because he was
virtuous and therefore, it was his destiny to rule. Conversely, should the
Emperor become a tyrant, he goes against li; then he would lose heaven's
Mandate and his overthrow would be just.'67 The Imperial intent, and the
end result, was the stability of the empire, ensured by this hierarchical
structure. In a circular fashion, authority was justified because it existed.
And because it existed, it was good. To rebel against authority, whether
against one's parents or elders, a violation of filial piety, or against the
Emperor, was to go against the natural order of things. Creation of
disharmony could have severe, even fatal, consequences for the
wrongdoer.
D. Integration and Coexistence with Taoism, (Zen) Buddhism and
Shinto
Over time, other beliefs, such as the Tao (the "way") and
Buddhism would become incorporated into Chinese philosophy. 68 The
Tao propounded the passivity principles of wu-wei (the art of standing
aside) as exemplified in the martial art of Tai-chi, also tzu-jan, or
spontaneity, and hsiang sheng, or seeing the complimentary nature of
supposed opposites, for example, good and evil, male and female, yin and
yang. Taoism and Confucianism were viewed as complimentary doctrines;
Taoism stressing solitude and freedom, while Confucianism stressed
responsibility and ceremony. The gap was bridged by the Book of
165. Liwei Wang, Symposium-Doing Business in China, The Chinese Traditions Inimical
to the Patent Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 15, 48 (1993).
166. Id. at 941 n.205. See also Dan Fenno Henderson, Promulgation of the Tokugawa
Statutes in TRADITIONAL AND MODERN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA 23 (David C.
Buxbaum ed. 1967).
167. KIM, supra note 161, at 60.
168. Douglas Todd, Taoism-Accepting Life's Flow in a Hyper World, VANCOUVER SUN,
Dec. 11, 1991, at D15.
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Changes.' 69  It is said that the Chinese are socially Confucian, but
individually Taoist. Later, another school of thought taking a different
tack, one towards strict interpretation of Positive law (Fa) would become
popular. Proponents of this school were known as the Legalists.
Buddhism would reach China, and thereafter the greater part of
Asia, by way of India. Half a millennium before Christ, Gautama, the
prince of the royal Sakya clan, properly known as "Sakya-muni:" or the
"silent sage" (muni) of the Sakyas. Gautama Sakyamuni left his palace
and family at the age of twenty-nine, and became a wandering mendicant
in search for the Truth. After a period of intense meditation, he received
Enlightenment and became Buddha. His ideology held that Man, as an
ignorant child, is enveloped in the "flames" of his wants, needs and
desires. Through meditation and spiritual learning via an endless cycle of
rebirths (reincarnation), the fire is extinguished (Nirvana) and one
becomes Buddha, one is Awake and no longer consumed by need. Once
Buddhahood is achieved, the need for further learning through
reincarnation is extinguished, and the Buddha moves on to a higher Plane
of existence.Buddha developed the "Four Noble Truths:" 70 (1) suffering is
universal (man is innately spiritually unhealthy); (2) suffering is caused by
desire (trsna); (3) to eliminate desire is to eliminate suffering; and (4) the
Path to Nirvana (end of rebirths) is by the "Eight-fold Path." 17' This
Eight-fold Path contained its own list, that of: Right View, Right
Aspiration, Right Speech, Right Conduct, Right Means of Livelihood,
Right Endeavor, Right Mindfulness, and Right Contemplation.
72
Buddha's path is called the "middle way" because it avoids extremes.
Buddha's teachings are based on love, compassion and service to others.
73
One should worship the six cardinal directions, points of the compass plus
zenith and nadir, and one's parents, one does this through obedience and
performing ones' duty to them. Buddha also taught codes of conduct for
husbands, wives, children, employers and kings, rejected violence in any
169. AL-FARUQI, supra note 147, at 222.
170. Heinrich Zimmer, Buddhahood, in THE WAYS OF RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 65 (1993).
171. GARY A. MATHER & LARRY A. NICHOLS, DICTIONARY OF CULTS, SECTS,
RELIGIONS AND THE OCCULT 47 (1993).
172. Zimmer, supra note 170, at 67.
173. Walpola Rahula, Buddhism as a Way of Life, in THE WAYS OF RELIGION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 99-100(1993).
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form and taught that crime could be eliminated by improving the economic
condition of the people.'74
King Ashoka made Buddhism the state religion of India in the third
century B.C., but this gradually faded through splits into rival factions and
hostile Brahmins. Around the birth of Christ, a major split gave rise to
two major kinds of Buddhism: Hinayana (Little Vehicle) or Southern
Buddhism, more individualistic and followed in Ceylon and Southern Asia;
and Mahayana (Great Vehicle) which more closely followed the original
teachings of Buddha. Mahayana was more social, polytheistic and
followed in Himalayas, Tibet, Mongolia, China, Korea, and Japan. 75
Another form of Buddhism is Zen Buddhism. Followed in Japan,
it relies on no God or Deities. It is indifferent to meditation. What, then,
is Zen? When asked by their pupils what Zen was, ancient masters have
answered in different ways. One master illustrated the concept by lifting
one of his fingers. Another kicked a ball and third enlightened his pupil
by slapping his face.'76 Zen is said to be the taking of a different point of
view at life (satori). It dwells in the concrete here and now. It is the
opening of one's spiritual eye in order to look at the very reason of
existence. It is the disciplining of ones' own mind through insight into its
proper nature. Westerners may be familiar with the expression, "the
sound of a single hand clapping." This is an example of a koan, or "mind-
snapping" problem given by masters to their pupils as basis of their
meditations. "
Shinto is yet another spiritual practice. "Spiritual practice" is so
named because it has no spiritual founder (i.e. no Jesus, Mohammed, or
Buddha). Shinto is a collective noun, embracing all faiths, and is the
seeking of alignment and harmony with the Way or Spirit of Things
(kami). Shinto has been a way of thinking and a way of life in Japan for
more than two millennia. 78 Shinto was originally the worship of spirits of
nature, family and imperial ancestors. The Occupational Forces abolished
Shinto as the state religion after World War II. 17
174. Id. at 102.
175. 1995 ALMANAC, supra note 125, at 417.
176. D.T. Suzuki, The Essence of Zen, in THE WAYS OF RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 121(1993).
177. YUN-MEN, Zen Buddhism: The Sound of One Hand Clapping, in THE WAYS OF
RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 113-114(1993).
178. Sokyo Ono, The Kami and Mythology, in THE WAYS OF RELIGION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 245(1993).
179. WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 55, at 206.
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Shinto, Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism can and do coexist
with one another. Certainly in Japan, the beliefs run side-by-side:
Confucianism deals with political organization, ethical precepts and a
rational view of the universe.'8' Buddhism is concerned with the relation
of the individual soul to the limitless cosmos and the afterlife, whereas
Shinto dwells on adapting to life in this world and the harmonious merging
of man with his environment.
These belief systems exist in many variations throughout Asia and
have become ingrained into the Oriental way of thinking, but
Confucianism appears to be the common denominator among non-Islamic
Asian countries."8' These religions or philosophies eschew the individual
accumulation of wealth and avariciousness, stress in their stead the
elimination of want of material things, and when thinking of property, to
do so for the benefit of the family, clan, or society at large.
E. Confucianism, Technology, and Profit
Another aspect of the Confucianist belief was a low regard for
profit, and thus personal, as opposed to communal, property.8 2 Confucius
expressed his low regard for profit in his Analects: "The noble-minded
man comprehends righteousness, the low-minded man comprehends
profit." These two tenets of belief stood out in stark contrast to the
individualist, competitive, advantage seeking concepts characterizing
Western civilization. These beliefs did not prevent technical innovation,
but they did not encourage them either. The magnet, gunpowder, and
paper were Oriental discoveries, yet it was the Westerners, after having
the discoveries introduced by the likes of Marco Polo, that exploited them
to their greater potential; which might have been early examples of piracy
but there is no mention as to whether these discoveries were patented at
the time. Indeed, Taoists believed too many devices would lead to laxity
and corruption of character"' and the Ruling classes termed science and
technology as "bizarre craft and cunning work" (qiji yinao).I14 Moreover,
180. Edwin 0. Reischauer, Shinto and Japan: An Overview, in THE WAYS OF RELIGION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 241-243(1993).
181. Yates, supra note 26, at Bus. 1. Yates did a survey of the Far East and intellectual
property piracy and stated that, "[o]thers say Americans and Europeans are ignoring fundamental
differences in attitudes toward intellectual property in Asia that are rooted in ancient Confucianist
beliefs. In the East, imitation is considered a sign of respect rather than a way to steal value."
Id.
182. KIM, supra note 161, at 90.
183. Wang, supra note 165, at 29.
184. Id. at 31.
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the Imperial bureaucracy wielded Confucianism as a tool of control. It
operated essentially as a state religion serving those in authority. It
operated against mobility, independent thinking, and the dissemination of
new knowledge. So it was for 2,000 years. While the Western nations
were busy becoming unstable and seeking technological advances over one
another, the Chinese dynasties were seeking to ensure all those in the
Middle Kingdom were kept in their place. Currently, there has been a
phenomenal rise in economic and technical development of the Pacific Rim
nations over the past twenty years. It would be inaccurate to state that
Confucianism and technology cannot coexist, or that Confucianism, in and
of itself, has served to hold back technological development."
F. Property Under Confucianism
All property belonged to the Emperor, much as in the same sense
all property in Western nations was subject to a claim of eminent domain
by the ruling Sovereign. Aside from the Emperor's claim, land and
property were held by the father/patriarch to manage, but often he could
only convey the land after consultation and acceptance by his sons, or
sons, and wife, or wives." 6 There was no primogeniture system"7 and
property was often held solely in the father's name, with no interest held
by sons, wives, or daughters while he lived.' Differences on claims to
land were to be resolved by mediation within the Clan or family unit, or if
between clans, by a neutral and learned man of unimpeachable character.
Litigation was strongly discouraged, as it brought disgrace upon
both parties, since it indicated to all that the parties could not keep
harmony amongst themselves. Moreover, it gave rise to the very real
possibilities that it would lead to embarrassment and questioning of the
patriarch's authority. Criminal and civil cases were termed "important
cases" and "trifling matters" respectively, with disputes over land and
property considered to be trifling.8 9  Thus, while there were property
rights in ancient Confucian China, they did markedly differ from the
185. David J. Thorpe, Some Practical Points About Starting a Business in Singapore, 27
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1039 (1994). Thorpe discusses the meteoric development of authoritarian-
governed Singapore and how a rise in the sophistication and education of the populace may
require a loosening of the governments tight grip on the reigns of power.
186. KIM, supra note 161, at 103.
187. Wang, supra note 165, at 32.
188. KIM, supra note 161, at 104.
189. Shuzo Shiga, Some Remarks on the Judicial System in China: Historical Development
and Characteristics, in TRADITIONAL AND MODERN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA
47 (David C. Buxbuam ed. 1967).
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concept of individually held and owned property that arose in nations
influenced by Roman law and the common law. Land and property were
held jointly and for the benefit of the family unit.
G. Intellectual Property
Confucius wrote in his Analects, "I have transmitted what was
taught to me without making up anything of my own. I have been faithful
to and loved the Ancients. " 19° The concept that ideas belonged to the
individual from whom they sprang, and that one should pay for their use
was alien to the official Confucian belief, especially considering that
system's emphasis on filiality and avoiding profit-seeking. However, just
because Confucian beliefs taught seeking profit was wrong and ideas were
not property, does not mean that the reality on the ground was a mirror-
reflection of such a belief. There was property in ideas in ancient Chinese
society; in practice, if not in written thought.
There is, for example, the story of the Taoist philosopher Lao Tse,
who lived sometime around 602 B.C.. Lao Tse was on his was way West
to India, or the "glorious Buddhist paradise of Sukhavati" when he was
stopped by a Chinese border official. The border official would not let
him leave the kingdom without an export license for his possessions. As a
court librarian, Lao Tse explained, he carried nothing with him, save for
his knowledge. The border official persisted. He would have to "leave
his wisdom" in China before departing. In order to leave, Lao Tse spent
the next three days writing the very succinct Tao te King, eventually a
very influential work of the Taoist belief. 91 Thus, in a round-about sort of
way, we find the concept, even in ancient China, that ideas were
considered property. And of property, it was said by Mencius, who was
one of Confucius' most notable disciples, "taking things to which one has
no right is contrary to justice."' 92 These examples illustrate a basic
understanding of intellectual property akin to that found in the West.
Pure knowledge, set to paper, such as the Tao te King, might be
considered analogous to something protected by the modem day copyright.
Trademarks, after a fashion, also existed in ancient China. Manufacturers
of sewing needles or silk would attempt to set their wares apart from
190. William P. Alford, Don't Stop Thinking About ... Yesterday: Why There Was No
Indigenous Counterpart To Intellectual Property Law in Imperial China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3
(1993) (citing Book VII, Chap. 1, Analects of Confucius).
191. Frederic Spiegelberg, The Old Master and His Book, in THE WAYS OF RELIGION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 202 (1993).
192. Menicus, Selections: The Book of Mencius, in THE WAYS OF RELIGION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 172 (trans. W.A.C.H. Dobson) (1983)
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others by distinctive trademarks and would petition the government for
protection against others who infringed. 93
But commerce and the dissemination of new ideas were not high
on the list of priorities on the Imperial agenda. Maintaining the state
monopoly on power, however, was at the top. Intellectual property
protection existed more for that purpose than for the uses traditionally
thought of in the West. For example, the Imperial Seal of the five-clawed
dragon was strictly protected against use by others. 94 The Empire also
forbade the unauthorized reproduction and dissemination of scientific and
astronomical writings, but this was more in the spirit of "state secrets,"
with an eye toward keeping knowledge, and thus power, centrally
controlled.' 95 Thus, a comparison to the contemporary patent would be
inappropriate. Other writings, such as poetry, were protected in an effort
to maintain quality and accuracy of reproduction. 96
Why should we have to resort to such a circuitous method of
finding property in ideas in ancient China? A good reason is that a
concept as avaricious as individual property rights might not serve the best
interests of the Emperor or the Imperial bureaucracy, and thus would not
get much press. If individuals could own property, that would challenge
the Emperor's otherwise exclusive claim to property in the kingdom. This
would not do. The emphasis in Confucian China, once again, was
maintenance of the status quo, meaning power and property, and on
"saving face." The Emperor and the bureaucracy used Confucianism
because it was ideally suited to this end. As long as all property belonged
to the Empire and its power could not be challenged under the Five
Truths, the Emperor's supremacy remained secure.
Therefore, what actually survived in officially sanctioned writings
was highly idealistic, and reflected a striving for a perfect world, not
reflective of reality. 9 Under an ideology where sharing for the common
good was the ideal, the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few, in
the form of opulent palaces, while the vast majority of the peasantry were
193. Id. at 172 n.57.
194. Id.
195. Wang, supra note 165, at 48 n.36. Most of the illegal copying was done by the local
officials, the ones who were originally charged with enforcing the Emperor's decrees. China still
has difficulty enforcing its laws, particularly in its far-flung outer provinces. See also Uli
Schmetzer, Bottom Line Overrides Party Line in China: Economic Boom Takes Precedence Over
Law, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 1995, at News 8.
196. Wang, supra note 165, at 48 n.61.
197. Wang He, The Danger of Too Much Abstraction in Debate on Traditional Culture:
Proceed from Reality in Studying the Role of Traditional Culture, Bur. Internal Affairs, Sep. 3,
1986, at China II; Part 3 The Far East FEI83541BII/1.
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dirt poor, made for an obvious, and embarrassing contradiction. It would
be best for the powers that be if writings of such things were strictly
controlled, lest free discussion of these disparities would give rise to
dissatisfaction and instability.
Toward this end, the Emperor understood that whoever controlled
the past could control the present. This required a state monopoly on
historical writings. The Empire was careful to "control" the past in order
to justify its actions. Chinese historians who engaged in unauthorized
research were subject to castration and imprisonment.'98 Others, reckless
enough to refer to the past to criticize the present, were subject to the
death penalty, along with all the members of their families.' Such
measures had a tendency to chill free speech. Nevertheless, piracy of
official writings, such as poetry and scientific works, was widespread.
Imperial attempts to suppress it were not very successful, even though
backed by threats of severe beating and exile.2'
H. Case Study: Intellectual Property Piracy - Made in Japan
Fast forwarding to the 1990's, we find much of Asia is heavily
influenced by the Confucian principles discussed above. Asia has also
been the scene of a tremendous shift of technology and wealth from West
to East.2"' Of the countries in the Pacific, Japan has garnered the lion's
share of this wealth. It has accomplished this while in the course of
converting itself from a country devastated by allied bombing during
World War II into an industrial giant. Japanese thinking is Confucian. 22
Clearly, the presence of Confucianist underpinnings have not interfered
with its assimilation of technology or the accumulation of wealth. If
Confucian principles have not interfered with Japan's phenomenal growth,
have they in fact, contributed to it? The answer is yes. The Confucianist
concept of freely copying the ideas of others has been key to its new-found
prosperity.
The example of Japanese piracy that follows explains in a
microcosm, how: (1) Western assumptions may not always be correct; (2)
how Confucianism contributes to the mind-set that, what the West calls
"piracy" is, in Asian eyes, merely a benign form of technology transfer;
198. Alford, supra note 190, at 103.
199. Id. at 106.
200. Alford, supra note 190, at 3-5.
201. Engardio, supra note 32, at 100.
202. Reischauer, supra note 180.
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and (3) how the strong desire for technical and economic advancement is a
potent incentive for piracy of Western intellectual property.
The Western assumption is that the intellectual property debate is
mostly North-South: but who defines "South?" In seeing Japan as a
major technology-exporting center, Americans and Europeans might
assume that Japan defines itself as a Northern nation. This assumption is
challenged by Daniel Garner's observation that "[d]espite its position as a
leading world economic power, Japan continues to see itself as a poor,
developing country," often aligning itself with Third World nations in the
intellectual property debate. 203
I. The Kilby Patent
The case of the Kilby patent is prime example of this copying of
Western technology. This was an almost thirty year battle for a patent
application in Japan for the United States invented "IC chip." Jack St.
Clair Kilby invented the integrated circuit (IC), the tiny device at the heart
of computers, calculators and most every piece of electronics since the
1960's, while working for Texas Instruments in the late 1950's.20
4
As background, one should note the United States Patent Office
will normally approve or disapprove an application for patent within
eighteen months. In contrast, it takes the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) an
average of five to seven years. Also, the JPO requires "full disclosure" of
the technology submitted in the application. This creates a five to seven
year window during which time other industries may copy, sell, and
improve on the design or process submitted for patent protection. Shoji
Tada, a JPO official, has admitted that the requirement was used to allow
Japanese companies to copy American intellectual property and thus to
"avoid the waste of time in coming up with the same ideas. "'
Kilby submitted his application for patent of the IC chip to the JPO
in 1960. Approval was thirty years in coming, during which time the
Japanese semiconductor industry copied and sold many IC chip products,
earning billions of dollars in profit from sales to America and to the rest of
the world. To add insult to injury, the JPO's approval for Kilby's patent
almost never came. Twelve major Japanese semiconductor producers filed
oppositions to the United States' application and the JPO once asserted that
203. Daniel Garner, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round, 3 INT'L LEGAL PERSP.
51 n.122 (1990).
204. Warshofsky, supra note 12, at 112.
205. Lindgren & Yundell, supra note 155, at 1 n.3 (citing Sunday Present: The
Intellectual Property War-Last Trap by the Americans (Japanese television broadcast, July 5,
1992)).
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the patent had expired while it was still within the approval process. In the
ensuing court battle, nineteen Japanese and Korean respondents were
accused of importing products that infringed on ten United States' patents.
Kilby eventually prevailed. Since that time, estimates of royalties from
Japan from that patent alone have been estimated to be worth $800 million
a year.'
Since the Kilby episode, American corporations have responded
with a more aggressive stance in filing patents and defending their
intellectual property rights in Far Eastern courts. As to the Japanese
response;20 7 Sony Corporation's chairman, Akio Morita, stated the reason
for all the suits by American firms against Japanese Corporations was "the
Americans are finally realizing just how good the Japanese products are,
and they are becoming frightened ... [and that] [t]he United States has
been using intellectual property rights as a means, not necessarily to beat
Japan, but to protect the United States' economy from the Japanese
economy. "208 To the average American, this would seem to be an example
of unmitigated gall, however, Japanese media reflect a real breakdown in
communication. The Tokyo Trigger published an article in 1992,
Advanced, Developing Countries Battling Over Patents, which stated that
"[t]he basic opinion of the United States was that anything... born out of
the intelligent activities of human beings is to be protected. This was
something that was impossible to understand for Japanese people, who are
permitted to 'borrow upon others' cleverness in all matters."2' This mind
set, asserts Robert Merges of the Boston University School of Law, is
reflected in the differences in the American and Japanese patent systems.
The Japanese patent laws severely limit what the inventor can claim as
exclusively his. Instead it. encourages "cooperative behavior" by
permitting others to copy more than they would be able to under American
patent law. 10
This example shows that, to a degree, there is a cultural disconnect
as to what is acceptable business practice. What is one man's theft is
206. Id. at 7.
207. Id. at 3 n.3.
208. Id.
209. Lindgren & Yundell, supra note 155, at 3 n.2.
210. Robert P. Merges, Battle of Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 239, 242 (1990). The Japanese patent system has been said to limit the scope of
exclusive rights which can be obtained, and thus encourages minimal claiming, licensing, and
other "cooperative" behaviors. There is some truth to this claim. If correct, it marks a stark
contrast with the more individualistic, pioneer-oriented United States system. To that extent, the
patent systems reflect deep seated cultural differences.
348 [Vol. 2:307
Vaughan
another's benign transfer of technology. It also shows, in dollar terms, of
what is at stake. But there is more to the equation than mere culture.
J. What Goes Around...
While culture may interfere with the communication process, self-
interest has a capability of penetrating a cloud of cultural static. Japan and
Taiwan, longtime leaders in piracy practices, are feeling the bite of illegal
copying themselves and are now becoming true believers of intellectual
property rights. First case in point, Yoshida Kogyo KK, maker of YKK
zippers and the world's largest manufacturer of clothing fasteners, found
Korean pirates were copying their distinctive "YKK" trademark. The
Japanese rightsholders lost a protracted six-year court battle against the
copiers. Since that time the Japanese Ministry of Finance has organized
the "Customs Information Center," a watchdog unit to monitor illicit
copying and trade practices and clearinghouse for information and legal
advice; all in an effort to combat intellectual property piracy. 21' Also,
United States' pressure has led to reforms of the JPO, including the
harmonization of Japanese patent laws to those of Europe and the United
States, discouraging the practice of "cluster filing," whereby Japanese
corporations "surround" and immobilize a United States invention by
filing scores of minor changes to the original22 and by accepting patent
applications in English.
A second case in point concerns the Taiwanese Chung Hwa Book
Company. Chung Hwa actually obtained a license to sell a ten volume set
of a Chinese-language version of the Encyclopedia Britannica. Before
Chung Hwa could issue its first set, the Tan Ching Book Company had a
lower-priced pirate copy on the market. The ensuing court action had little
apparent effect on the piraters.21 4 Now Taiwan has the Government
Information Office, whose task is to crack down on video and motion
picture pirates. Says its deputy director general, Liao Ching-kao,
"respecting intellectual property is not only for the benefit of foreigners..
. respect for [intellectual property rights] benefits our own creations and
businesses as well. ,215
Although the total figures of United States' losses to Asian piracy
remain high, improvement in intellectual property protection in the Far
211. Yates, supra note 26, at Bus.1.
212. Warshofsky, supra note 12, at 28.
213. Protection of Intellectual Property: Japan, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT:
INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD, Aug. 1, 1994, at 4.02.
214. Hoffman & Marcou, supra note 25, at C03.
215. Id.
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East has been dramatic." 6 Yates' survey of the region found that, overall,
United States pressure has created a grudging, yet steady improvement in
the enactment and enforcement of intellectual property laws by the
governments of East Asian nations were piracy was rampant.
VII. PROPERTY AND ISLAM
A. A Brief Exploration of the Islamic Religion
Approximately one-fifth to one-sixth of the world's population in
countries ranging from the Middle East, Africa, West Asia to Indonesia,
live under Islam.2"7 Many of these same nations have been placed on the
USTR's Priority Watch List and Watch Lists.2"' Generally, the practices
complained about range from a foreign national government's failure to
enact or enforce antipiracy laws; to actively requiring Northern patent
holders to give up their intellectual property rights ("compulsory
licensing" and the like);21 9 to actual threats of physical violence against
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) personnel.22
Is there any correlation between the high occurrence of intellectual
property piracy in those nations and the culture surrounding the Islamic
belief system regarding property?
It may be helpful to first orient the reader by briefly exploring a
history of the Middle East and the religion of Islam itself. Secondly, to
examine the Islamic concept of "property." Third, to inquire as to
whether the Islamic concepts of property differ substantially from those of
the Anglo-American concept. And finally, to examine whether there are
aspects of Islamic beliefs that would preclude the protection of Northern
intellectual property.
216. Yates, supra note 26, at Bus.1.
217. Jamar, supra note 141, at 1079.
218. USTR Announcement on Foreign Government Procurement (Title VII) and Intellectual
Property Protection (Special 301), Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 18, at d91 (May 3, 1995).
219. Compulsory licensing refers to requirements that the producer of a product allow a
local manufacturer to produce that good. General Developments, Intellectual Property: China,
Turkey, India, Brazil Faulted for Intellectual Property Inaction, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 7, at d3
(Feb. 15, 1995).
220. IIPA Submission to United States Trade Representative on "Priority Foreign
Countries, " 4 World Intellect. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 84-88 (1990). See also USTR: Watch List 3:
United Arab Emirates Remains on Watch, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Dec. 2, 1994.
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B. Islam in a Nutshell
The United States expressly separates church and state22 and the
nations of Europe likewise have secular legal systems. Islamic countries
have generally not split the functions of church and state. Islam is at once
a religion, a political system, and a philosophy used to organize a society
in accordance to a divine purpose. 22 It is not a state religion, per se, as
the existence of the state is secondary. 223 By and large the belief of Islam
revolves around the individual, and the individual's duty is to Allah and to
his fellow man. 2  The Western concept of state sovereignty conflicts with
these duties, therefore, the concept of the state is different in Moslem
countries. For instance, the State is just as much subject to Shari'a
(literally "the path to water"), or the Divine Islamic law, as the most
humble believer is' and it does not enjoy any special immunity.
C. Sources of Islamic Law
Islamic law is bifurcated into Shari'a and Non-Shari 'a.226 Shari'a,
or the Divine Islamic law, is further subdivided into codified and
uncodified law. Much like Western systems of law, Islamic law follows a
logical hierarchy. The first and most authoritative source of law is the
written word of the Koran (the Islamic holy scriptures). Next, in order of
authority is the Sunna, or the words, sayings (hadith) or actions of the
prophet Mohammed. Third is ijma, or consensus on a point of law by
those authorized to interpret the Koran or the hadith of the Sunna. Only
when there is nothing directly on point in the foregoing sources of Islamic
law, may qiyas, or strict analogical reasoning be resorted to. Qiyas is not
resorted to lightly. A point of departure must first be established from the
Koran, Sunna or Ijma, and the extended rule applied to the facts in a
narrow fashion.
221. U.S. CONST. amend. I
222. 85 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW (Majid Khadduri et al. eds., reprint
1984).
223. M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., Panel Discussion at the American Society of International
Law, in Islamic Law, A Survey of Islamic International Law Contracts and Litigation in Islamic
Law, 76 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 55, 59 (1982).
224. Id, at 60.
225. HANS WEHR, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC 544-45 (4th ed. 1979).
See also MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 100.5 (Kenneth R. Redden ed. 1984). Islamic
law, as communicated by God through his prophet, Mohammed, was not a mere collection of
metaphysical abstractions, but was transmitted in a context embodying a philosophy for
organizing an entire society with a divine purpose. Id.
226. Jamar, supra note 141, at 1.
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When all other sources of law fail to give a clear resolution to a
problem that has not been dealt with before, Islamic judges and scholars
attempt to resolve it in the manner Mohammed would have resolved it.227
This method is called "ijtihad" ("the struggle for understanding").
Sometime around the fifteenth century (or before) Islamic law was
"frozen." 8  This "freezing" of independent reasoning is commonly
known as "the closing of the gate of ijtihad."' Thus, the interpretation of
Islamic law is essentially locked into the world view that existed between
the tenth to fifteenth centuries A.D." ° Since that time, taqlid, or the
"submissive acceptance of an earlier interpretation," has been more the
rule than the exception. To some observers, this inflexibility, and its
effect on individual property rights, has been a root cause of "tyranny and
stagnation" in Islamic societies.Y' This important aspect will be revisited
in greater detail below.
Whatever the school, there is almost universal agreement that
interpretation of the Koran or Hadith (Tradition) is reserved to mujtahids,
or those Muslim men whose intellect and integrity have been recognized as
being worthy by the religious and legal scholars who have preceded them.
A layman's attempt to use the Koran or Tradition to advocate a position,
therefore, has always been met by condemnation.12 The second source of
Islamic law is non-Shari'a, or those aspects upon which the Koran and
other sources of Sharia law are silent. As long as the nonshari'a does not
conflict with Shari'a law, adoption of new law is permittedY 3
D. Variations within Islam
Islamic law is far from monolithic. Within the first 200 years after
Islam came into existence, four major schools of interpretation developed:
the Hanafi (also known as the Kufa or Iraqi school), the oldest of the
schools, with the greatest number of adherents worldwide, who are located
for the most part in Turkey, India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; the Maliki,
227. In this last area, the schools are in disagreement as to whether such decision-making
is open to laymen, or reserved only to judges and scholars, or even completely foreclosed. David
A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate Expressions of
World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819 n. 170 (1993).
228. Tom Bethell, The Mother of All Rights, REASON, Apr. 1994, at 45.
229. Id.
230. Sohrab Behdad, Property Rights in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Critical
Perspective, 47 REV. Soc. ECON., 185, 208 (1989).
231. Bethell, supra note 228, at41.
232. Behdad, supra note 230, at 207.
233. Jamar, supra note 141, at 1082.
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(or Medina) located mostly in North Africa and the Magreb; the Shafii, in
South India, Southeast Asia, East Africa and along the Arabian coastline;
and the Hanbali, the most traditional of the schools, whose followers are
found primarily in Saudi Arabia. 34
E. Foreign Influences on Islam - A Historical Perspective
Like most bodies of law, Islam has been influenced by its contact
with other belief systems such as Roman law.2 5 Indeed, one scholar goes
so far as to assert "the best part of Islamic law is but a republication of
Justinian Roman law, adapted for Moslems and clothed in an Arabic
dress." 236 Other contributors have been; Judeo-Christian traditions,237 the
civil codes of Turkish,"8 German, Swiss, 9 and French' ° origin, as well
as the English common law.24' To one familiar with the history of Islamic
nations, the concept of foreign influence is an old one. Islamic nations
have been the both the invader and the invaded. Thus, Islam has spread its
influence to other nations and has itself been influenced by them.
The Moors held Southern Spain for 400 years until driven out by
"El Cid" and the Turks were fought back from the gates of Vienna
234. Bassiouni et al., supra note 223, at 69-70.
235. Joseph L. Brand, Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law and Practice, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1986).
Many of [the Saudi Arabia's] substantive laws and procedural aspects are similar to,
and were received from, other legal systems. It is in the differences of shari'a law, the
law's religious origins, its role as protector of the Islamic faith and guide to daily
social life, and its historical aversion to contemporary reinterpretation, and in Western
lawyers' ignorance of these differences, that misunderstandings arise.
Id. at 2.
236. SHERMAN, supra note 54, at 178.
237. Saba Habachy, Property, Right and Contract in Muslim Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
450, 453 n.10 (1962); see also MOHAMMEDIANISM: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY 88, 89 (2d ed.
1953).
238. HAIM GERBER, STATE, SOCIETY AND LAW IN ISLAM: OTrOMAN LAW IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 15 (1994).
239. Bassiouni et al., supra note 223, at 62. "[I]n Saudi Arabia the applicable commercial
code was borrowed from the Turkish code, which in turn was borrowed from the German
commercial code, unlike most of the other Turkish codes which were borrowed from the Swiss
codes." Id.
240. Jamar, supra note 141, at 1095 n.93. "[Tihe Egyptian Copyright Statute is modeled
on French law and is consequently very different in its particulars, and in some of its basic forms
of protection, from United States law." Id.
241. Hani Sarie-Eldin, Operation of FIDIC Civil Engineering Conditions in Egypt and
Other Arab Middle Eastern Countries, 28 INT'L L. 951, 952 (1994).
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twice.242  In turn, Islamic nations have themselves been invaded.
Alexander the Great and his legions would reach as far east as India. The
Romans would burn Carthage and rule Northern Africa and Egypt for a
time. Crusaders would storm eastwards from Europe in the eleventh
century and hold sway over the region for some 200 years. Napoleon,
before Waterloo, would march south and introduce his Code into Egypt,
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The Ottoman Turks would rule the Levant
until the end of World War II, only to be succeeded by the English, the
French, and the Italians. 3 With the discovery of petroleum, United States
oil companies introduced American influence on the economic and social
direction of the Middle East.'" While Shari'a ruled the daily lives of
those who lived under Islam, commerce, banking, and foreign relations
were increasingly governed by laws adopted from Western systems.245
Independence from Colonialism and the Cold War introduced Marxism
and Nationalism into the region, and with it, a resurgence in the
fundamentals of Islamic beliefs. 2'
Presently, the societies within Islamic countries are undergoing a
fierce debate. Islamic societies are splitting into two major camps; those
who support modernization, that is to say, harmonization of their own
legal systems with those of the West (particularly in relation to
international relations, banking, commerce, and human rights); and those
who believe that Islamic fundamentalism is the proper course to take. To
date, there is little prospect of agreement between those camps. 247
F. An Examination of the Islamic Concept of Property.
The average American has had little direct contact with the Middle
East. Westerners have heard tales of hands cut off for thievery (the
practice known as hadd) and public square decapitation for religious
crimes. It would not be unfair to characterize the Western image of Islam,
and therefore its justice system, as pagan. This outlook was immortalized
by Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Tenniniello v. Chicago.248 Justice
242. Tom Hundley, Muslims Find New Strength to Defend Ancient Values, DET. FREE
PRESS, Feb. 1, 1987, at 1A.
243. The Bishop and the Imam Ask, Do We Really Have to Fight?, ECONOMIST (U.K.
ed.), Dec. 22, 1990, at 18.
244. Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage: Wy So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the
West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not be Easily Mollified, ATLANTIC, Sept. 1990, at 47.
245. Jamar, supra note 141, at 1083.
246. The Bishop and the Imam Ask, Do We Really Have to Fight?, supra note 243, at 18.
247. Bassiouni et al.. supra note 223, at 55.
248. Terminiello v. Chicago, 377 U.S. 1, 17 (1949) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
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Frankfurter likened what he felt was an unbounded and unwarranted abuse
of discretion by the United States Supreme Court to Islamic judges (kadis).
"This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not
sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of
individual expediency." While the outer trappings of legal decision
making may seem very different to Western eyes, there are striking
similarities in basic legal principles, with property beliefs being no
exception.
The common law concept of absolute ownership, such as fee
simple absolute in land, is akin to that of mulk in Islamic law. A form of
ownership in perpetuity for the benefit of charity or family, waqf, is
similar to the common law concept of trust.249 Free and empty lands
(mawat), to which title may be acquired by three years of occupation and
improvement, are similar to lands granted settlers in the days of the
westward expansion.25° To extend the analogy, such a title may also be
lost to abandonment in both systems. Another form of property ownership
is that of miri, or state-owned land, whose possession or usufruct (tasarru)
was given for a period of time."5 This is roughly similar to Federal lands
for which license to exploit is often freely given. Land also may be
leased, rented, mortgaged, and pass via succession. Thus, under religious
doctrine at least, ownership of property reflects Western values and
concepts in many ways. A comparative analysis of land ownership is not
inapt to the question of intellectual property protection. Islamic countries
classify property into moveable and immoveables, similar to that of civil
code countries, rather than real and personal property. 2 What is sought
here is whether the differences in property concepts between Western and
Islamic culture is so broad as to lead to a breakdown in communication.
In the developed nations, statutes and constitutions of secular
governments define and protect property rights. Under Islam, the
individual's right to property is not only recognized, it is absolute and is
249. See generally Monica M. Gaudiosi, The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the
Development of the Trust in England.- The Case of Merton College, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1231
(1988).
250. FARHAT J. ZIADEH, PROPERTY LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: REAL RIGHTS IN
EGYPT, IRAQ, JORDAN, LEBANON, LIBYA, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES 37
(1979).
251. Id. at 8.
252. Id. at 27.
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considered sacred.27 All property belongs to Allah but is given to Man in
"inheritance. "254
That property belongs to Allah and is held by the individual in
trusteeship is not problematic; the owner's title is good against all takers
aside from Allah himself. 25 Trespass is a sin against Allah and a violation
of Shari'a. Foreigners are protected by this edict as well. The property
right, once acquired, applies equally to Muslim and non-Muslim, Arab and
foreigner alike."' The Hanbali jurist Ibn Taimiya taught the protection of
this right was the first duty of the state. 27" Expropriation is only allowed in
two instances. First, in the execution of judgment against a debtor and
second, for the purposes of public utility75 8 Even if property is taken to
satisfy a debt, such as the religious requirement of alms (zakat), the state
may only take what it is owed and no more. If seized in the name of
public utility, just compensation must be paid the owner.
G. Recognition of Intellectual Property Under Islam
The Koran, at 11:188, admonishes the faithful against the theft of
another's property. Thieves and converters, therefore, cannot obtain good
title, but become trustees of the property and are liable for any damage or
loss incurred on the true owner." Islamic law also recognizes the
separability of physical property and ideas. It recognizes that those
concepts, fixed in their expression are worthy of a property right.2 '6 More
253. Brand, supra note 235, at 26.
254. KoRAN VII:128; Habachy, supra note 237, at 452.
255. Jamar, supra note 141, at 1084 n.24.
256. Habachy, supra note 237, at 451 n.1, citing 1 SANTILLANA, INSTITUZIONI DI
DIRITTO MUSULMANO MALICHITA 356 (2d ed. 1938).
257. Jamar, supra note 134, at 453.
258. Id. at 455 n.19.
259. David F. Forte, Lost, Strayed, or Stolen: Chattel Recovery in Islamic Law, in
ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 97, 103 (Nicholas Heer ed., 1990).
260. Jamar, supra note 141, at 1085, discussing the protectability of concepts under Islam:
Islamic law did recognize that physical property on one hand and ideas on the other are
conceptually separable, at least in the context of the hadd, the amputation of the hand
of a thief, under certain limited circumstances, for things of certain minimum monetary
value. For example, the Hedaya provided that one does not amputate the hand of a
thief for stealing a book because the thief's intention is not to steal the book as paper,
but the ideas in the book, which was not tangible property. However, the same source
notes that stealing a book of accounts is "appreciable" property, and not just the paper
and materials which make up the book. It must be noted that this particular rule is not
Quranic, does not come from the traditions, is not based on consensus, and is not from
the qiyas type of reasoning. That is, this rule comes from a commentary on the law
written by a prominent jurist. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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to the point, forgery of original creations has been considered to be wrong
under Islam, and indeed, to be a serious crime.2 6' Also congruent to the
Western concept of the limited monopoly needed to effect intellectual
property protection, is the existence of restrictive and self-regulating
Islamic trade guilds.262 The concepts of intellectual property, limited
monopoly, and a prohibition against forgery, all exist under the cultural
history of Islam. Thus, the differences which exist between the Western
and Islamic systems would seem to argue for greater, not less,
understanding of Northern intellectual property.
H. Zakat: The Difference within the Similarities
As we have seen, Islamic law has many influences on it from
Roman and other, more recent, Western legal systems. Ideally, Islam
should present no barrier to a common North/South understanding of the
word "property."263 The difference within these similarities lies with the
Muslim distributive justice doctrine (maslaha or "public interest").2 64
Islam, as far as property rights are concerned, seems to take the middle
way between the communal property rights of Confucianism and the
individual natural rights of the Labor-Desert theory. Mohammed lived
during a period of great disparities and, in the Koran, he enjoins the
Believer to share his wealth with the less fortunate. 2' 5 Maulana Shah
Ahmad Noorani, a notable Pakistani religious scholar stated, "Mohammed
was the leader of the first welfare state. . . . At the time of the Prophet,
Id.
261. GERBER, supra note 238, at 99. Gerber conducted what he termed to be "legal
anthropology" by searching the records of legal cases (fetva) of the Ottoman empire between the
16th and 19th centuries. His research uncovered the crime and punishment of "coin forgery"
(i.e. the minting of "debased" currency). Coin forgery was committed in large part by the State
itself. Id.
262. Id. at 118-19.
263. Survey: Islam and the West: The Next War, They Say, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 1994, at
3.
[Tihese two civilizations have more in common with each other than either has with
the Confucian world or the Hindu one ... [while there are] disagreements ... they sit
alongside a large number of shared convictions. A Muslim and a westerner both
believe, more clearly than most other people, in the idea of individual responsibility.
They can exchange opinions about the nature of good and evil, or property rights, or
the preservation of the environment, in something like a spirit of brotherhood.
(emphasis added).
Id.
264. Jamar, supra note 141, at 1090.
265. KORAN II: 270-73, VIII: 73; John L. Esposito, Muhammad, Prophet of God in THE
WAYS OF RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR TRADITIONS 373 (1993).
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everyone was provided for-even the lowest beggar. ,266 This concept of
sharing for the good of all extends to "knowledge" as well, and may give
rise to a belief, under the doctrines of economic and social justice, that
Northern technology, particularly when it comes to medicines and
educational materials, must be shared "for the good of all.
267
L Idealism Versus Reality: No Western-Style Property Rights
Under an Islamic Kleptocracy
An analysis of Islamic religious tenets asserting individual property
rights are sacred is fine, but does little to explain the crushing poverty
which exists side-by-side with vast amounts of oil wealth in many Islamic
countries, nor does it explain the many other crucial differences that make
the Middle East seem so alien to the average Westerner. It would seem at
first blush there are many common roots (such as Roman law) linking the
West to Islam. However, just as in the preceding look at the disparity
between the Confucian ideal and reality, there remains a gulf between
concepts and practices under Islam. One commentator, Tom Bethell,
asserts, in reality, property rights in Islamic nations are far less secure than
those in the West.268 And it is this insecurity, according to Bethell, that is
the single most important reason for the great disparity of material wealth
between the two societies.269 Bethell sought, but could not find a reason
under Islam why the on-the-ground concept of a property right should be
so different from the Western ideal. Certainly, the Koran forbids riba,
usually interpreted to mean "usury," but in some schools, there is the
outright prohibition against interest when lending money. The Koran also
condemns hoarding;27 0  gambling, (maisair literally means getting
something too easily, getting a profit without working for it);27 and
requires the giving of zakat. But, as discussed above, the Koran praises
industry and gives its express blessing to the concept of private property.
Bethell thinks a leading cause of the insecurity of private property
in Islamic countries is the closing of the gate of ijtihad and the
establishment of a kleptocracy. Much as in the case of the Confucian
Orient, religion was used as a means of gaining unassailable authority.
Where independent reasoning is foreclosed, those in power may not be
266. Hundley, supra note 242, at IA.
267. Buckingham, supra note 146, at 11.
268. Bethell, supra note 228, at 42-43.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 45.
271. Jamar, supra note 141, at 1089.
358 [Vol. 2:307
Vaughan
questioned and the believers' sole recourse is prayer and endurance.
Thus, a civilization that once was preeminent in the sciences and
international trade was frozen in time at its fifteenth century stage of
development. Whether under the oppression of Ottoman Turks, the
Caliph, or under the more recent tenets of Socialism, the national
government, taqlid served the ends of those in power and gave license to
seize private property with impunity. Bethell's analysis clarifies why
intellectual property rights are given such short shrift in Islamic countries,
in spite of the contrary teachings of the Koran. Property rights of Islamic
countries' own citizens do not exist in the Western sense-why should it be
that foreigners are given any better rights over property than their own
countrymen?
Another commentator, William E. Schmidt, of the New York
Times, conducted a more temporal investigation as to the attitudes of
intellectual property pirates in Islamic countries. Polling merchants in the
Cairo souk, he found a variety of reasons why they sold counterfeit
Western goods. Some saw themselves as Robin Hood, taking from the
rich to give to the poor. Others simply asserted that it was not illegal.
Still others did not see piracy as a moral or ethical issue, but as a question
of the market. They were simply offering goods to the community (umma)
at a price they could afford, but were unaware of the long-term
consequences.272
VIII. THIRD WORLD PIRACY-NOT A CULTURAL EXCUSE
But are the doctrines like the Islamic zakat and the Confucian free
alienability of ideas, the true motivating factors behind piracy from
Confucian and Islamic countries? Based on the foregoing discussion they
are not. We have seen that under both Confucianism and Islam, valuable
information, even if not in a fixed form of expression, may be considered
to be property.
While cultural differences do exist, they are not so extreme as to
cause a linguistic or cultural breakdown in communication between the
North and South when each says the word "property." However, there is
a serious breakdown in communications, with fault being attributable to
both sides, when it comes to the issue of perceived national self-interest.
272. William E. Schmidt, A Third- World Rule on Video: Copy It and Sell It, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1991, at sec. 1, p.1 .
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IX. THE ANSWER-PIRATE COUNTRIES' TRUE MOTIVE IS
PERCEIVED SELF-INTEREST
Cultural arguments notwithstanding, Third World countries, the
"have-nots" of the world, are pirating out of self-interest.2 3 Statements
going to their state of mind reveal this to be their true motive. For
example, Third World pirates scoff at patents, saying only the West will
benefit if patents are enforced. They are also unabashed in giving their
reasons; Vaivudhi Thanesvorakul, managing director of the Thai
pharmaceuticals pirate company Biolab stated, "Thailand's pharmaceutical
industry isn't yet mature enough for patents . . . .We haven't had time to
copy enough. "274 Sometimes it is Third World government officials
themselves who advocate piracy. Senator Leahy once asked a government
official about his government's refusal to take action against widespread
piracy in his country and his answer was direct, "[iut makes money."275
Other government officials claim helplessness.276 Only recently, Chinese
government officials, attempting to shut down a factory for making pirated
goods, were chased out of town by locals; "[i]f it makes money, it's
untouchable, no matter what the [Chinese Communist] Party orders." 2'
273. Eric Wolfhard, International Trade in Intellectual Property: The Emerging GATT
Regime, 49 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 106, 123 (1991). See generally 21 UN CHRONICLE 11,
HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT: ADDRESSES AT THE OPENING OF THE THIRTY-NINTH
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1984), available in LEXIS, News library,
Arcnws file (Third World leaders calling for the unilateral transfer of technology from the West
to the South as the "common heritage of mankind" and further, asserting that rich countries of
the North were responsible for financially assisting poor Third World countries). See also
Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Unveiling of an Increasingly Complex Global Marketplace,
CHALLENGE, Jan. 1993, at 10 (quoting the United States GAO (General Accounting Office) as
asserting [that the] "[d]eveloping countries" desire for economic development is perhaps the
single most important reason for the persistence of inadequate protection, particularly for
foreigners."). Id.
274. Helen White, Thailand's Drug-Copying Companies Keep Prices Down, Upset Foreign
Firms, Economist, Dec. 1, 1986, at 25.
275. Oversight on International Copyrights: Hearing Before the Subcommittee. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Committee. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
276. What to Watch for on the US/Asia Front: Japan, Bus. ASIA, Jan. 8, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File. The Japanese have remained intransigent in protecting
their market from United States and European imports while enjoying a massive trade imbalance
in their favor. Business Asia reports, "[i]n Japan, talks on supercomputers, satellites and wood
products have yielded nothing thus far. Citing a litany of social and historical factors-including
earthquakes-Japan says it simply can't change its ways." Id.
277. Schmetzer, supra note 195, at News 8.
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A. Southern Excuses-Pirate America
One of the counter-arguments leveled at the United States by
nations pirating American intellectual property is the fact that in the early
days of the United States, the government offered very little, if any,
protection to foreign intellectual property in order for it to achieve
advancement.278 This argument would have merit but for the considerable
changes in the circumstances in the hundred-odd years that have passed
since then, and in the nature and importance of intellectual property as
well.
In the mid-nineteenth century, the concept of intellectual property
was neither well developed nor as widely accepted as it is today.279
Intellectual property piracy, particularly in the field of copyright was more
the rule than the exception. 2' For instance, Holland and Belgium
absolutely refused to protect foreign copyrights. The French, being
primary targets of such piracy, failed to draw Holland into negotiations.
Only by criminalizing piracy and other economic measures did France
finally succeed in protecting its literary works.28' Young America, like
many of its European compatriots, had no qualms in pirating the inventions
and literature of the rest of the developed world.282 Eventually, the
problems associated with piracy resulted in the negotiation of a series of
international patent and copyright protection regimes, such as the Paris
Convention283 in 1883, which dealt with patent and trademark protection,
and the Berne Convention28 in 1886, which dealt with copyright
protection.
Prior to this time, the United States was not so far from the norm
in international intellectual property protection. Now, intellectual property
protection has existed on the international scene for well over a century.
278. Watanabe, supra note 35, at 1.
279. Brenner-Beck, supra note 107, at 84 n.15.
280. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and its Key Role in the Future, 3
J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (1988). Burger explains as literacy increased, so did piracy of intellectual
property, particularly of books. While the United States blatantly discriminated against foreign
rightsholders, piracy at the time was more the rule than the exception throughout Europe. Id.
281. Id. at 8 n.49.
282. Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property:
Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 301 n.50.
283. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature Mar.
20, 1883, T.S. No. 379, as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 24 U.S.T. 2140, 828 U.N.T.S.
305.
284. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berne Copyright
Union Item A-i Berne Convention, Additional Article and Final Protocol, Sept. 9, 1886, 3
UNESCO Copyright Law & Treaties of the World.
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Moreover, the very nature and importance of intellectual property has
changed dramatically. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to steal,
and then use, someone else's intellectual property required some
considerable effort: book printers had to actually typeset and print the
books they pirated. Those copying cotton gins had to actually make cotton
gins; in essence, pirating required almost the same effort as making the
original during its production phase. The scope of piracy was also much
narrower in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The buying and
selling of books, a primary target of pirates of that era, was mostly
domestic, and not exported to compete with the original product. 2
85
One hundred years hence, the situation has changed considerably.
Costs of research and development have soared. Expense factors such as
large-scale production, international distribution and marketing, have been
added to the basic cost of every item. Add to this, the cost of piracy. On
the other side of the equation, the ease of mass-copying of software, music
and videos, as well as the ability to instantaneously transmit data around
the globe via satellite, has made costs of piracy minuscule relative to
profits realized.286 Northern exports cannot make entry into foreign
markets where pirated copies of their wares are offered at a fraction of
their normal price.2" 7 Pirates will even import their illegally-copied wares
and sell them in direct competition with legitimate goods in Northern
markets. 288 Also, intellectual property simply did not occupy the same
state of importance to the national interest as it does now. Finally, the
events surrounding the resolution of the international piracy dispute then
mirror much of the discourse taking place now; with producers demanding
increased protection, while the lesser-developed nations sought free
alienability of ideas.289 Thus, if Third World nations use the argument that
they are justified in taking property because at one time Northern nations
285. Burger, supra note 280, at 7. Later, when international trade boomed and
rightsholders felt the bite of piracy, holders of copyrights would seek greater protection for their
works. Id.
286. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward
a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 281 (1991).
287. Indonesia Cracks Down on Pirated Computer Software, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1989,
at B5 (describing how an American computer program that sells for $422.00 in the United States
sells for the equivalent of $1.50 in Jakarta, Indonesia and with such odds as these, original goods
have no chance of market entry).
288. Maggie Farley, Trade Tussle is Killing Toy Makers' Fun, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1995,
at 4D (describing how product spies roam the corridors of toy conventions looking for hot
products to copy. "They can ask for a sample, knock it off and have it on a boat to the States in
a matter of weeks," said one United States Rightsholder).
289. Burger, supra note 280, at 12.
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were also guilty of piracy, the North may rebut by pointing out the earlier
situation, was finally resolved by the imposition of protective laws.
B. Piracy Endangers International Trade Accords
By doggedly pursuing what they perceive to be their own national
interest, and short-circuiting the multilateral dispute resolution process,
piracy by Third World nations endangers the viability of international trade
accords. By incorporating piracy into "national development" policies,2"
using multilateral organizations, such as the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO)29' to block effective remedies for Rightsholders, and
by using multilateral negotiations merely as delaying tactics to stave off
economic sanctions while they continue to copy Western ideas.292 Third
World nations have essentially forced the hand of Developed nations into
using unilateral measures.
For instance, the United States' use of Sections 301 and 337 have
proven to be effective in achieving improved intellectual property regimes
for Northern ideas in nations who initially failed to respond to multilateral
and bilateral talks.293 Finding their access to free transfer of technology
290. Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of United States Patent Rights in Developing Countries:
United States Efforts To Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 569, 572 (1994). Kirchansky asserts that "these countries may fear drastic price
increases that would result from paying royalties on patented pharmaceutical and agricultural
technology as well as a loss of control over technology that is vital to national development." Id.
291. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, opened for
signature July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, A3(iii). See also Monique L.
Cordray, GAIT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 121, 137 (1994). Cordray
states that Third World nations have formed U.N.-style voting blocks to effectively prevent
developed nations from advancing any agenda that would work against intellectual property
piracy. Id.
292. Hoffman & Marcou, supra note 25, at C03.
293. See generally John F. Sweeney et al., Using U.S. Courts and International Treaties
to Protect Against Infringement Abroad, and at Home, 393 PLI/Pat 9 (1994). Sweeney and
coauthors state that
developing countries which play host to a disproportionately high amount of
counterfeiting activities do not have any strong motive to voluntarily pass or enforce
laws to prevent such activities. Therefore, developed countries like the United States,
as well as the European Community and several of its individual members, have
endeavored to persuade the developing countries to take such measures. Since the
developing countries require access to the developed countries as markets for their
tangible products, the developed countries such as the United States have found that the
threat of foreclosing or restricting trade access for the export products of the
developing countries is the most persuasive tool available for compelling those
countries to pass and enforce laws which will protect the intellectual property rights of
the developed country's nationals.
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cut off, Developing Nations dependent upon piracy have raised a strident
protest, alleging that United States' unilateral measures are violations of
GATT. 294  Nevertheless, the United States continues to use unilateral
measures despite GATT panel findings that they violate the GATT doctrine
against discriminatory treatment.295 Indeed, the United States considers
trade sanctions, such as the imposition of countervailing tariffs and
suspension of GSP benefits, to merely be "retaliation in kind" and well
within their rights under GATT.296 Piracy, they allege, distorts markets
and defeats the comparative advantage of nations.
297
This vituperative back-and-forth is ultimately destructive to all
parties concerned. The GATT structure is jeopardized when the United
States, its major proponent, is seen by others as having to ignore GATT
Panel findings and to strike out on its own in order to protect its interests.
298 Also, the very end that the pirating nations hope to achieve, that of
economic and technological development, will be defeated if the developed
nations find that they can only protect themselves by denying Third World
nations' access to their markets, by refusing to export needed technology
to them, 299 and by refusing to invest in them.3" Yet, this is the very
direction continued piracy is taking the world's nations.
Id. See also Intellectual Property: United States Making Progress in Convincing Other Nations
to Improve Rights Protection Laws, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 557 (Apr. 22, 1987).
294. Cordray, supra note 291, at 137 n.58. See also Bilateral Negotiations: Japanese
Ministry Report Faults United States Trade Policies, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 22, at dlI
(Jun.1, 1994); Unfair Trade Practices: United States Special 301 Process Undermining GATT,
Hurts United States Credibility, Brazil Official Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 845 (Jun. 28,
1989).
295. Id. at 134. See also GAIT. EC, Other Nations Said Set To Attack United States Over
Trade Sanctions at GATT Meeting, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 171 (Feb. 8, 1989); GATT Council
Finds That Section 337 Discriminates Against Foreign Companies, 39 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 955, at 30 (Nov. 9, 1989).
296. Sweeney, supra note 293, at 9 n. 106. See also GATI: United States Rebuffs
Criticism at Council Meeting That it Acts Unilaterally on Trade Problems, 6 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 194 (Feb. 15, 1989); After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes the Hard Part, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 3, at d71 (Jan., 18, 1995). Even after passage of the World Trade Organization
articles, a United States administration official stated recently that' "[t]he United States will not
shy away from using unilateral measures such as Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which
authorizes investigations and trade sanctions." See generally Robert G. Krupka et al., Section
337 and the GAT: The Problem or the Solution?, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 779 (1993).
297. Wolfhard, supra note 273, at 130.
298. Joel Havemann & Karen Tumulty, Clearing the Maze for Free Trade, Nov. 20, 1990,
at Hi.
299. Copyright Pirates, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 17, 1989, at 20.
300. Terry Atlas, Hills Backs Using Brazil Debt in Bargaining on Patents, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 12, 1989, at Bus. 3.
1996] Vaughan 365
C. Self-Destructive Nature of Piracy
The underlying premise of intellectual property piracy is that it is a
fast and cheap method for a lesser developed or newly industrialized
country to join the ranks of developed nations. Commentators have
pointed to Japan's apparent success, through institutionalized piracy as a
"model for emulation." 30 1  These commentators ignore Northern,
particularly American, 302 bitterness engendered by these and other
Japanese trade practices which have persevered despite long-standing
United States protests. 33  They also ignore the fact such practices may
touch off trade wars and endanger the GATT, as well as other international
business accords.3
Aside from simply incurring anger from developed nations and
drawing trade sanctions upon themselves, piracy is self-destructive to
developing nations in other ways. For instance, for the individual Third
World consumer, a pirated copy may not even be less expensive than the
original. Piraters have copied originals, charged the same price and
simply pocketed the profit. 35 Nor, like their namesakes, do piraters have
the best interests of the customers in mind. Copies can be dangerous to
the user, such as using cheaper non-flame-retardant material for children's
301. Harold C. Wegener, International Patent Law Developments, 4 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 329, 331 n.42 (1993). Asserting that "systematic assimilation of
patent disclosures published abroad" is a tactic worthy of emulation by other developing
countries. See also Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 155, see also Edward J. Lincoln, A New Kind
of World Power-Japan in the 1990s, BROOKINGS REV., 1992, at 12.
302. Chimerine & Fallows, supra note 36, at A15. Chimerine, chief economist at the
Economic Strategy Institute, discussing unfair Japanese trade practices. Even though Europeans
also feel the bite of "managed trade" or Japanese markets closed to their products, they are less
vociferous in their protests, as they themselves are highly protective of their own markets. Id.
303. Helene Cooper, Kodak Case Against Japan is Stronger than that of Auto Firms,
Analysts Say, WALL ST. J., Jun. 9, 1995, at B4. Describing how Fuji camera films has
systematically worked to smother United States Kodak's access to the Japanese market through
monopolistic control by five tokuyakuten (exclusive distributorships); Chimerine & Fallows,
supra note 36, at A15.
[I]f Japanese markets were open to the same degree of the United States or even
Europe, it would import $200 billion more in goods than it does now; at least $50
billion of which would come from the United States. Closed cartel-like business
relationships, keiretsu, serve as hidden, non-tariff barriers to entry of United States
goods.
Id.
304. Cooper, supra note 303, at B4. The United States has threatened Japan with $5.9
billion in punitive tariffs unless it opens its market to American automobiles and car parts.
305. Peters, supra note 38, at 589.
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pajamas. Other pirate operations have been exposed as to be just another
money-making proposition for the Mafia.3"
On a larger, macroeconomic scale, by not protecting intellectual
property, Third World nations stunt the growth of domestic innovative
industries since there is no incentive to create new knowledge or ideas.3"7
This in turn has led to a "brain drain," where the best and brightest from
the Third World feel compelled to leave their home countries for the more
remunerative systems in developed nations.308 Another destructive aspect
is the downward spiral of quality, since competing copiers, after having
forced original products out of the market, try to undercut one another.30 9
Moreover, those producing intellectual property, such as pharmaceuticals
or magnetically-reproducible media such as cassettes, computer software,
and videotapes, will refuse to allow their products to be exported to those
countries where they know their products will be given no protection by
local intellectual property laws. 310  Piracy also has had a serious chilling
effect on direct foreign investment and the startups of new production
facilities. all  Developed nation producers want to move production
offshore. They look longingly to the sheer massive size of the potential
consumer markets in developing nations, yet hold back as they have been
burned by their earlier ventures in those markets. 12 In this sense, Third
World Nations are the authors of their own misery.
X. CONCLUSION
The data would tend to show that the Southern nations are acting
in their own perceived economic self-interest and in what they believe is
an expedient, even necessary, course of action, rather than acting under a
good-faith misunderstanding of the issue at hand. If the North is to
306. Williams, supra note 22, at 27.
307. Brenner-Beck, supra note 107, at 95.
308. Ronald Bailey, Brain Drain, FORBES, Nov. 27, 1989, at 261; Bob Johnstone,
Diverting the Brain Drain, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 28, 1988, at 70; but see ROBERT
SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 156, 174 (1990)
(describing a reverse "brain drain" back to South Korea after the enactment of new intellectual
protection laws there).
309. Brenner-Beck, supra note 107, at 96.
310. Id. at 94 (citing Gunda Schumann, Economic Development and Intellectual Property
Protection in Southeast Asia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 173 (F. Rushing & C. Ganz Brown eds., 1990). Seventy-five
percent of corporations in a 1987 survey stated lack of intellectual property protection was a
strong disincentive to license technology to Developing Countries. Id.
311. Id. at 94.
312. Id. at 94.
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staunch the hemorrhaging trade imbalances and lost jobs brought about by
the failure of the LDC/NICs to enforce IP measures in their own countries,
it must raise the stakes to make it the self-interest of those violator-nations
to suppress IP piracy.
The Northern nations which produce intellectual property are
steadily moving production offshore where LDC's find their competitive
advantage in providing the labor-intensive aspects of industry. The North
is becoming increasingly dependent upon the LDC's for raw materials,
fossil fuels, and production and must be able to retain its right in the
property in the creative arts and sciences. These are, in sum, our own
competitive advantage. A caution however; Smoot-Hawley-type trade
protectionism generally harms the economic well-being of all parties
concerned. It lowers political stability and enhances the likelihood of
hostilities between nations by foreclosing alternatives to armed conflict.
Most disturbing, however, is the entire backdrop against which the
North-South conflict is being played. The conflict, if it ever is to be
peacefully resolved, must be analyzed from a wider perspective, "a
world-view, a larger frame of reference."313 The South is poor and getting
poorer. Third World population pressures" 4 are taxing the environment
and seriously threaten the stability of Southern hemispheric
governments." 5 First World Nations themselves are feeling the osmotic
pressure of Third World populations pushing into their own countries. 3"'
313. Tim Stafford, The Bet-Understanding Population and Population Control,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 3, 1994, at 46.
314. Robert McNamara, The Population Problem, in EARTH AND Us 50 (Mostafa Kamal
Tolba & Asit K. Biswas eds. 1991). McNamara cites disturbing figures: forty-two countries
have population growth rates over three percent per year, and twenty-four of these are in Africa,
by far the poorest continent. Africa's population will have soared from 220 million in 1950 to a
projected 880 million by the end of the century. By contrast, the population of economically
advanced nations grew by an average of 0.74% from 1970 to 1985. Id. See also Samuel
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 22 (1993); Matthew Connelly &
Paul Kennedy, Must it be the Rest Against the West? Immigration and Relations Between
Western and Developing Nations, 274 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 61 (1994); Thomas Fraser
Homer-Dixon, On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, J. INT'L
SECURITY (1991); Ross Laver, Special Report: Looking for Trouble: Tad Homer-Dixon's
Prophesies for a Crowded Planet Have Created a Stir in Washington, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 5,
1994, at 18, available in Westlaw, Magazine database.
315. Major Fran W. Walterhouse, Using Humanitarian Activities as a Force Multiplier
and as a Means of Promoting Stability in Developing Countries, 1993 ARMY LAW. 16, 17 (1993),
available in Westlaw, JLR database (explaining the connection between failed economic systems
and insurgencies).
316. See generally Geoffrey Kemp, Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of the
Cold War: The Third World in the 1990's 13 WASH. Q. 4,33 (The Center for Strategic and
International Studies: Mass. Inst. Tech. 1990). See also Tens of Millions on Move as Poor Flee
Bleak Prospects: Migration "Could Become Human Crisis of Our Age" MIA. HERALD, July 7,
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Add to this mix, the arsenal-for-sale of the erstwhile Soviet Union, to
include weapons of mass destruction,3 17  as well as the unemployed
scientists who made them, the military officers who watched over them,
and the idle hands of the largest terror-and-espionage services history has
ever seen, that is, the KGB and GRU. 3Is Add to these, the rising Islamic
fundamentalism in the Middle East, and to this, the stirring giant of China,
who has shown itself a willing supplier of weapons refined with the new-
found technology provided by Western education. 3 '9  Now pour in a
widespread belief system based on anger and resentment against First
World Nations that is often used by NIC/LDC elite for their own
purposes, 320 and the mix is volatile indeed.
In sum, the Developing Nations are justified in their own minds
when they take AIC intellectual property, but not for the reason that they
give-the disingenuous argument that intellectual property is the "common
heritage" of mankind. Even a cursory study of the major cultures of the
world show that each includes the very human understanding of the feeling
that "this is mine." They take Western intellectual property out of
necessity. It is in the long-term interest of the developed nations that they
get Western technology, since it serves to lend stability to the South (as
1993, at 1A; George J. Church, Send Back Your Tired, Your Poor: As Illegal Entries into the
United States Rise at a Time of Job Shortages and Budget Woes, a Backlash is Gaining Force,
TIME, June 21, 1993, at 26; Lynne Duke, S. Africa Fails to Fence Out Job-Seeking Migrants,
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1995, at Al.
317. George D. Moffett III, Third-World Access to Ballistic Missiles Poses Global Threat,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 13, 1991, at 9; Seeking a New World; "Unconventional and
Indiscriminate:' The Changing Face of War; The Planet May be Less Safe Because Insurgents
are Getting Newer, More Sophisticated Arms, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990, at H5 (reporting
greater instability within Third World nations accompanied by more lethal weapons).
318. Christopher Dobson, The Lights Go Out in KGB's Lie Factory, DAILY TELEGRAPH
PLC, Oct. 27, 1991, at 21.
319. Recall that it was Chinese-made "Silkworm" anti-ship missiles that Iran launched
against oil tankers in the Gulf of Hormuz during the "Tanker" war; that "Scud" missiles
provided from the Far East and the USSR rained down on Israel and Saudi Arabia during Desert
Shield, and that a substantial portion of graduate students in the hard sciences, have been, and
are, students from the Peoples' Republic of China. The Tanker War, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE SER.,
May 1, 1992; see also Duncan Lennox, Iraq's "Scud" Programme-The Tip of the Iceberg,
JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY., Mar. 2, 1991, at 301.
320. Lewis, supra note 244, at 47. See also RICHARD H. SCHULTZ & ROY GODSON,
DEZINFORMATSIA: ACTIVE MEASURES IN SOVIET STRATEGY (1984) (describing how the world
press, politicians and academics were manipulated by the Soviet secret services (KGB and the
GRU) to spread inflammatory untruths). Some examples were that (1) AIDs was a CIA plot to
destroy the Third World using biological warfare, (2) American were abducting Third World
babies to use as organ donors for Western babies, and (3) the United States, by introducing
neutron bombs and cruise missiles into Western Europe to counterbalance the overwhelming
preponderance of tanks and their own introduction of mid-range SS-20's, was pushing the West
into a nuclear war which would be fought exclusively on West European soil. Id.
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thus the world). This was, after all, the underlying logic and intent of
establishing the Bretton Woods institutions in the first place.
There is a quid pro quo however. It is imperative that the
Southern Nations gain control over and drastically reduce their
skyrocketing population rates. Economic and political stability will be
impossible until this is done. It will not be enough simply to find new
ways of feeding, housing, educating, and employing an ever-growing
population with new technology. The introduction of AIC medicines and
food aid into Third World countries has had the salutary effect of reducing
infant and child deaths, however this was not sufficiently balanced by
increased use of birth control. Now, the effects are being felt in the form
of the desertification in Africa, and of the loss of the Amazonian Rain
Forest, where a great proportion of the world's oxygen is produced and
from which global weather patterns are affected, and by the tides of
overflowing Third World humanity pressing into Europe and America.
Nor is there any reason that First World Nations be expected to
part with what has become their competitive advantage for free. The
Third World is sitting upon a mineral, and in the case of the Amazonian
Rain Forest-a biological wealth that the First World very much needs.
What is needed is an exercise of good-faith and common-sense bargaining.
However, given human nature, perhaps this is asking too much from either
side. Third World hosts to joint extractive or manufacturing enterprise
must discard the Marxist revanchist policies that they embraced during the
"Wars of Liberation" in the fifties and sixties, and which serve now only
to scare off reasonable investors and punish foolish ones. Instead, they
should allow for repatriation of profits and not unduly interfere with
management's' control over the daily business operations of the enterprise.
Joint venturers from developed nations, in their turn, should
actually benefit the host country. Aside from just providing jobs, they
must not drive such a hard bargain by whipsawing competing Third World
countries, that in the "race to the bottom," no benefits have accrued to the
host country at the end of the tax holiday. Nor should production or
extraction operations in a Third World nation be a free license to pollute.
A balanced "win-win" approach is needed, whereby creative Northern
intellectual property is protected, and the means and opportunity are given
Lesser Developed Countries to achieve their own advancement.
In conclusion, the data shows that cultural barriers to
communication do exist, but they are not insuperable. And, although
power politics may be able to force a solution today, an agreed-to
settlement that recognizes and deals with the barriers to meaningful
communication would result in a more peaceful and enduring coexistence
tomorrow.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Spanish Constitution of 1978,' a milestone in Spain's transition
from the Franco era to the ranks of Western European democracies, has
been described, in at least one respect, as "absolutely innovative on the
panorama of European constitutions."2 It is "the first constitution worldwide
to raise consumer protection to the status of a principle of general law."I
Chapters Three and Four of the Spanish Constitution provide in relevant
part:
Art. 51.1: The public authorities shall guarantee the
protection [defensa] of consumers and users, protecting the
safety, health and legitimate economic interests of same by
means of effective procedures.
Art. 51.2: The public authorities shall promote the
informing and educating of consumers and users, foster
their organizations and attend to them on matters which
may relate to the foregoing, upon the terms established by
law.
Art. 51.3: Within the framework laid down in the
foregoing paragraphs, the law shall regulate domestic
1. The official text was published in the BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL ESTADO [Official Bulletin of
the State] [hereinafter B.O.E.] on December 29, 1978. See Spain, in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. & Gisbert H. Flanz trans.,
1991) (also reprinting the official Spanish-language text); and George E. Glos, The New Spanish
Constitution, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47 (1980). The translation contained in an appendix to
Professor Glos' article appears to be based on a different text from the Spanish text reprinted in the
Blaustein & Flanz collection.
2. lgnacio Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, La Responsabilidad del Productor: Referencia a la
Directiva Comunitaria y a las Leyes y Proyectos de Actuaci6n, 43 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL
737, 742 (1990) (translation in the text by the Author, as are all other translations herein, except as
otherwise noted).
3. Paloma Pemdn Domecq, Products Liability in Spain, 15 COMP. L.Y.B. INT'L BUS. 137
(1993). Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, while acknowledging that the Portuguese Constitution of two
years earlier had also contained a specific reference to consumers, indicates that the concrete
protections it afforded were rather more limited than those in the Spanish Constitution. Dfaz, supra
note 2 (quoting Portuguese Constitution of 1976). In its second revised form, promulgated in 1989,
the Portuguese Constitution now contains a new Article 60 with more extensive guarantees than




commerce and the system [rdgimen] for authorizing
commercial products.
Art. 53.3: A recognition, respect and protection of the
principles recognized in [the above-cited provisions et al.]
shall inform positive law, the practice of the courts and the
actions of public authorities.'
Adopted against a backdrop of increased sensitivity in Western Europe to
matters of consumer protection generally and the issue of products liability in
particular,' it should be noted these provisions are neither merely hortatory,
nor self-executing. Rather, they affirmatively direct public authorities,
positive law, and the courts to see to their further implementation.
Both before and after the 1978 Constitution, the Spanish legal
system was naturally acquainted with the matter of liability from harmful
products. 6  Until the mid-1980's, matters of civil products liability were
addressed within the statutory framework provided by rather general
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code, and supplemented by judicial
improvisation., This regime, however, was significantly altered in 1984 with
the passage, in partial fulfillment of the constitutional mandate indicated
above, of a wide-ranging consumer protection act, the "General Law for the
Defense of Consumers and Users" (GAC). Chapter VIII of the GAC
contained a complex set of provisions dealing with liability for harm arising
from the consumption or use of goods, products and services. 9
4. CONSTITUCION arts. 51.1-3 & 53.3 (Spain) [hereinafter C.E.]. Article 51 was inspired or
influenced by the Resolution of the Council of the European Economic Community of April 14,
1975; a preliminary program for a consumer protection and information policy. Diaz, supra note 2,
at 742; Angel Rojo, La Responsabilidad Civil del Fabricante en el Derecho Espafol y en la
Directiva 85/374/CEE, in 3 LIBER AMICORUM: COLECCI6N DE ESTUDIOS JURiDICOS EN HOMENAJE
AL PROF. DR. D. JOSl PtREZ MONTERO 1253, 1256 (1988); compare C.E. art. 51.1-2 with, e.g.,
1975 O.. (C 92) 2 ("Consumer interests may be summed up by a statement of five basic rights: (a)
the right to protection of health and safety, (b) the right to protection of economic interests, (c) the
right of redress, (d) the right to information and education, [and] (e) the right of representation (the
right to be heard)").
5. See infra and text accompanying notes 90-97.
6. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254.
7. For a discussion of the treatment of products liability matters arising before the effective
date of the 1984 legislation alluded to in the text that follows, see infra, text accompanying notes 20-
66.
8. For a discussion of the background of this law, see infra text accompanying notes 67 - 73.
The acronym GAC, which one encounters in some English language discussions, presumably stands
for the shorthand designation "General Act for Consumers."
9. For a discussion of the operation of the much-criticized, but still pathbreaking chapter VIII
of the GAC, see infra text accompanying notes 82-89.
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Less than a year after this new consumer protection law was
enacted, the Kingdom of Spain successfully concluded negotiations to join
the European Economic Community, signing a Treaty of Accession on June
12, 1985.10 The very next month the Council of the European Communities,
seeking to "approximate" Member States' laws on liability for defective
products, issued a long-awaited Products Liability Directive with instructions
that Member States implement its provisions in their domestic law." This
Directive clearly posed a problem for the not quite one year old GAC,
because "Spanish lawmakers, in writing the [1984] Act, had the Directive
project in mind but did not follow it."" Hence, Spanish lawmakers were
faced with a need to revisit the matter of products liability in order to fulfill
their obligations to the EEC, which included a requirement that the Directive
be implemented in Spanish national law by July 30, 1988.'
3
10. For Spain's accession, see Jason S. Abrams, European Economic Community: Entry of
Spain and Portugal-lnstruments Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the
Portuguese Republic to the European Communities, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 250 (1986). Under the
1992 Treaty on European Union, known as the Maastricht Agreement,
[t]he European Economic Community (EEC) was renamed the European Community
(EC), and a new entity was created, the European Union .... [TIhe European Union
(EU) . . . comprises three legal persons, the EC, the ECSC [European Coal and Steel
Community] and Euratom [European Atomic Energy Community] ..... [Iun law there
are still three Communities, though there is only one set of institutions ..... [T]he
European Union may be regarded as the legal and political concept which gives
expression to the underlying unity.
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 8-9 (3d ed. 1994).
Hence, the practice followed herein is to refer to the "European Economic Community" as such
during the period for which that designation is technically accurate, and thereafter to refer either
to the "European Community" or "European Union."
11. Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, 1985
O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Products Liability Directive]. Article 19 of the Directive provided that
"Member States shall bring into force, not later than three years from the notification of this
Directive, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive." Id. at 33. For a discussion of the background and substantive terms of this EEC
legislation, see infra text accompanying notes 90-118.
12. Pem~n Domecq, supra note 3, at 155. The Preamble to the Act stated that its drafting had
taken account of relevant "principles and directives of the European Economic Community in
force." GAC, pmbl. para. 2. But see Miquel Martin Casals, Spain: Spanish Products Liability -
The Likely Impact of the New Act, LLOYDS PRODUCTS LIABILITY INT'L, Feb. 27, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File ("I regret that the Spanish General Act approved in July 1984
didn't follow the already known proposals of the [EEC] P[roduct] L[iability] Directive."); cf. Ram6n
Mullerat & Sonia Cortes, Spain, in EUROPEAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY 339, 352 (Patrick Kelly &
Rebecca Attree eds., 1992) (noting distance between the GAC and the Directive).
13. Article 19 of the Directive provided Member States had three years from the Directive's
notification date to implement its provisions. For the relevant language of Article 19, see Directive,
supra note 11. Member States were notified on July 30, 1985. Id. at 33 n. 1.
Ansaldi
Like most other EEC Member States, Spain did not comply with the
Directive's mandate within the required time.,, Among the reasons cited for
this delay were policy disagreements within the Spanish Government'" and
general elections ,'16 the simple fact that Spain had previously opted to deal
with products liability by statute, which distinguishes it from most other
Member States whose national law questions of products liability were
effectively left to more easily superseded case law. 7  Finally, however, in
1994, the Spanish Parliament passed the "Law 22/1994 of July 6 on civil
liability for damages caused by defective products (SPLA),"' 8 noting in the
preamble that its object was "the adaptation of Spanish law to European
Community Directive 85/374/EEC of July 25, 1985 concerning civil liability
for damages caused by defective products."' 9
Part Two of this article describes the "original" state of Spanish
product's liability law under the most frequently invoked general provisions
of the Civil Code and the cases decided thereunder. Part Three will consider
the significant changes wrought to the Spanish legal regime by the passage of
the GAC in 1984. An understanding of both these states of the law is needed
for a complete understanding of current Spanish law, inasmuch as portions
of the legal status quo ante survive into the present. Part Four moves from
Spain to Europe, and sketches the background history and the key
substantive provisions of the 1985 EEC Products Liability Directive.
Returning to Spain, Part Five provides an analysis of the 1994 SPLA, the
legislation to implement the EC Directive. Part Six concludes with a number
of reflections and comparative observations.
14. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 119-126.
15. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 361 (citing disagreement between Ministry of Justice
and Ministry of Health and Consumption); Abrams, supra note 10, at 277; see also infra text
accompanying notes 131-36.
16. Pemdn Domecq, supra note 3, at 159; see also infra text accompanying note 130.
17. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254. Rojo notes the partial exception of the Federal Republic of
Germany's treatment of Pharmaceutical Products through a 1976 statute. Id.
18. Ley 22/1994, de 6 de Julio, Sobre Responsabilidad Civil por los Dahios Causados por
Productos Defectuosos, B.O.E., No. 15797, July 7, 1994. See infra Appendix (providing a
translation of the SPLA).
19. Id.
19961
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II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY UNDER THE SPANISH CIVIL CODE OF
18892
Commentators generally agree that the civil law of products liability
in Spain has historically not been an especially highly developed area of the
law.2' Case law has been sparse, 22 largely owing to the standard practice of
concurrent adjudication of both the criminal and civil liabilities to which the
defective products may have given rise.Y Other factors that have been
20. In principle, the label "products liability" can certainly be extended to include such
situations as claims for lost profits by one business against another, arising from some product
malfunction. Apart from the occasional sideward glance, however, this Article will focus chiefly on
what has come to be regarded as the core meaning of the term, as well as the sense in which it is
used in both the Directive and the SPLA: physical injuries to natural persons, along with any
concomitant material damage to their property and non-material damage (in the nature of emotional
distress or pain and suffering) to other protected interests of natural persons. Also, occasionally the
term used will be Product Liability. Nothing significant is meant by such alternation.
21. Casals, supra note 12 (identifying "main reason... why the law of torts in general, and
the law of product liability in particular, have not expanded sufficiently in Spain"); Mullerat &
Cones, supra note 12, at 339 (describing product liability law as "not properly developed"); GERD
BROGGEMANN, DIE PRODUKTHAFTUNG IM SPANISCHEN RECHT 59 (1988) (noting the "initially
rather hesitant" treatment of product liability in Spanish literature and decisions); cf Santiago
Cavanillas Migica, Prdctica de la Responsabilidad Civil en la Defensa de Conswidores y Usuarios,
45 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO 4463 (1989) (describing Spanish Consumer Law generally as "a
novelty"); Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254 (describing product liability as "originally an imported topic"
from European and American law). But C. SANTIAGO CAVANILLAS MGICA, LA
TRANSFORMACI6N DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA 17 (1987) (opining that
a line of Spanish strict-liability decisions was "the equal of any of those existing in European
comparative law").
22. See Casals, supra note 12 (reporting that over the last 50 years the Spanish Supreme Court
averaged about one product liability decision a year, but with a "substantial increase in the late
80s"); see also Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 350 ("Decisions on product liability have been
very scarce.... in spite of the efforts of the courts, there has been no decisive case law for product
liability in Spain as in some other countries like the United States of America or the German Federal
Republic."); Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254 (calling Spanish Supreme Court decisions "scarce");
BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 61 (calling the number of Spanish product liability decisions "even
today still exceedingly small, particularly as regards the typical form they take, where no immediate
contractual relationship between manufacturer and end-purchaser exists"); id. at 62 (referring to
Spanish cases developing product liability as "quite paltry, right up to the present day").
23. Diaz de Lezeano Sevillano notes that under the combined effect of certain provisions of
the Civil and Criminal Codes,
civil obligations arising from delicts or faults are to be governed by the provisions of
the Criminal Code, which establishes that every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable. Consequently, criminal courts are obligated to decide on matters of civil
liability, unless the injured party expresses his wish either to waive such responsibility
or reserve it for subsequent exercise before the civil courts.
Diaz, supra note 2, at 751-52; see generally 2 JAIME SANTOS BRIZ, LA RESPONSABILIDAD
CIVIL: DERECHO SUSTANTIVO Y DERECHO PENAL 903-27 (6th ed. 1991) (discussing civil and
criminal product liability actions). Casals further describes this situation as follows:
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identified as contributing to the relatively low volume of products liability
actions on the civil side are: (1) Spain's long-standing "paternalistic"
welfare system, which effectively relegates tort law to the status of a "junior
partner" as a source of compensation for personal injuries; (2) the
impermissibility of contingent-fee arrangements as a means of compensating
plaintiffs' attorneys; (3) the inhospitality of Spanish law to class actions; (4)
the absence of presumptively proplaintiff juries in civil actions; (5) the lack
of a specialized products liability bar; and (6) the minimal attention given to
tort law, in general, and to products liability, in particular, in Spanish legal
education.4 Other commentators have noted: (1) the general caution of
Spanish courts, especially courts of first instance, in allowing claims for
which no unequivocal statutory basis exists;2 (2) difficulties of procedure and
proof; ' and (3) "still too little 'social sensitivity' in the Spanish legal order
[concerning the need] for manufacturers' products liability independent of
contractual relations. " 17 The argument that products liability is assigned a
lower value in predominantly agricultural Spain than in more highly
industrialized countries may once have been truer than it is today.2
In practice, where a criminal action is available, plaintiffs prefer to sue in the criminal
jurisdiction. The reason is this jurisdiction is regularly more expeditious and cheaper;
the public prosecutor has the duty to follow both actions in favor of the victim, and
take all the steps necessary to investigate all the relevant facts. Furthermore, his
activity is charged to the taxpayer and, in most cases, the victim doesn't even need to
pay for a private prosecutor. And finally, if the offender is found guilty, the victim
will not have to start a new process in order to, recover damages; if, on the contrary,
the offender is not found guilty, this decision does not preclude a civil action, and, the
victim can still claim for damages before the civil jurisdiction.
Casals, supra note 12; see also Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 350 (noting, inter alia, that
more evidence may be available to prove criminal liability than civil). On the generally restricted
discovery rights of civil litigants in Civil Law countries, see generally R. SCHLESINGER ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE LAW 426-28 (5th ed. 1988). Hence, because proven criminal liability for delict or
fault necessarily includes civil liability, there would be no need for a court's opinion to focus on the
particulars of civil liability as such. Conversely, should a court fail to find criminal liability (or
should the public prosecutor have declined to bring the criminal suit in the first place), that might
tend to indicate that the underlying facts on which the plaintiff would be relying in a civil action were
somewhat weak, thus diminishing the likelihood of plaintiff's prevailing therein. Against the
backdrop of two standard procedural rules which Spain shares with many if not most Civil Law
jurisdictions-the assessment of the prevailing party's attorney's fees against the losing party, and the
illegality of contingent fee arrangements as a means of paying one's own attorney's fees-the
perception of a diminished chance of success would operate as a significant disincentive to the
bringing of many cases that might otherwise have provided an opportunity for the elaboration of a
purely "civil" product liability case law.
24. Casals, supra note 12 (quoting John Fleming).
25. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 62 (citing Angel Rojo y Fernndez Rio).
26. Id. (citing several Spanish commentators).
27. Id. at 62-63 (quoting Rojo y FemAndez Rio and citing Arrillaga).
28. Id. at 63 (citing Arrillaga).
378 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
For such civil actions as did arise, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
supplied a number of somewhat broadly worded principles of contract and
tort 9 liability which were generally considered to govern their disposition. 0
To the extent certain aspects of this earlier Spanish Products Liability law
continue to survive, even now that the SPLA has gone into effect, it is still
worthwhile to consider the operation of these sections of the Civil Code.
The relevant contract principles will be discussed first.
A. Contract-based Products Liability
Because Spanish civil law embraces the principle of privity of
contract," the contractual avenue of recovery for harms deriving from
products is only available when a contract relationship exists between a
products liability plaintiff" and the defendant. What this has meant in
practice is that contractual liability is generally asserted when a sales contract
had previously been entered into between the injured party as purchaser and
the manufacturer as seller of a defective product." However,
nonmanufacturing retailers are also potential defendants under a contract
theory.
There are two distinct forms in which a contract theory may be
advanced: one cause of action arises under the general law of obligations,
the other under the law of sales. Article 1101 of the Spanish Civil Code,
located in Book Four, Title One entitled "On Obligations," provides "those
who, in the performance of their obligations, commit fraud, negligence or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor of the aforesaid
29. What an Anglo-American lawyer would call tort liability would probably be referred to by
a Spanish lawyer as "extracontractual" or possibly "Aquilian" liability. See, e.g., Gabriel Garcia
Cantero, Exegesis Comparativa del Articulo 1.902 del C6digo Civil, in 1 CENTENARIO DEL
CODIGO CIVIL 875 (1990). The term "Aquilian" derives from the Lex Aquilia, a Roman law "of
fundamental importance in the law of delict," probably dating back to the late third century B.C. See
generally BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAw 16, 218-22 (1962). In the text,
however, I shall employ the term tort, more familiar to Anglo-American readers.
30. This situation was not substantially different from those prevailing in other European
countries. Prior to the mid-1980's, several European states did not have any product liability
legislation. This included the United Kingdom and Ireland whose common law jurisdictions did
not include any concept for product liability. If a person was injured in the United Kingdom
because of a defect in a product, they had to bring the claim either under the law of contract or
the law of negligence. Dai Davis, Product Liability in the European Community: A Practical
and Economic Perspective, 15 CoMP. L.Y.B. INT'L Bus. 117 (1993).
31. "Contracts only produce an effect as between the parties who make them ... " C6digo
Civil art. 1257 (Spain) [hereinafter C. CIV.]. This principle is usually referred to in Spanish law as
the "relativity" of contracts (relatividad de los contratos).
32. The class of potential plaintiffs under a contract theory includes, but is not limited to,
consumers.
33. Didz, supra note 2, at 754.
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[obligations], are subject to making indemnity for the damages and harms
caused."I, In meeting the required proof of the defendant-seller's
negligence, which would typically be at issue, the Article 1101 products
liability plaintiff may benefit from a somewhat relaxed burden of proof."
By contrast, article 1484, located in Book Four, Title Four, entitled
"On Contracts of Purchase and Sale," provides:
The seller shall be obligated to make indemnity for any
hidden defects the item sold may have had, if they make it
improper for its intended use or so diminish its use that the
buyer, had he known them, would not have acquired it or
would have paid less for it; but shall not be liable for
manifest defects or those which were visible, nor for those
which are not [manifest or visible] if the buyer is an expert
who, by reason of office or profession, ought easily to
have recognized them.36
Hence, under Spanish Sales law, sellers of goods are responsible for latent
product defects, both known and unknown," with no requirement to show
any kind of fault. However, because of a variety of disadvantages"8
34. C. Civ. art. 1101.
35. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 134.
36. C.CIV. art. 1484.
37. Sellers' liability for unknown latent defects is, however, subject to agreement otherwise.
The seller is liable to the buyer for indemnifying hidden vices or defects in the thing
sold, even though he is unaware of them. This provision shall not apply when there
has been an agreement to the contrary, and the seller was unaware of the hidden vices
or defects of what has been sold.
C. CIv. art. 1485. The GAC may have made article 1485's disclaimer possibility ineffective as
applied to consumer contracts, because GAC art. 3.1 provides: "Products, activities and services
placed on the market so as to be available to consumers or users shall not involve risks to their health
or safety [except for those permitted by custom or regulation]." Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12,
at 343.
38. The lack of a need to prove fraud might, at first, seem to make the sales cause of action
more attractive however relaxed the burden of proof under the "Obligations" theory. Furthermore,
article 1485's explicit imposition of liability for "unknown" defects would seem, prima facie, better
suited to address questions of liability for harms resulting from so-called "development risks," i.e.,
from product defects which the state of science and technology at the time the product was placed in
circulation did not permit to be realized. See infra text accompanying note 42 (discussing
development risks). Any seeming advantages, however, are more than offset by other aspects of
sales theory. Under sales law, the general remedy available to a plaintiff-buyer of a product with a
latent defect is merely a choice between rescission (with refund and expenses) and price reduction.
C.CIV. art. 1486. It is only if the seller has failed to inform the buyer of those latent defects which
are actually or constructively known to him that the seller becomes liable for damages, including
those for personal injury. Id. arts. 1486-88; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 343-44; Dfaz,
supra note 2, at 754-55. This formulation would mean that his responsibility for injuries from
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associated with the Sales approach, products liability actions sounding in
contract were generally more likely to have been brought under the general
"obligations" theory.
The damages to which a successful products liability plaintiff under
an obligations theory is entitled are defined as "not merely the value of the
loss suffered, but also that of the gain which the [plaintiff] has failed to
obtain. . ... -9 However, this generous measure of damages is subject to a
very important caveat: to be compensable, the injuries sustained have to
have been foreseeable at the time the obligation arose.40 Only in cases of the
obligor's fraud does the obligee become entitled to "all [damages] which are
known to derive from breach of the obligation. "" Hence, this requirement
of foreseeability would exclude liability for injuries resulting from so-called
"development risks," i.e., defects that, because of the state of science or
technology existing at the time of the contract, were necessarily unknown to
the seller.42
As perhaps might be expected, because the law of obligations
imposes liability only for injuries which were the "necessary consequence"
of breach or "derive from" the breach,' 3 a defendant under a contract theory
development risks, unknowable ex hypothesi, would still remain minimal. The major disadvantage
of the sales theory, however, lies in its exceptionally short statute of limitations: six months from
delivery of the thing sold. C.CIV. art. 1490. Fortunately for plaintiffs, however, case law of the
Tribunal Supremo has long permitted plaintiffs to elect the Obligations theory where both were
applicable. BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 120-23 (discussing a 1911 case); Dfaz, supra note 2, at
755. Furthermore, there is apparently no pro-plaintiff adjustment of the burden of proof in sales
law. See BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 133-34. Additionally, the measure of damages is
generally agreed to be a "reliance" measure, rather than obligation law's "expectancy" measure, a
factor certainly of significance to prospective business plaintiffs. Id. at 111-12, 129-30.
39. C.CIv. art. 1486. BROGGEMANN notes that this includes all quantifiable injuries as well
as damages for accompanying non-material harms, such as loss of consortium. Only purely non-
material injuries would appear to be excluded. BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 129; see also
Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 344 ("Damages for personal injury are generally calculated on
the basis of a particular amount per day the victim has not been able to work, in addition to any [pain
and suffering] and physical damage or costs incurred (e.g., medical expenses, etc.)").
40. "Apart from cases expressly mentioned by law, and those where the obligation so states,
no one shall be liable for those occurrences which could not have been foreseen or which, being
foreseen, were inevitable." C.CIV. art. 1105. "The damages and injuries for which the good-faith
obligor is liable are those foreseen or which could have been foreseen at the time the obligation arose
and which are a necessary consequence of its breach." Id. art. 1107, para. 1.
41. C.Civ. art. 1107, para. 2.
42. See BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 91. For definitions of "development risks," see,
e.g., SPLA art. 6.1(e), infra, Diaz; Sevillano, supra note 2, at 763; Anita Bernstein, L'Harmonie
Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European Community, 31 VA. J. INT'L L.
673, 674 (1991). Bernstein notes that in American law, the concept of development risks will
typically surface in the context of the "state of the art defense." Id.
43. C.CM. art. 1107
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may defeat the claimed liability by showing the presence of such factors as
victim negligence approaching or equaling 100%," negligent intervention by
a third party which breaks the causal chain between the defective product
and injury, or force majeure or act of God." Spanish case law has also
accepted principles of comparative negligence in reducing the size of
awards.47
Compared to the tort theory discussed below, the contract theory of
products liability suffers from the perspective of injured consumers. For
example, some obvious drawbacks are: availability to only a limited class of
plaintiffs, i.e., those in privity of contract with the defendant; and availability
only against one class of defendants, members of which will not always have
the deepest pockets, i.e., nonmanufacturing retailers. 4 On the other hand,
the contract theory has the obvious advantage of a considerably longer
statute of limitations than tort theory; fifteen years for the former" versus
one year for the latter.-l Because of this advantage, legal writers have
attempted to develop lines of arguments under which the contract theory may
be employed against remote sellers like the manufacturer."
B. Products Liability in Tort
For all products liability plaintiffs not in privity of contract with their
defendants, the only generally accepted theory under which they might
recover was, until 1984, tort theory. Article 1902, modeled after key
provisions of the French Civil Code, 2 provides, "He who, by action or
omission, causes harm to another, with fault or negligence intervening, is
obligated to redress the damage caused." The tort liability, thereby, created
44. Cavanillas Mtigica, supra note 21, at 4476.
45. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 345.
46. C.Civ. art. 1105.
47. Cavanillas Mdgica, supra note 21, at 4476.
48. As will be seen, it shares the exclusion of liability for development risks with tort theory.
See infra text accompanying note 61.
49. C.Civ. art. 1964 (providing a 15-year limitations period for general personal actions not
otherwise specified).
50. C.Civ. art. 1968. The one-year period, however, is extended to 15 years when the
defendant's actions also constitute a crime. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 348.
51. See, e.g., Cavanillas Mtigica, supra note 21, at 4479; Sevillano, supra note 2, at 757.
52. "The formula used by the legislator in Article 1902 substantially reproduces the scheme
[contained in] Articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code . . . ." Dfaz, supra note 2, at 756;
cf BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 66 (noting overall influence of Napoleonic Code on the Spanish
Civil Code). For a discussion of the referenced articles of the Civil Code and the expansive reading
French courts have made of them and other sections, see generally SCHLESINGER et al., supra note
23, at 555-62; GERAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 101-10 (1993).
1996]
382 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 2:371
was not disclaimable.5 3 Article 1902, "among the most frequently cited in
court decisions,"" was described by one Scholar as "the channel through
which it is possible to provide a basis for redressing damages occasioned by
defective products."5"
Like its French models, Article 1902 imports into the noncontractual
liability, analysis a requirement of fault. "For this liability to arise, what had
to come together were fault in the conduct of the manufacturer and a victim
who could prove it. '56 However, despite the formidable task that proof of
fault would appear to be, Spanish courts had in fact developed a practice of
inverting the burden of proof, with the result that it really was up to the
defendant to prove "that he had used all required diligence, according to the
circumstances" 1 or, in other words, his lack of fault. Hence, the
presumption was subject to rebuttal.-" The plaintiff, in any event, continued
to be responsible for demonstrating the causal relationship between the
defendant's fault and his injury, for which no presumptions were available.19
While the code does not provide a measure of damages for infractions of
Article 1902, the common opinion of courts and scholars is that Article 1902
"includes damages for both physical and nonmaterial injury."6°  These
damages are also subject to foreseeability requirements, 6 the same as
53. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 175.
54. Garcfa Cantero, supra note 29, at 875.
55. Diaz, supra note 2, at 756; cf. Casals, supra note 12. If we analyze the main
decisions of the 1990's, it can be ascertained without much difficulty that the general clause of
Article 1902 CC and some of the devices created by jurisprudence, such as the reversal of the
burden of proof, would in most cases be sufficient to protect the victims of defective products.
Id.
56. Diaz, supra note 2, at 756.
57. SANTOS BRIZ, supra note 23, at 948; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 348;
BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 164-73; see also Casals, supra note 55.
58. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 348.
59. SANTOS BRIZ, supra note 23, at 948.
60. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 160. Damages in tort cover all damages directly
caused by the negligent act and those that may be deemed to have been caused by the act, but not
those that are too remote. In particular, they include replacement of the product, damage
effectively caused and an amount for compensation for damage to property and other prejudices
[sic] and non-physical damage (pretium doloris) including pain and suffering, reputation, etc.
They cover not only the damage (damnum emergens) but also lost profits (lucrum cessans) if
there is sufficient evidence of the loss. In general, Spanish case law provides for a lump sum to
be paid for all the heads of damage. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 347-48.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42: Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 347.
Ansaldi
required for the defenses and mitigations described above for contractual
liability.6 2
Despite the courts' alleviation of the products liability plaintiffs task
by inverting the burden of proof,63 a number of commentators continued to
feel that "great difficulties," including proof difficulties and other procedural
and substantive complexities, continued to face product victims who sought
compensation from the manufacturer. One feature to be highlighted here is,
again, the rather short statute of limitations; one year from the date the
victim discovered or ought to have discovered the injury." One scholar
argued that one of the main impediments to a purely case law resolution of
the products liability question, and the reason so many plaintiffs' claims still
ran aground, was "the persistent primacy of the fault principle."6  Hence,
such opinions concluded, "[the] system of protection for consumers deriving
from these general rules was certainly insufficient. "6
III. GENERAL LAW FOR THE DEFENSE OF CONSUMERS AND USERS
The 1978 Spanish Constitution's explicit invocation of consumer
rights,6 along with Western Europe's growing engagement with the topic,6"
no doubt only served to bolster the widely shared sentiment among many
lawyers that Spanish law's treatment of products liability was somewhat
lacking. However, the true impetus for legal change may have been two
widely reported mass torts that galvanized public opinion thereby forcing
Spain's political leadership to respond. These tort incidents were the Los
Alfaques campsite disaster in 1978 and the so-called "Toxic Oil Syndrome"
of 1981 .61 The latter, most especially, revealed "the inadequacy of the law
62. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47; cf. Pem~in Domecq, supra note 3, at 139
(describing third-party negligence, acts of God (force majeure) and comparative negligence as
standard features of a civil liability system).
63. This judicial strategem of inversion of the burden of proof has been described as one
whereby "one slowly passes from a fault-based or subjective system to an objective system which
dispenses with fault." Dfaz, supra note 2, at 757.
64. C.CIv. art. 1968. But see Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 348.
65. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1254.
66. Dfaz, supra note 2, at 758 (listing anti-plaintiff factors identified by Bercovitz-Cafio).
"A further motive for the passage of the GAC was surely the fact that the form taken by the
dispositive [Civil Code] provisions on which a Products Liability claim could be grounded were
still viewed as inadequate for the successful bringing of an effective claim for damages from
defective products." BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 77 (omitting citations to Civil Code).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
69. On July 11, 1978, an over-capacity tanker truck carrying more than 23,000 kilos of liquid
propylene gas crashed into a campsite wall at Los Alfaques, near San Carlos de la Rapita along the
Mediterranean and exploded, killing 215 campers, mostly French, German, Belgian, Dutch and
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in force [and] moved the political parties ... to prepare or, best of all, to put
the finishing touches on, a piece of general legislation. In the electoral
programs and campaigns of the period, consumer protection achieved the
rank of a priority problem. "70
In September 1981, the center-right government of Prime Minister
Adolfo Sudrez sent the Cortes (the Spanish Parliament) a draft "Consumer
Law," the effect of which was either to make no change at all in the legal
status quo or, effectively contract the scope of protection afforded consumers
by confining products liability to a contractual basis. 71 The Spanish Socialist
English in nationality. See Bjorn Edlund, Untitled Report, UPI (International Section), Jan. 18,
1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file; Kevin Dunn, Untitled Report, REUTERS, July
11, 1979, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File; Fay Wiley & Miguel Acoca, A Scene
Out of Dante, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1978, at 53.
Beginning in May of 1981, at least 402 people, chiefly from working class neighborhoods of
Madrid, died and many more became seriously ill, generally believed to be a result of ingesting
reprocessed industrial rapeseed oil marketed for cooking and consumption. The longest trial in
Spanish history concluded in 1989 with a conviction of the businessmen who had imported the oil
from France, tampered with it and sold it for home use. However, only two of the 37 defendants
ever went to prison as a result, a verdict which outraged the public. Adela Gooch, Court 12 Opens
Hearings on Oil Scandal, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 25, 1992, at 9; Robert Hart, Hundreds Shut Out of
Spanish Toxic Oil Hearings, REUTER LIBRARY REP., Feb. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Reuters File; Richard Lorant, Mass Poisoning in Spain Still Steeped in Mystery, L.A.
TIMES, June 16, 1991, at A6.
Among the authorities who see a clear link between one or both of these events and the
heightened concern with product liability matters that led, inter alia, to the passage of the GAC are
PernAn Domecq, supra note 3, at 137; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 369; Diaz, supra note 2,
at 759; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1256; Francisco Javier Tirado Srurez, La Directiva Comunitaria de
Responsabilidad Civil, Productos y Ordenamiento Espaofl, 43 REv. GENERAL DEL DERECHO 4967,
4973 (1987).
70. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1256. Among the first reactions were the passage of a regional
consumer protection act by the Basque Parliament in November of 1981. Portions of this Act were
held to be unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court the following year as going beyond
the legislative competence of the Spanish Constitution delegates to the so-called "Autonomous
Regions." Id. at 1256-58. A discussion of the Basque Consumer Statute, BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL
PAlS VASCO, Mar. 2, 1983, No. 26, and of consumer legislation by the Andalusian governments, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Ley 5/1985, de 8 de Julio, de Estatuto de los Consumidores y
Usuarios en Andalucia [Law 5/1985 of July 8, on the Statute of Consumers and Users in Andalusia]
B.O.E., July 20, 1985, No. 173; BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL PAlS VASCO BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL PAIS
VASCO, July 16, 1985, No. 71, Catalan (Ley 1/1990 de 8 de Enero, Sobre Disciplina del Mercado y
Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios [Law 1/1990 of Jan. 8, on market controls and defense of
consumers and users], B.O.E., Feb. 16, 1990, No. 41; Diario Oficial De La Generalidad De
Catalufia, Jan. 17, 1990, No. 1243); Galician (Ley 12/1984 de 28 de Diciembre, del Estatuto
Gallego del Consumidor y Usuario [Law 12/1984 of Dec. 28, on the Galician Consumer and User
Statute], B.O.E., June 11, 1985, No. 139; Diario Oficial De Galicia, Feb. 1, 1985, No. 23); and
Valencian (Ley 2/1987, de 9 de Abril, de Estatuto de Consumidores y Usuarios de la Comunidad
Valenciana [Law 2/1987, of Apr. 9, on the Valencian Community's Statute of Consumers and
Users], B.O.E., Apr. 29, 1987, No. 102; Diario Oficial De La Generalidad Valenciana, Apr. 15,
1987, No. 568.
71. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1258-59.
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Workers' Party, the P.S.O.E., then the largest group in the parliamentary
opposition, forwarded a response in its own draft, "Law for the Defense of
Consumers and Users." From the consumer's perspective and in the opinion
of at least one scholar, the P.S.O.E.'s draft was a distinct improvement over
not just the Suirez government's bill which preceded it, but even over the
later text of what would subsequently become the "General Law for the
Defense of Consumers and Users. "7
The GAC was passed in 1984 after the dissolution of the Cortes and
the accession of the P.S.O.E. to power under Prime Minister Felipe
GonzAlez.71 The widely shared opinion of legal scholars is as a piece of legal
craftsmanship, it was not just bad, but awful.7 Whatever its technical
defects, however, there is no doubt the GAC made significant changes in
Spanish products liability law."
Articles 1 and 2 of the GAC, stating that its provisions were in
furtherance of the Constitution's consumer protection provisions," began
with a broad enumeration of the basic rights of consumers and users, and a
72. Rojo opines that this may have had something to do with the fact that the Ministry of
Health and Consumption went to politicians other than those who had been most directly responsible
for the area of consumer protection. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1259-61.
73. Ley 20/1984, de 19 de Julio, General Para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios
[General Law for the Defense of Consumers and Users], B.O.E. 176, July 24, 1984. For translated
excerpts and a brief discussion in English see Ian S. Blackshow, New Spanish Law on Conswner
Protection, 5 Bus. L. REV. 290"(1984).
74 "The 1984 Act is a defective product itself; it is not only technically defective, but also
incoherent." Casals, supra note 12. "Incomplete and technically deficient ... reveals important
shortcomings . . . incoherent and technically defective." Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at
339, 352. "The unintelligibility of its articles 25 to 28 is so radical that, in my opinion, it cannot
be overcome, not even by an interpretive effort well-meaningly bent on favoring consumers."
Cavanillas Mtigica, supra note 21, at 4464. A source of the highest legal uncertainty
[t]he result could not be worse. On the question of the manufacturer's civil liability
the Law, without intending to, constitutes a front attack on legal certainty . . . . The
system's lack of clarity and the imprecision of the terms employed has given rise to
very different and contradictory interpretations of the rules in force, with grave injury
to the public interest."
Rojo, supra note 4, at 1260. "[Article 28's strict liability r6gime] could not be called progressive
but purely and simply irrational." Id. at 1272. "At many points [including the product liability
regulations], the Act creates the impression that the wide sweep of the matters regulated was
often at the expense of a precise working through of the details." BROGGEMANN, supra note 21,
at 77; id. at 78 (noting "vehement" criticism in the literature).
75. See, e.g., Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 352; BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 85
(identifying GAC Article 28 as the law's "genuine innovation").
76. For the relevant constitutional text, see supra text accompanying note 4; see also
BRUGGEMANN. supra note 21, at 75 (describing GAC as rooted in Article 51.1-2 of the Spanish
Constitution).
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definition of the protected class under the act." The portions of the GAC
directly related to products liability appeared in chapter 8, Articles 25-31.
Article 25 sets out the general principle that consumers had a right to
compensation for harms caused to them by goods or services, except insofar
as the harm was their culpa exclusiva [own fault] or was caused by persons
for whom they were civilly liable. The principle is noncontroversial, and the
exception merely codified existing case law. But then chapter 8 of the GAC
confusingly went on to establish not one, but two separate regimes of
products liability. Articles 26 and 27 establish the "general" regime of
products liability, and Article 28 a "special" regime.
Much like Article 25, the "general" regime set up by Articles 267'
and 27,19 in essence, also largely codifies existing law, adding a few specific
rules for particular fact situations. While it is certainly possible to criticize
them, as scholars have done, for faulty draftsmanship, the regime these
77. GAC Articles 1.1 & 2. Consumers and users are defined in Article 1.2. For a
translation, see infra text accompanying note 87. The difference between them is apparently that the
term "consumers" relates to goods, and "users" to services. Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note
2, at 773. This article, however, will hereafter generally follow standard American usage in
referring simply to consumers, rather than to consumers and users.
78. GAC art. 26 provides:
Actions or omissions of those who produce, import, supply or provide products or
services to consumers or users which cause damage or harm to same shall give rise to
liability in the former, unless it appears or can be shown that there has .been
compliance with the demands and requirements established by regulation and with
other [types of] care and diligence demanded by the nature of the product, service or
activity.
Id.
79. GAC art. 27 provides:
a) the manufacturer, importer, seller or supplier of products or services to
consumers or users, shall be liable for the origin, quality and suitability of same, as per
their nature and purpose and the governing norms.
b) for products in bulk, the holder of same shall be liable, without prejudice to his
ability to identify and prove the liability of the prior holder or provider. 1. In general,
and without prejudice to more favorable results to consumers or users by virtue of
other provisions or conventional agreements, the following criteria shall govern on the
matter of liability
c) for products packed, labeled and enclosed with an unbroken seal, the company
or company name appearing on the label, presentation or advertising shall be liable. It
may be released from such liability by proving its falsification or incorrect
manipulation by third parties, who shall be those responsible.
d) If several persons shall have come together in producing the harm, they shall
be jointly and severally liable to the victims. Whoever pays the victim shall have a
right to seek contribution from the other liable parties, as per their participation in the
causation of the harm.
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articles set up was essentially the "rebuttable presumption of fault" regime
which Spanish courts had already created under Article 1902 of the Civil
Code . 0 Hence, it suffered from the same major defect as the latter:
rebuttable presumptions can be rebutted.8'
Article 28, the "special" liability regime, was quite a different
matter altogether:
28.1: Notwithstanding the foregoing, there shall be
liability for damages originating in the correct use and
consumption of goods and services when, by their very
nature or by being so established by regulation, they
necessarily include a guarantee of determinate levels of
purity, efficacy or safety, under objective conditions of
determination, and presuppose technical, professional or
systematic quality controls until they reach the consumer
or user in the proper condition.
28.2: In any event, considered to be subject to this
liability regime are all food products, those of hygiene and
cleanliness, cosmetics, pharmaceutical specialties and
products, sanitary services, gas and electric service,
household appliances and elevators, means of
transportation and motor vehicles, and toys and products
directed at children.
28.3: Without prejudice to what other statutory provisions
may establish, the liabilities arising under this Article will
have a limit of 500 million pesetas. This amount is to be
periodically revised and updated by the Government,
taking account of the variation in consumer price indices.2
What Article 28, in fact, established was a seemingly parallel products
liability regime qualitatively different from any preceding it. This regime
was one of strict liability, since it did not provide that a defendant's fault was
at all relevant to the plaintiff's case for recovery, either by way of proof or
presumption.
The obvious scope questions, then, would seem to be presented:
when does the "general," more traditional products liability regime of
80. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 79-80. For criticism of the draftsmanship, see, e.g.,
Pemdn Domecq, supra note 3, at 141-42; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1265-67; see generally supra note
74, (citing authorities).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
82. GAC art. 28.1-3.
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Articles 26 and 27 apply, and when does the "special," strict liability regime
of Article 28 apply? The technical conclusion of most commentators who
studied the matter was, in fact, that the exceptional regime of Article 28
basically swallowed up the general regime of Articles 26 and 27, because "it
is difficult to find a product that, either by inclusion in the list or by being
included within the definition, is subject to the general regime and not the
special. ' ,  Furthermore, the benefits of a strict liability theory were
enhanced by the very limited number of defenses a liable party could assert.
Liable parties can only free themselves of the obligation to
make indemnity if they prove the victim's fault (or the
fault of persons for whom the victim is civilly liable).
Only if the use or consumption has been 'incorrect' (art.
28.1 in connection with art. 25) is exoneration in order. 1
These liable parties apparently included almost everyone in the production
and distribution chain: the manufacturer, importer, seller, or supplier of the
products to consumers, any one of whom could be sued at the consumer's
election.1 Finally, as to damages available, there is no explicit limitation to
those foreseeable. Hence, injuries from development risks were apparently
also included within the scope of coverage. 86
83. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1271. "Given its great breadth, the scope of this special strict
liability system seems to be greater than that of the general liability system." PemAn Domecq, supra
note 3, at 143. "The wide scope of this Article [28] means that what was intended to be a rule
applicable only in exceptional cases, turns out to be the general rule . . . ." Mullerat & Cortes,
supra note 12, at 355-56. "It [the Article 28 rtgime] is given such a broad substantive scope that in
practice it operates with priority." Maria Elena Zabalo Escudero, La Ley Aplicable a la
Responsabilidad por Dahos Derivados de los Productos en el Derecho Internacional Privado
Espahol, 43 REVISTA ESPAROLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 75, 81 (1991). "Finding a product
which does not fit into Article 28 of the GAC and which must follow the fault liability regime is
rather difficult." Diaz, supra note 2, at 763-64. But cf. BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 86 (citing
one's scholar's questioning of whether handicrafts and agricultural products in their natural state
would fall under article 28).
84. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1272. Cf. BRUGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 99 (citing opinion in
the literature that under Article 28, principles of comparative negligence would also apply, thereby
reducing a negligent plaintiff's recovery). Id. at 100-02 (noting some scholars' opinion that such
defenses as "assumption of risk," "victim predisposition to the injury," and "fortuitous
circumstances" would also be available under Article 28).
85. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1265; Diaz, supra note 2, at 761. Since article 28 itself contains no
indication of liable persons, the authorities cited both argue that they must be the same as those
enumerated in Article 27. But see BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 93-96 (citing with approval the
line of scholarly opinions that would confine a liable party's liability to those product risks
specifically arising within the latter's sphere of activity).
86. Id; see also Dfaz, supra note 2, at 764; cf. Pemn Domecq, supra note 3, at 154 (opining
that foreseeability requirements go along with negligence-based liability); Rojo, supra note 4, at
1270 (noting that lack of foreseeability is a defense under the general regime of Articles 26-27);
BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 90-92 (noting split of opinion in the literature, but opining that the
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Even though the de facto generalization of a regime of strict
products liability may have come about more by sloppy draftsmanship than
perhaps by conscious design, the substantive result would still appear to be a
major advance for consumers. But that appearance is rather deceptive,
because of the definition of "consumers and users" the protected class
created by the GAC. These were defined as "natural or legal persons who
acquire, utilize or enjoy, as destinatarios finales [end-recipients], personal or
real property, products, services, activities or functions, whatever may be
the nature, public or private, individual or collective, of those who produce,
supply, furnish or extend them."81 Whereas, under the Civil Code it had
been the limited class of persons in privity of contract with a products
liability defendant who could benefit from the advantages of a contract
theory over a tort theory, under the GAC, it was now only "end-recipients"
or "end-users" who could benefit from the no-fault regime. Because
membership in the two classes, "those in privity with the products liability
defendant" and "end-users" of a product or service, would in the normal
course of things, substantially overlap, it was roughly speaking, the same
limited class which would benefit from the more advantageous theory of
recovery." All third parties and all bystanders, being neither "consumers"
nor "users" for purposes of the GAC, would continue to be relegated to the
Civil Code's presumed-fault tort regime under Article 1902.89
peseta cap in Article 28.3 is a "strong indication of intentional inclusion of liability for development
risks").
87. GAC art. 1.2 (emphasis added).
88. While many, possibly most, products and services will be purchased by those who will
eventually use them, the GAC would protect, for example, donees or thieves from the contract-
purchaser, while depriving the latter of its benefits. It would also apparently not protect a private
person who uses a product and subsequently re-sells it. Another peculiarity, much criticized, is the
inclusion of "legal persons" within the definition of "consumers and users." The intention was,
presumably, to include such presumptively not-for-profit organizations as churches and charities
within the definition. But the language of the definition does not make this clear. Hence, one
business suing anther might well be, in certain circumstances, a "consumer" for purposes of this
Act. See the discussion in Rojo, supra note 4, at 1262-64.
89. But cf BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 97 (noting the proposal of some scholars for a
contra legem interpretation of Article 28 so as to include third parties on policy grounds).
There were other problems with the Article 28 rgime as well. For one thing, there is much
disagreement over how the 500 million peseta cap, apparently intended as a counterweight to the
strict nature of the liability itself, was to be applied: per person, to all claims arising from the same
defect, to all products made or supplied by a liable party, to ech specific series of products, or per
defect. Diaz, supra note 2, at 764; BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 92; PemAn Domecq, supra
note 3, at 144; BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 98 (citing Bercovitz y Rodriguez Caflo); Mullerat
& Cortes, supra note 12, at 361; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1272. Would amounts paid out under a fault
theory count towards the cap? Rojo, supra note 4, at 1272-73; cf. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at
105 (implying that when limit was reached there might still be additional recovery under Civil
Code's fault regime).
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IV. THE EEC PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE
A. Background
In 1968, the Commission of the European Economic Community
undertook preliminary studies for the drafting of a Directive to harmonize
the products liability laws of the various member states.90 Subsequently, in
October of 1972, European heads of state and government, meeting in Paris,
called upon European community institutions "to strengthen and coordinate
measures for consumer protection."9I That same month, a "Convention on
the Law Applicable to Products Liability" was adopted under the auspices of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law.Y
On April 14, 1975, the European Council passed its resolution on a
preliminary program for consumer protection and information policy. 91 In
September of the following year, the European Commission submitted to the
Council of the European Communities its "proposal for a Council Directive
relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the [m]ember [s]tates concerning liability for defective
products. "9' This was followed, in January of 1977, by the Council of
Europe's adoption of the "European Convention on Products Liability in
Regard to Personal Injury and Death." 5 In turn, the latter would serve as a
significant source ' for the European Council's July 25, 1985 "Directive on
the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions
of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products."17
Another area of doubt was the limitations period for bringing an action: the standard 15 year
period under the Civil Code Article 1964 for actions not otherwise specified, or the one year allowed
by Civil Code Article 1968, or either, depending on whether a contractual relationship is present or
the one year allowed by Civil Code. Article 1968. Pem,n Domecq, supra note 3, at 145; Tirado
Surez, supra note 69, at 4976; cf. BROGGEMANN, supra note 21, at 102 (arguing for one year but
noting that question would ultimately have to be answered by case law); Mullerat & Cortes, supra
note 12, at 360; cf. Cavanillas Mdigica, supra note 21, at 4479; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1277 (noting
silence of Spanish law on limitation period for bringing the action). A discussion of the remaining
articles of chapter VIII is not necessary for the present discussion.
90. Dfaz, supra note 2, at 771. Two years later, a special commission of the Council of
Europe took on the task of proposing harmonization measures in this area as well. Id.
91. 1975 O.J. (C 92) 1.
92. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on the Law Applicable to
Products Liability [adopted Oct. 21, 1972] 11 I.L.M. 1283 (1972). For a discussion of the
interaction of this Convention and Spanish law, see generally Zabalo Escudero, supra note 83.
93. 1975 O.J. (C 92) 2
94. 1976 O.J. (C 241) 9 (later amended by 1979 O.J. (C 271) 3).
95. European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death
(1995), 16 I.L.M. 7 (1977).
96. Pemdn Domecq, supra note 3, at 148; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1255.
97. 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29.
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Writing about a year after the Directive's adoption, Hans Claudius
Taschner, staff member of the EEC Commission, described it as follows:
The Directive is the result of a compromise achieved with
difficulty among the Member States, but also among the
naturally very much opposed interests of industry and
consumers. Member States' laws are quite diverse
[hdt6rog~nes]. They range from traditional liability for
fault with classic burden of proof . . . to de facto strict
liability, unlimited as to amount and length of time, as
progressively introduced by case law's tilting of an
irrefutable presumption of fault . . . passing through
liability for fault with reversal of the burden of proof, with
ever more rigorous conditions on making proof to the
contrary....
As for the social partners, industry sought the maintenance
of liability for fault or, in the event of strict liability, its
overall and specific limitation to as weak a level as
possible, exclusion of development risks, exclusion of
property damage, and limitation of liability to a duration of
five years; as for consumers, they considered that
safeguarding their interests would necessarily come via
strict liability unlimited as to amount and duration and
extending to development risks, via liability for property
damage with no threshold amount, and via reversing the
making of proof to make it the producer's burden as far as
the causal nexus between defect and damage goes.
Given positions this far apart, it is hard to see how one
could hold it against the Directive that it did not result in a
rapprochement of national laws, but on the contrary in an
accentuation of their diversity. The adoption of the
Directive was only achieved at a price of temporarily
maintaining a certain number of established rules. It
remains no less the case that the keystone of the Directive,
to wit the introduction of strict liability, which all alone
justifies all the efforts and relegates all other question to
the background, has been accepted without exception or
reserve by all Member States. 98
98. Hans Claudius Taschner, La Future Responsabilitg du fait des Produits Difectueux dans la
Communauti Europdene, 297 REVUE DU MARCHI COMUN 257, 258 (1986) (omitting examples).
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From Taschner's description of the genesis of the Directive, one can get a
fairly good sense of both its setting and its accomplishments: (1) a pre-
existing diversity of national laws; (2) opposing interests;" (3) attempted
"harmonization" around the core idea of strict liability;'1° and (4)
incomplete harmonization achieved.'°' A very brief summary of some of
its more important terms follows.
B. Summary of Provisions
Strict Liability: Apart from its clear embrace of strict liability' °0 in
the recitals, the operative provisions of the Directive which embody this
principle are Articles 1 and 4, which together provide for a "producer's"
liability for his product's defect, if the injured person can prove damage,
defect and a causal relation between the two. What this formulation leaves
99. Heinz Kr6ger, Probl~mes D'application de la Directive Europiene dans les Diffirents
Etats Membres, 32 ANNALES DE LA FACULTI DE DROIT DE LIGE 298 (1987).
The adoption of the Directive has provisionally put an end to an important part of the
debate in the E.E.C. regarding future European laws on the topic of liability for
damages caused by defective products. The debate which has concluded, to my mind,
brought with it neither winner nor loser. By that I understand that neither the
consumer organizations who actively sought the Directive, nor organizations .. .
representing industry which were against certain aspects of the proposed Directive and
which for that reason were reticent, indeed against the Directive, completely carried
the day.
Id.
100. See Bernstein, supra note 42, at 676 (arguing passim that the purported
"harmonization," in the (minimalist) sense of "approximation," "an effort to unify, with minimal
change of law," was not so much what the Commission was after as harmonization in the
"meliorist" sense of law reform, "reconcil[ing] national laws with a Community ideal"). But she
goes on to criticize the underlying idea behind the reform: "The Community has slighted its
combination of assured compensation [through Member States' social-welfare safety net] and well-
developed principles of liability in favor of an alternative known chronically to fail as a source of
compensation and to waste money." Id. at 689. She attributes this to the "sense of finitude"
engendered by the rising costs of state health-care programs. "In the spirit of austerity that began in
the mid-1980's, many Europeans regard universal health care as a luxury of potentially infinite
expense." Id.
101. See generally, e.g., Wolfgang Freiherr von Marschall, The Three Options of the EEC
Directive on Products liability and their Application in the Implementing Statutes of Member States,
1991 REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALE 707; cf. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 676
("mhe increasing amount of leeway that the Commission now condones will assure divergent
national laws in perpetuity.").
102. The English language text does not use the term "strict liability" but rather "liability
without fault." The French equivalent is responsabilitO objective. For the use of the responsabiliti
objective to mean strict liability, see, for example, Zabalo Escudero, supra note 83, at 80 n.23
(noting the 1973 Hague Convention's use of French term as equivalent to American "strict
liability"); see also Bernstein, supra note 42, at 680 ("The origins of the Directive suggest an
appreciation for American-style forthright strict products liability....").
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out, of course, is any need to show the producer's fault. Article 2 identifies
"products" as most moveables, including those that have been incorporated
into something else, and electricity, but excluding unprocessed agricultural
products and game. A product is defective if it does not provide the safety a
person is entitled to expect under the circumstances. 03 Exculpatory clauses
or limitations of this liability are not enforceable. '°
Protected Class: Under Article 4, prospective enforcers of this
liability, i.e., products liability plaintiffs, are simply "injured persons" with
no requirement of a contractual relationship with anyone. Third parties and
bystanders have just as much protection under the Directive as parties to a
contract. The only caveat is that the injured person's own fault, or the fault
of someone legally in his charge, may, but need not, cut down or cut off his
recovery.'0 But the negligence of all other persons, if it is a coparticipant in
causing the damage, in no way affects the injured person's right to recover
against the producer.10
Liable Parties: Article 1 identifies the "producer" as liable for the
damage caused by product defects. As defined by Article 3, "producer" is
an umbrella term, and includes: (1) manufacturers of finished products or
component parts; (2) producers of raw materials; (3) "own branders," i.e.,
those holding themselves out as manufacturers or producers; (4)
commercial importers into the EU;' °0 and (5) provisionally, any suppliers
of the product.°8 If, on the facts of a given case, there is more than one
"producer," they are to be jointly and severally liable, with any national law
rights regarding apportionment of the loss inter sese unaffected thereby.'°9
Possible Defenses to Liability: Apart from the plaintiff's own fault
or that of one legally in his charge, the more useful defenses" available to
producers are the "development risks" defense,", unless national law opts to
103. Directive, supra note 11, art. 6.
104. Id. art. 12.
105. Id. art. 8.2.
106. Id. art. 8.1. The producer is free to exercise any rights under national law to seek
contribution from such negligent person. Id.
107. An importer deemed a producer and held liable as such may have certain rights against
the actual producer. Directive, supra note 11, art. 3.2.
. 108. Suppliers may discharge this provisional liability by giving the injured party, within a
reasonable time, the identity of the actual producer or importer or of his own immediate supplier.
Id. art. 3.3.
109. Id. art. 5.
110. Davis, supra note 30, at 126-27.
111. Directive, supra note 11, art. 7(e). The "development risks" defense was apparently
added in response to pressure from the European Parliament. See, e.g., 1980 O.J. (C 147) 122-23
(parliamentary resolution endorsing development risks defense). The 1979 Amended Proposal did
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eliminate it, as it may, ' 2 and if one is a "producer" by virtue of having
manufactured a component part, proof that the defect causing the damage is
due to overall product design or to having followed the product
manufacturer's instructions."'
Scope of Allowable Damages: Under Article 9, the injured person is
always entitled to damages for death or personal injuries. Apparently, this
entitlement refers only to the material damages, because there is a reference
back to national law for the possible availability of nonmaterial damage.
There is no attempt to introduce uniformity into the calculation of those
damages.' '1 The injured person is also always entitled to property damage
for certain property, provided the damage is over an amount of 500
European Currency Units [ECU's]. The property damaged must be
consumer property. If the property was either not ordinarily intended for
personal use or consumption or not mainly so used by the injured party,
which basically means capital goods, there is no recovery allowed. The
Directive does not affect contract and tort rights which an injured person
may have under national law.'"
The Directive allows a person to exercise their rights within three
years of the date the injured person actually or constructively knew of the
damage." 6 In no event may they be exercised more than ten years from the
date the individual damage-causing product was put into circulation."' The
total damages which a producer might be required to pay as a result of
not contain any such defense. See 1979 O.J. (C 271) 3-11 (text of Amended Proposal); see also
supra text accompanying note 42.
112. Directive, supra note 11, art. 15.1(b).
113. Id. art. 7(f.
114. Andrew Geddes, Difficulties Relating to Directives Affecting the Recoverability of
Damages for Personal Injury, 17 EUR. L. REV. 408 (1992) (citing DAVID MCINTOSH &
MARJORIE HOLMES, PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS IN E.C. COUNTRIES (1991)).
The importance of making the correct choice [of forum] has been dramatically
illustrated by a recent survey of damage awards in different Member States. Taking
one example of a 40 year old male doctor who is married with two children and who
suffers serious brain injury, if he brings his proceedings in Ireland he would be likely
to receive something in the region of $2 million. If he brings his proceedings in Spain
on the other hand he would be lucky to receive $250,000. As the authors of the report
point out, until the Community introduces measures to iron out these disparities, forum
shopping will remain prevalent, settlement will be difficult and the single market ideal
of equal treatment in every Member State will be undermined.
Id.
115. Directive, supra note 11, art. 13.
116. Id. art. 10.
117. Id. art. 11.
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identical items with the same defect may, but need not, be capped by
national law at a minimum of seventy million ECU's.1 8
C. Implementation in Member States' National Law
The only three member states able to implement the Directive as of
July 30, 1988, were the United Kingdom, Italy, and Greece, with the latter
two only doing so by decree."19 In fact, "in the [European] Commission's
opinion, the only Member State which had correctly transposed the Products
Liability Directive into its national law was Greece," since the Commission
implemented infraction proceedings against both Italy and the United
Kingdom.'1°  In addition, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal had not implemented
the Directive on time.' 2' One commentator, writing in 1993, bluntly stated
that "[tihe implementation record of most states in relation to this Directive
is nothing short of scandalous. . . . [I]t is extraordinary that France and
Spain have yet to implement the Directive."' 22 Another commentator a few
years earlier noted, "The (interim) balance which one might have struck at
the end of the period prescribed by Art. 19 of the EC Directive-the end of
July 1988-was simultaneously skimpy and surprising. "1 23
In March of 1990, the European Parliament asked "[w]hat urgent
action does the [European] Commission intend to take against the Spanish
Government [for nonimplementation of the Directive]?"124  Shortly
thereafter, the Commission provided a written answer in which it indicated
118. Id. art. 16.1.
119. Willibald Posch, Die Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie 'Produlahaftpflicht" in den
Mitgliedstaaten und die beim "Autonomen Nachvollzug" durch Drittstaaten Auftretenden Probleme,
in SYMPOSIUM STARK: NEUERE ENTWICKLUNGEN IM HAFTPFLICHTRECHT 85 (Heinrich Hansell
& Heinz Rey eds., 1991). This Article will not deal with the question of whether, given the failure
to make timely implementation of the Directive in national law, the Directive's provisions therefore
took "direct effect" therein. See Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note 2, at 790-92.
120. D. Struyven, La Transposition de la Directive Europiene en Matire de Responsabiliti
du fait des Produits Difectueux dans le Droit des itats Membres: Bilan et Perspectives, 66 REVUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE ET DE DROIT COMPARI 140, 141 (1989).
121. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 675 n.13. Subsequently, the European Union was enlarged,
on January 1, 1995, with the accession of new members Austria, Finland, and Sweden.
122. Christopher Hodges, EC: The European Minefield: Looking at EC Product Liability
Law, LLOYDS PRODUCT LIAB. INT'L, Sept. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter
Textline File.
123. Mathias Schubert, Unsetzung der EG-Produkthaftungs-Richtlinie: Eine Zwischenbilanz,
36 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 272 (1990).
124. EUR. PARL. DEB. (3-389) 199 (Apr. 4, 1990) (question no. 56 by Mr. Valverde Lopez,
H-367/90).
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that it had indeed begun "infringement proceedings" against
nonimplementing member states, but went on to say:
However, the Commission took the view that Spain as a
new Member State should be tacitly granted more time for
full implementation. But this does not mean that the
Commission could not now open infringement proceedings
against Spain at any time that seems appropriate, which
risks happening in the present case, as the Member State
has not yet communicated to the Commission the necessary
national measures for the implementation of the
directive. 12
Finally, as of August 3, 1995, "[a~ll EU member states, including the three
new members, have now transposed this directive except for France." 1'
V. THE SPANISH PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT OF 1994
A. Legislative History
"A directive is an EC law addressed to Member Nations of the
Community. It is binding as to its result, but it leaves to each nation the
choice of form and methods to implement it. "121 Writing in 1988, one
Spanish commentator identified three possible implementation options open
to Spain:
125. Id. at 200; see also, e.g., EUR. PARL. DEB. (3-409) 214 (Oct. 9, 1991) (Commission's
written answer to parliamentary question indicating that nonimplementation proceedings had been
commenced against Ireland).
126. EU: Infringement Procedures Continue for Non-Transposition of Directives, AGENCE
EUROPE, Aug. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Textine File (list of the national
legal provisions which EU Member States have communicated to the Commission in connection with
the Directive is available in Westlaw, CELEX Library, NP file).
The Commission of the European Communities brought suit against France in the Court of
Justice of the European Communities on November 21, 1991. In January 1993, the Court held that
France's nonimplementation of the Directive constituted a failure to comply with its obligations
thereunder and under the EEC treaty. Affaire C-293/91, Commission c. Republique Franaise,
available in LEXIS, Eurocom Library, CJCE file (Jan. 13, 1993). In its filings with the Court,
France admitted the facts complained of, but indicated that it was having problems integrating the
Directive into existing French law, because the Directive's measures did not easily harmonize. Id.;
see also Dfaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note 2, at 789 (noting that French implementation of the
Directive was faced with two problems: "coordination with the discipline of the Code Civil and
coordination with special laws"). But see Rojo, supra note 4, at 1277 (noting that integration with
the Civil Code was the method being employed by the Dutch). For a discussion of the difficulty of
making changes in long-established civil codes, see generally SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 23,
at 547-52.
127. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 673 n.2 (citing Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. 11).
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[F]irst, modification of the Civil Code, by introducing into
the part relative to tort liability norms corresponding to the
manufacturer's liability. Second, modification of [the
GAC], revising articles 25 and following of said general
law and squeezing the Community rules within Chapter
VIII. Third, finally, the drafting of a special law.1'2
That commentator recommended the third option, and that position seems to
have prevailed relatively early in the process.'29 The process itself was
punctuated, not to say delayed, by three national elections: in 1986, 1989,
and 1993.' 30
Two drafts were prepared in 1988, one by the Commercial Law
section of the General Commission on Codification, in the Ministry of
Justice, dated January 28, 1988,1' and the other the work of the Ministry of
Health and Consumption, apparently following the issuance of a Report
commissioned by the National Institute on Consumption. 2 The Ministry of
Justice's bill, which basically followed the text of the Directive, included a
repeal of Articles 25 through 29 of the GAC, opted to include agricultural
products within the definition of "product," opted to put a global cap of ten
billion pesetas on damages from identical products with the same defect, and
allowed the "development risks" defense for products other than
pharmaceutical products.'33 The Ministry of Health and Consumption's bill
instead proposed merely amending the GAC to conform, where necessary,
to the Directive. It would, for example, have allowed the GAC to continue
to provide for recovery of property damage below the Directive's threshold
of 500 ECU's. It also opted to include "agricultural products" within the
definition of "product" and disallow the "development risks" defense for
both medicines and food.'3
128. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1277.
129. Cf. Struyven, supra note 120, at 154 n.28 (noting in 1989 "the Directive will be
implemented by means of a special law" and referring to early 1988 draft of same).
130. Cf. Spain, in THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1995 1201, 1203 (132d ed., Brian Hunter
ed.).
131. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 361.
132. Pemin Domecq, supra note 3, at 158-59; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 361.
133. Pemin Domecq, supra note 3, at 158; Directive art. 15.1 (a) (option to include "primary
agricultural products" and "game" within definition of "product"); id. art. 16.1 (option to cap global
damages for identical products having same defect).
134. Pemndn Domecq, supra note 3, at 159. But see Casals, supra note 12 (stating that food
products were excluded from the "development risks" defense only in 1993). The National Institute
on Consumption's report, also proposing the amendment of the GAC, would apparently have also
used the latter to supplement the Directive's ten year period after which consumers' rights were
extinguished. It also accepted the global cap, and the exclusion of capital goods from coverage.
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Another draft was prepared in early 1991. It excluded primary
agricultural products, game and fish from the definition of "product," as
long as they had not undergone any processing. It would have required for a
supplier to discharge himself of his provisional liability as "producer" under
Article 3.3, he would have to inform the injured person of the identity of the
producer or his own immediate supplier within one month of receiving a
request therefor. The Directive had merely specified "within a reasonable
time." The bill permitted the "development risks" defense, a cap on global
damages of 10.5 billion pesetas, and allowed the injured person's own
contributory negligence affect his recovery. ' 35
Finally, in 1993, there was another bill from the Ministry of Justice.
It declared Articles 25 through 28 of the GAC inapplicable to damages
covered by the Directive. It apparently accepted the exclusion of game, fish
and primary agricultural products from the definition of covered products,
the global cap of 10.5 billion pesetas, and set the threshold amount for
recoverable property damage at 75,000 pesetas.'36 The 1993 Justice Ministry
Bill appears to have served as the basis for the eventual 1994 Act.
B. Summary of Key Provisions of SPLA
The SPLA was promulgated on July 6, 1994 and published the next
day in the Official State Bulletin.'" The Preamble to the Act states that its
purpose is the adaptation of Spanish law to the Directive which it describes
as, the opinion of many commentators to the contrary notwithstanding,
"aim[ing] to achieve a substantially homogeneous legal regime within
Community boundaries," and refers to the "format" decision of opting to
draft a new law to take the place of the GAC.' 31 The details which the
Preamble highlights are: (1) a regime of "strict but not absolute" liability
and the limited defenses available to the manufacturer; (2) coverage of
There was some question about whether the Article 13 of the Directive, a savings clause for "rights
[under] a special liability system existing at the moment when this Directive was notified," would
technically permit the maintenance of the GAC. The specific situation the Commission had in mind
was apparently Germany's Pharmaceuticals Law. But some argued that the GAC also qualified as
such a "special liability system." See Rojo, supra note 4, at 1279-81.
135. Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 12, at 361-62. The authors do not make clear to what
extent the "development risks" defense was to be permitted.
136. Pemn Domecq, supra note 3, at 159.
137. For the reference to the official publication, see supra note 18. An English translation of
the SPLA appears in an Appendix infra. For a brief discussion in English, see Ram6n Mullerat,
New Product Liability Law in Spain, 22 INT'L BUS. LAW 418 (1994).
138. See infra Appendix. All other quoted language in this section is taken from the
translation of the SPLA in the Appendix, unless the context indicates that it is taken from the
Directive and/or a footnote further identifies the source.
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physical injury and property damage over 65,000 pesetas; (3) designation
of "those harmed by the defective product," or injured persons, as the
protected class, whether or not they qualify as "consumers in the strict
sense" (presumably that of the GAC); (4) the ten-year duration of the strict
liability created, accompanied by the curious apologia that "it is a
reasonable period of time if one takes into account the Bill's objective
range of application, which is limited to movable goods and gas and
electricity"; and (5) the exercise of the option to put a global cap on
damages a manufacturer may have to pay for "personal" damages caused
by identical articles having the same defect.
Strict Liability: Article 1 of the SPLA follows Article 1 of the
Directive, making "manufacturers" and "importers" (Directive:
"producers") liable for damages caused by the products they manufacture or
import. Article 5 of the Act, tracking Article 4 of the Directive, states that
the injured party who seeks to recover must prove "the defect, the damage
and the causal relation between both." Adhering to the text of Article 2 of
the Directive, SPLA Article 2 defines "product" as all moveables except
primary agricultural products and game, plus gas and electricity. In other
words, the option under Article 15.1 (a) to count primary agricultural
products and game as "products" was not exercised. The addition of "gas"
goes beyond the text of the Directive, but is arguably within its spirit.
Most of SPLA Article 3, "Statutory Definition of Defective
Product," follows Article 5 of the Directive by defining a defective product
as one "not offer[ing] the safety that might legitimately be expected" under
the circumstances, and also by eliminating the argument that an item is
defective because it subsequently appears in an improved version. However,
accepting an amendment proposed by Izquierda Unida, the ex-Communist
party in the Cortes, SPLA 3.2 departs from the text of the Directive by
adopting verbatim a feature of the Italian Products Liability Decree, to the
effect that "[i]n any event, a product is defective if it does not offer the
safety normally offered by other examples in the same series." By side-
stepping the possibly complicated task of having to show what degree of
safety might "legitimately" be expected of a product, this provision
facilitates plaintiff's proof. '39 Article 14 of the Act reproduces the substance
of Article 12 of the Directive, to the effect exculpatory clauses and clauses
limiting liability are "inoperative."
Protected Class: As highlighted in the Preamble, the protected class
under the SPLA is identified by Article 6 as "the injured person."
Following the option provided by Article 8.2 of the Directive, SPLA article
139. Casals, supra note 12 (criticizing SPLA Article 3.2 for impeding the Directive's aim of
developing "a unified concept of defect").
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9 permits the contributory negligence of the injured person, or of one for
whom the latter is civilly liable, to reduce or eliminate the manufacturer's or
importer's liability. Like the Directive's Article 8.1, the SPLA's Article 8
makes the intervention of a third party, other than the one mentioned in the
previous sentence, although a joint cause of the damage together with the
product defect, ineffective to reduce the manufacturer's or importer's
liability to the injured person. The manufacturer or importer, may,
however, subsequently seek a proportionate contribution from the third
person after having satisfied his obligation to indemnify the injured person.
Liable Parties: As mentioned above, whereas Article 1 of the
Directive makes "producers" liable for the damage done by their defective
products, the Act's Article 1, still following the Directive's substance, breaks
up that umbrella term into its basic components, "manufacturers" and
"importers," probably for linguistic reasons. Counting as "manufacturers"
are manufacturers of finished products, manufacturers of component parts
and "own-branders," as well as producers of raw materials. For
"producer," the Spanish text uses the same word, fabricante, that with the
others is translated "manufacturer." The "importers" who are liable under
the act are commercial importers into the EU.
Under Article 4.3 of the SPLA, a supplier of the product is
provisionally deemed a manufacturer unless he informs the injured person
within three months of the identity of the unknown manufacturer or
importer, or of his own immediate supplier. The Directive has a "within a
reasonable time" requirement. However, an "additional provision" of the
Act, appearing towards the end, further provides that any supplier who
supplies a product knowing of the existence of the defect is liable as though
he were the manufacturer or producer. But if he is held so liable, he has a
claim against the manufacturer or importer. There is no parallel to this
provision in the text of the Directive.
Article 7 of the Act, following Article 5 of the Directive, provides
for joint and several liability of more than one liable person under the Act.
Possible Defenses to Liability: Besides the injured person's own
fault under SPLA Article 9, Article 6 of the Act, in keeping with Article 7 of
the Directive, includes the two useful defenses of "development risks"-
except as to "pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food products intended
for human consumption" and the "sub-component" defense, where a
component part is incorporated into a defectively designed product or the
manufacturer or importer of the part has simply followed the product
manufacturer's instructions. The exception to the "development risks"
defense is a partial exercise of the option provided by Article 15.1 of the
Directive, which allowed reinstatement of liability for "development risks"
in implementing legislation once the member state followed a notification
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procedure.'14 The Directive itself neither prohibits nor endorses such partial
reinstatements of development risks liability.
With respect to the elimination of the "development risks" defense
on "pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs, or food products," Professor
Casals stated:
The practical consequences of the new provision go much
further than the German Pharmaceutical Act [of] 1976.
Thus, in comparison to the German Act, there is no
distinction between prescription and over-the-counter
drugs; liability refers both to physical injury and to
property damage, and the concept of drug established by
Spanish law is much wider. '4
The definition of "food" is found in the Spanish Food Code. The
same Code defines the concept of "food product" (producto alimentario),
which includes additives and other substances without any nutritional value
used in food processes. 4 2
Scope of Allowable Damages: Paralleling article 9 of the Directive,
SPLA Article 10.1 allows recovery of damages for death and bodily injury
and for damages to noncapital, consumer goods-objectively so intended and
subjectively, in the main, so used-over a threshold amount of 65,000
pesetas. Following the tenor of Article 13 of the Directive, Article 10.2 of
the Act is a savings clause which preserves the right to be compensated for
other damages and injuries, including pain and suffering, under the general
civil law. Under the "third final provision" of the SPLA, this amount may
be changed by the Government in accordance with periodic revisions by the
Council of the European Union.
Article 12 of the SPLA sets a three-year statute of limitations on the
bringing of an action, "from the date the injured person suffered the injury,
from either the product defect or the damage that said defect occasioned him,
provided the party liable for such injury is known." Presumably the quoted
language is meant to indicate, in a roundabout sort of way, what Article 10.1
of the Directive stated: "The limitation period shall begin to run from the
day on which the plaintiff became aware, or should reasonably have become
aware, of the damage, the defect and the identity of the producer."'14 Article
140. None of the sources consulted indicated whether Spain followed the notification
procedure outlined in Article 15.2 of the Directive with respect to this provision.
141. Casals, supra note 12.
142. Id.
143. 1985 O.J. (L 210) 31.
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12 of the Act goes on to insert a one-year limitation period on actions by a
liable party seeking contribution from another.
As instructed by Article 11 of the Directive, Article 13 of the SPLA
extinguishes all rights of injured persons "ten years from the date the specific
product causing the injury was placed into circulation."
The Act's Article 11 places a global cap of 10.5 billion pesetas on
damages stemming from deaths or personal injuries caused by identical
products showing the same defect. This exercises Article 16. 1's option with
respect to the capping of damages. Under the "third final provision" of the
SPLA, this amount too may be changed by the Government in accordance
with periodic revisions by the Council of the European Union. 144
Partial Repealer of GAC: The "first final provision" of the Act
makes Articles 25 through 28 of the GAC inapplicable to civil liability for
damages caused by "defective products" within the meaning of the Act.
Further discussion and observations on the SPLA will be made in Part VI.
VI. THE SPLA COMPARED
A. The SPLA and Post-Directive European Products Liability Law
One explicitly stated rationale for the Directive was "because the
existing divergences [in member states' laws] may distort competition and
affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a
differing degree of protection of the consumer. "'4 The antidote administered
by the Directive was a self-described "approximation" of member states'
laws. 14 6  The very word chosen, "approximation," or "drawing closer,"
suggests that substantive 'equalization' of member states' laws, which
perhaps alone could truly eliminate market distortions and differential
protections, was not in sight, nor intended to be.
That having been said, two policy questions then surface: How
close do member states' laws need to be brought in order to achieve
significant diminution of market distortions; and should the desired degree of
proximity ever properly be achieved at the cost of diminishing the protection
144. Quaere whether this language establishing the cap means that the damage to non-capital
consumer property which accompanies a death or personal injury is uncapped. Furthermore, since
neither the Act nor the Directive states that death or personal injury is a prerequisite to the
recoverability of damages to noncapital consumer property, quaere whether consumer property
damages occurring apart from death or personal injury are equally uncapped. One could argue that
since the cap provisions only speak to "damage resulting from a death or personal injury," both
kinds of property damage are uncapped. Whether this was intended, or is sensible policy, is another
matter. The interpretive question is posed by the language of the Directive as well as of the
implementing legislation.




afforded to consumers by member states whose antecedent products liability
regime had progressed further, from a consumer perspective, than the
Directive's? The likely answers to these global questions would tend to
point each in a different direction on the permissible contents of post-
Directive national products liability laws. On the one hand, because of the
concern with advancing consumer interests, evidenced by the text of the
Directive and its pre-history,"4 the latter should certainly not be construed so
as to leave some European consumers effectively worse off than before. On
this interpretation, the Directive would be taken only as establishing a
minimum, a guaranteed "floor" of protection, below which the national law
of any member state might not fall.1'4 Member states would be free to make
their products liability laws more generous to consumers than the terms
mandated by the Directive.' 9 On the other hand, it might be argued that
because undesirable market distortions will only be removed the closer to
parity, member states' laws are brought, no more "divergences" should be
tolerated other than those the Directive explicitly permits. Ideally, those
divergences would eventually disappear. On this view, the Directive would
be both minimum and maximum, floor and ceiling, for European consumer
protection against defective products."
As a general matter, the precise quantum of legal approximation
necessary for significant diminution of market distortions is probably not
ascertainable ex ante. But even on the most restrictive reading of the
Directive; i.e., one that would yield the maximum possible "approximation"
of national laws, it is quite clear that the post-Directive products liability
regime in Europe has still had to tolerate a significant amount of
divergence.", The latter emanates from a variety of sources:
147. The Preamble to the Directive states that "insofar as [existing contract and tort
provisions of national law] also serve to attain the objective of effective protection of consumers,
they should remain unaffected by this Directive." 1985 O.J. (L 210) 30. For the pre-history of the
Directive, see supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
148. "The Directive only compels.. . a uniform minimum level of protection of the injured
'consumer' vis-4-vis that liable party who is a 'manufacturer.'" Gerhard Hohloch, Produkthaftung in
Europa, 2 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT 408, 430 (1994).
149. Cf. Pemin Domecq, supra note 3, at 157 (opining that post-directive Spanish law might
continue to allow for recovery of damages to defective goods themselves or to capital goods).
150. See, e.g., Rojo, supra note 4, at 1273. "What is involved is not a Directive of
minimums, expandable at the will of every State. In it is contained a special closed system of civilliability .. .." Id.
151. Hodges, supra note 122.
[T]he much vaunted 'level playing field' has not been created in relation to product
liability. Indeed, the [national divergences] could be said to reveal a playing field
which not only undulates but is peppered with unpleasant pitfalls for the unwary.
Depending on the viewpoint which is adopted, this is to the disadvantage of
manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers and consumers.
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Some problems arise from the fact that the Directive
contains a number of optional provisions, which lead to
divergencies between the national laws of the Member
States. Other problems arise from the inherent nature of
legislating by directive, particularly that its terms do not
have direct effect but need to be implemented into national
legislation, which therefore allows for divergencies of
implementation, whether intentional or accidental. Other
problems arise from matters which are explicitly not dealt
with in the Directive, such as relevant aspects of national
law, practice, the legal systems and funding of litigation in
Member States. 52
The three options explicitly provided for' 3 are: (1) whether to include
"primary agricultural products"'I within the definition of "product;" (2)
whether to permit the so-called "development risks" defense;, and (3)
whether to include a global cap of at least seventy million ECU's on
damages payable by a producer "for death or personal injury... caused by
identical items with the same defect.'"16 Besides perpetuating a "differing
degree of protection of the consumer" to one extent or another,' 7 these
Id. "It can be said that, far from harmonising laws within the EU, the implementation of the
Directive has added a further layer of liability in the national law." Casals, supra note 21. See
also Struyven, supra note 120, at 151; Posch, supra note 119, at 113-14 ("The implementation of
the EC-Directive does not in fact lead to standardization of law, but merely to a limited
approximation that, due to highly relevant divergences in border-straddling products-liability
cases, makes the private international law in this area not obsolete even among Common Market
Member States."); Kr6ger, supra note 99, at 300 (Member States' options under the Directive
"obviously do not favor harmonization"); cf. Hohloch, supra note 148, at 434-35 (opining that
while what has been standardized predominates, Article 13 of the Directive "undoubtedly is also
leading down the road to renewed diversification and separate development of [national] laws
outside the core area [of standardization]").
152. Hodges, supra note 122.
153. Actually, there are four options. On the canonical three options, see generally Hohloch,
supra note 148, at 426, 431-32; Hodges, supra note 122; von Marschall, supra note 101, at 708 &
712; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1273; Struyven, supra note 120, at 148-50; and Kr6ger, supra note 99,
at 300-02.
154. Primary agricultural products are defined by the Directive as "the products of the soil, of
stock-farming and of fisheries, excluding products which have undergone initial processing."
Directive, supra note 11, art. 2. The Directive's default position is to exclude them from the
definition of "product." Id. Article 15. 1(a), however, allows Member States the option of including
them within said definition.
155. See BROGGEMANN supra note 21, at 111-12.
156. Directive, supra note 11, art. 16.1.
157. See, e.g., Geddes, supra note 114, at 417 (noting the "still ... very substantial
differences in Member States' laws governing personal injury awards arising out of product liability
claims [left by] the Directive").
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options and other divergences may well pose a threat to the goal of
eliminating market distortions.' 8 This result was probably preordained,
given the character of the Directive as a compromise agreement. 9
1. The Three Options
Primary agricultural products: As for "primary agricultural
products," the SPLA does not choose to include them within its definition of
"product."'"6 Earlier drafts of the law had, however, included them,'6' which
would tend to indicate this was a subject of some controversy. Such an
exclusion was prospectively criticized by one Spanish commentator, who
noted "European agriculture has nowadays largely become rather more of an
industrial process. The exclusion of primary agricultural products and game
is inspired more by political than legal reasons rooted in the support and
protection [given] to the agricultural sector, traditionally well protected by
Member States." 62
In this respect, Spain is among the majority of member states,
inasmuch as only three states, Luxembourg and two new member states,
Finland and Sweden, have opted to include primary agricultural products,
although a draft French law would apparently also include them. 3 Even so,
one scholar has opined that the divergence of national laws on this point may
in any event not be terribly significant, since processed foods are always
subject to liability and any additional liability imposed by an expanded
definition would not in practice extend to "spoilage [of fresh food products]
en route to the consumer." This is presumably because such spoilage would
not be a "defect" whose absence the donsumer is reasonably entitled to
expect but the liability would only relate to the "narrowly construed ...
growth phase" of such products.'"
158. See Hodges supra note 122. But cf. Bernstein, supra note 42, at 681-82 (wondering
whether the legal changes implemented pursuant to the Directive will have any effect at all on
decisions relating to the movement of goods, and if so, whether goods will be moved in a non-
desired direction).
159. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 98-101; von Marschall, supra note 101, at 707
(describing the Directive as "a compromise which was achieved after long discussions and
negotiations").
160. SPLA art. 2.1.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
162. Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note 2, at 777; see also Rojo, supra note 4, at 1281
(recommending inclusion of primary agricultural products in definition of "product"). The European
food-processing industry was also in favor of the expanded definition, in light of Article 5 of the
Directive's provision regarding joint and several liability of two or more parties liable for the same
damage. Kr6ger, supra note 99, at 302.
163. These statistics are tabulated in Hodges, supra note 122.
164. Hohloch, supra note 148, at 432.
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Development Risks: Article 6.1 (e) of the SPLA makes a
"development risks" defense generally available, but Article 6.3 later
eliminates it with respect to "pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food
products." Such a limited acceptance of the defense was apparently an
agreed feature of the Spanish legislation from a rather early stage.'" But, by
partly allowing and partly disallowing the "development risks" defense,
Spain's position is an anomaly among EU member states.'" The great
majority of the latter, and France in draft form, have opted to permit the
defense; only Luxembourg and Finland have excluded it.167
One commentator described the legal differences in member states'
products liability laws on development risks as "more significant" than the
differences over primary agricultural products.' '6 Recently, a Spanish
scholar further opined that Spain's difference from other EU member states
would be especially pronounced in the area of pharmaceutical products.'"
By contrast, another writer indicated a belief that cases involving
development risks would be "extremely rare,"170 and this is seconded by a
commentator who observed "[t]he Directive's critics tend to overestimate the
scope of development risk liability. "171 Under the terms of the Directive, a
report was due to be filed by the Commission in 1995 on the development
risks defense, with a view to its possible complete elimination from the
Directive.72
Global Cap on Damages: Article 11 of the SPLA institutes a cap of
10.5 billion pesetas on "overall civil liability for death and personal injuries
caused by identical products showing the same defect." Such a cap was a
feature of the Ministry of Justice's draft as early as 1988,"7, and the idea of a
165. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35. The elimination of the defense doubtlessly
owes something to the "Toxic Oil Syndrome."
166. "To date, it seems that Spain has been the only country to answer [the development risks
question] with a peculiar 'No, but. .. .' " Casals, supra note 12.
167. Hodges, supra note 122; Hohloch, supra note 148, at 432. Hohloch wrongly reports
that the Swedish law has imposed development risk liability on manufacturers.
168. Hohloch, supra note 148, at 432.
169. See supra text accompanying note 141.
170. von Marschall, supra note 101, at 712.
171. Kathleen M. Nilles, Defining the Limits of Liability: A Legal and Political Analysis of
the European Community Products Liability Directive, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 761 (1985); see also
von Marschall, supra note 101 at 764.
172. Directive, supra note 11, art. 15.3.
173. See supra text accompanying note 133. It was apparently not a feature of the Ministry of
Health and Consumption's bill of the same year, which, however, would presumably have retained
the GAC's ambiguously applied 500-million cap. See supra text accompanying notes 89, 134.
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cap was explicitly endorsed by at least one Spanish expert in the area.'71
Here again, Spain is in the minority. Only three other member states,
Germany, Greece, and Portugal, have also exercised this option, while the
other eleven states, including France in draft, have not added such a
provision. What these numbers may reflect is a general tradition of
uncapped liability in European law'" and the suprisingly weak support of
European industry for the idea of a cap.7 6 Under the terms of the Directive,
the effects of the cap on consumer protection were likewise due for decennial
review in 1995.'"
Effect of Injured Party's Fault: Apart from the three widely
discussed options indicated above, the Directive expressly provides for an
additional option. Article 8.2 permits, but does not require, member states'
national laws to reduce or disallow a producer's liability when "the damage
is caused both by a defect in the product and by the fault of the injured
person or any person for whom the injured person is responsible." SPLA
Article 9 exercises this option.
2. Nonuniform Implementation
Definition of "Product": While having chosen to exclude "primary
agricultural products" from coverage, the SPLA went on to state that "gas
and electricity are [also] considered products."" The Directive, however,
had only specified that "'[p]roduct' includes electricity. "'11 This addendum
may be a reflection of the still rather widespread use of gas canisters, called
bombonas, to provide, for example, hot water in many Spanish households,
174. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1281.
175. Krdger, supra note 99, at 301; cf. Diaz, supra note 2, at 785 (noting "different traditions
among the member states").
176. Cited as reasons for this are the fact that "the proposed ceiling was so high that
businesses scarcely saw any advantages it might hold for them" and the fear some businesses in fact
felt that they might be "driven to insure themselves up to the ceiling even though their risks were in
fact less significant." Kr6ger, supra note 99, at 301-02. The basic theory behind the Directive's cap
has also been criticized on policy grounds: The choice of any figure as a financial cap is, of course,
entirely arbitrary.
The financial ceiling might be more justifiable if it were related mathematically to
factors such as the number of a given type of products in circulation in a country and
the size of the population of individual states. There is little justifiable correlation here
between the widely fluctuating population sizes of different states.
Hodges, supra note 122.
177. Directive, supra note 11, art. 16.2.
178. SPLA art. 2.2.
179. Directive, supra note 11, art. 2.
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as well as the fact that a number of leading decisions by the Tribunal
Supremo on products liability had involved gas explosions. '1
Definition of 'Defect': The Directive's basic definition of a defective
product is "not provid[ing] the safety which a person is entitled to expect."''
However, the SPLA superimposes another, more objective test: "In any
event, a product is defective if it does not offer the safety normally offered
by other examples in the same [product] series. "1 As indicated previously,
this more objective test was apparently added to facilitate plaintiff's ability to
meet the burden of proof, inasmuch as the Directive's general test of
defectiveness is a rather more open-ended and, hence, less predictable
inquiry.' 3
Suppliers' Liability: Where a producer or importer could not be
identified, the Directive made any supplier of the product provisionally liable
just as though he were a producer, unless he informed the injured person
"within a reasonable time" of the identity of the actual producer, importer,
or of his own supplier.'" The SPLA, instead, chooses to draw a bright line
and specifies that the supplier has three months to provide such
information.U3 In an earlier draft of the Spanish law, the period had been set
at one month.186 There is wide divergence here among the national laws of
member states.8 7
In another nonuniform provision, the SPLA additionally provides for
the nonprovisional liability of suppliers who "suppl[y] [a] product knowing
of the existence of the defect."lu For all that, such scienter liability may be
good policy, it has no basis in the text of the Directive.
180. See, e.g., Casals, supra note 12.
181. Directive, supra note 11, art. 6.
182. SPLA art. 3.2. The test was copied from the Italian Products Liability Decree.
183. See supra text preceding note 139.
184. Directive, supra note 11, art. 3.3.
185. SPLA art. 4.3.
186. See supra text preceding note 135.
187. By way of comparison, the Italian and Portuguese product liability laws also set a three
month period and the German law sets a one month period, whereas the Greek, Danish, English and
Austrian legislation followed the more open-ended "reasonable time" approach. By way of non-
binding interpretive aid, the Austrian government's commentary on the relevant section of its law
stated that normally a one to two week period is sufficient. Posch, supra note 119, at 97-98. Posch
also notes an opinion to the effect that such more precise definitions of the available time period as
that contained in the Spanish act contravene the Directive, going on to observe: "Here, precisely, is
it particularly clearly shown how far from complete is the approximation of laws within the Common
Market that the Directive aimed for." Id. at 96-97.
188. SPLA "Additional provision (one only). Supplier's liability."
408 [Vol. 2:371
Ansaldi
3. Subsistence of Background Law
Directive References to National Law: The Directive explicitly
states that national law continues to govern in the following five areas:
(1) contribution or recourse rights among two or more
jointly and severally liable persons;1 9
(2) contribution or recourse rights between a liable
producer and a contributorily negligent intervening
third-party; 19
(3) recovery for nonmaterial damage such as pain and
suffering; 91
(4) tolling of the statute of limitations;'1
(5) rights under rules of contract or tort [noncontractuall
liability and rights under any pre-existing "special
liability systems"' 93
Contribution and Recourse Rights: Article 7 of the SPLA establishes
joint and several liability for those persons, manufacturers, importers, or
suppliers, the Act makes liable for the same injury. Article 8 further
provides that a person found liable under the SPLA who has satisfied the
obligation to pay compensation to the injured party may then bring a claim
against a negligent third party for "the portion corresponding to his
intervention in causing the injury.""' In principle, it seems likely that such
rights would not vary widely from one member state to another.
Nonmaterial Damages: In light of the SPLA's repeal of Articles 25
through 28 of the GAC as to damages caused by defective products, the
background Spanish law on compensation for nonaterial damages, such aspain and suffering, will hence revert to the Civil Code's contract and tort
provisions discussed earlier. Both of them, as interpreted by the courts,
generally permitted recovery for nonmaterial damages.1 95 But a reversion to
the Civil Code to recover such damages will obviously entail the
reinstatement of some sort of fault analysis in Spanish products liability
189. Directive, supra note 11, art. 5.
190. Id. art. 8.1.
191. Id. art. 9.
192. Id. art. 10.2.
193. Id. art. 13; see also supra note 134.
194. Additional provisions regarding joint and several liability and contribution rights can be
found in Civil Code Articles 1137-48, 1195-1202.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 39 & 60.
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litigation. '" Such divergences as may exist on a theoretical level among the
various member states in their treatment of nonmaterial damages were
assessed by one commentator as often being merely apparent differences
which, to his mind, really had no discernible distorting effect on
competition. '1'
Tolling of the Three-Year Limitations Period: The Directive dictates
a three year limitations period for the bringing of an action, which begins to
run "from the day on which the plaintiff became aware or should reasonably
have become aware, of the damage, the defect, and the identity of the
producer."' '  In an awkwardly worded provision,'1 Article 12.1 of the
SPLA provides that an action must be brought "within three years from the
date the injured person suffered the injury, from either the product defect or
the damage that said defect occasioned him, provided the party liable for
such injury is known." It goes on to provide "[t]he tolling of the limitation
period is governed by provisions of the Civil Code."200
From the rather opaque language used, it is hardly crystalline that
the second part of the disjunctive phrase "three years from the date the
injured person suffered the injury, from either the product defect or the
damage that said defect occasioned him" is meant to cover subsequently
discovered injuries. Presumably, the SPLA intends to cover such situations;
for it not to do so would be extraordinarily regressive.201 However, in the
unlikely event that Article 12.1 of the SPLA is found not to extend to such
subsequently discovered injuries, however, it is clear that the referenced civil
law provisions tolling the statute of limitations would not be adequate to
bring them within the Act, whatever other lacunae they could be used to
fill.202
196. See supra text accompanying notes 34, 56-59.
197. See Hohloch, supra note 148, at 437-39.
198. Directive, supra note 11, art. 10.1.
199. See supra text accompanying note 142.
200. Directive, supra note 11, art. 12.2.
201. Cf. C.CIV. art. 1968.2. The general statute of limitations for civil actions for fault or
negligence under Civil Code article 1902 states that the same have to be brought within one year
"from [the time] the aggrieved party discovered it."
202. The general provisions on tolling are found in the Civil Code Articles 1973-1975. They
do not deal with the problem of after-discovered injury. Where American legal theory uses the one
umbrella term "tolling," Spanish legal theory distinguishes between the "suspension" of a Statute of
Limitations, which prevents its ever starting to run in the first place, and its "interruption" once it
has started running. Hence, it is the text of SPLA Article 12.1 itself which needs to contain rules
regarding the "suspension" of the three-year statute, since Article 12.2's reference to civil law only
relates to its "interruption." For a general discussion of tolling of the statute of limitations in the
context of the Civil Code Articles 1902. see SANTOS BRIZ, supra note 23, at 1045-68.
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Savings of Contract and Tort Rights: In addition to the just
mentioned possibility of contract or tort rights to recover nonmaterial
damages, the following eight types of damages have also been identified as
falling outside the scope of national legislation implementing the EEC's
Products Liability Directive:
1. Damage caused by products which were put into
circulation before the implementing date of the
legislation and which remain in circulation.
2. Damage [from development risks]....
3. Damage to the defective product itself.
4. Damage to commercial property.
5. Damage to personal property not in excess of 500
ECU.
6. Damage for which proceedings are not commenced
within three years from the plaintiff's date of actual or
constructive knowledge of the damage, the defect and
the identity of the producer.
7. Damage caused by a product which has been in
circulation for more than ten years.
8. Pure economic loss not caused by death or personal
injuries .1
As for defective products already in circulation when the new law
went into effect, the SPLA's single "transitional provision" provides that the
Act is inapplicable. Liability for such products latter "shall be governed by
the provisions in effect at said time." For such situations, then, the GAC or
the Civil Code will continue to provide the governing law.
With respect to the other items on the list, Article 15 of the SPLA
provides that actions brought thereunder "have no effect on other rights the
injured person may have as a result of the contractual or noncontractual
[tort] liability of the manufacturer, importer or of any other person." As a
result, it would appear that most, if not all,2 of the listed damages may
203. Hodges, supra note 122. Hodges opines that manufacturers' continuing uncertainty
about non-Directive based liability for development risks is particularly regrettable.
204. Liability for development risks was excluded under both the contract/obligations and tort
regimes. See supra text accompanying notes 42 & 61. However, there was a minimal development-
risk liability under the Sales theory. See supra text accompanying note 38. Damages not sought
within three years from the plaintiff's date of actual or constructive knowledge of the damage, the
defect and the identity of the producer would continue to be available only under a
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continue to be sought under the Civil Code's contract and tort provisions.
Of course, those damages may not be sought under the GAC since the SPLA
repealed its products liability provisions.-) Once again, as with nonmaterial
damages, this means that these damages are still recoverable, though only
upon proof, or unrebutted presumption, of the defendant's fault. Hence, one
Spanish scholar has indicated that he regards the continued vitality of the
civil code regime as assured: "[I]n practice it is likely that future claims
under the SPLA will be made with causes of action which would previously
have been used, pleaded in the alternative."6
Most of the member states, except France, have effectively
preserved contract and tort rights. I From a theoretical perspective, the
Directive's permitted savings of such rights should not result in a wide
degree of divergence among member states because most had previously
followed some sort of mixed contract-tort approach to products liability
questions in the time preceding the Directive.2 As a result, one scholar calls
the practical consequences of such differences "small" and "tolerable."0
Other Features of the Legal System: Far from inconsequential, at
least as it relates to the "bottom line" of compensation, are differential
practices of national court systems in measuring damages. Spanish courts
have at times been cited for the conservatism of their products liability
awards, as compared with other EU member states. 210  On the other hand,
Spain was identified by one commentator as belonging to a group of
countries making legal aid available, "particularly where there is no
assessment of the merits of a claim. "2, The high level of availability of legal
aid is a factor which may make it easier in Spain to bring products liability
lawsuits. 212
contract/obligations theory, which has a 15-year statute of limitations, but not under a tort or a sales
theory, which have limitations of one year and six months, respectively. See supra text
accompanying notes 38, 49-50, 64.
205. See supra text following note 144.
206. Casals, supra note 12.
207. Hohloch's attempted differentiation of Great Britain and Italy in this respect seems open
to question. See Hohloch, supra note 148, at 428, 429 n.93. Both the British and Italian laws have
explicit savings clauses. See Consumer Protection Act [United Kingdom], § 2(6) (1987) and Decreto
del Presidente Della Republica n. 224 del 24/05/88, Supplemento Ordinario Alla Gazzetta Uficiale
n. 56 de1 23/06/88 [Italian Products Liability Decree 1987], § 15.1.
208. See, e.g., supra note 30; Hohloch, supra note 148, at 413.
209. Hohloch, supra note 148, at 429, 430.
210. See Geddes, supra note 114 (contrasting Spain and Ireland).
211. Hodges, supra note 122.
212. Another theoretically "anti-consumer" feature of the Spanish legal system, one which it
shares with other Civil Law countries, is a lack of easy access to extensive documentation on
discovery. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 23, at 426-28. "Ease of access to extensive
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B. The SPLA and the GAC
Prior to the passage of the SPLA, many Spanish commentators
agreed that a comparison of the GAC with the legal regime set up by the
Directive would show consumer interests better protected by one over the
other. Hence, they saw a simple replacement of the GAC with the Directive
as a simultaneous improvement and worsening of consumer protection in
Spain.213 But if this was so, why not, when implementing the Directive,
adhere to the policy stated in the Directive's Preamble '14 and maintain the
GAC "to the extent it implies a plus in protection?"211
While the Spanish government was considering how best to
implement the Directive, one option some were arguing for was in fact the
maintenance in force of an amended GAC. 216  This option, however, was
ultimately rejected, and it is not hard to find compelling reasons to have
rejected it. Quite apart from the savage criticism of the GAC's
draftsmanship and its very intelligibility,2' there may have been a feeling that
the lavishly pro-consumer regime instituted by Article 28 was beyond what
was tolerable at that stage of development of Spanish society,2 18 having been
perhaps something of an overreaction to the Toxic Oil Syndrome. Hence,
one commentator argued, any attempt to have the best of both worlds, i.e.,
to keep the most attractive, pro-consumer, features of both, would lead to a
relative weakening of Spanish industry vis-4-vis its European competitors.2 1 9
Ultimately, the SPLA did in fact repeal Articles 25 through 28 of the GAC
as they related to "civil liability for damages caused by defective products
[as defined by the SPLA]."
documentation on discovery" is cited by Hodges as one of a number of features which are generally
regarded as "major risk factors" in product liability from a defendant's perspective. Hodges, supra
note 122 (singling out Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (less Scotland) as presenting this
risk factor). On the other hand, under the SPLA parsimonious discovery is less likely to prove a
problem to injured Spanish consumers, inasmuch as the question of fault, whose access to such
documents would be most relevant, should not surface except at the margins.
213. PemAn Domecq, supra note 3, at 155; Mullerat & Cortes, supra note 13, at 363; Rojo,
supra note 4, at 1282.
214. See Directive, supra note 11, pmbl., para. 13.
215. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1280.
216. See supra text accompanying note 134; Diaz de Lezcano Sevillano, supra note 2, at 773
n.95 (citing opinion of Sequiera that GAC already provided and exceeded the level of protection
required by the Directive); cf. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1279-80 (arguing that the substance of GAC
Article 28 could be maintained under Article 13 of the Directive).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 74 & 89.
218. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1260-61, 1272.
219. Id. at 1282.
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One Spanish commentator has recently described his own and a
portion of the public's response to the SPLA as follows:
I thought the implementation of the EC Directive on
Products Liability would be an important step towards
more effective protection for consumers in Spain without
burdening manufacturers with unreasonable costs. Today I
doubt it. The editorial of last October's [1994] issue of
Dinero y Derechos (Money and Rights), a magazine
published by a Spanish consumer organisation, states that
the new Spanish Products Liability Act (SPLA) "will end
by creating more problems instead of offering solutions to
the victim"; it adds that judges were already showing the
right path to adapt Spanish law to the EC Directive, and
questions whether this new Act will mean a backward step
or not.n0
What accounts for the pessimistic tone of these reactions? Underlying it
must be a perception that the overall net position of Spanish consumers who
are products liability plaintiffs is worse under the SPLA than it had been
under the GAC. Is such a conclusion warranted by a comparison of the key
features of the two Acts?221
1. Improvements in the Consumer's Position Under the SPLA
Under the GAC, it was only "destinatarios finales," end-recipients
or end-users, who were defined as "consumers." Only "consumers," so
defined, could benefit from the virtually absolute liability of the GAC Article
28 "special" regime. All others were relegated to the Civil Code's fault-
based liability system with causes of action sounding either in contract or
tort.mn Given the SPLA's preservation of contract and tort rights, those
products liability plaintiffs whom the GAC had effectively confined to the
Code theories of liability are clearly not harmed by the passage of the SPLA.
They can now, in essence, choose between Civil Code and SPLA-based
causes of action or, as Professor Casals predicted, argue them in the
220. Casals, supra note 12.
221. For the sake of discussion, the following analysis adopts an avowedly partisan, purely
"pro-consumer" perspective as opposed to the more self-consciously "balanced" perspective of one
interested in the overall equilibrium and well-being of Spanish society. It assumes, then, that
increases in consumer rights and protections are social goods, without more, and vice versa. This is
done, however, solely to throw certain aspects of the SPLA into high relief. It is in no sense an
attempt to obviate a society's need to weigh consumers interests against others, to the possible
detriment of the former.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
414 [Vol. 2:371
Ansaldi
alternative. 23 As a class, then, they can only be benefited from the SPLA.
It is only those plaintiffs who would previously have been eligible to sue
under the GAC, "consumers" narrowly defined, who may now be adversely
affected by its repeal. Alternatively, such plaintiffs may have been benefited
by the SPLA, to the extent that the latter's provisions are more advantageous
than the ones they replace.
Protected Class Broadened: There is one obvious feature of the
SPLA which may represent an improvement over the GAC for consumers.
This relates to the scope of the protected class under each. Whereas under
the GAC it was only "consumers" who could benefit from the virtually
absolute liability of the GAC Article 28 "special" regime, the SPLA by
contrast defines the protected class much more broadly as "injured
persons. "2 Consequently, the no-fault protection afforded by the latter Act
extends well beyond the confines of the GAC's "consumers." All
prospective products liability plaintiffs who would previously have been
slotted into the category of nonconsumers have now been benefited by their
admission to the SPLA's no-fault liability regime. Thus, to the extent that
the Civil Code regime continued to prove problematic even after judicial
establishment of a rebuttable presumption of defendants' fault,2  plaintiffs
who are ineligible for "consumer" status under the GAC are clearly better
off under the SPLA regime which largely dispenses with the fault inquiry.
By the same token, to the extent that the GAC's absolute liability provided
an even higher degree of protection to certain consumers than the SPLA's
strict liability, those plaintiffs who could previously have sued under the
GAC have clearly been harmed by being deprived of the latter. As a matter
of policy, the legal treatment of end-using and non-end-using products
liability plaintiffs no doubt ought to have been largely equalized. Whether
that equalization ought to have come about by lowering the protection of the
one and then raising the protection of the other to the same new level is
another matter.
On a statistical level, if the subset of product liability plaintiffs who
are not end-users is larger than the subset of plaintiffs who are, more people
would be benefited by the improved position of the former than would be
harmed by the worsened position of the latter. Hence, if this assumption is
correct, one might well say that, in this respect, there is a net improvement
in the position of Spanish consumers. On the other hand, if this statistical
assumption is incorrect, and end-users in fact preponderate among products
liability plaintiffs, then a greater number of Spanish consumers will have
223. See supra text accompanying note 206.
224. See supra text following note 139.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
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been harmed by the relative contraction of their legal rights as compared to
the status quo ante under the GAC.
Without statistical data, of course, it is impossible to give anything
more than impressions about which of these assumptions is correct. To the
author, however, it appears intuitive, though no more than intuitive, that
"end-users" would constitute the great majority of products liability
plaintiffs. If so, then this aspect of the repeal of the GAC is obviously a
setback to the interests of more consumers than not. Nonetheless, it
indubitably provides a clear-cut benefit to some consumers, even if they turn
out to be numerically in the minority.
To this clear-cut benefit for those consumers previously
disadvantaged under the GAC, we may now perhaps add two rather
speculative benefits of the SPLA to the other consumers, those who would
have been entitled to sue under the 1984 Act. The first benefit relates to the
statute of limitations; the second to the cap on damages. These benefits must
perforce be viewed as speculative, owing to the lack of clarity in the GAC
itself.
Statute of Limitations Lengthened: Article 12 of the SPLA provides
for a three-year statute of limitations. Characteristic of its inartful drafting,
the GAC was silent on the limitations period. If the latter's limitation period
was in fact one year as some commentators argued,2 then those who would
previously have been "consumer" plaintiffs under the GAC as well as those
non-end users suing in tort,m were clearly benefited by the SPLA'S increase
of the limitations period to three years; even non-end-users suing in contract
probably benefited therebyY8u On the other hand, if the GAC's limitations
period was in fact fifteen years, as one commentator claimed,29 then those
who previously would have been consumer plaintiffs under the GAC were
obviously harmed by the SPLA's reduction of the time period for bringing
an action. However, since the weight of opinion, however, appears to be
with the one-year interpretation, one can venture a qualified judgment in this
226. See supra text accompanying note 89.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 64.
228. Plaintiffs under a contract/obligations theory, which had a fifteen-year limitations period,
would not necessarily lose out if SPLA Article 15, which saves contract rights, is read as giving a
product-liability plaintiff the option of suing either under the SPLA or under the contract provisions
of the Civil Code (assuming he meets the factual predicates for the latter status). See supra text
accompanying note 49. Of course, if he chooses the latter route, that would come only at the cost of
re-instating a fault analysis. Should this prove too high a price to pay, the SPLA's apparent option to
sue in contract might well only rarely be exercised. In that case, those plaintiffs having the
theoretical option to sue in contract might be viewed as having had a trade off made for them: a
shorter limitations period in exchange for a lack of need to prove defendant's fault. In the calculus of
net benefit or loss, those plaintiffs would probably still be better off under the SPLA.
229. See supra text accompanying note 89 (opinion of Pemat Domecq).
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respect the SPLA's three-year period represents an advance in consumer
protection.
Higher Cap on Damages: Article 11 of the SPLA, exercising the
option provided under Article 16 of the Directive, implemented an overall
cap of 10.5 billion pesetas on liability "for death and personal injuries caused
by identical products showing the same defect." The GAC, for its part, had
a cap of 500 million pesetas on liability arising under Article 28's special
regime, with no indication of how it was to be applied.2" There are at least
four different ways the GAC's cap has been interpreted.231 If the GAC's cap
was (a) the same kind of cap as the SPLA's, i.e., a cap on all claims arising
from the same defect in the same product series; or (b) a cap on all claims
stemming from the same product series, albeit from more than one defect; or
(c) a cap on all no-fault damages payable by a given defendant, then the
SPLA's raising of the cap amount and/or making it a per defect cap, is a
major legal improvement. If, on the other hand, the GAC's 500 million
pesetas is simply a per person cap-which seems to be the best-reasoned
interpretation-then the SPLA's 10.5 billion peseta cap is, at least on a
theoretical level, a drawback for consumers. Once all claims totaled 10.5
billion pesetas, the SPLA's cap would be reached and no-fault liability would
be extinguished, whereas under the GAC there could have been an infinite
series of claims each totaling less than 500 million pesetas. Where this
difference could conceivably rise above the merely theoretical, of course,
would be in the area of mass torts.
2. Setbacks for Consumers Under the SPLA
Need to Prove Existence of Defect: Article 5 of the SPLA requires
that the injured person prove "the defect, the damage and the causal relation
between both." The defect that must be proven, according to Article 4, is a
failure to provide either "the safety which might legitimately be expected" or
"the safety normally offered by other examples in the same [product]
series." Article 28 of the GAC, by contrast, only required consumers to
prove "correct use [or] consumption of goods" and the damages it caused, a
formulation which totally dispensed with proof of product defect, as well as
defendant's fault.123 That the need to prove defectiveness was felt to be a
setback for consumers is probably indicated by the Cortes' adding to the
230. See supra text accompanying note 89.
231. See supra text accompanying note 89.
232. See supra text accompanying note 82. Pemdn Domecq, however, notes that the
product's defectiveness is clearly implied by the fact that its correct use or consumption caused
injury. Pemtn Domecq, supra note 3, at 144.
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Directive's definition of defectiveness a second, nonuniform way to prove
it.
233
Noninclusion of Agricultural Products: Article 2.1 of the SPLA
excludes from its definition of a "product," which could potentially give rise
to no-fault liability, "primary agricultural and livestock materials, and
products of hunting and fishing which have not undergone an initial
transformation. "234 Under the prevailing interpretation of the GAC, by
contrast, such products would most likely have been covered under the
special regime of article 28.25
Less Generous Calculation of Damages: SPLA Article 10.1
excludes liability for damage caused to the defective product itself and to the
plaintiff's nonconsumer capital goods. 236  That same article also allows
compensation for damage "consumer property" only to the extent it exceeds
65,000 pesetas. Under the GAC, virtually all types of damage were
covered,'7 including those excluded by the SPLA.
"Development Risks" Liability: With the exception of
"pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food products intended for human
consumption," Article 6 of the SPLA excludes liability for development
risks. Article 28 of the GAC, however, was generally interpreted as
creating liability for such risks. 2M
Contraction in Suppliers' Liability: Along with manufacturers and
importers, the SPLA also provides for provisional liability of suppliers
pending their timely identification of the manufacturer, importer or own
supplier, and nonprovisional liability of suppliers who supply a defective
product with scienter. 9 Article 28 of the GAC, though it contained no list
of liable parties, was interpreted to include as liable parties the manufacturer,
importer, seller, or supplier of a product to a consumer.2 ° The portion of
233. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 160, 2.
235. See supra text accompanying note 83. There is perhaps an argument to be made here to
the effect that, since the SPLA technically only repealed Articles 25 to 28 of the GAC as they related
to "civil liability for damages caused by defective products within the meaning of article 2 [of this
Act]" (emphasis added), the GAC remains in force with respect to "products" not included in Article
2. Whether the argument would succeed, in the face of clear legislative intent to exclude primary
agricultural products and the like, seems unlikely, but it is at least a possibility.
236. For the sense in which the term "capital goods" is used, see supra text preceding note
115. Damages to the defective product itself and to non-consumer property may, of course, still be
sought under the appropriate Civil Code provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
237. Penn Domecq, supra note 3, at 148; Rojo, supra note 4, at 1276.
238. See supra text accompanying note 86.
239. See infra Appendix arts. 1, 4, "additional provision."
240. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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the GAC's liability system which the SPLA thus eliminated, is a supplier's
liability for unknown defects.
Statute of Repose: Article 13 of the SPLA provides that an injured
person's rights are in any event extinguished ten years from the date the
injury-causing product was put into circulation. There is no comparable
provision under the GAC:
3. Partial Continuance of the GAC
The SPLA does not include liability for defective services. 2"1 Article
28 of the GAC, by contrast, explicitly included "services" within the scope
of the special system it set up. But inasmuch as the SPLA only repealed
Articles 25 to 28 of the GAC as they related to "liability for damages caused
by defective products," that portion of the GAC regime relating to liability
for services still continues in legal effect.24
4. Summary
Viewed at the micro level, the only relatively clear benefit to the
seeming majority of Spanish products liability plaintiffs from the SPLA is an
extended statute of limitations, though even that benefit is not free from
doubt. In every other respect the new Act represents a contraction of
protection for that group. On the other hand, another group of plaintiffs is
clearly benefited by the newly conferred ability to invoke a theory of strict
liability in seeking to recover for product injuries. While it is technically
true, as many commentators predicted, the GAC is better in some areas and
the SPLA in others, the GAC, for all its defects in craftsmanship, is the
superior text from a consumer's perspective.
At the macro level, how important are these consumer setbacks in
the governing statutory text? If the paternalistic Spanish welfare system
continues to provide a safety net at the level it long has, most cases of
product injury will probably go on never becoming "products liability cases"
in the first place.23 Those that, even despite this safety net, might otherwise
proceed to litigation, will mostly continue to be deterred by the persistent
structural features of the Spanish legal system identified by Professor
Casals.2" Presumably, it will still be only the most extreme situations that
241. In 1991, the European Commission proposed a directive which would have imposed
Community-wide standards for the liability of service providers. 1991 O.J. (C 12) 8. This proposal
was subsequently withdrawn. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 1132 (1993), 225 (Supp. 1995).
242. Such an outcome was prospectively criticized by Rojo, more for its inelegance than
anything else. Rojo, supra note 4, at 1278.
243. See supra text accompanying note 24.
244. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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come before the Spanish civil courts. On the other hand, if the safety net is
removed or its benefits significantly altered, which does not seem
impossible,' the lowering of protection represented by the SPLA may
acquire somewhat greater practical significance in a universe in which more
Spanish product victims become forced to seek effective compensation for
their injuries through the civil law.
C. Spanish and United States Products Liability: Some Comparisons
Perhaps one reason for the Directive's rejection of the term "strict
liability" is its unsavory association with the products liability regime of the
United States, the experiences of European manufacturers with which had
frequently been met with "incredulous astonishment" or "ascribed to the
realm of fable."m But now, in fact, the observation might be made that,
with the implementation of the Products Liability Directive, the products
liability laws of the member states have been brought into closer alignment
with the law generally prevailing in the United States, in which strict
products liability has been a key feature since the early 1960s. 7 7 Spain, of
course, has had a strong variant of strict products liability, in some aspects
no doubt stronger than that in the United States, on the statute books since
1984. Although the SPLA weakens Spain's earlier form of strict liability,
the new act is still an embodiment of that theory, and thus Spain's law in this
area may still be said to be close to that in the United States, certainly closer
than it would be if its only products liability laws were those of its Civil
Code.
Such an observation, however, would obviously be open to the
charge of formalism, a comparison of two varieties of "law in books," when
what is really much more at issue is a comparison of "laws in action."
Comparison of laws should never be limited to juxtaposing
legal norms or institutions viewed in isolation. Rather, it
must display whatever rules are to be compared in their
social context. Only the depiction of the socio-cultural
background of a legal norm enables us to get an insight
245. See supra text accompanying note 100.
246. Peter Borer, Bringt uns die EG-Richtlinie "amerikanische Verhidtnisse"?, in US AND
EEC PRODUCT LIABILITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 105, 124-25 (Roger Zach ed., 1988) [hereinafter
ZACH COLLECTION]. Borer, writing about Germany, notes that, when the Directive project first
began to be discussed, there was a fear that the United States doctrine of strict liability would
necessarily entail the American experience with that liability. Id. at 125.
247. Id. at 124.
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into a country's or a culture's multilayered process of
making and applying laws.2
As discussed above, one Spanish scholar has identified the unchanged
features of the Spanish legal landscape that he believes will prevent Spain's
experience with strict liability from ever comparing to that in the United
States.2' 9 Similarly, a German writer identifies the following features of the
United States legal and social system as primarily responsible for the
peculiarly American experience with the doctrine of strict products liability:
much lower levels of social insurance and welfare schemes; the attorney
system, particularly with respect to compensation by contingent fees;
extensive pre-trial discovery; jury trials; lack of rules for shifting attorneys'
fees; and punitive damages.2" He also notes the research done by another
German writer, predicting that the effect of introducing American-style strict
liability through the Directive would only be to increase risks, presumably of
manufacturers, by ten to twenty percent.2'
Hence, it may well be that Spanish products liability law may never
really be like American products liability law in any but the narrow sense of
"formal rules." That having been said, however, one might still venture a
number of comparisons between the two systems at that admittedly formal
level. These comparisons shall assume that § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, "a veritable Everest among a few other relatively tall
peaks and hundreds of foothills,"2 2 is generally representative of United
States law in this area:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
248. Id. at 125.
249. See supra text accompanying note 24.
250. ZA cH COLLECTION, supra note 246, at 129-46.
251. Id. at 146-47.
252. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl Restatement
Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 636 (1995).
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(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with
the seller. 3
To this statement of the rule itself must be added the accompanying caveat:
The [American Law] Institute expresses no opinion as to
whether the rules stated in this Section may not apply
(1) to harm to persons other than users or consumers;
(2) to the seller of a product expected to be processed or
otherwise substantially changed before it reaches the
user or consumer; or
(3) to the seller of a component part of a product to be
assembled.2- ,
Strict Liability: The first obvious point of comparison is the plain
exclusion of fault from the Restatement's inquiry, inasmuch as § 402A(2)(a)
makes the seller's due care no defense to liability. All the plaintiff need
show is a defective product in an unreasonably dangerous conditione, and the
physical harm, to the consumer/user or his property, thereby caused. This is
very much on a par with the SPLA's Article 5: "The injured person
attempting to obtain redress for the damages will need to prove the defect,
the damage and the causal relation between both."
Another feature of U.S. law, both as represented by the Second
Restatement as well as by the most recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, is to omit any explicit consideration of product presentation and
marketing in the context of determining whether a product is defective, an
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). This provision was first approved
for inclusion in the Restatement in 1965. MICHAEL GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 279
(2d ed., 1991).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A caveat (1977).
255. It has been argued that "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" are both
aspects of one and the same inquiry. See, e.g., James R. Adams, Product Liability Law in the
United States: An Overview, in PRODUCT LIABILITY: PREVENTION, PRACTICE AND PROCESS IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 3, 5 (Rudolph Hulsenbek & Dennis Campbell eds., 1989).
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omission strongly criticized by Professor Shapo.- Article 3 of the SPLA,
by contrast, makes "presentation" the first of the attendant circumstances to
be considered in judging whether a product offers "the safety which might
legitimately be expected."
Scope of Protected Class: One striking feature is the former parallel
between the Restatement's grant of protection to the "user or consumer" and
its agnosticism about all others, on the one hand, and the narrowly defined
protected class under the GAC, consumers or users in the sense of "final
recipients," on the other. Comment o to the Restatement (Second) notes that
"there may be no essential reason why such [other] plaintiffs should not be
brought within the scope of the protection afforded," but states that the
limitation in the rule reflects the social pressure for a rule of strict liability
coming from consumers.2'
Liable Parties: Another point of comparison is the Restatement's
imposition of liability on all "sellers" of the defective product, whether or
not there is a contractual relationship between the seller and the
consumer/user. Such a formulation encompasses the entire chain of
distribution between the manufacturer and purchasing consumer/user, and
the liability of each to the consumer is not provisional or subsidiary; though,
naturally, one "link" in the chain may have recourse rights against another.
The great breadth of this formulation may reflect the large geographic size of
the United States, and the difficulties of obtaining long-arm jurisdiction or
bringing a lawsuit in a distant forum. The situation under Spanish law is
certainly comparable, but not precisely the same: manufacturers and
importers are the normally liable parties, with "suppliers" only occasionally
liable. While the United States law is more "pro-consumer" by providing
more potential defendants, doubtless it makes better general sense2 to try, as
the Spanish law does to some extent, to concentrate liability on the party, the
manufacturer, who was best able to avoid the injury, with the liabilities of
the importer and supplier being concessions to the practical difficulties
occasionally involved in holding a manufacturer liable.
While Section 402A is also agnostic on the liability of manufacturers
of component parts, it is nonetheless generally true that component
256. Shapo, supra note 252, at 664-65.
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. o (1977).
258. Cf. David W. Leebron, An Introduction to United States Products Liability Law:
Origins, Theory, Issues and Trends, in ZACH COLLECTION, supra note 258, at 36 (describing the
products liability of middlemen as "perhaps the least defensible application of the warranty heritage
of strict products liability").
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manufacturers, "after some initial hesitation," can now be held liable.19
Article 4. lb of the SPLA makes that liability explicit.
Development Risks: The text of the Restatement does not explicitly
speak to the important question of liability for development risks, and
comment k to § 402A speaks only to the conceptually related "unavoidably
unsafe products," which deal, however, with known risks that cannot be
eliminated. One leading American products liability scholar recently
opined that it is impossible to predict how an American court would respond
to a claimed "development risks" defense.2' Another writer described the
law here as "both murky and unsettled," though noting a trend in favor of
the state of the art defense.- ' This is to be contrasted with the clarity of
Spanish law on this issue: a "development risks defense" is permitted,
except as to pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food products intended
for human consumption.26 But if there is indeed a United States trend
towards a state of the art defense, there may in fact be occurring a
convergence of United States and Spanish law in this anti-consumer
direction.
Scope of Allowable Damages: It is also worth noting that United
States law, as represented by the Restatement, allows recovery for damage to
the consumer's "property," without any requirement that it be "consumer
property" in any narrow sense, and also allows recovery for such injuries
"from the ground up," i.e., without any deductions. The SPLA contains
both these "anti-consumer" features.
It should also be noted, though Section 402A does not speak to the
issue, that a United States plaintiff may also recover noncompensatory
punitive damages, a possibility that does not exist in Spain. 6 On the other
hand, however, an award of punitive damages in a United States proceeding
is frequently a means of providing covertly what the Spanish legal system
allows directly: recovery of the prevailing party's attorneys fees.
Services: One last issue, closely related if not directly on point, is
liability for defective services. By its only partial repealer of the GAC,M the
SPLA preserved a clear statutory basis for the imposition of strict liability for
defective services. No comparably broad statutory basis exists for imposing
259. Id.
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A cmt. k (1977).
261. Shapo, supra note 252, at 679.
262. Leebron, supra note 258, at 19, 23. For "state of the art" defense as the American label
for the "development risks" defense, see Bernstein, supra note 42.
263. See supra text preceding note 140 and accompanying note 141.
264. Casals, supra note 12.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41.
424 [Vol. 2:371
Ansaldi
such liability on services in the United States; where liability for defective
services in fact exists, it is essentially a creature of case law or narrowly
targeted statutes, and in any event "the consumer recovers only upon proof
of negligence" .66
What Spanish commentators said when comparing the GAC with the
Directive could be applied, with greater justification still, to this comparison
of the formal rules of United States and Spanish products liability law: one
is better protective of consumer interests in some areas, the other in others.
But when these two bodies of rules are put into their institutional and social
setting, then which of the two systems, taken as a functioning whole, better
provides for the well-being of its consumers, let alone of the other competing
interests at stake, is very much a separate question.
266. GREENFIELD, supra note 253, at 342-58.
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LAW 22/1994 of July 6, on civil liability for damages caused by defective
products.
To all those who shall see and have knowledge hereof, KNOW YE:
that the Cortes Generales have approved and that I grant my assent to the
following law:
STATEMENT OF REASONS [PREAMBLE]
This law has as its object the adaptation of Spanish law to European
Community Directive 85/374/EEC of July 25, 1985, concerning civil
liability for damages caused by defective products. The fruit of a long and
complex drafting process [proceso de elaboraci6n], the Directive aims to
achieve a substantially homogeneous legal regime within Community
boundaries on a subject especially delicate by reason of the conflicting
interests [involved].
Given that neither the scope of the protected class [6.mbito subjetivo
de tutela] nor the objective contemplated by the Directive coincide with
those of General Law 26/1984 of July 19 for the Defense of Consumers and
Users, it was opted to draft a special Bill.
Pursuant to the Directive, this law establishes a regime of strict
[objectiva] though not absolute liability, allowing the manufacturer to
absolve itself of liability under the circumstances enumerated.
Contemplated as compensable damages are personal injuries and
property damage with, in the latter case, a threshold amount of 65,000
pesetas.
The persons protected are, in general, those injured by the defective
product, independent of whether or not they hold the status of consumer in
the strict sense.
267. This translation is by the Author. See also Product Liability in Spain-The Recent
Legislation, LLOYDS PRODUCT LIABILITY INT'L, Dec. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library, TXTLNE File (translating the same legislation into English).
[Vol. 2:371
Ansaldi
The manufacturer's objective liability lasts ten years from the time of
placing in circulation of the defective product causing the damage. It is a
reasonable period of time if one takes into account the bill's objective range
of application, which is confined to movable goods and gas and electricity.
Finally, the law makes use of the option offered by the Directive of
limiting a manufacturer's overall liability for personal injuries caused by
identical articles having the same defect.
ARTICLE 1. GENERAL [STATEMENT OF] PRINCIPLE
Manufacturers and importers shall be liable, in conformity with the
provisions of this law, for damages caused by defects in the products which
they respectively manufacture or import.
ARTICLE 2. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF PRODUCT
1. For purposes of this law, "product" means any movable good,
even when it is affixed to or incorporated into another movable good or real
property, except for primary agricultural and livestock materials, and
products of hunting and fishing which have not undergone an initial
transformation.
2. Gas and electricity are considered products.
ARTICLE 3. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCT
1. By "defective product" it is meant that one does not offer the
safety which might legitimately be expected, keeping in mind all the
circumstances and, in particular, its presentation, the foreseeable reasonable
use of same and the time of its placing in circulation.
2. In any event, a product is defective if it does not offer the safety
normally offered by other examples in the same [product] series.
3. A product is not to be considered defective by the mere fact that
said product is subsequently placed in circulation in an improved form [de
forma mrus perfeccionada].
ARTICLE 4. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MANUFACTURER AND
IMPORTER
1. For purposes of this law, "manufacturer" means:
a) the [manufacturer] of a finished product.
b) the [manufacturer] of any component part integrated into a
finished product.
c) one who produces a raw material.
d) anyone who holds himself out to the public as a
manufacturer, placing his name, company's name,
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trademark or any other sign or distinguishing feature on the
product or the packaging, wrapping or any other component
of the [product's] protection or presentation.
2. For these same purposes, "importer" means one who, in the
exercise of his entrepreneurial activity, introduces a product into the
European Union for sale, rent, lease, or any other form of distribution.
3. If the product's manufacturer cannot be identified, anyone who
provided or supplied the product shall be regarded as its manufacturer,
unless within a three-month period the person shall have indicated to the
person damaged or injured the identity of the manufacturer or of whomever
provided or supplied to the individual the said product. The same rule is to
be applied in cases of imported products if the product does not indicate the
name of the importer, even though the manufacturer's name is indicated.
ARTICLE 5. PROOF
The injured person attempting to obtain redress for the damages
caused will need to prove the defect, the damage, and the causal relation
between both.
ARTICLE 6. EXONERATING CAUSES
1. The manufacturer or importer shall not be liable if they show:
a) that they did not place the product in circulation.
b) that, on the circumstances of the case, it may be presumed
that the defect did not exist at the time the product was
placed in circulation.
c) that the product was not manufactured for sale or for any
other remunerative type of distribution [cualquier otra forma
de distribuci6n con finalidad econ6mica], nor manufactured,
imported, provided or supplied in the context of any
professional or entrepreneurial activity.
d) that the defect was due to the fact that the product was made
as mandated by existing rules [conforme a nonnas
imperativas existentes].
e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge existing
at the time of [the product's] placing in circulation did not
allow the existence of the defect to be ascertained.
2. The manufacturer or importer of a component part of a finished
product shall not be liable if either shows that the defect is ascribable to the
design [concepci6n] of the product into which it was integrated, or to the
instructions given by that product's manufacturer.
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3. In the case of pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs or food
products intended for human consumption, the persons liable hereunder may
not invoke the exonerating clause contained in subparagraph e of paragraph
1 of this Article.
ARTICLE 7. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
The persons [made] liable for the same injury by the application of
this law shall be jointly and severally liable.
ARTICLE 8. INTERVENTION OF THIRD PARTIES
The manufacturer's or importer's liability shall not be reduced when
the injury was jointly caused by a product defect and the intervention of a
third party. Notwithstanding, the person liable hereunder who has satisfied
[the obligation to pay] compensation may claim of the third party the portion
corresponding to that person's intervention in causing the injury.
ARTICLE 9. INJURED PERSON'S FAULT
The manufacturer's or importer's liability may be reduced or
eliminated based on the circumstances of a case if the injury caused was
jointly due to a product defect and the fault of the injured person or [the
fault] of one for whom the latter is civilly liable.
ARTICLE 10. SCOPE OF PROTECTION
1. The regime of civil liability envisaged hereunder encompasses
cases of death and bodily injury, as well as damages caused to things distinct
from the defective product itself, provided that the item damaged is found to
have been objectively intended for private use or consumption and was
principally used in such manner by the injured person. In the latter event, a
threshold amount of 65,000 pesetas shall be deducted.
2. Other damages and injuries, including pain and suffering, shall
be compensable in conformity with the general civil law.
3. The present law shall not apply to recovery of damages caused
by nuclear accidents, provided such damages are covered by international
conventions ratified by European Union Member States.
ARTICLE 11. LIMITS ON TOTAL LIABILITY
For the liability regime envisaged hereunder, the manufacturer's or
importer's overall civil liability for death and personal injuries caused by
identical products showing the same defect will be limited to the amount of
10,500,000,000 pesetas.
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ARTICLE 12. LIMITATION PERIOD FOR ACTIONS
1. An action seeking redress of damages and injuries described
herein must be brought three years from the date the injured person suffered
the injury, from either the product defect or the damage that said defect
occasioned the individual, provided the party liable for such injury is known.
An action by one who has satisfied [the obligation to pay] compensation
against all others liable for the injury must be brought one year from the date
the compensation is paid.
2. The tolling of the limitation period is governed by provisions of
the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 13. EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITY
The injured person's rights recognized herein shall be extinguished
upon the lapse of ten years from the date the specific product causing the
injury was placed into circulation, if the corresponding judicial claim has not
been commenced during that period.
ARTICLE 14. EXCULPATORY CLAUSES, OR CLAUSES LIMITING
LIABILITY, INOPERATIVE
As against the injured person, exculpatory clauses or clauses limiting
civil liability hereunder are inoperative.
ARTICLE 15. CONTRACTUAL OR NONCONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
The actions recognized hereunder have no effect on other rights the
injured person may have as a result of the contractual or noncontractual
liability of the manufacturer, importer, or of any other person.
ADDITIONAL PROVISION (ONE ONLY). SUPPLIER'S LIABILITY
The supplier of the defective product will be liable as though the
individual were the manufacturer or importer if the individual supplied the
product knowing of the existence of the defect. In that event, the supplier
may bring an action claiming over against the manufacturer or importer.
TRANSITIONAL PROVISION (ONE ONLY). PRODUCTS IN CIRCULATION
This law shall not apply to the civil liability arising from injuries
caused by products placed in circulation before its entry into effect. Said
liability shall be governed by provisions in effect at said time.
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FIRST FINAL PROVISION. CERTAIN PROVISIONS REPEALED
Articles 25 through 28 of General Law 26/1984 of July 19 for the
Defense of Consumers and Users shall be inapplicable to civil liability for
damages caused by defective products within the meaning of Article 2
hereof.
SECOND FINAL PROVISION. NEW TEXT OF ARTICLE 30 OF LAW
26/1984 OF JULY 19
Article 30 of General Law 26/1984 of July 19 for the Defense of
Consumers and Users is amended to read as follows:
The Government, after having heard from, interested
parties and consumer and user groups, shall have the
power to set up a mandatory insurance system for civil
liability deriving from damages caused by defective
products or services, and a guarantee fund covering, in
whole or in part, damages consisting of death, poisoning
or bodily injury.
THIRD FINAL PROVISION. MODIFICATION OF AMOUNTS
The Government is authorized to modify the amounts established
hereunder, in conformity with the periodic.revisions made by the Council of
the European Union, under the terms established by community norms.
FOURTH FINAL PROVISION. EFFECTIVE DATE
This law shall go into effect the day after its publication in the
"Official State Bulletin."
Wherefore,
I command all Spaniards, private citizens and [the public] authorities to
observe and make observed this law.
Madrid, July 6, 1994
JUAN CARLOS R.
The President of the Government
FELIPE GONZALEZ MARQUEZ
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I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered
into force on January 1, 1994.' Since then, the new General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been approved; control of the United
States Congress has changed from Democrat to Republican; Mexico is
going through a financial crisis; and apparently nothing dramatic, for
better or for worse, has yet happened to the American economy.
In practice, the viability of NAFTA was resolved on November
17, 1993, when the United States House of Representatives voted to pass
the bill of implementation and approval of the international accord.2 After
weeks of intense political debate, the House approved the agreement by a
vote of 234 to 200.' The margin did not fully reflect the degree of
uncertainty before the vote: such a wide margin was considered
* Alejandro Posadas is a fellow law lecturer at Duke University School of Law; J.D., UNAM,
Mexico 1992; LL.M. Duke, 1995. He is a founding member of the Mexican International Law
Students Association (AMEDI), of which he served as the first national President in 1991.
1. According to its Article 2203, the accord would enter into force "on an exchange of written
notifications certifying the completion of necessary legal procedures," which were completed on
December 30, 1992. North American Free Trade Agreement, 39 Free Trade L. Rep. (CCH) (Dec. 17,
1992).
2. H.R. 3450, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
3. 139 CONG. REc. H10,048 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993).
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unattainable just a week before.4 The Senate approved the agreement,
three days later, by a comfortable margin.'
This paper is a study of the United States Congress in action, using
the passage of NAFTA as an example of the process. Chance did not
dictate the choice of NAFTA as the basis of the study. NAFTA is the first
serious effort to liberalize the exchange of goods and services, and to
adopt transnational rules and principles on aspects ranging from investment
and intellectual property to environment and labor, among countries that
have unequal economic capacity, diverse legal systems, and different
historical and cultural backgrounds. Moreover, Canada, the United States,
and Mexico, these "distant neighbors," share borders thousands of miles
long.
NAFTA probably had one chance in Congress. This article
questions how and why the controversial legislation was approved by the
bicameral representative body. In doing so, it raises typical issues
Congress faced in its decision-making process. The article focuses on the
House of Representatives when the international trade agreement was on
the verge of failing.
II. STATING THE ISSUE
A. One Long Day
If Representative Robert Dornan, a Republican from California ate
a late dinner that night, we might never know. It was to be his fate to
vote yes on bill HR 3450 that implemented NAFTA. Apparently, his wife
did not share his position and would probably have gone against the bill if
she had been voting instead of her husband. On the floor, someone even
regretted the representative's wife was unable to take his place.6
This split of opinion was mirrored across the United States during
the months preceding the approval. The polls reflected similar percentages
of people in favor of NAFTA, against NAFTA, and undecided.7 The
percentages were similar in the House of Representatives, and according to
Representative Dornan, probably in his house as well. Other houses were
4. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, XLIX CONG. Q. ALMANAC 171 (1993).
5. The final vote was 61 "ayes" and 38 "nays." 139 CONG. REC. S16,712 (daily ed.
Nov. 20, 1993).
6. "Mr. Chairman, no late dinner for me tonight. My wife is against NAFFA. But I have
the vote. I rise in support of NAFTA." 139 CONG. REC. H10,037 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993)
(statement of Representative Doman (R-CA)). Another member retorted, "Mr. Chairman, I
made a suggestion to the gentleman from California that his wife take his place . I." d. at
H10,039 (statement of Representative Gerald Solomon, R-NY).
7. See Public Support for NAFTA chart infra p. 447.
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also divided: Democratic representatives in the House and their own
leadership.
On November 17, the House was to decide the future of an
agreement mainly negotiated by a Republican President, but adopted and
presented to Congress by a Democratic President. The agreement had
been fiercely attacked by a strange coalition composed of organized labor,
environmentalists, the radical right, the protectionist left, and some very
specific powerful business groups, such as big sugar firms, citrus growers,
and the flat-glass industry.8 This coalition was especially favored by the
money and participation of former presidential candidate Ross Perot. On
the other hand, NAFTA arrived in the House in the wake of a string of
congressional approvals of trade liberalizing agreements stretching to the
end of World War II.' In addition, Presidents Carter, Ford, and Bush
responded to Clinton's request for support.'0 Corporate America and
almost all of the state governors were also pro-NAFTA allies."
The media had a significant role in the process by covering the
NAFTA debate extensively. 2 The academic world also participated
actively, producing a large body of literature on the subject, and
organizing symposiums and conferences all over the nation. 3 One of the
high points of the public dialogue was the November 9, 1993, televised
debate between Vice-President Al Gore and Ross Perot. " Unlike the Free
8. NAFTA: The Showdown, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 23 (discussing how torn
between populism and sound economics, Congress prepares to vote on NAFTA); Viva NAFTA,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 1993, at 21 (choosing sides in treaty ratification).
9. According to I. M. Dextler from the University of Maryland, Congress has not
rejected a trade liberalization proposal in the postwar era. David S. Cloud, Decisive Vote Brings
Down Trade Walls with Mexico, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3014, 3175 (1993). See also Waking
up to NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1993, at 28 (gathering support for treaty for fight in
Congress).
10. Clinton invited the ex-Presidents to the September 14, 1993, signing of the NAFTA
side agreements. Their presence was intended to signal NAFTA represented a bipartisan and
national interest issue. Waking up to NAFTA, supra note 9, at 27.
11. See Businessmen for NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 27. In the last week of
August, all but nine governors supported the adoption of NAFTA. Viva NAFTA, supra note 8, at
22.
12. On November 21, 1993, 91% of respondents to a poll conducted by Gallup had, at
least to a small degree, followed the news about NAFTA; 24% responded they had followed it
very closely; 44%, somewhat closely; and 23%, not too closely. Only nine percent responded
that they had not followed the news at all or refused to answer. Westlaw Database, POLL,
NAFTA (Nov. 19-21, 1993).
13. See Jeffrey R. Jaffe, A Guide to the NAFTA Literature, 1 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 197
(1994).
14. The debate was held during the CNN Larry King Show. Polls done before and after
the debate showed support for NAFTA rose from 34% to 57%. David S. Cloud, As NAFTA
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Trade Agreement with Canada, passed by Congress only five years earlier
by a very comfortable margin, the NAFTA process aroused controversy.' 5
"Not since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act has trade legislation produced
such bitter polarization of opinions." 6  Each side predicted dire
consequences if NAFTA did pass or if it did not pass. One long day in
November, the House debated for more than eleven hours before voting on
the bill. The debate had been framed months ago, but the result was
unknown until that long day ended.' 7
B. The Debate
The two most controversial issues in the NAFTA debate involved
the environment and labor; their lobbyists were the most active NAFTA
opponents. At the end, however, the fight was fought mainly by the AFL-
CIO. Since the Bush presidency, some environmental groups, including
the World Wide Fund for Nature, decided to support the agreement,
reasoning that it would be easier to monitor abuses in Mexico with an
agreement than without it. Other groups followed suit and supported the
agreement. '8
The environmental opponents mainly contended that the lower
enforcement levels in Mexico would attract American industry, adding
Countdown Begins, Wheeling Dealing Intensifies, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3104, 3106 (1993).
Another poll showed 52% of respondents did not change their opinion after the debate, but 35%
were more likely to support the agreement, versus 12% who were less likely to support it.
Westlaw, supra note 12.
15. The United States Senate passed S. 5090, implementing the Free Trade Agreement
between Canada and the United States, on September 19, 1988, by a vote of 83 to 9. By a vote
of 366 to 40, the House of Representatives passed it on August 9, 1988. Westlaw, Database CR-
ABS.
16. Paul Krugman, The NAFTA Debate-The Uncomfortable Truth about NAFTA: Its
Foreign Policy, Stupid, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 13.
17. The debate started at 11:11 a.m. and finished at 10:36 p.m. when the vote was
recorded. 139 CONG. REC. H10,078 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993).
18. Environmentalists were easier to convince through the creation of domestic incentives
and funds to promote infrastructure and environmental clean-up. The division, along with the
fact that presently all environmental groups are experiencing a decline in membership and a rise
in financial problems, weakened their fight against NAFTA. Organizations mentioned as backing
the ratification of the agreement were the National Audubon Society, the World Wildlife Fund,
the National Wildlife Foundation, the National Resources Defense Council, and the
Environmental Defense Fund. The main environmental groups opposing NAFTA were the Sierra
Club and the Friends of the Earth (some charters of the Auduborn Society and Greenpeace played
a less relevant role). Land of the Free-For-All, NEW STATESMAN & Soc'Y, Nov. 19, 1993, at
38; 139 CONG. REC. H9887, H9901 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993); see also Viva NAFTA, supra note
8, at 21.
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incentives to damage the already deteriorating Mexican environment.' 9
They pushed for reprisals against Mexico, rather than cooperation.
Framed in this manner, the environmental issue was closely related to the
labor issue. Labor groups also feared that industries were attracted to
Mexico by the low wages paid to local workers. The "giant sucking
sound," was the phrase used by Ross Perot to describe the catastrophic
phenomenon of companies and jobs moving to Mexico as though they
were being sucked into a black hole. This metaphor represented the main
force binding together this unusual coalition.
The Administration attacked the jobs issue with an equally forceful
opposing argument. It promoted NAFTA as a job producing agreement.
Thus, the ensuing battle of statistics with respect to prospective job losses
or gains caused confusion, radically divided public opinion, and probably
overemphasized the issue.20 As a result, relations between the White
House and organized labor deteriorated, and the labor groups defined all
those not with them as against them. Nevertheless, President Clinton
trusted that despite this confrontation, unions were not likely to abandon
the rest of his legislative agenda.2
The academic world had a mostly positive view of NAFTA.
Considering the acute difference between the American and the Mexican
economies, the overall impact was expected to be minimal, but positive.22
19. Krugman, supra note 16, at 16 ("The question is whether factories emerging from
NAFTA will do more damage than the factories in which Mexican workers would otherwise have
been employed."); see also William A. Orme, Jr., The NAFTA Debate-Myths Versus Facts: The
Whole Truth about the Half-Truths, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 2, 8. There were two
reasons to think NAFTA would be good for the environment: (a) the United States had made the
environment a top priority; and (b) industry was relocated to the North of the country, rather than
to the already unhealthy central valley of Mexico City. Id.
20. See Public Perception Regarding Jobs and NAFTA chart infra p. 448 which provides
an example of the differing results from one inquiry to another.
21. On November 7, 1993, President Clinton accused American labor unions of using
'roughshod muscle-bound tactics" to intimidate legislators such as threatening to retire support
for their re-election if they voted for NAFTA. NAFTA: The Showdown, supra note 8; Viva
NAFTA, supra note 8; CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3014, 3017 (1993); Congress OKs North
American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 173. Unions still contribute an average of one third of the
campaign funds for Democratic congressmen. At the root of the NAFTA debate "was a battle
about sovereign democratic lines . . . . [Tihe lines were drawn between progressive coalitions
anchored in labor, against the Fortune 500 represented by the White House." Land of the Free-
For-All, supra note 18, at 39.
22. The Mexican Gross National Product represents less than 4% of the United States
GDP. Other numbers, used to further this argument, view Mexico as the new addition to the
existing free trade agreement between Canada and the United States, but Mexico's economy is
just five percent of those of Canada and the United States combined. NAFTA could hardly add
much more than 0.1 % to the real income of the United States. Regarding job losses, the overall
figures were hardly above the 200,000 monthly average displacement rate of the United States
438 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 2:433
The liberalization and closer relationship between the two countries could
help specific areas of concern, such as those regarding the Mexican
environment, wages, democracy, and immigration. At least, the
agreement would not make these issues worse. One interesting approach
promoted enactment of NAFTA as a matter of foreign policy rather than of
economics.23  A congressional member, advancing this trend, even
compared the opportunity to approve NAFTA with the historic opportunity
to purchase Louisiana or Alaska.24
In the midst of the debate, many other topics were addressed, such
as human rights, drug dealing in Mexico, United States' sovereignty,
supranational bureaucracies, the uneven playing field in trade,
immigration, and the deficit increase. Many specific examples of midsize
companies threatened by the unfair competition, with Mexico, or highly
benefited by the already opening Mexican market, were offered. The final
debate was between two groups that, according to some analysts,
possessed competing domestic agendas and irreconcilable world views.' 5
Nevertheless, the debate was to be resolved by a third group of undecided
voters. Pushed by the Administration, this undecided group found itself
trapped in a war of extremist assertions. Its decision required a leap of
faith and personal sensitivity. Many of those who were undecided were
economy. According to union sponsored research, only 96,000 jobs had shifted to Mexico over
the last 15 years. Considering the average level of tariffs of the United States towards Mexico
were already at four percent, no dramatic change was expected in that area. On the other hand,
the benefits of the accord would flow out from the principle of free trade, scale economies, and
globalization. As a result, in the three countries, employment would increase in some industries
and would fall in others; but, the final result would be positive. Krugman, supra note 16, at 13;
Orme, supra note 19, at 2; Glasmeir et al., Tequila Sunset? NAFTA and the US Apparel
Industry, CHALLENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 36; NAFTA: The Showdown, supra note 8, at 23; Eat
Your NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 15-16. For an approach questioning the
globalization-free trade view, see Thomas I. Palley, The Free Trade Debate: A Left Keynesian
Gaze, 61 SOC. RES. 379 (1994).
23. The accord was viewed as tying up the Mexican economic reform, and as an
indubitable signal from the so-called "Latin American emerging markets" whose main partner, if
market reforms continued, was to be found in the United States. In the post-cold war, multi-
polar, multi-level international society, the United States faced the strengthening of the European
Union and the Pacific rim. It thus was sensible for the United States to take the first steps in
securing Latin America as a market area. Furthermore, considering the United States efforts to
push forward the world's multilateral liberalization trend through GATT's Uruguay Round,
approval of NAFTA was a congruent example of its commitment. See Krugman, supra note 16;
Orme, supra note 19, at 8; Abraham F. Lowenthal, Latin America: Ready for Partnership?,
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 74.
24. 139 CONG. REC. H9890 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993).
25. Orme, supra note 19, at 2.
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torn by the congressional dilemma, balancing local concerns with national
interests.26
III. THE ROAD TO CONGRESS
In 1990, the government of Mexico approached the government of
the United States with the idea of negotiating a free trade agreement.
Since 1985, with its accession to the GATT system, Mexico began to
liberalize and to open its economy. The process proved profitable to states
such as Texas, which in turn encouraged then President George Bush to
initiate talks.2 7 By 1991, opposition to the agreement was already
organized as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) and several environmental groups focused on
achieving the defeat of a congressional revival of the "fast-track
authority." Nevertheless,. Congress approved it in May 1991.' In
November 1992, Bill Clinton defeated President Bush in the presidential
election. Although NAFTA negotiations were completed before the 1992
election,29 then candidate Clinton had endorsed the accord by promising to
pursue supplemental agreements to address the deficiencies in the
negotiated text in the areas of the environment, labor, and safeguards.30
Clinton was apparently trying to appease two major interest groups which
supported his campaign: labor and environmentalists. The carefully
negotiated side agreements, however, proved to be unappeasing.
On August 13, 1993, marking the completion of negotiation of the
supplemental side agreements, House Majority Leader Gephardt
announced he could not support the accord as it stood.3' Previously,
Gephardt had suggested that Clinton should not support the Bush text
because it contained no protections for the enforcement of Mexican
workers rights, nor any mechanism that assured wages in Mexico rise
26. For a detailed analysis of the concept of two Congresses, see ROGER H. DAVIDSON &
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS (1994).
27. Cloud, supra note 9, at 3180.
28. 'Fast Track' Trade Procedures Extended, XLVII CONG. Q. ALMANAC 118 (1991).
29. President Bush initialed the pact on August 12 of that year. Initialing the pact was a
formal requirement under the "fast-track authority." With that act, Bush expressed his intent to
sign the accord. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 173.
30. Then Governor Clinton defined his position in an address at the Student Center of the
North Carolina State University campus in Raleigh on October 4, 1992. Luis Miguel Diaz, The
NAFTA Tri-Lateral Commissions on the Environment and Labor, 2 U.S.-MEXICAN L.J. 13
(1994).
31. Gephardt is a leader of the labor cause in the House. See Viva NAFTA, supra note 8,
at 21.
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along with productivity.32 On September 21, in a speech at the National
Press Club, Gephardt confirmed that he would vote against the pact. With
this news, the formerly unified Democrat leadership was divided on the
passage of NAFTA. Aside from Representative Gephardt, the second
highest ranked Democrat in the House, Majority Whip David Bonior,3
also opposed the pact. One month before, Bonior collected 100
commitments from Democrat Representatives to demand NAFTA be
delayed until healthcare reform was passed. 34 Despite widespread support,
this action did not prosper. However, Representative Bonior continued to
work hard for the defeat of the pact. In October, he announced he was
only nine votes away from the 218 needed to kill the agreement. 35  Thus,
the leadership role of the pro-NAFTA Democrats fell to House Speaker
Thomas S. Foley.36 The split in the leadership showed the vote was not
going to be based on loyalty, but on conscience. Partisan affiliation,
therefore, was not a reliable variable for predicting the result. President
Clinton had not yet begun working strongly for NAFTA passage when his
opponents, especially Ross Perot, took advantage of the White House
Administration's slow start to try to capture the public conscience.37
32. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 177.
33. Representative Bonior is an interesting case of the representative-constituency
relationship. Bonior represents a district in Michigan that encompasses the city of Macomb. His
opposition to NAFTA was greeted enthusiastically there; even his last Republican challenger
opposed the pact. A large part of his constituents still remember the 1981-82 recession, when the
Big Three (Ford, Chrysler, and GM) reduced the Macomb workforce by half. Furthermore, the
small and midsize business community believes the future lies in productivity associated with
nearby markets. The community does not understand why the government would tempt the car
industry to move to Mexico. Representative Bonior also has personal reasons to oppose the pact.
Representative Bonior believes the pact to be an extension of the United States colonialist policy
toward Latin America, furthered by a conspiracy of corporate and academic elitists.
Representative Bonior has voted for higher taxes, higher spending, and lifting of the Cuban
embargo. He voted against the Gulf War. Any of the items on that list would probably have
been sufficient to eject any other member from Congress, but Representative Bonior's relation to
his constituents is symbiotic. Representative Bonior worked for the Detroit car plants and shares
Polish-American roots with a large part of his supporters. His Catholic sense of justice and his
ability to outspend his opponents five to one have also been key elements contributing to his
permanence in the House. Free Trade, the Vast Middle and David Bonior, ECONOMIST, Sept.
18, 1993, at 36.
34. Viva NAFTA, supra note 8, at 22.
35. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 178.
36. Representative Bill Richardson functioned as the Democrats' Whip for passage of
NAFTA, and together with Representative Matsui coordinated the party. The Flying Arkansan,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1993, at 25; Cloud, supra note 9, at 3014.
37. President Clinton had been immersed in budget battles and, to avoid offending anti-
NAFTA Democrats, he had been careful not to raise the issue throughout the negotiations on the
side agreements. Marketing NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 1993, at 14 (noting that the treaty
faced a fight in Congress).
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September 14, 1993, with the signing of the Environment and
Labor Side Agreements, was the date chosen by the President to launch a
campaign for approval of NAFTA. He designated lawyer William W.
Daley as special advocate for the NAFTA cause.3" President Clinton
delivered a speech that made George Bush comment, "[n]ow I know why I
am outside looking in and he is inside looking out."3 9 Soon after,
corporate America got on the road through an alliance of 2700 companies,
including most of the Fortune 500, to lobby for the agreement. The
alliance, under the name of USA NAFTA, chose Lee Iacocca as its
champion. The business community prepared for a short, fierce fight.'
On September 24, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed a lower court decision that required
NAFTA to be submitted to an environmental impact study, thus clearing
the last obstacle to a congressional vote .4' Finally, on November 3, the
President sent the implementing NAFTA bill to Congress.
IV. THE HOUSE, THE COMMITTEES, AND THE DEALS
According to a media specialist, "NAFTA is a tough challenge for
the art of congressional arm twisting. Proponents are trying to sell a
policy with global economic implications to lawmakers for whom all
politics are local.' 42
Before the President sent the implementing bill to Congress, a
peculiar practice had already occurred, the drafting of mock
implementation bills. This practice was a response to the nature of the
agreement. Negotiated under fast-track authority, the NAFTA bill could
not be modified once submitted to Congress. Neither the bill of
implementation, nor the text negotiated by the countries, which was
included in the former, were subject to modification. The mock bills were
38. Daley, brother of the Mayor of Chicago, was named campaign coordinator for
NAFTA, and was given the privileged "War Room" in the Old Executive Office Building next
door to the White House. He was responsible for heading the White House lobbying efforts in
Congress. Waking up to NAFTA, supra note 9, at 27.
39. Id. In his speech, President Clinton called on Americans to embrace change and to
"create the jobs of tomorrow," rather than seeking to preserve "the economic structures of
yesterday." Id. at 27.
40. USA NAFTA sponsored 60-second televised advertisements which began airing on
October 10, 1993, tailored to combat Perot's anti-NAFTA propaganda. Businessmen for NAFTA,
supra note 11, at 27.
41. The court of appeals held that the President's actions are not agency action, and
therefore are not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. Public Citizen v. United
States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
42. CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., supra note 21, at 3014.
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drafts prepared by congressional committees working on the implementing
bill. The President had absolute discretion in deciding whether or not to
consider the mock bills' in preparing his own bill. Nevertheless, if he
wanted a positive result he could not simply disregard them. The mock
draft exercise was a first step in the Congress-White House negotiating and
lobbying process.43
Once in Congress, the bill went through committee consideration.
Adhering to the rationale of the mock drafts, this consideration was pro-
forma only." Before voting on NAFTA, Congress had conducted eighty-
eight hearings beginning in June 19 1990, issued six reports beginning in
September 1992, and conducted three NAFTA debates. 45 Because of the
thoroughness of the process, it would be difficult to imagine that a member
casted an uninformed vote.
One of the most criticized aspects of the approval process were the
deals the Administration made to win over undecided members. NAFTA
contains additional side agreements other than the well-known agreements
covering environmental and labor issues. These concessions presented an
interesting international political compromise among Mexico, Canada, and
the White House to fulfill some congressional members' expectations and
conditions. Thus, the Administration extracted a commitment from
Mexico not to export sugar indefinitely, and to begin negotiations after
NAFTA's passage for the acceleration of the phasing out tariffs in for flat
glass, wine, appliances, and bedding.46 In exchange, the White House
agreed to reinstate tariffs for oranges and tomatoes in case they overflowed
the American market, to finalize last minute deals protecting peanut
growers and wine producers in California, and to extract concessions from
43. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee were
responsible for conducting the mock or shadow markups of the NAFTA. For example, on
September 30, the Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee approved a draft version of the bill.
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Oct. 2, 1993, at 2620, 2621; see also Congress OKs North American
Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 171.
44. In the House, the Ways and Means Committee approved NAFTA on November 9,
1993, by a vote of 29 to 12; the Energy and Commerce Committee sent it to the floor without
recommendation; and the same day, the Banking Committee sent the bill to the floor
accompanied with an unfavorable recommendation. Land of the Free-For-All, supra note 18.
45. Of the 88 hearings, 64 were conducted by House committees. The hearings ranged
from issues such as environment, labor, and settlement of disputes to human rights, democracy,
elections, and the peso devaluation in Mexico. Congress also conducted fourteen related hearings
and issued seven related reports. Congressional Information Services, 93-P.L. 103-182.
46. The sugar deal was made to assure the support of Louisiana lawmakers. Sugar
producers feared that Mexico would substitute corn sweeteners in products for its local markets
and export its sugar surplus. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 178.
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Canada regarding American wheat farmers near the Canadian border.47
Representative Clay Shaw Jr., a Republican from Florida, saw an
opportunity to condition his vote on a promise from Mexico to extradite an
alleged rapist.48
Even non-NAFTA countries were affected by the deals. For
example, the White House reinstated the phasing out of textile tariffs from
ten to fifteen years, which applied to the Philippines and other developing
countries.49 The Hispanic caucus, led by Representative Esteban E.
Torres, a Democrat from California, pushed for the allocation of one
billion dollars to public works projects for communities that would lose
jobs to Mexico.5 Other members of Congress worked out their own
deals. For example, Representative Floyd H. Flake, a Democrat from
New York, after announcing his support for NAFTA, received a call from
President Clinton informing him of a Small Business Administration pilot
program that had been allocated to his district in Queens, New York.5
Many of the deals were formalized through letters of
understanding, but others were the product of unwritten political
compromises.52 Anti-NAFTA groups attacked this give-away procedure
vociferously. Regardless of what position they took on the deals, the
defenders of the deal-making process explained that the deals were
substitutes for the amendment process which was foreclosed because of the
fast-track rules for the adoption of NAFTA. The White House also was
restricted as to the extent of the concessions which were granted. For
example, the Administration rejected a tax cut on cigarettes sought by
47. The Administration designed a mechanism for re-imposing tariffs on Mexico if the
price of orange juice concentrate as tracked on the New York Commodities Exchange dropped
down to a certain level. With the agreement on oranges and tomatoes, the Administration won
the votes of the nine representatives from Florida. Cloud, supra note 9, at 3179; Congress OKs
North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 178; The Flying Arkansan, supra note 36, at 25.
48. The accused was charged of having raped a five-year-old girl. Mexico's practice
regarding extradition is not to extradite Mexican nationals but to judge them under its own laws.
Clay wanted the accused to be judged in the United States, where the act was committed. CONG.
Q. WKLY REP., Oct. 2, 1993, at 2620; CONG. Q. WKLY REP., Nov. 13, 1993, at 3106.
49. This decision included 10 votes of House members from textile producing districts.
Cloud, supra note 9, at 3175.
50. The North American Development Bank (NAD Bank) addressed this concern; only
Representative Torres from the Hispanic caucus voted for NAFTA. Although the NAD Bank
was not the only one to tackle this concern, some critics sarcastically adopted the phrase: "one
bank, one vote." Cloud, supra note 9, at 3175; David S. Cloud, Clinton Turns Up Volume on
NAFTA Sales Pitch, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 2863, 2863 (1993); The Great NAFTA Bazaar,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 27.
51. Congress OKs North American Trade Pact, supra note 4, at 179.
52. See 139 CONG. REC. H9883 (letters of understanding).
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representatives from North Carolina.53  Furthermore, the active
participation of Mexico and Canada in lobbying the United States
Congress evidenced a concerted effort to stay within the well marked
boundaries of the political process.'
V. THE VOTE
The process of gaining votes for passage of NAFTA resembled
climbing a mountain, a race to the top against the clock.55 Somber, or
deeply doubtful, remarks were not uncommon throughout the process.
"Being for NAFTA right now is like being for a congressional pay raise,"
declared Representative Fred Upton, a Republican from Michigan, in early
November 1993; Representative Dale E. Kildee, a Democrat from
Michigan, pointed out the undecided "want to cast their vote quietly;" and
Representative Richard A. Gephardt, the Democrat from Missouri, said he
had never seen such intense pressure on members for a positive vote.56
On November 9, 1993, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen,
unofficially declared that the Administration was twenty-six members short
of the required 218 votes to obtain House approval for NAFTA.57 More
detailed analysis that week showed 175 members favoring the accord,
fourteen were classified as "leaning" towards approval, and thirty-two
were undecided.5" Many Republicans favored the agreement but were not
willing to let the White House rely on them for support. Republican
Minority Whip, Newt Gingrich, made it clear that a bipartisan effort was
necessary to obtain congressional approval of NAFTA.59
53. The tax on cigarettes was a powerful arm of the upcoming healthcare reform effort; the
Administration was not willing to endanger it. Cloud, supra note 9, at 3179.
54. During the November 17th House debate, a member affirmed according to a study
conducted by the Center for Public Integrity, Mexico had spent at least 30 million dollars in
lobbying the United States Congress (no confirmation of this data could be found by the author).
See 139 CONG. REC. H9900 (statement by Representative Benjamin A. Gilman, R-NY).
55. On August 21, 1993, it was estimated the vote in the Senate was in favor of NAFTA,
but in the House the numbers showed only 120 of the 176 Republicans were in favor; only 1/3 of
the Democrats were then in favor, 1/3 opposed it, and 1/3 were undecided. Large delegations,
such as California and Florida, opposed the agreement. Viva NAFTA, supra note 8, at 22.
56. Cloud, supra note 14, at 3104.
57. This remark was made before the Gore-Perot debate on NAFTA. The Great NAFTA
Bazaar, supra note 50, at 27.
58. According to this analysis, of the 175 favoring the accord: 100 were Republicans and
75 were Democrats, 14 "leaning" members were Democrats, and 15 of the undecided were
Republicans, the remaining 17 being Democrats. Cloud, supra note 14, at 3107.
59. Representative Gingrich feared too much reliance on Republicans would push
Democrats into taking a safe position not to risk any political capital. Some Republicans
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Although the Republican Party did not control the House of
Representatives, President Clinton owed more to the GOP members for his
victory in obtaining approval for NAFTA than to members of his own
party: 132 Republicans and 102 Democrats voted "aye." Democratic
members who received twenty percent or more of their total campaign
contributions from labor Political Action Committees (PACs) generally,
but not in all cases, voted against the agreement. 60 From the thirty House
members that identified themselves on November 12, 1993, as being
undecided, twenty-one voted in favor of NAFTA.6'
Another element of the victory was the public support for
NAFTA. Wisely, it was remarked that if President Clinton won the
support of the voters, he was going to win in Congress.62 Through the
final months preceding the vote, public opposition to NAFTA grew and
resulted in a small approval margin. 6' The relationship between the voters
and the representatives was reflected in the House decision.
Finally, Ross Perot's prediction of a second vote on NAFTA, by
those congressional members who were elected in the 1994 general
election, proved unfounded." Of the 234 members who voted for
NAFTA, 184 were re-elected, nearly 80%. The surveys regarding this
issue, the Republican agenda in the 1994 race, and the nature of mid-term
elections, strengthens this assumption.65
VI. CONCLUSION
Although NAFTA will achieve the complete liberalization of
ninety percent of the actual trade in goods and services among the
contracting parties, it is a gradual process planned to be completed, within
twenty years. Considering the safeguard measures, the accord can be
viewed as an instrument of industrial oriented policy which is close to
President Clinton's and other Democrats' economic philosophy. As such,
complained they were being asked to take the risk for the President's policy, while Democrats
were running for cover. Cloud, supra note 9, at 3179.
60. Jon Healey & Thomas H. Moore, Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA's
Approval, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 3181, 3182 (1993) (stating that 77% voted no).
61. It is difficult to find a defined pattern. For example, Representative Sangmeister (D-
Ill), who received 40% of total campaign contributions from labor PACs, voted against NAFTA,
but Representative Thomas C. Sawyer (D-OH), who received 41%, voted yes.
62. Marketing NAFTA, supra note 37, at 14.
63. See Public Support for NAFTA chart infra p. 447 which provides figures on public
support for NAFTA.
64. Ross Perot warned that in case NAFTA was passed by the Congress, it was still going
to be subject to two other votes, the electoral responses of 1994 and 1996.
65. See Public Reaction to Congressmen if Voted for NAFTA chart infra p. 450.
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it not only offers another explanation of why the President enthusiastically
adopted it, but it also reflects the nature of determining winner and loser
nations under the terms of NAFTA. This feature was exploited by many
members to extract concessions for local producers that were not able to
make their way into NAFTA at the negotiation table. Although highly
criticized, this practice is influenced by the local accountability to which
representatives are subjected. When decisions are made, and the affected
agents are not able to advance their concerns, social frustration will result.
Here, the political process was at work, and although it was not perfect in
this case, it was able to advance all interests: the administration had
NAFTA, many groups received concessions, and representatives
strengthened ties to their constituents. The fight over NAFTA left no scars
and has now been forgotten, leaving Congress free to address other issues.
On the other hand, many of the opponents of NAFTA had
radically different views on the philosophy, principles, and commitments
which underlie the agreement. Why did their efforts fail to defeat
NAFTA? The answer to this question may lie in the economic situation of
the country, and in the globalization trend. All of these factors influenced
the positions of the voting public and the members of Congress who voted
for NAFTA. In the end, after hearing so many arguments, pro and con,
can it be denied public opinion guided the outcome? After all, Congress is
a mirror image of the American people. The NAFTA approval process
shows us politics at work and the influence of public concerns.
Finally, the capacity of the collegiate organization of Congress to
assess decisions containing profound foreign policy implications should be
questioned. Today, we see Senate Committees addressing the White
House response to the Mexican financial crisis. How much of that
response can trace its origin to the change that NAFTA represented in
United States' foreign policy toward Mexico and the Latin American
region? Whatever the answer to these questions may be, in the midst of
the human conditions which result because of NAFTA, there will always
be the temptation for nations to think that their decisions are better for
their interests than the decisions reached through NAFTA, and whatever
nation can benefit the most from the agreement will also be motivated into
doing less to disturb its terms.
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Public Support for NAFTA
September 19, 1993
Do you favor or oppose NAFTA?
Oppose not so strongly 15%
Favor strongly 16%
Favor not so strongly 17%
No answer 27%
Do not know 1%
Oppose strongly 24%
October 26, 1993
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Public Perception Regarding Jobs and NAFTA
October 26, 1993




















No one works 3%
November 16, 1993
Do you think NAFTA will create jobs because Mexico will buy more U.S. imports, or will




Do not know 10%
March 21, 1994
Do you think NAFTA will help/hurt the overall job situation?
Hurt a little 14%
Hurt a lot 18%
Help a little 32%
Help a lot 20%




I Public Perception of NAFTA Issues
November 15, 1993
If NAFTA is passed, do you think immigration from Mexico into the U.S. would
go up, go down, or stay about the same?7
Go up 26%
Go down 18%
Stay about the same 50%
Not sure 6%
November 11, 1993





Do you consider the vote in Congress on NAFTA a crucial test of America's
leadership role in the world?***
Yes 55%
No 37%
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Public Reaction to Congressmen if Voted for NAFTA
October 26, 1993
Which candidate for Congress in 1994 elections would you support:
A) Supported president Clinton's economic program, health care program, and
NAFTA;
B) Opposed all of the latter
Candidate A 52%
Candidate B 39%
Depends on candidate 4%
Not sure 5%
November 15, 1993
If your member of Congress votes against NAFTA, would this opposition make




Not sure about vote 4%
Not sure 8%
November 16, 1993
If youi mernie of Cpgress votes will that make you more/less like




Do not know 6%
October 10, 1994
If your candidate supported NAFTA, wil that make you more/less likely to
support him?
More likely 19%
Somewhat more likely 29%
Much less likely 18%
Somewhat less likely 19%
Not much difference I %1f
Not sure 19 %
Posadas
The President, Congress and NAFTA
December 26, 1993
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I. THE BRITISH SYSTEM
It can be said without fear of contradiction, that there is a need,
both perceived and real, for reform of the British civil justice system.
Although different, I draw no distinction between Scotland's and England's
justice systems. However, to the extent that any distinction could be
drawn, perhaps it would suggest that the case for reform is stronger in
Scotland. The tension between the disenfranchisement of the middle
classes from the British judicial system and the impossible demands placed
upon a publicly funded Legal Aid system have, in part, been recognized
through legislation in Scotland. Specifically, the laws of Scotland allow
enhanced fees in cases where solicitors take instructions on a speculative
basis, "no win - no fee," and there are proposals pending in England for
similar reforms. To the extent that one measure of a civilized society is its
system of law, we must be concerned when a system fails to provide
access to justice for all and where all do not stand equal before the law.
There is also the problem of failing public confidence in a system
which can, on the one hand, deliver what are perceived to be large
verdicts in defamation and libel cases, and modest, inadequate
compensation for those who have suffered devastating personal injury, or
have seen their loved ones killed through the negligence of others, such as
the recent thalidomide victims. I pause to reflect that parents who have
suffered the tragic and immeasurable loss of their child might find such a
death in Scotland valued at about £3000. It has been said that reform of
the law is far too serious a matter to be left to the legal profession.
Instead, I submit that the responsibility for correcting such matters must lie
with us all. The law must reflect the society it serves. It must change and
develop if it is to continue to be relevant rather than becoming a museum
* Head of Litigation, Levy & McRae, Glasgow, Scotland; L.L.B., University of
Edinburgh; B.A., University of Strathclyde.
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relic preserving ideas of the past which have increasingly little relevance
for today's needs. Therefore, we need to look at other legal systems. We
need to experiment and find ways of delivering access to justice, and in a
way which does not impose intolerable burdens on public expenditure.
In the areas of personal injury and wrongful death, there is a
useful comparison to be made between the civil justice system in Britain
and that in the United States which, to some extent, shares a common
origin with the British system, although it has developed quite differently.
If access to justice is as I suggest, a fundamental indicator of the relevance
of any system of justice, then the system in Britain is in need of radical
reform. Presently, only those who have been granted Legal Aid or who
are very wealthy can afford the costs and the risks inherent in most
litigation. Eligibility for Legal Aid has increasingly been restricted, and
even those who are granted Legal Aid, subject to a contribution, often find
the contribution so large in relation to their means as to make the sacrifice
too great. Those who accept the offer of Legal Aid will find their freedom
to instruct a solicitor restricted to those lawyers prepared to act for the fee
rates paid by the Legal Board, which fall considerably short of those paid
by privately instructing clients.
The law of supply and demand dictates that many of the best
lawyers, whether solicitors or counsel, often prefer to act for the corporate
or private client who pays "top dollar," while those who depend upon
Legal Aid may be restricted to the less experienced or perhaps less able
attorney. While this is a general comment subject to many exceptions, it is
nonetheless true to say that the Legal Aid client is placed in a different
position from those able to instruct privately. Lawyers who act for Legal
Aid clients agree to provide their services at a hugely discounted rate.
Many skilled and able solicitors and counsel agree to this, but many do
not. It is perhaps an inevitable consequence of a system of publicly funded
litigation that there will always be a need for cost control, and inevitably
fees paid from the public purse will fall short of those available from the
private client. I would argue not only must we achieve access to the courts
for all, but the quality of representation should be determined by needs of
the case rather than the wealth or poverty of the claimant. It is surely right
that all should stand equal before the law and in that sense "David" is
surely entitled to be equal with "Goliath."
It cannot be just that a Legal Aid litigant is advised by an
inexperienced or less able lawyer working within budgetary constraints,
often overloaded with cases, in an effort to compensate for an inadequate
fee structure. Meanwhile, those he sues are represented by the most able
in their field, fully prepared and able to apply the skill, time, and
resources necessary to properly argue their client's cause. This
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observation is not a criticism of solicitors and counsel who represent
clients of Legal Aid, but a reflection of the uneven playing field often
facing the Legal Aid litigant.
It is also clear that the present Legal Aid System is, by design,
bound to fail. It is the classic dilemma of infinite demand and finite
resources. Is it conceivable that we could have a system of publicly
funded litigation which meets any and all demands placed upon it? Such a
system would inevitably consume a disproportionate amount of public
expenditure. Legitimate claimants should be able to bring their claims
before the courts, and those responsible for acts of negligence or who
cause injury and death, should not be able to hide behind the imperfections
of a legal system which denies justice to victims.
Great Britain's Legal Aid System is also one which, by design,
encourages inefficiency. Fee charging is either by the hour or by the act
performed. It is said that this scheme leaves the system open to abuse.
For example, unscrupulous lawyers may make up for poor rates by doing
unnecessary work or allowing pointless litigation to proceed through the
courts with the sole purpose of charging more fees.
In response to some of these problems, the legal profession has
seen the introduction of new rules in Scotland which allow solicitors and
clients to enter into special fee arrangements which in turn enable lawyers
to recover enhanced fees of up to 100% if they are prepared to take on
litigation speculatively; that is no win - no fee. Similar proposals are
being considered in England. The new rules are subject to a number of
qualifications and do not cover all the fees that a solicitor would normally
charge a client. Lawyers are restricted to fees that might be recoverable
from the losing party in the event of success. These fees are often much
less than the actual fees and costs incurred, and there are a number of
other restrictions and qualifications. These proposals remain wedded to
the principle of paying lawyers on an hourly rate. It is not equivalent to
the American contingency fee system with lawyers paid on a percentage of
what is recovered in damages. Nonetheless, these proposals recognize a
remarkable departure from one of the often voiced objections to the
American system; namely, that a lawyer should not have an interest in the
outcome of his client's case. It now appears that such an interest is not
only permissible, but that it may in fact be a good thing to the extent that
lawyers under these arrangements are unlikely to pursue pointless
litigation.
It is unclear to what extent these proposals will address the
problem of access to justice, or ensure that the choice of lawyer is
governed by the needs of the case rather than the means of the client. Nor
is it clear whether this new approach can or will generate sufficient
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additional fees to compensate solicitors for the risk of taking a case on a
speculative basis. Such speculative arrangements impose a considerable
risk, particularly for solicitors in smaller practices. Resources and
manpower in pursuing litigation can be considerable and the failure to
recover a fee can cause considerable financial problems for the solicitor.
In the American system, where lawyers are paid a percentage of damages
recovered, usually between twenty-five to forty percent, depending on the
type of case and the risk involved, the sums recovered are often sufficient
to provide a "cushion" for cases which do not succeed. It is not clear
whether the current proposals would achieve figures sufficient to
compensate for the risk involved. There is also the difficulty that litigants
in Britain, even in a speculatively funded action, continue to face perhaps
the biggest disincentive to pursue their rights; namely, the "expenses rule"
where the loser pays expenses. The very persons which the new proposals
seek to help, those who cannot afford to instruct lawyers privately and who
by definition are not wealthy, are asked to take the risk of paying expenses
if they lose. Expenses can be huge and sufficient enough to overwhelm
the resources of most middle income earners.
In England there is a proposal for litigants to buy insurance to
cover expenses. It is not clear to what extent this system will work. No
equivalent system is in place in Scotland and those wishing to pursue an
action are at a considerable disadvantage. Corporate and wealthy
individuals defending actions are at an advantage which often deters others
pursuing litigation or, if raised, can see litigation prematurely settled at
below value settlements. Every lawyer in practice in Britain is aware that
the expenses rule is often used to bludgeon litigants into settlements which
do not properly reflect compensation for the loss they have suffered, but
reflect a compromise to avoid the expenses inherent in the judicial process.
In comparison with other systems, most notably the system in the
United States, it is often said that the British system avoids the excesses of
massive jury awards. One notable exception in Britain and often the
subject of adverse comment, is the difference between the perceived huge
awards sometimes made by juries in defamation and libel cases (principally
in England) for plaintiffs who suffered hurt feelings and the more modest
awards for plaintiffs who suffered devastating personal injury. This
exposes a number of problems and contradictions in the British system.
The adjectives used to describe some United States' jury awards
presupposes they exceed what is just and, by definition, what would have
been awarded in a similar case in Britain.
The difference in result in many cases is, in my view, arrived at
for one very important reason. For the most part, damage awards in
Britain are decided by judges whilst in the United States by juries. If the
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purpose of an award of damages is to compensate victims for their loss,
past, present and future, and to compensate them for their pain and
suffering, who is best able to assess damages? It is true that juries are
composed of ordinary people who are not experts and who may, from time
to time, make mistakes. Many who criticize the system in Britain say
judges are conservative in their approach, and they take into account wider
concerns which are sometimes irrelevant, such as the effect large awards
may have on insurance premiums, all of which have little to do with
compensating the individual concerned. What is clear is that the level of
damages recoverable in Britain for personal injury and wrongful death
cases fall considerably short of the damages generally recoverable in the
United States. Many dealing with personal injury litigation believe that the
proper course is to allow juries to determine personal injury matters, to
have a greater faith in the jury system, and to allow the courts to correct
those awards if it can be demonstrated that juries have behaved
unreasonably. As will be seen, the effect of jury awards is wider than just
the proper compensation of those affected by the negligence of others.
Although jury trials are sometimes available in Britain, they are not
commonplace, nor are they easy to obtain. Perhaps there is reason to
extend the role of juries to personal injury cases on the basis that they are
as qualified as judges to assess the proper compensation deserved in a
case. The appreciation of pain and suffering, and the likely impact on an
individual's life and his or her ability to earn a living, are not matters
which judges are any more qualified to assess than is a member of the
public applying his or her life experience. Some might argue that the
experience of ordinary people in such an assessment is a great deal more
relevant than that of judges. The perceived failure of our system to
properly compensate those who have been the victim of personal injury has
led lawyers, in cases where the opportunities exist, to take litigation to
other countries in order to recover higher compensation.
II. THE UNITED STATES' SYSTEM
In contrast to the British system, the system in the United States
has much more of a free market feel to it. There is no equivalent system
of publicly funded litigation and there is no equivalent rule about expenses.
Those who wish to litigate may sue whomever they want, without fear of
expenses. However, first they must find a lawyer. Those who wish to
pursue litigation have a choice between retaining attorneys on an hourly
rate or engaging attorneys on a contingency basis. When an attorney is
engaged on a contingency fee basis, the lawyer is largely responsible for
the funding and associated costs of any litigation, before taking on a case
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they must be convinced of the prospects of success. All costs and fees are
contingent upon success. The effect is that American attorneys will screen
cases to determine the prospects of success. Those wishing to pursue
hopeless and pointless litigation will not readily be able to engage
attorneys, and those who initiate claims will find that their attorneys
constantly monitor the prospects of success. Another effect of the
contingency fee system is that it allows those with claims to choose the
attorney best suited to the case rather than seek out an attorney prepared to
work at discounted fee rates with the obvious risk that the best lawyer for
the job is not retained.
It would now appear acceptable and perhaps even appropriate for
lawyers in Britain to have an interest in the outcome of litigation. This
much is implicit in the most recent proposals for Scotland and England,
but what can be said of the comparison between our system and that in the
United States? There is, I would suggest, greater access to justice in the
United States. Almost everyone with a claim is in a position to retain
attorneys on a contingency fee basis. The system involves no public
expenditure and therefore imposes no burden on the public purse. The
system does deliver larger awards for personal injury and wrongful death
cases. It is really a question of which system delivers best in the widest
sense. Those against contingency fee systems argue that it has led to an
explosion in litigation, log jammed the American court system, and
negatively affected business. Another argument against the contingency
fee system blames large jury awards for increased insurance premiums,
driving the United States medical system to the point where many doctors
cannot afford the insurance premiums. When examined, most of these
observations are found to be largely anecdotal and have little basis in fact.
Litigation is certainly popular in the United States. However,
there is little evidence that its popularity has been fueled by speculative
litigation. Much of the litigation is raised by the government seeking to
recover student loans and other debts, and viewed in another way the
courts are being used for precisely the purpose they are designed. That
purpose is to regulate disputes and to settle claims. Equally, there is little
evidence to suggest that litigation harms the competitiveness of American
firms or that there is any link between insurance costs and the performance
of business. So far as the medical profession is concerned, it is important
not to exaggerate what is happening in the United States. Most doctors do
very well despite insurance premiums. The reality is that very few
medical malpractice cases succeed. Fifty percent of those filed result in no
awards at all and whilst insurance premiums for doctors doubled in the
years 1976 to 1984, this did not equal the rise in average earnings for that
period. In fact, as a percentage of earnings, premiums fell. There appears
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to be little evidence to suggest that larger jury awards in the United States
have imposed an unacceptable social cost by penalizing business or the
medical profession in such a way that they are adversely affected. Indeed,
per contra, it can be argued that in a country which does not have a
national health service, or the extensive welfare system provided in
Britain, such awards are necessary to properly reflect the costs of ongoing
medical care, support, and loss of income for those injured through the
fault of others. In Britain, where awards have been much smaller, the
State, through the National Health Service and the system of State
Benefits, has to some extent paid the bill for the ongoing effects of those
suffering long term disability who have not been adequately compensated
for the effects of their injuries. It can be argued that as pressure on public
funds mount, affecting not only funding for the Legal Aid, but also the
National Health Service and other State Benefits, the better way to
compensate those affected by the negligence of others is to have the
negligent party pay the full cost, relieving the state of responsibility for
funding litigation or looking after the victim.
There is, of course, another consequence of American jury
awards; what I call the "economic imperative." This describes the
consequence of such awards on those who have to pay them, notably the
insurance industry or large corporations. The manufacturers of defective
products are, as a matter of economic necessity, more likely to react to
large damage awards than to small awards. The prospect of facing
multiple claims is such that corporations are likely to react to improve
safety standards and correct defective products to avoid multiple large
damage awards. If the death of a child were to result in an award of
£3000 it will have little financial impact on a company or insurer. If the
award were $3,000,000 the equation is of necessity different. The United
States has seen many improvements in safety standards which are a result
of large jury awards or the threat of them. Large verdicts are more
effective than the periodic promotion of higher safety standards by
government departments or other bureaucratic agencies. The "economic
imperative" is a stimulus to improve standards. Perhaps it comes as no
surprise that corporations react more quickly when faced with multimillion
dollar law suits rather than the prospect of a modest fine imposed by a
criminal court after a breach of a health and safety regulation.
In summary, the American system appears to offer many
advantages. Contingency fees allow all, irrespective of their personal
circumstances, to retain attorneys most appropriate to the case. Those
attorneys are unlikely to accept litigation where there is no prospect of
success since not only do they put their fees at risk, but in most cases they
risk the cost of funding actions. Jury awards are large enough to make the
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contingency fee system work to the extent that prospects of a share in
damages are sufficient to compensate the lawyers for the risks taken. The
effect of larger awards is measured partly as the "economic imperative" to
improve standards and by imposing the true costs of the negligence on a
guilty party rather than the state assuming responsibility for after care and
other social support. This relieves the demand on the public purse while
ensuring greater access to justice for those who need it.
The American contingency fee system has been the subject of
much criticism by many in Britain and is now under attack in the United
States. It is unfortunate that many in Britain who criticize have been silent
as an increasing proportion of the British public have become
disenfranchised from a legal system, which purports to serve them, often
sees just claims not pursued or victims bullied into inadequate settlement.
Those in the United States who see apparent advantages in the "expenses
rule" should consider with care the effect such a rule will have on access
to justice.
It has been said that the contingency fee system will encourage
lawyers to take shortcuts and to be unethical. The logic of this argument is
difficult to follow. It presumes that the system in Britain is free of such
problems or that the unscrupulous and unethical are unable to find
opportunities to abuse our system, but clearly this is not the case. Those
administering te British Legal Aid System are aware of many abuses
within that system where pointless litigation is pursued on an hourly basis
with little or no prospect of delivering any success to the claimant. The
system of hourly paid fees, whether legally aided or privately funded, is
always open to abuse by the unethical and unscrupulous. I am aware of no
evidence to suggest that the American system or American lawyers are any
more likely to produce such abuses than Great Britain. The question of
ethics and standards is one quite separate from how we organize access to
justice.
III. THE WAY FORWARD
I do not seek to suggest that all in the British system is wrong nor
that all in the American system is correct. I would suggest, however, that
we can learn from looking at other systems and looking at our own
critically. It is neither appropriate nor desirable to substitute one for the
other and the better course undoubtedly would be to encourage
development of our own system to meet the demands of the present day.
For my part, I would argue for an experiment in the area of personal
injury litigation. It should not be beyond the wit of government and the
profession to devise a system allowing contingency fees for certain classes
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of actions or within certain parts of the court structure. I would also argue
that such a system will not work unless it permits greater access to juries.
In principle, there is no reason why this should impose additional costs.
The option of a jury trial could result in damages sufficient to meet any
additional costs. Would it be unreasonable, for example, for those who
elect a jury trial to agree to pay a percentage of the sums awarded as a
cost? Again, I would suggest this would be payable only on success,
reflecting the philosophy of contingency based litigation and ensuring that
those who were of modest means were not disadvantaged in the pursuit of
their claims.
I am the first to appreciate that these proposals are imperfect, but
then again, so is the current system. We are in urgent need of reform. It
is a reform which, to be successful, requires everyone to contribute to
ensure that we end up with a system which meets the expectations and
needs of the public that it seeks to serve.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last several years have been marked by considerable economic
reform in nonmarket countries. The changes which have occurred have
undoubtedly impacted upon United States' law and policy with respect to
the United States' treatment of those countries. The purpose of this paper
is to examine the effects, or potential effects, this reform has had, or could
have, on the United States' law of countervailing duties with respect to
nonmarket economies. In particular, this paper seeks to demonstrate,
through case analyses, how these effects are, or likely will be, driven by
those basic principles already established under the United States'
countervailing duty law. Part I is a general look at the United States' trade
law, highlighting some recent changes made to it by the Uruguay Round
Agreement. Part II outlines how the United States Commerce Department
(Commerce), which is responsible for administering this law, developed
the United States' policy on countervailing duty law and nonmarket
economies. Part III is devoted to a discussion of important antidumping
law developments which impact upon the application of countervailing
duties to nonmarket economies in transition. Part IV examines what can
already be said about the application of countervailing duty law to
reforming nonmarkets given the fact this is still a very new area for
Commerce. This paper will then conclude with some final thoughts on
related foreign policy concerns.
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II. GENERAL UNITED STATES' LAW OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
The purpose of United States' countervailing duty law is "to offset
the unfair advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from
export subsidies paid by their governments."' Before the Commerce
Department can impose countervailing duties on any imports, it must make
a two-part determination. First, the goods are being subsidized by the
foreign government; and second, a United States' industry is materially
injured, or is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of a
United States' industry is slowed because of the subsidized imports. 2 Upon
making a positive finding for countervailing duties, the Commerce
Department will publish a countervailing duty order covering the
subsidized goods, or "subject merchandise"' in the Federal Register
pursuant to this order. The Commerce Department will then direct
Customs to impose countervailing duties equal to the amount of the net
subsidy.'
The Commerce Department defines subsidies as direct and indirect
government grants, whether in the form of direct cash payments, tax
credits, or artificially low-interest loans, for the production or exportation
of goods., In its statutory definition of subsidy, the Tariff Act of 1930 lists
two types: export and domestic.6 The former kind are defined to include
those examples which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Subsidies Code enumerates in its Illustrative List of Export
Subsidies. That list includes various subsidies, credits, and preferential tax
treatments contingent upon export. 7
In defining domestic subsidies, the Tariff Act holds that subsidies
must be provided "to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of
enterprises or industries.", Thus, United States' trade law aims at
countervailing, not foreign government programs designed to achieve
1. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 455-56 (1978)).
2. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1) (1995) [hereinafter Tariff Act].
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(d).
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c). An estimated amount is used before Commerce makes a more
definite assessment.
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1).
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Agreement on Interpretation and Application
of articles, VI, XVI and XXIII of the agreement of Oct. 30, 1947 as rectified by the proces-
verbal of Dec. 17, 1979. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, TIAS No. 9619
[hereinafter GATT]. This is part of the Tokyo Round.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(I), (ii).
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broad economic goals such as lower inflation or unemployment, but the
government aid which benefits a specific economic sector. The Tariff Act
states such aid includes provisions of capital, low-interest loans, debt
forgiveness, and cost assumptions.9
III. SIGNIFICANT URUGUAY ROUND CHANGES TO UNITED STATES
COUNTERVAILING DUTY OBLIGATIONS
Until recently, United States' trade law did not require Commerce
to conduct a material injury test for subsidized goods from all countries.
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the United States was obligated
to conduct such a test on imports only from those nations which: (1) were
signatories to the Tokyo Round Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Code; (2) had assumed comparable obligations; (3) or were not signatories
to GATT but had bilateral trade agreements with the United States
requiring unconditional Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment.'0
Otherwise, countervailing duties could be imposed without an injury test.
This bifurcated system changed, however, with the Uruguay Round. All
signatories to that accord are afforded an injury test, and since all World
Trade Organization (WTO) members are parties to these agreements, an
injury test must now be applied by the United States in every
countervailing duty case involving a WTO member."
Prior to the Uruguay Round, controversy frequently arose
regarding exactly what type of government-conferred benefits constitute
"subsidies" under GATT."1 At times it was unclear just when the United
States could hold such benefits as actionable, under the GATT law of
countervailing duties. The Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement clarified
this area of GATT obligations when it defined a subsidy as a "financial
contribution" provided directly or indirectly by a government which
confers a benefit." The Agreement more completely developed this
definition of an actionable subsidy by establishing a classification of
subsidies. The classes include subsidies which are: (1) prohibited, or "red
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(I), (ii).
10. Walter Kolligs, The United States Law of Countervailing Duties and Federal Agency
Procurement After the Tokyo Round: Is it 'GATT Legal'? 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 553, 568
(1990); see also JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 785 (1995).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b)(1)(a).
12. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 783. 785.
13. GA'T , supra note 7, art.1, §1.1.
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light;" (2) permissible, but actionable if they cause adverse trade effects or
"amber light;" and (3) nonactionable, or "green light. " 
Under this new Uruguay Round classification, the United States
may continue to treat export subsidies as a violation of GATT obligations,
but may also treat as prohibited any de facto export subsidies or subsidies
contingent upon the manufacturer's use of domestic materials for
production." The United States may now also legally take countervailing
action when it can demonstrate, by means proscribed under the "amber
light" category, the use of subsidies by a nation has adversely affected
United States' trade interests through price or market share effects;
whether they have caused "serious prejudice" to United States' interests.16
In cases where serious prejudice is presumed, the burden is on the
subsidizing nation to demonstrate harm was not caused to the importing
nation. The new classification prohibits the United States from taking
countervailing action in certain cases of governmental assistance for:
industrial research, regional development, or the adaptation of existing
plants or equipment to meet new environmental standards. 7 A notification
provision allows for other countries to judge the permissibility of subsidies
before they are granted by a government.
IV. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES' POLICY ON
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES LAW AND NONMARKET ECONOMIES
AWARDED
A. Imports of Carbon Steel Wire from Poland and Czechoslovakia
The first three petitions for application of countervailing duties
against nonmarket economies were filed in 1983.1' In September of that
year, the American Textile Manufacturers Institute filed a petition alleging
subsidization of textile and apparel imports from the People's Republic of
China.'9 That petition was ultimately withdrawn on the day the Commerce
14. See also U.S. COMMERCE DEP'T, UNITED STATES-CHINA LEGAL SEMINAR-UNITED
STATES ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING LAWS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 23 (1994) [hereinafter SEMINAR].
15. GATT, supra note 7, art. 3, § 3.1(a). The United States must, however, allow a three-
year grace period from the Agreement's entry into force before it may act on the latter two
practices. SEMINAR, supra note 14, at 24.
16. GAT, supra note 7, art. 6; see also SEMINAR, supra note 14, at 24.
17. GATT, supra note 7, art. 6.
18. Michael G. Egge, The Threat of United States Countervailing Duty Liability in the New
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Department was scheduled to issue its preliminary determination. Later
that year in November, a group of United States' producers of carbon steel
wire rod filed a petition against imports of that product from Poland, and
another petition against imports from Czechoslovakia. ° In March of 1984,
United States' producers of potassium chloride (potash) filed petitions
against imports of potash from the Soviet Union and East Germany.21
In May 1984, the Commerce Department finally declared its
stance on the applicability of countervailing duties to nonmarket economy
countries. In its final determination on the cases of the carbon steel wire
rod imports from Czechoslovakia and Poland, Commerce decided
countervailing duty law could not be applied to nonmarket economies.22
The Department's rational in each case was that it was impossible to
identify a countervailing subsidy in a nonmarket economy. Under the
United States' law of countervailing duties, the Department recognized a
subsidy as "any action that distorts or subverts the market process and
results in a misallocation of resources." 23 Yet, in nonmarket economies,
there is no such market process to distort. Nonmarket economies rely on
the central government rather than market forces to determine prices and
resource allocation. As a result, anything which results in such markets is
caused by the central planning, and not by subsidization.4 Thus,
Commerce found it lacked the grounds to find a nonmarket government
action to be a countervailing subsidy.,-
As a result of its conclusions, the Commerce Department denied
the petitions for duties against the Polish and Czechoslovakian imports. 2 6
One month later, the Commerce Department dismissed the petitions
against the Soviet Union and East German imports and rescinded the
initiations of the related countervailing duty investigations. 7 The above
determinations were appealed by the petitioners, and the Commerce
Department's ruling was reversed by the United States Court of
20. Id.
21. Id. at 954.
22. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370, 19,374 (1984).
23. Id. at 19,371.
24. Id.
25. id.
26. Id. at 19,370.
27. Potassium Chloride From the German Democratic Republic, Recision of Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of the Petition, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984);
Potassium Chloride from the Soviet Union, Recision of Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigation and Dismissal of the Petition, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (1984).
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International Trade in Continental Steel Corp. v. United States.' The
court held that the language of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 did
not make any distinctions concerning a country's economy, and that it did
not matter whether a subsidy could be said to exist in a nonnarket
economy under our legal definitions.29 Finally, the case was brought
before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Georgetown Steel v.
United States." The court reversed the Court of International Trade and
sustained the Commerce Department's position against the nonapplicability
of countervailing duties against imports from nonmarket economies."
B. Georgetown Steel
The basis of the Georgetown Steel decision was the court's
determination that the concepts of subsidization and its resultant
misallocation of resources, indeed had no meaning outside the context of
market-based economic systems since commercial activity in nonmarket
economies is controlled according to central plans.32  The court was
convinced by the Commerce Department's argument that subsidies cannot
affect the allocations of resources when the state establishes such
allocations pursuant to a central economic plan.33 The court found that, in
such markets, government subsidies may aid producers in accomplishing
their set economic goals, but the subsidies "do not create the kind of unfair
competitive advantage over American firms against which the
countervailing duty act was directed."1' Since such nonmarket economy
subsidies do not help producers make sales in the United States which they
otherwise may not have made, the court held countervailing duties to be
inapplicable under United States' trade law."
It is interesting to note that in its reasoning, the Georgetown Steel
court went back to the basic purpose of United States' countervailing duty
law. The court went beyond the narrow analysis of the International Trade
Court and sought out whether or not the benefit conferred by a nonmarket
government actually gave its producers an unfair competitive advantage in
foreign markets such as the United States. By showing that the nature of
28. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
29. Id. at 551; see also 19 U.S.C.S. May 1995 JM Supp. § 1303 repealed.
30. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1315.
33. Id. at 1316.
34. Id. at 1315.
35. Georgetown Steel Corp., 801 F.2d at 1315.
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nonmarket economies precludes such an effect, the court made it clear why
countervailing duty law cannot be applied to nonmarket economies to
accomplish the law's purpose.16
The Georgetown Steel court strengthened its position by pointing
out that in a nonmarket economy the government owns everything. Thus,
if the government were to give a true subsidy, it would effectively be
giving itself a subsidy, which is impossible. 37 The court also added its
belief that Congress did not intend the countervailing duty laws to apply to
nonmarket economies . The court stated, if Congress had intended the
countervailing duty laws to apply to nonmarket economies, it would not
have remained silent with regard to countervailing duties when it amended
the antidumping laws in 1974 and 1979 to cover goods from nonmarket
economies. 39 Such silence led the court to believe Congress meant for the
antidumping laws to be the sole defense for United States' manufacturers
against unfairly traded goods from nonmarket economies.40 Finally, the
court declared that the Commerce Department was neither unreasonable
nor abusive of its discretion in its determination that countervailing duty
law was inapplicable to nonmarket economies.'
C. Commerce's Current Challenge: Nonmarket Economies in
Transition
In recent years, a number of the traditional nonmarket economies
have undergone considerable political and economic reforms. Included in
these reforms has been a shift from centrally planned to market oriented
economies. During this period of transition, these countries have had
neither pure centrally controlled economies, nor true market economies.
As these countries continue their transitions, the Commerce Department's
challenge has become the determination of whether, or to what degree,
countervailing duty law should apply to them. 2 The Department's task is
to fairly and accurately determine whether certain government-subsidized
imports from these countries are produced in an industry which operates
under a free market system. A positive finding, in this regard, means that
36. David W. Richardson & Robert E. Nielsen, Recent Developments in the Treatment of
Nonmarket Economies Under the AD/CVD Laws, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS
1995, at 162 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-789).
37. Georgetown Steel Corp., 801 F.2d at 1316.
38. Id. at 1315.
39. Id. at 1317-18.
40. Id. at 1318.
41. Id.
42. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 151.
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our countervailing duty law ought to apply to these imports. While
making these evaluations, the Commerce Department must also seek to
balance competing United States' foreign and domestic policy goals,
namely the encouragement of further transitions to market economies and
the protection of United States' industries from subsidized imports.4 1
As already discussed, countervailing duty law has not been
considered applicable to nonmarket economies since the Georgetown Steel
court concluded subsidies have no meaning outside the context of market-
based economic systems." However, when a reforming nonmarket
economy begins to exhibit elements of both market and nonmarket
economies, it becomes more difficult to justify the inapplicability of this
law. During this time of transition, prices and costs which were
previously set by the state begin to be set by the emerging market forces of
supply and demand.4 1 Thus, it becomes inappropriate to hold
countervailing duty law inapplicable under the assumption that subsidies to
these transitional economy industries fail to either distort resource
allocation, or to give these industries a competitive advantage in the United
States' marketplace. If a manufacturer in a certain foreign industry has
suddenly been freed from central planning and is now basing its production
decisions on market forces, government subsidies would influence this
manufacturer to produce more or less different products. 4 Likewise, these
subsidies would help the manufacturer make sales it would otherwise not
have been able to realize. This is exactly the kind of unfair competitive
advantage which our countervailing duty law was meant to prevent.
Therefore, the Commerce Department would need to find some way to
legally apply the countervailing duty law in these circumstances.4
Perhaps due to efforts by some foreign countries to honor their
international obligations to restrict subsidies, or perhaps due to the
inability of some countries to afford subsidization, the Commerce
Department has yet been faced with a petition for countervailing action
against imports from reforming nonmarket economies." However, if a
foreign government from a transitional economy nation in question began
to recover from their current economic difficulties, and can afford subsidy
programs once again, it is certainly possible such petitions may eventually
43. Id. at 152.
44. Georgetown Steel Corp., 801 F.2d at 1308.
45. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 164.
46. Id. at 165.
47. Id.
48. Telephone Interview with Paulo Mendes, Policy Analyst, United States Department of
Commerce (Apr. 7, 1995) [herinafter Interview].
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be brought to the Commerce Department. The Commerce Department
may have to turn to existent United States' antidumping law for help in
determining how to treat such imports. Currently, there exists no
legislation or case law which specifically addresses the application of
countervailing duties to reforming nonmarket economies.4 9
Nevertheless, Congress and the courts have provided helpful
direction in this area in the related realm of antidumping law. Congress'
decision to amend the nonmarket economy provisions of the antidumping
law would provide the legal basis for the Commerce Department to apply
our countervailing duty law in the case of a reforming nonmarket
economy.5 Thus, it is necessary to examine relevant antidumping law
which the Commerce Department would consider.
V. ANTIDUMPING LAW AND REFORMING NONMARKET ECONOMIES
A. The Problem with Valuation
Antidumping law is aimed at offsetting the margin amount in price
by which an imported good is being unfairly dumped on the United States'
market)' Thus, the Commerce Department obviously must determine this
dumping margin as accurately as possible if it is to truly carry out the
purpose of this law.-2  In normal antidumping investigations, the
Commerce Department compares an import's foreign market value to the
United States' value to determine the margin amount by which the
imported good is being dumped into the United States' market.-3 If the
import comes from a market economy country, the Commerce Department
may base the foreign market value on prices in the exporting country, in
another foreign country, or on a constructed valueM
Valuation is not as simple when an import arrives from a
nonmarket economy nation. In these cases, the Commerce Department
cannot use the nonmarket economy prices since, from a United States'
perspective, the prices are distorted by central planning and have nothing
to do with market forces.5 Since the economic principles upon which
nonmarket economy prices are based are incompatible with the supply and
49. Id.
50. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 165.
51. Id. at 155.
52. Id. (quoting Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1190 (Fed. Cir.
1990)).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1).
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(a).
55. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 155-56; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A).
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demand principles upon which United States' prices are established, use of
the nonmarket economy prices in determining the dumping margin would
not produce a meaningful result."
Section 1316 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
19881, provided the Commerce Department with a method for more
accurately calculating the foreign market value of nonmarket economy
imports. 8 The statute directs the Commerce Department to determine
foreign market values by totaling the amounts of the input factors used in
the production of goods . 9 The factors are computed by using their values
in a "surrogate" market economy country where is economically
comparable.60 Thus, the distortion of nonmarket economy prices is
eliminated and the Commerce Department can make a meaningful
calculation of the dumping margin.
Over the next several years following the Act of 1988, a number
of nonmarket economy countries continued to make transitions to market
economies. Prices in some industries within these countries began to be
driven by market forces rather than by central planning. In these cases,
the Commerce Department would better meet its goal of accurate dumping
margin measurements by foregoing its use of surrogate market economy
values, and simply using the nonmarket economy countries' prices for the
goods in question.6' In the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Congress made the provision for the Commerce Department to use
nonmarket economy prices in those cases where the prices of the imports
in question are found to be sufficiently market driven.6 2 The Department's
problem was Congress gave no statutory guidance in determining when the
exporting country's prices were market oriented and sufficiently free from
the value distortions caused by central planning.6 3  Consequently, the
Commerce Department had to develop an approach for determining value
distortions which would be consistent with the purpose of antidumping law
and its nonmarket economy provisions.6'
56. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 155-56.
57. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1316, 102
Stat. 1186-88 (1988) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(c) (1988)).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1995).
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1995).
60. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-b(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1995).
61. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 157.
62. 19 U.S.C. § 16776(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1995).
63. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 154-55.
64. Id. at 155.
1996] 473
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
B. The Bubbles Test: Imports of Lug Nuts and Fans From the
People's Republic of China (PRC)
The Department's first test for determining whether or not certain
nonmarket economy prices were distorted was the "bubbles of capitalism"
test.6 This test was developed by the Commerce Department in 1991 from
an investigation of certain imports of fans from the People's Republic of
China (PRC)." This test was also used by the Commerce Department in
another 1991 case involving lug nuts from the PRC.1 The PRC remains
the only country against which the bubbles test has ever been used.6
Under the "bubbles test," or the "100% test," if the Commerce
Department finds that 100% of the nonmarket economy prices of
manufacturers' costs were "market driven," then it will consider those
foreign producers as operating within a "bubble of capitalism."69 In such
cases, the Department uses the reported nonmarket economy input prices
rather than surrogate market values in determining the foreign market
values of the imports in question.70
The following case analysis is used to illustrate how and why the
Commerce Department applied the "bubbles test" to imports from China.
In Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People's Republic of China;
Preliminary Determinations of Sales Less than Fair Value, the Commerce
Department first had to get information from each individual company on
its sources of cost inputs, manufacturing processes, distribution channels,
controls on external trade, profit retention, and the nature of its
ownership.71 The Commerce Department then stated that it would decide
whether each company was a "bubble of capitalism" on the basis of
whether a company could demonstrate, de jure and de facto, that it was
free from central economic controls.,2 A finding for de jure absence of
central control could be supported by, but does not require, evidence of:
"(1) an absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an individual
exporter's business and export licenses; and (2) any legislative enactments
65. Id. at 157.
66. Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Oscillating Fans and
Ceiling Fans from the People's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,664 (1991).
67. Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts From
the People's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,153 (1991).
68. Interview, supra note 48.
69. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 158.
70. Id.
71. 56 Fed. Reg. 25.664.
72. 56 Fed. Reg. 25,664.
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[sic] devolving central control of export trading companies.' 3 De facto
absence of central control could be supported by evidence that: "(1) each
exporter sets its own export prices independently of the government and
other exporters; and (2) . each exporter can keep the proceeds from its
sales. "74
The PRC manufacturers submitted evidence in order to support
their market oriented status so their own prices or costs could be used in
the Commerce Department's dumping calculations. First, PRC industries
involved in the case were privately owned and operated on market
principles." Second, the overwhelming majority of their input materials
were purchased from outside the PRC, or from other foreign investment
projects in the southern part of China.7 6 Third, all of their output was sold
outside the PRC. Finally, evidence was submitted to prove that the labor
market in the southern part of the PRCs was subject to competitive
forces."
The PRC manufacturers then attempted to convince the Commerce
Department that their industry was market oriented as a whole by arguing
that: their producers are generally foreign-owned; their government does
not control prices, production, profits distribution, or the use of capital;
materials used by their manufacturers generally come from outside the
PRC; those materials which are purchased from within the PRC are
generally done so at arm's length; the government does not control prices
for materials or involve itself with labor; companies in the industry deal
freely with their employees; PRC companies pay a higher rate for
electricity than those in Hong Kong; and the government does not impose
foreign exchange controls on the companies.7" Therefore, the PRC
manufacturers argued their own prices could be used because their
industry was sufficiently free of state control under section 771(18) of the
amended United States Tariff Act of 1930."
The Commerce Department's written reaction to the above
evidence seems to convey the frustration which must have influenced
73. 56 Fed. Reg. 25,664.
74. 56 Fed. Reg. 25,664.
75. 56 Fed. Reg. 25,664.
76. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,666.
77. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,666.
78. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,666-67.
79. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667. That section lists the factors Commerce must take into
account in evaluating whether an economy is a nonmarket one: currency convertibility, freely
bargained wage rates, government ownership or control over production factors.
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Commerce to decide on such a stringent, "all-or-nothing," rule such as the
"bubbles test." Commerce stated
These assertions, and our understanding of the
circumstances under which these respondents produce and
sell the subject merchandise, require us to consider how
any industrial sector or any commercial entity in an NME
can be said to be operating on market principles such that
costs and prices are acceptable, reliable measures of fair
market value.10
Commerce then indicated, since the legislative history of the Tariff Act
provided no helpful guidance in determining the fair market value for
producers from nonmarket economies in transition, Commerce would
require a showing by the manufacturers that all of their costs and prices
are market oriented.,' Absent such a showing, the manufacturers could not
use their own prices in the dumping calculations of fair market value, and
instead factors of production methodology would be used.Y In the case of
the fan manufacturers, the Commerce Department's preliminary
determination was not all of their manufacturing costs were market based,
therefore, they could not be used in the calculations.83
C. The Mini-Bubbles Test: Initiation of Countervailing Duties
Investigation of the Lug Nut Imports
Eventually, the Department must have realized an "all-or-nothing"
test was not appropriate for evaluating the market orientations of reforming
nonmarket economy producers. The reality is manufacturers in reforming
nonmarket economies use some production materials which have market
driven prices, and other materials which have centrally controlled prices.
To allow the "100% test" to accommodate for this fact, the Department
added a second "mini-bubbles" test.8' Under this test, it is not necessary
for 100% of the manufacturer's costs to be market driven. If the
manufacturers can demonstrate that at least some of their costs are market
driven, then those nonmarket economy values will be used in the
Department calculations; the surrogate market values are then used only
for the remaining distorted prices.' Under the "mini-bubbles test," a
80. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667.
81. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667.
82. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667.
83. 56 Fed. Reg. at 25,667.
84. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 158.
85. Id. at 159.
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nonmarket economy value was considered market driven if it were shown
to be free of direct or overt central government influence.'
The "mini-bubbles test" was applied by Commerce in the PRC lug
nuts case, which concerned manufacturing costs. To determine whether
the manufacturing costs paid by the lug nut manufacturer were free of
distortion, Commerce examined the nature of the individual transactions
which took place between the manufacturer and its suppliers. The
shortcoming of this test was Commerce failed to take into account any
price distortion which resulted indirectly from the manufacturing of a
product within a nonmarket economy.
The Commerce Department's published investigation of the PRC
lug nut producers is used below in order to analyze the nature of an
indirect distortion.u A study of this report helps explain why the "mini-
bubbles test" was inadequate for properly determining whether a
manufacturer's operations are truly market oriented. The petitioners in the
report pointed out to the Commerce Department that manufacturers in the
PRC lug nut industry were benefiting from upstream subsidies89 which
were being bestowed upon their steel and chemical suppliers.9 In other
words, subsidies being conferred by the PRC, upon steel and chemical
producers, were significantly affecting the lug nut manufacturers'
production costs. Lower costs for suppliers indirectly resulted in lower
costs for the lug nut manufacturers, thus the latter were enjoying a
competitive benefit from the upstream subsidies. Under section 701(e) of
the Tariff Act,91 the Commerce Department has the power to investigate
such upstream subsidies if it has reasonable grounds for doing so.'
The Department indicated the petitioners had demonstrated ample
evidence of the existence of upstream subsidies.n However, it seemed the
problem for the Commerce Department was the same one which was at the
heart of the Georgetown Steel decision; the Department was simply
incapable of identifying or quantifying those subsidies because they were
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks from the People's Republic of China;
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 57 Fed. Reg. 877 (1992) [hereinafter
Countervailing Duty Investigation].
89. Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 771A(a)(1) (1995).
90. Countervailing Duty Investigation, 57 Fed. Reg. 878 (1991).
91. Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
92. Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
93. 57 Fed Reg. 878.
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granted in the context of a nonmarket economy. 94 As the court in
Georgetown Steel held, subsidies in nonmarket economies simply have no
meaning within our sense of the concept. As a result, the Department
declined, in the lug nut case, to initiate a separate investigation of the
upstream subsidies.1 This is why the Commerce Department failed to take
into account the indirect price distortions surrounding the lug nut
manufacturers' operations.
The Commerce Department realized this shortcoming and asked
the Court of International Trade for a remand so it could reconsider the
use of this test. During the remand, the Commerce Department developed
another test which would take into account both the direct and indirect
effects of central planning in the determination of whether a particular
nonmarket economy industry is market oriented."
D. The Market Oriented Industry Test: Redetermining the Dumping
Investigations of the Lug Nut and Fan Imports
The Commerce Department's new test was called the market
oriented industry test.Y This test has three parts. To be considered market
oriented, the foreign industry under investigation must: (1) have no
government involvement in the setting of its prices or scheduled output; (2)
"be characterized by private or collective ownership; "9 and (3) pay market
driven prices for all its significant inputs and government determined
prices for only an insignificant proportion of the total value of
production. 99. To determine if prices are market driven, the Commerce
Department looks at the circumstances under which the inputs were
purchased from the supplier and also looks at the supplier itself.a If the
supplier also provides input materials for centrally planned production, it is
unlikely the Commerce Department will find that the suppliers prices are
entirely market driven.' 1' Through this three part test, the Commerce
94. 57 Fed. Reg. 878.
95. 57 Fed. Reg. 878.
96. 57 Fed. Reg. 878.
97. 57 Fed. Reg. 15,052, 15,054.
98. Amendment to Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and Amendment
to Antidumping Duty Order: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts From the People's Republic of China, 57
Fed. Reg. 15,052 (1992).
99. 57 Fed. Reg. 15,052.
100. 57 Fed. Reg. 15,052.
101. Richardson & Nielsen, supra note 36, at 161.
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Department seeks to ensure the foreign market value of the final goods be
determined by market forces, and not by government influence.'10
While the lug nut and fan cases were on remand, the Commerce
Department applied the market oriented test for the first time on the
imports of Sulfanilic Acid from the People's Republic of China.03 There
the Commerce Department concluded that the Chinese producers did not
produce enough documentary evidence to overcome the presumption that
their input prices were not market driven. ,0, Consequently, the Commerce
Department used surrogate country values to determine the foreign market
value of the Chinese imports. 0
Shortly following the Sulfanilic Acid case, the Commerce
Department applied the market oriented test to the remanded PRC lug nut
and fan cases.'10 Thus, in the lug nut case, the Commerce Department
looked beyond the manufacturer's individual transactions for its inputs.0""
The Commerce Department found the Chinese government played a
significant role in setting suppliers' prices and outputs of steel, a major
input for the lug-nut manufacturers. '0 As a result, the Commerce
Department concluded the prices the lug nut manufacturers paid for their
steel inputs could not really be considered market driven.' °9  Thus,
surrogate input prices would have to be used to determine the foreign
market value of the lug nuts. The Commerce Department permitted the
fan manufacturers in the other case, however, to use their own prices of
significant inputs since those inputs came from outside the Chinese
market.110
E. The Challenges of Foreign Production Investigations
The above decisions on the proper classification of particular
Chinese industries are obviously much easier to discuss in retrospect than
they were for the Commerce Department to make. This writer gained an
appreciation for the type of nuances with which the Commerce Department
102. Id. at 141.
103. Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sulfanilic Acid From
the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 9409 (1992).
104. 57 Fed. Reg. 9409.
105. 57 Fed. Reg. 9409.
106. Judith H. Bello et al., Searching for Bubbles of Capitalism, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 665, 715 (1992).
107. Id. at 716.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 716-17.
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had to deal with by studying a particular public document memorandum
which was sent by an import compliance specialist in the Commerce
Department to his division director of antidumping investigations in
January of 1994.' The compliance specialist, Andrew McGilvray, had
just participated in a meeting at the Beijing offices of the PRC's Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on matters regarding an
antidumping duty investigation of silicon imports from the PRC."1 At the
meeting, the Ministry's Treaty and Law Department Division Chief,
Zhang Yuging, had to explain what he had meant when he informed the
Commerce Department earlier that the Chinese government does not own
or control producers of silicon because they were owned "by all the
people. "13
Zhang explained China has a different ownership concept than
other countries, and when companies in China are said to be owned by all
the people, it does not mean the PRC's central government owns or
controls the companies."' What this really means, said Zhang, is that the
company "belongs to the community," and cannot be taken over by any
individual. Under this setup, the company's employees are responsible for
the company's management. Zhang told the Commerce Department when
a company is owned by all the people, the government cannot interfere in
decision making, nor can it involve itself in the handling of profits, aside
from assessing taxes."- Likewise, such a company is responsible for
financing its own losses or selling off its assets.
The memorandum also includes Zhang's explanation of a
provincial government's role in the ownership and control of such
community owned companies. Zhang explained provincial governments
were authorized by the central government to license businesses, but that
did not mean that these second level governments could legally dictate the
decision making processes of the companies."6  When asked by the
Commerce Department compliance specialist if the provincial governments
were still permitted to influence companies to comply with any of the
Commerce Department's import regulations, Zhang explained the
111. Memorandum to Gary Taverman, Director, Division I, Office of Antidumping
Investigations, Investigation Public Document A-570-824 (Feb. 15, 1994) [hereinafter
Memorandum to Taverman].
112. Id. at 3.




116. Memorandum to Taverman, supra note 11.
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governments could not force compliance but could give incentives for it.
In sum, the memorandum is valuable as an example of the attention the
Commerce Department must give to the meanings which different
countries attach to their economic terminology. Such attention is
necessary if the Commerce Department is to properly evaluate the
economic information it has on a country in order to make an accurate
market oriented industry analysis. If the Commerce Department is to
correctly apply or not apply countervailing duty law to countries in
transition, it has to know which industries are in fact state controlled and
which industries only sound as if they are because of the foreign
terminology used to describe them.
F. A Market Oriented Manufacturer: Imports of Magnesium from
the Russian Federation
While the Chinese cases involved market orientation analyses of
whole industries, a recent final determination was issued by the Commerce
Department in the spring of 1995 which involved a decision on whether a
single manufacturer within a reforming nonmarket economy was
sufficiently market oriented in its operations for antidumping pricing
purposes. The purpose of the investigation was to decide whether the
Russian magnesium sector from the Russian Federation was sufficiently
market oriented to permit use of Russian producers' own prices in the
dumping determination." One of the two Russian manufacturers involved,
SMW, requested the Department to conduct an individual market
orientation examination of the company, rather than the usual examination
of the entire industry within which the company operates. '8 SMW wanted
to demonstrate that government ownership and control were absent from
its own individual operations."9 SMW was ultimately seeking to have the
Commerce Department make an individualized dumping calculation for its
own exports of alloy and pure magnesium, which was separate from other
potential Russian exporters of magnesium.1"
The Commerce Department granted SMW's request for the
opportunity to demonstrate its own market independence, but asserted that
to make such a positive showing, SMW would have to demonstrate the
absence of both de jure and de facto governmental control over its export
117. Notice Final Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Pure Magnesium and
Alloy Magnesium From the Russian Federation, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,440 (1995).
118. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
119. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
120. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
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operations.12' Evidence which the Commerce Department indicated SMW
could use, but did not require in order to support a finding of de jure
absence of central controls included: "(1) an absence of restrictive
stipulations associated with [its] business and export licenses; (2) any
legislative enactments decentralizing control of companies; or (3) any other
formal measures by the government decentralizing control of
companies."'2 To determine whether governmental control over SMW
was absent de facto, the Commerce Department stated it would weigh the
following factors:
(1) whether [SMW's] export prices are set by or subject to
the approval of [governmental] authority; (2) whether
[SMW] has authority to negotiate and sign contracts and
other agreements; (3) whether [SMW] has autonomy from
the government in making decisions regarding the selection
of management; and (4) whether [SMW] retains the
proceeds of its export sales and makes independent
decisions regarding disposition of profits or financing of
losses. 1
Pursuant to its stated guidelines, the Commerce Department decided that
central control of SMW was absent de jure on the basis of the following
findings. 4' First, the President of the Russian Federation had issued a
decree in July of 1992 that joint stock companies, such as SMW, were out
of the control of state authority. '2 Second, a law had been passed in July
of 1991 which mandated the privatization of former state held enterprises,
such as SMW.'2
The Department was also satisfied with findings on SMW's de
facto independence. The Commerce Department found that SMW set its
own prices, had free access to its own export profits, could finance its own
losses, and could purchase foreign currency or dispose of assets.'" In
addition, the Commerce Department found that the Russian government
did not interfere with SMW's disposition of its sales proceeds, and that the
board of SMW was responsible for the appointment of its management.'
121. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,444.
122. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,444.
123. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,444.
124. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,444.
125. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,444.
126. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,444.
127. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,444.
128. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,444.
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This writer believes that the Russian magnesium case is significant
in that it demonstrates the level of sensitivity with which the Commerce
Department now deals in matters of market orientation determinations.
"Sensitivity" refers to the degree to which the Department is willing to go
beneath the nonmarket surface of an economy to find individual entities of
capitalism. With final determinations on the Chinese fan and lug nut
cases, we saw the Commerce Department go beyond the nonmarket
exterior of the PRC's economy in order to investigate the possible market
oriented nature of a particular industry. With the Russian magnesium
case, the Department went further by looking beyond the nature of a
certain industry within the reforming Russian economy to examine the
status of a particular company in that industry. Thus, to this writer, this
methodology in "Magnesium from the Russian Federation" seemed as if it
were a return to the type of analysis once used by the Commerce
Department in the mini-bubbles test, as discussed previously. Recall that
this test, used only in the preliminary determinations of the Chinese fan
and lug-nut cases, involved a thorough investigation of certain individual
manufacturers within a particular industry, for purposes of determining
whether their own prices were market driven. In the Russian magnesium
case, the Department was doing essentially the same thing. It is worth
noting that the above de jure and de facto tests used in the Russian case for
determining the absence of government control are substantially similar to
the corresponding tests used in the preliminary determinations of the
Chinese fan case, as discussed previously.
The Commerce Department's willingness to look beyond whole
industries and to focus instead on individual companies indicates that, as
reforming nonmarkets move closer to capitalism, an industry wide
investigation will not always yield a proper finding for whether
countervailing duty law ought to apply to certain imports. Perhaps one of
the marks of an economy in transition is that some companies within a
particular industry move more quickly toward market orientation, while
others take more time to free themselves from state control. By confining
an investigation to a single producer, rather than the producer's whole
industry, the Department seems to be sensitive to the microcosmic levels
on which capitalism sometimes apparently exists in transitional markets.
This has particular import to this study on countervailing duties: The
greater willingness the Department has to find capitalistic entities within
reforming markets, and the more likely such markets are to find
countervailing duty law applied to their imports.
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VI. APPLICATION OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW TO REFORMING
NONMARKET ECONOMIES
A. Market Oriented Industry Analysis: Countervailing Duty
Investigations of the Lug Nut and Fan Import Cases
The above developments in antidumping law are important to our
discussion of countervailing duty law and reforming nonmarket economies.
As previously noted, the Commerce Department faces the near future
possibility of having to decide whether to apply countervailing duties to
imports from nonmarket economy countries in transition. The current
Commerce Department policy is that such duties are inapplicable to
nonmarket economies. However, the Commerce Department might find
that a foreign industry in question is a market oriented part of an otherwise
nonmarket economy. In that case, the Department may be forced into
making a determination as to whether countervailing duty law is
inapplicable. The Department would not have any countervailing duty law
to aid it in a decision such as this. It would, however, have the above
antidumping laws and policies to turn to. Using the market oriented
industry analysis, the Commerce Department may one day come to the
conclusion that countervailing duty law is applicable to a particular
industry within a nonmarket economy.
The Commerce Department has already used the market oriented
test in two countervailing duty investigations which it recently conducted.
In the cases involving the importation of fans and lug nuts from the
People's Republic of China, the Commerce Department used this test to
determine if countervailing duties were applicable on the basis that the
industries in question were actually market oriented. 29 In neither case did
the Department find that the industry in question was really market
oriented, so countervailing duty orders were not issued. 130
In these countervailing duty cases, the Commerce Department
applied a system of evaluation which it had developed for the purposes of
antidumping law. For example, in its preliminary determinations in the
Ceiling Fans countervailing duty case, the Commerce Department first
sought to determine whether the Chinese government was involved in
129. See Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Oscillating and Ceiling Fans
From the People's Republic of China (PRC), 56 Fed. Reg. 57,616 (1991); Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigation: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks From the
People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 877 (1992).
130. See Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling
Fans From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,018 (1992); Rescission of Initiation
of Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and
Wheel Locks From the People's Republic of China (PRC), 57 Fed. Reg. 10,459 (1992).
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setting prices and production amounts in the fan industry."' Then the
Commerce Department tried to determine whether or not the industry was
generally characterized by private and collective ownership by fan
producers.' Finally, the Commerce Department sought out whether the
fan producers under investigation paid state set or market driven prices for
their major inputs purchased within China.33  Here, as in the lug nuts
antidumping case, the Department found that the government played a
significant role in setting prices and outputs of suppliers of steel. Since
steel represents a major portion of the fan manufacturers' input purchases,
the Department decided that the fan industry cannot be considered a
capitalistic industry within an otherwise nonmarket economy."" Thus,
countervailing duties could not be applied to the fan imports.
The Commerce Department decided that countervailing duties
were inapplicable to the lug nut imports as well.'" Again, the final
determination was based on finding the steel industry in China was heavily
controlled by central planning. Thus, the industry could not be considered
to be market oriented either.
B. Reforming Nonmarket Economy Manufacturers Absorbed by
Capitalism: Imports of Steel from Germany
The previous cases involving Chinese imports demonstrated the
Commerce Department would be making more decisions on the
applicability of countervailing duty law to reforming nonmarket economy
imports in the near future. As previously noted, such cases have yet to be
brought before the Department. As a result, the Commerce Department
has not taken an official stance on when countervailing duties could be
applied to imports from reforming countries, such as those in Eastern
Europe. One countervailing duty case, which did come before the
Department and which is of interest to this study, involved subsidies to
certain German manufacturers of carbon steel products."' In this case,
subsidies to the manufacturers were found to clearly exist, and the
International Trade Code found a reasonable indication of material injury
or threat of material injury to United States' manufacturers of like
131. Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling
Fans From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,011-12 (1992).
132. 57 Fed. Reg. 10,012.
133. 57 Fed. Reg. 10,012.
134. 57 Fed. Reg. 10,013.
135. 57 Fed. Reg. 10,459.
136. Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products From
Germany, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315 (1993).
1996] 485
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
products.' Since Germany is a market oriented country, it would have
seemed that the determination to apply countervailing duties would be
routine.
The final determination in this case was not so routine, and this is
interesting because of the German manufacturers' defense. The
manufacturers argued that the United States' countervailing duty law was
inapplicable to them because they were located in the former East
Germany. 38  The manufacturers asserted the Commerce Department
exempts countervailing duty law companies located in countries still
considered to have nonmarket economies. Under this policy, the
manufacturers proceeded to argue countervailing duty law should likewise
be inapplicable to producers located in a former nonmarket economy
which is adapting to a market economy.'39
This was an unusual case because subsidized manufacturers in a
market country were asking for an exemption from United States'
countervailing duty law. The manufacturers were recently operating
within a nonmarket economy. The manufacturers felt that the application
of countervailing duty rules to their case would result in an unequal
treatment of producers in the former East Germany and those in other
former East Bloc countries.1'4 The manufacturers argued they should be
treated equally with producers in reforming countries such as Poland and
Romania where antidumping proceedings had initiated, but where no
countervailing duty action has been taken. According to the German
manufacturers, countervailing duty law was inapplicable in those countries
because of their status as former nonmarket economies in transition.1
4
'
A further argument for exemption from the United States'
countervailing duty law by the German producers is the United States'
obligation to MFN treatment under GATT. 4 2 The producers pointed to the
Department's recent decision not to apply countervailing duties to the
oscillating and ceiling fan imports from China. They felt that, under the
MFN status, Chinese imports were going to be exempted from
countervailing duty law, then there ought to be an exemption as well for
imports from the former East Germany, which was a former nonmarket
economy in transition.' 3
137. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315.
138. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
139. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
140. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315, 37,324.
141. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315-24.
142. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315-24.
143. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315-24.
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With respect to this last argument, the German producers perhaps
misunderstood the reasoning upon which the Commerce Department based
its decision in oscillating and ceiling fans from the PRC. The Department
did not decide to exempt the Chinese imports because they were from a
nonmarket economy which was undergoing some reform. As
demonstrated previously, The Commerce Department was more than
willing to apply countervailing duties to the imports, regardless of the
PRC's political-economic status. What the Commerce Department was
concerned with was the status of the individual Chinese industry in
question. The Commerce Department ultimately decided against
countervailing duties because it could not find sufficient evidence that the
fan industry was really market oriented. Thus, the German producers
could not claim the same exemption under the most favored nation
principle because they were indeed operating in a recognized market
economy.
With respect to the rest of the German producers' argument, the
Department sided with the claims of the petitioning American producers.
The Commerce Department agreed with the Americans the imports under
investigation ought to be looked at as imports from the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), not from the former German Democratic Republic.'"
Furthermore, the subsidy programs being examined were funded by the
FRG.14- These simple facts appeared to have made the difference in this
case. Because the FRG is a market economy, government subsidies have
real economic meaning. Additionally, they can certainly be identified and
quantified. Contrast this with subsidies given to producers in nonmarket
economy countries. Nonmarket economy subsidies have no meaning in
our capitalistic sense because they cause market distortions and result in
sales which would not have otherwise been achieved. They cannot be
identified anyway since prices are controlled by the state. This is the
fundamental reason why the Commerce Department generally exempts
nonmarket economy imports from countervailing duties. Thus, it is futile
for producers such as the German manufacturers in this case, or their
counsel, to attempt to introduce issues of political economic status, or
MFN status, as grounds for exemption from countervailing duty law. In
short, the Commerce Department will apply this law as long as it finds the
subsidies in question have real economic meaning and can be identified,
regardless of whether the foreign industry in question operates within a
nonmarket economy or one in transition.
144. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
145. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
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The petitioners were correct to assert the subsidies in question
were exactly those which United States' countervailing duty law was
designed to counteract."4 Thus, the petitioners were also correct in
pointing out the Commerce Department would be violating the United
States' obligations to GATT if it did not apply countervailing duties to
these imports because the United States would be extending preferential
treatment to Germany against the interests of other producers in market
oriented economies.147
In its final determination to impose countervailing duties on the
carbon steel imports from Germany, the Department emphasized that
United States' countervailing duty law does not prohibit a domestic
industry from a countervailing duty petition against a reforming nonmarket
industry, whether it has been absorbed into a market oriented economy, as
with the GDR, or whether it is still in a transitional process.," In each
case, the basic test will be whether the industry under investigation is
sufficiently market oriented for the law to apply. In addition, the
Department noted that application of our countervailing duty law is
consistent with our GATT obligations under Article 15 of the subsidies
code allows a country to apply either a countervailing duty law or an
antidumping law to imports from a country with a state controlled
economy. 49
The final determination on the German carbon steel case is an
important statement by the Commerce Department, if for no other reason
than reasserting the major factors upon which it makes its countervailing
duty decisions. The determinations on the Chinese imports were grounded
on the market oriented industry test discussed earlier, and not on the fact
that China was a nonmarket economy undergoing reform. Had prices
within the Chinese fan industry been found to be sufficiently market
driven, the result would have been different.
VII. TREATING REFORMING NONMARKET ECONOMIES AS MARKET
ECONOMIES
A. Analyzing an Economy for Market Orientation: the Russian
Magnesium Imports
The Commerce Department need not look at a country's whole
economy in order to make a market orientation determination for purposes
146. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
147. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
148. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
149. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,324.
488 [Vol. 2:463
Meszaros
of antidumping or countervailing duty law cases. As demonstrated in the
cases concerning Chinese and Russian imports, the Department can restrict
its investigations to a particular industry, or even a single producer.
However, the very recent Russian magnesium case also demonstrated, as
numerous reforming nonmarket economies move closer to market
orientation, the Commerce Department may soon be using individual
antidumping or countervailing duty cases to decide whether particular
nonmarket economies ought to be reclassified. Though not mentioned in
the earlier discussion of the Russian case, the two Russian producers
involved actually first asked the Department to use their own prices on the
basis that the Russian economy as a whole ought to be reclassified by the
Commerce Department from its previous nonmarket status. '*
In Magnesium from the Russian Federation, the Russian
manufacturers claimed that the current economic conditions, which were
prevalent throughout Russia, warranted revocation of the country's
nonmarket economy status for purposes of antidumping law price
determinations."' The Commerce Department asserted that such a finding
would center on an analysis of the Russian government's role in the
country's general economic activity. 1 2
In determining whether to revoke the Russian Federation's
status as a nonmarket economy, the Commerce
Department turned to the factors listed under section
771(18) of the amended Tariff Act of 1930.' 5 In
particular, these criteria are: (1) the extent to which the
currency of the foreign country is convertible into the
currencies of other countries; (2) the extent to which wage
rates in the foreign country are determined by free
bargaining between labor and management; (3) the extent
to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of
other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign
country; (4) the extent of government ownership or control
of the means of production; (5) the extent of government
control over the allocation of resources and over the price
150. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
151. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443. Recall from the earlier discussion that nonmarket producers'
costs are presumed to be distorted unless the producers demonstrate otherwise under the market
oriented industry test.
152. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
153. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,443.
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and output decisions of enterprises; and (6) other factors
the Commerce Department considers appropriate."'"
Pursuant to the above guidelines, the Department concluded that
the Russian Federation still merited a nonmarket economy treatment for
purposes of antidumping law.'" Though it was evident to the Commerce
Department that Russia had made significant steps toward a market
economy by freeing most prices, and privatizing most state held
enterprises, the Commerce Department was not convinced that functioning
markets had replaced state controls. Nor was the Commerce Department
satisfied that prices and costs in Russia adequately reflected market
considerations.'-
B. Foreign Policy Concerns for the Commerce Department to
Consider
The Russian magnesium case demonstrates the significant authority
vested in the Commerce Department for classifying individual foreign
markets for purposes of applying countervailing duty law or making
antidumping calculations. Under the trade statutes, the Commerce
Department may at any time make a determination that a foreign country is
or is not a nonmarket economy. 7 As of the end of 1994, Poland is the
only country which the Commerce Department has reclassified from a
nonmarket to a market nation.' As illustrated above, the Commerce
Department's decision to treat a nation as a market or nonmarket economy
revolves around the application of a thorough statutory test. However, the
decision to begin treating a nonmarket nation as a market country means
the Commerce Department can begin applying countervailing duties to
exports in appropriate situations. Thus, the making of this decision ought
to perhaps also include a careful consideration of certain important foreign
policy issues.
Chief among the policy issues to consider is the fact that the
application of countervailing duties to the imports of reforming markets
can substantially slow their transitions. Countervailing duties obviously
impose a cost on a foreign producer sales within the United States. The
lost sales have a heightened significance when the foreign producer is new
154. 19 U.S.C. § 771(18); 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
155. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,440, 16,443.
156. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,440, 16,443.
157. SEMINAR, supra note 14, at 10.
158. Stanislaw J. Stoltysinski, The U.S. Import Relief Laws and Trade with Centrally
Planned Economies, 3 FLA. J. INT'L L. 59 80-81 (1987).
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to the competition of the free market because it becomes more difficult for
the producer to establish products in the United States. If the producer
cannot successfully break into an important market such as the United
States, its market share might never grow. It follows such producers
might begin believing the move to a free market was not as good a change
as it might have originally promised.
Countervailing duties are also viewed by many in Eastern Europe
as an unfair United States' practice which threatens to undermine much of
the political and economic reform going on in the area. Some are
concerned that the negative feeling which it stirs among producers might
only serve to strengthen the arguments of those who would prefer to see a
return to full central planning.,59 Others are convinced such duties are just
another example of the "capricious and discriminatory policies of the
West. "60
The United States has certainly demonstrated that it wants to
develop trade with Eastern Europe, as evidenced in large part by our
substantial funding of economic development in that region, as well as by
numerous political announcements and promises. For instance, the United
States clearly would like to see a continued development in the former East
Germany in order to expand our trade interests in Germany. The more
rapidly that area can develop, the more quickly United States' exporters
can benefit from the large potential market there. However, the United
States retards that expansion when it applies countervailing duties to those
imports being purchased from manufacturers operating in the reforming
region of Germany.' 6' Countervailing duties hurt exporters' profits, which
hurts industry in general and slows development.
Does the Commerce Department really even have a choice in these
matters? On the one hand, the Department probably joins United States'
exporters in its desire for continued development in reforming areas. On
the other hand, the Commerce Department has its duty to United States'
manufacturers to apply the law of countervailing duties wherever it is
applicable, regardless of policy concerns. United States' producers
obviously view an unfairly subsidized import as an unfairly subsidized
import, regardless of the import's country of origin. To United States'
manufacturers, countervailing duty law exists to protect them from just
such imports, from where ever those imports may arrive. Moreover, the
Commerce Department must consider United States' MFN status
159. Egge, supra note 18, at 959.
160. Id. (quoting Stoltysinski, The United States Import Relief Laws and Trade with
Centrally Planned Economies, 3 FLA. J. INT'L L. 59, 80-81 (1987)).
161. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,315.
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obligations under GATT. Exemption of countervailing duties for a certain
country might be supported by foreign policy, but it is certainly not
supported by the GATT.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the
homeless, tempest tossed to me: I lift my lamp beside the golden door."
Those are the words of Emma Lazarus, inscribed on the Statute of Liberty.
Unfortunately, the United States has continually interpreted those words to
mean men, not women, particularly, women seeking asylum. Women
make up a majority of the world's refugees,' yet their particular needs
* B.A., 1975, University of Maine; M.Ed., 1979, Boston University; Candidate for Juris
Doctor, 1997, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. The author wishes to
express appreciation to attorney Clark Trainer for introducing her to the subject of this article and
to Immigration Judge Neale Foster for his support and encouragement.
1. Third Circuit Recognizes Potential Asylum Claim Based on Gender, 71 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 164 (Jan. 24, 1994); see also Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the
Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 625-26 n.1 (1993).
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have been overlooked.2
While the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) recently
issued new procedural guidelines, recognizing rape and other sexual
persecution as a potential justification for asylum claims,3 they are
intended to educate asylum officers and immigration judges on the
procedural aspects of women's asylum claims and do not acknowledge
gender-based persecution alone as a basis for asylum.' A woman must still
establish she is persecuted because of her political opinion in order to
justify relief.'
Gender-based persecution is violence directed at women
specifically because they are women.6 A woman may be persecuted
because of her gender' or a trait related to her gender.' Such abuse
includes: dowry related murders9 and bride burnings l in India; rape; 1
forced sterilization in China 12 and Mexico;"3 genital mutilation in the
2. Pamela Goldberg, Asylum Law and Gender-Based Persecution Claims, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS, Sept. 1994, No. 94-9, at 1.
3. See Ashley Dunn, Abused Women Can Win Political Asylum, MIAMI HERALD, May
28, 1995, at 9A (noting that the decision to adopt the guidelines was a result of the mass rape of
women in Bosnia).
4. Id.
5. Id. A refugee may also establish persecution for asylum purposes on account of her
race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group. See 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) (1988).
6. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelly, International Human Rights and Violence Against
Women, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 195, 195 (1993) (according to India's statistics there were over
eleven-thousand dowry murders between 1990 and 1993).
10. Peter C. Godfrey, Defining the Social Group in Asylum Proceedings: the Expansion of
the Social Group to Include a Broader Class of Refugees, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 257, (1994) (citing to
Jill Lawrence, Gender Persecution New Reason for Asylum, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at 14).
11. Rape by the military, or for military purposes, is a worldwide problem. It is used to
punish actual or imputed opposing political views of the victim or her family, as well as to
control local populations. It becomes persecution when the government either condones or fails
to protect against such abuse. See M. Jane Kronenberger, Refugee Women: Establishing a
Prima Facie Case Under the Refugee Convention, 15 ILSA J. INT'L L. 61, 66 (1992); see also
Karen Bower, Recognizing Violence Against Women as Persecution on the Basis of Membership
in a Particular Social Group, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 173, 173 (1993).
12. Nurjehan Mawani, Introduction to the Immigration and Refugee Board Guidelines on
Gender-Related Persecution, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 240, 246 (1993).
13. "Of all Mexican women using birth control today, 45 percent are sterilized, up from 9
percent two decades ago." Nancie L. Katz, Mexican Women Describe Coerced Sterilization at
Government Clinics, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 28, 1995, at 8A. The results of a 1987 national
19961 Ciampa 495
Middle East, Africa,14 and Asia; 5 and domestic abuse. 6 Gender-based
persecution can also take the form of repressive and discriminatory laws
and practices meant to oppress and subordinate women. In Haiti, adultery
results in a potential three month prison sentence for women while men are
fined $6.50.11 In Islamic countries, women are required to veil their faces
or face flogging and imprisonment by the religious police.' 8 In Muslim
countries, women living alone face abuse for failing to have a male family
member's protection.' 9  Each of these acts constitutes gender-based
violence directed specifically at women. Such abuse rises to the level of
persecution when the government is either unable, or unwilling, to prevent
it.20
The United States must recognize gender-based violence and
should expand the definition of the "particular social group" classification
for asylum claims to meet the needs of women facing such persecution.
Courts must recognize the types of violence targeted specifically at women
as well as a state's involvement in such action, and follow the decisions in
health survey showed that one out of twenty-five women who are sterilized did not agree to it.
Id.
14. "An estimated seventy percent to ninety percent of Egyptians are circumcised just
before puberty." Egypt Bans Circumcision of Females at State Hospitals, MIAMI HERALD, Dec.
30, 1995, at 13A.
15. Mattie L. Stevens, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add
Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 179, 193 (1993).
Female genital mutilation includes clitoridotomy, clitoridectomy and
infibulation. Clitoridectomy is the removal of the prepuce of the clitoris.
Clitorectomy removes the clitoris and the surrounding tissue. An
infibulation involves the excision of the clitoris, labia minora and most of the
labia majora, followed by the sewing of the sides of the vulva, "leaving a
hole the size of a match stick."
Id.
16. Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private
Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 115 (1993). In
Brazil alone, over 400 women were murdered by their spouses or lovers between 1987 and 1989
in the state of Penambuco. The criminal justice system of Brazil recognizes a "defense of honor"
and, during the same period above, seventy percent of all reported acts of violence were in
private residences and most were committed by husbands or lovers. Id.
17. Haiti's Victimized Women, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 28, 1995, at 8A (a man can also
claim extenuating circumstances for murdering his adulterous wife).
18. Stevens, supra note 15, at 195.
19. Nancy Kelly, Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 517,
528 n.40 (1994).
20. The United States requires state participation in the persecution either through action or
inaction in order for an alien to qualify for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (1982).
496 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 2:493
In re A and Z,2 and In re M.K.Y Part I reviews the historical background
of refugee and asylum law. Part II discusses the history of United States
asylum law and how it has been applied to female refugees. Part III looks
at recommendations by the United Nations and changes being implemented
in Canada and Germany to meet the needs of women seeking asylum under
claims of gender-based persecution. Part IV examines the first known
cases in the United States where an Immigration Judge granted asylum to
two women, one claiming domestic abuse, and another claiming both
domestic abuse and abuse as a result of female genital mutilation, finding
both members of a "particular social group."
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF REFUGEE AND ASYLUM LAWS
Asylum is the discretionary grant of haven to an individual who
meets the definition of a refugee. The definition of refugee originated in
1946 by the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization,
created for the protection and resettlement of displaced victims of World
War II.' The definition of refugee was developed further by the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees24 which added "particular
social group" as a category' and was refined by the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees.26  The Convention and the Protocol are
independent provisions; the United States ratified the Protocol in
November 1968, but never signed the Convention." Parties to either the
Convention, the Protocol, or both comply with their obligations under
21. In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893, No. A72-793-219 (U.S. Immigr. Ct. Arlington, .Va.
Dec. 20, 1994) (unpublished I.J. decision).
22. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558 (U.S. Immigr. Ct. Arlington, Va. Apr. 13, 1995)
(unpublished I.J. decision).
23. Kronenberger, supra note 11, at 63 n. 10 (citing the Constitution of the International
Refugee Organization, 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Aug.
20, 1948)).
24. David Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as
Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 203, 226 n.128 (1988) (citing the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, art. 1A(2) 19
U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954)
[hereinafter Convention]).
25. Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace But Home: Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing
Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 565, 590 (1993). The Swedish delegation added
.particular social group" to the grounds for asylum, recognizing the potential failure of the other
four categories to include "all the reasons for persecution an imaginative despot could conjure
up." d. at 590 n. 143.
26. Neal, supra note 24, at 227 n.128 (citing the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, opened for signature, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6233, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (effective Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]).
27. Kronenberger, supra note 11, at 64 n.20.
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these instruments by creating domestic refugee laws and policies.2 The
Convention defines a refugee as any person who
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence, as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it.
29
The Protocol adopted the Convention definition of refugee but removed the
geographic and temporal restrictions and added victims of inhumane
treatment world-wide.30
This has become the dominant definition of refugee world-wide,
with numerous countries implementing the same or a similar definition.
France became a party to the Convention in 1952 and enacted the Office of
Francais des Protection des Refugees et Apatrides, using the same
definition.3' The 1971 Immigration Act of Great Britain refers to the
Convention definition, 2 while the 1982 Asylum Procedure Law of
Germany states refugees will at a minimum enjoy the status recognized by
the Convention.3 3  The Convention definition of refugee is applied by
Canada, Switzerland, the Organization of African Unity, with similar
definitions implemented by the 1954 Caracas Convention on Territorial
Asylum 34 and the United States. 35
28. Id.
29. Neal, supra note 24, at 228 n.131.
30. Bower, supra note 11, at 177.
31. Kronenberger, supra note 11, at 65 n.24 (citing the Office of Francais des Protection
des Refugees et patrides, Loi. No. 52-893 of July 25, 1952, art. 2.).
32. Id. at 65.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
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III. THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 ESTABLISHED THE CURRENT LAWS FOR
ADMITTING REFUGEES INTO THE UNITED STATES.
36
The United States asylum law is modeled after and governed by
the Convention and the Protocol.37 It follows the United Nations
Handbook38 as a persuasive guide when determining refugee status. The
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), first enacted in 1952, did not
mention the word refugee.39 In 1953, the Refugee Relief Act was passed
by Congress to deal with World War II refugees,' but the Act did not
include refugees until 1957."' It was not until 1965 that Congress, by
amending the Act, made refugee a distinct category for admission into the
United States, ending the selection of immigrants, mainly Europeans,
based on national origin, race, or ancestry.42 Section 3 of the 1965 Act
stated in part that refugees include those who have fled from any
Communist or Communist-dominated country, or area, or from any
country within the general area of the Middle East, and are unable or
unwilling to return to such country because of persecution or fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.43
The Refugee Act of 1980 established the current laws for admitting
refugees into the United States." Under the Act, asylum is granted to
those who meet the definition of refugee as stated in 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) (1982). A refugee is defined as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality, or in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
36. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, § 101(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102, 102-03
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
37. Bower, supra note 11, at 176.
38. Kelly, supra note 19, at 521 n.15 (citing UNHCR's Handbook for Determining
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
(Geneva 1979)).
39. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101.
40. Stevens, supra note 15, at 181.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 181-82 (citing Act of Oct. 3, 1965, §§ 3, 203(1)(7)).
43. Id. at 181-82.
44. Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. at 102-03 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
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account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.45
An individual may seek asylum either at designated locations
outside of the United States,' or at any time after arrival into the United
States by presenting her claim to the INS for review by an asylum
officer.47 If the claim is denied, the INS begins either exclusion or
deportation proceedings s against the individual. The alien may then file a
new application for asylum with an immigration judge as a form of relief
from either exclusion or deportation.49
While persecution has no universally accepted definition,5" the
Handbook and the Immigration and Naturalization Service Basic Law
Manual (Manual) considers serious physical harm, loss of freedom, threat
to life, discriminatory treatment which leads to consequences of a
substantially prejudicial nature,5' and a combination of numerous harms,
which standing alone may not constitute persecution, but in combination
create a well-founded fear of persecution, as forms of persecution. 52 The
Manual also recognizes arbitrary interference with a person's privacy,
family, home, or correspondence as forms of persecution. Furthermore,
the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has characterized persecution as
harm or suffering inflicted upon a person to punish that individual for a
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
46. An individual seeking asylum outside the United States is known as an "asylee," while
a person who applies for asylum either upon entry into, or once in, the United States is referred
to as a "refugee."
47. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b) (1988).
48. An individual who is not accepted during inspection upon entry into the United States
faces exclusion proceedings and is known as an applicant, while an alien either admitted or
paroled into the United States is placed into deportation proceedings and is referred to as a
respondent.
49. Administrative immigration judges, sitting in different regions of the country, are
under the supervision of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). EOIR and the
INS are part of the Department of Justice but are independent of one another. Decisions of the
immigration judge are appealable to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) whose members
are appointed by the Attorney General. Once all administrative remedies are exhausted, an alien
may file for review with the Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the deportation hearing was
heard. Appeals to the United States Supreme Court are possible, but rare.
50. Persecution was not defined by the Convention or the Protocol.
51. Discriminatory treatment such as the denial of the right to earn a living, practice one's
religion, or have access to educational facilities are considered forms of persecution. See Kelly,
supra note 19, at 521.
52. Certain human rights are considered so basic and fundamental as to be nonderogable,
and any violation is considered persecution. Included are genocide, slavery, torture, and
arbitrary arrest and detention.
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belief or characteristic associated with him.53
United States asylum law is further defined by case law. INS v.
Stevic54 established that the burden is on the alien to prove there is a "clear
probability" that one's life or freedom would be threatened upon return to
a given country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.55 The court in Cardoza-
Fonseca v. INS 6 held the threat of persecution may come from the
government or from groups the government is "unwilling or unable to
control. "5"
The "well-founded fear" of persecution was initially defined by In
re Acosta,58 and In re Mogharrabi.59 In order to establish a "well-founded
fear" of persecution, an alien must show he possesses a belief or
characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of
punishment of some sort; the persecutor is aware, or could become aware,
that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; the persecutor has the
capability of punishing the alien; and the persecutor has the inclination to
punish the alien.' The term was further defined in Blanco-Comarribas v.
INS,6 where the court held the fear of persecution must be both
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.62
Case law has also refined the definitions for each of the five
enumerated categories, but this Comment will focus primarily on the
categories of "particular social group" and "political opinion," which are
the primary categories used by women seeking asylum for gender-based
persecution. The Handbook defines political opinion broadly, stating that
53. In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (1992).
54. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
55. Id.
56. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
57. Id.
58. In re Acosta, 19 1 & N Dec. at 211.
59. In re Mogharrabi, 19 1 & N Dec. 439, 441 (BIA 1987).
60. Id. at 446.
61. Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987).
62. In re Mogharrabi, 19 1 & N Dec. at 445; the BIA held the objective standard is met if
a reasonable person in similar circumstances would fear persecution. A reasonable person may
fear persecution even if the likelihood that it may occur is significantly less than a clear
probability. Id. Moreover, an alien's own testimony, without corroborative evidence, may be
sufficient to establish a "well-founded fear" of persecution where testimony is believable,
consistent and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account for the basis of
fear. Id. In In re Chen, the court ruled asylum relief could be granted for humanitarian reasons,




a person can fear persecution because of a political opinion even if the
opinion is not expressed. Further, action or inaction can constitute an
expression of political opinion. 63 Following this premise, in INS v. Elias-
Zacarias,64 the Supreme Court held a petitioner must actually possess
political opinions and the persecutor's motives must be based on those
opinions. Imputed opinions are not to be considered, but a court may
interpret resistance or noncompliance as a manifestation of opposition.66
The Supreme Court's decision goes against the holding of Lazo-Majano v.
INS,67 where the Circuit Court of Appeals ruled a political opinion imputed
to the petitioner is a valid basis for relief.
There are even greater conflicts concerning the category of a
"particular social group." No United States court has yet defined the
qualifications necessary to establish membership in a particular social
group. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS68 was the first appellate case to consider
what constitutes a particular social group. The court stated a particular
social group is normally comprised of persons of similar backgrounds,
habits, or social status, habits which are essentially beyond the individuals
power to change.69
While courts have generally agreed that members must share some
common characteristic which is fundamental to their identity as a member
of a particular social group that is both recognizable and discrete and
serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor,70 there are
conflicting decisions concerning whether the characteristic must be
immutable. The BIA decision in In re Acosta7 ' established the social group
must share a "common immutable characteristic" or that "the common
characteristic that defines the group . . . must be one that the members of
the group either cannot change or should not be required to change
because it is fundamental to their identities or consciences." 72  This
63. Stevens, supra note 15, at 203 (citing Craig A. Fielden, Note, Persecution on Account
of Political Opinion: Refugee Status After INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 67 WASH. L. REV. 959, 977
(1992)).
64. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
65. Id. at 482.
66. Id.
67. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
69. Id.
70. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986); see Gomez v. INS, 947
F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
71. In re Acosta, 19 1 & N Dec. at 211.
72. Id.
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decision acknowledged sex as an immutable characteristic.73 However, in
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS?4 the Ninth Circuit held the phrase particular
social group meant a collection of people who are affiliated with each
other and have a common impulse or interest, and stated the existence of
the associational relationship must be voluntary.75 To date, this conflict
has not been resolved.76
The different court interpretations of political opinion and
membership in a particular social group have not borne well for women.
There have been few federal court cases addressing women's claims of
asylum based on membership in a particular social group or political
opinion, but in each case, relief was denied. In Gomez v. INS,77 the
petitioner Carmen Gomez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought
asylum alleging she had been raped by guerrilla forces at least five times
between the ages of twelve and fourteen, and that each time, her life had
been threatened and her home vandalized. She based her asylum claim on
membership in a "particular social group of women who had been raped
by the guerrillas" and claimed because of past persecution she had
established a well-founded fear of persecution should she return to El
Salvador.78 The court denied her request for relief, stating she had failed
to demonstrate the guerrillas were inclined, or would seek, to harm her
based on her membership in a "particular social group. ,79 The court held
the possession of such broadly based characteristics as youth or gender
does not create a particular social group, and such characteristics by
themselves do not distinguish members in the eyes of the persecutor. 80
Had the court recognized women fleeing gender-based persecution as
members of a particular social group, it is likely that Ms. Gomez would
have been granted asylum.
In Fatin v. INS,8' the petitioner Parastoo Fatin applied for asylum
under both the political opinion and particular social group categories, and
was denied relief under each. Fatin, an Iranian citizen, entered the United
73. Id.
74. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
75. Id.
76. BIA decisions are followed by immigration judges except in areas where the circuit
court has ruled otherwise.
77. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
78. Id. at 662.
79. Id. at 664.
80. Id.
81. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
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States in 1978 as a nonimmigrant student.12  In 1988 she applied for
asylum, claiming she was a member of a "particular social group of
educated, Western free-thinking individuals with a deeply rooted belief in
feminism" and she would be persecuted if she did not wear the traditional
Islamic veil. 3 Fatin also requested asylum based on her political opinion,
stating in high school she had participated in a political organization which
supported the Shah.'
The court dismissed her request based on political opinion,
reasoning because of the length of time since she participated in political
activities, she would not be singled out for persecution based on past
action.' While acknowledging Fatin had established a legitimate social
group for asylum purposes, 6 the court denied her request for relief, stating
she failed to establish she would not wear a veil, making her subject to
persecution.8 7 The court went on to say that just because a state has laws
or traditions repugnant to the United States and our concepts of freedom, it
does not subject them to persecution. 8 "If persecution were defined that
expansively, a significant percentage of the world's population would
qualify for asylum in this country." 89
The reasoning and holding of Fatin were followed by the court in
Safie v. INS.' In Safie, the petitioner, an Iranian women, requested
asylum as a member of a "particular social group of Iranian women who
advocate women's rights or oppose Iranian customs relating to dress and
behavior," as well as for her political opinion as a Shah supporter. Safie's
claim based on membership in a particular social group was denied
because the court found her opposition was not of the "depth and intensity
82. Id. at 1235-37.
83. Id. The veil is known as the chador, and the Islamic practice requiring the veiling of
women is known as the Hejab. See Neal, supra note 24, for a detailed discussion of Islamic
traditions pertaining to women.
84. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
85. Id. Courts have since held that an alien need not prove that they would be "singled
out" for persecution in order to establish a valid asylum claim.
86. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241. The social group was Iranian women who refuse to conform
to the government's gender-specific laws and social norms.
87. Id. Fatin stated that she would try not to wear the veil, not that she would not wear
one. Nor did she testify that wearing the veil was so abhorrent to her deepest beliefs that it
would amount to persecution.
88. Id. at 1240.
89. Id.
90. Safie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994).
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required." 9' Her political opinion claim was denied because she failed to
establish she had or would be singled out and persecuted for her opinion.
92
In each of these cases the court correctly held that persecution was
not based on the petitioner's political opinion. Each petitioner was
persecuted specifically because of their gender, and had the courts
acknowledged women fleeing gender-based persecution as members of a
particular social group it is likely each would have been granted asylum.93
The United States needs to start implementing substantive
immigration laws recognizing the unique circumstances of some women
seeking asylum in order to alleviate the discrepancies among the courts and
to end the discrimination against women. Such action would be in line
with the recommendations of the United Nations and the changes being
implemented in Europe and Canada.
IV. UNITED NATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHANGES IN CANADA
AND GERMANY BEING IMPLEMENTED IN RECOGNITION OF THE
PARTICULAR NEEDS OF WOMEN SEEKING ASYLUM
Since 1980, the United Nations has focused on the particular needs
of women seeking asylum. Following its lead, Canada and many
European countries have implemented changes to their respective asylum
laws, addressing the special circumstances encompassed in women's
asylum claims.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) is the most prominent international document
to recognize the right of women to be free from discrimination. 9" Ratified
by 112 countries, although not the United States,95 it specifically
acknowledges all forms of discrimination against women. % The CEDAW
91. Id. While Safie claimed to have been arrested for smoking and wearing Western
clothes and make-up, the court found she did not show proof she had suffered severe
consequences because of her nonconformance. Id. at 640. The amount of prior persecution
needed to establish a valid asylum claim is determined on a case by case basis, because asylum is
considered a personal issue.
92. Id.; see Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d. Cir. 1991).
93. See also Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (rape by terrorists
based on uncle's political opinion does not constitute persecution on account of political opinion
or membership in a particular social group); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986)
(repeated sexual assault by a member of the Salvadoran army not based on imputed political
opinion or membership in a particular social group).
94. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 197 n.9 (citing to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR,
34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 194, U.N. Doc. AJRES/34/46 (1980)) [hereinafter CEDAIW].
95. Id. at 197 n. 13.
96. Id. at 197 n. 12.
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prohibits discriminatory state action and demands that governments take
action to end both state and private discriminatory practices on any level
and in any form against women.97 It also considers gender-based violence
a form of discrimination, and considers such action a violation of the
Convention. 98
In 1985 the International Seminar on Refugee Women was held. 99
Its purpose was to examine the situation of refugee women worldwide, and
concluded states should acknowledge gender-based persecution and grant
asylum to women who have suffered forms of oppression which violate
human rights."0
Later that year, the UNHCR issued its "Conclusions on Refugee
Women," declaring that countries might recognize claims of gender-based
persecution under the "particular social group" category for purposes of
asylum claims.' ' It urged states to recognize the social, economic and
cultural oppression of women, and that they should interpret asylum laws
liberally when granting asylum to women faced with such persecution."
It stressed the special needs of women refugees concerning health,
education, and employment, and urged states to consider women seeking
asylum for having transgressed social mores in their country as members
of a "particular social group."1°3
97. Id. at 197 n.13.
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term discrimination against women
shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction, made on the basis of sex which has
the effect of, or purpose of, impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men
and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field.
Id. (citing CEDAWpt.1, art.1).
98. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 198 n.15.
This definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence. That is violence
which is directed against women because she is a woman or which affects women
disproportionately. It includes acts which inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or
suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Gender-
based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether
those provisions mention violence.
Id. (citing to CEDAWpt.1, art. 1).
99. Neal, supra note 24, at 230.
100. Id. (citing Recommendations, in INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON REFUGEE WOMEN 53
n. 148 (Soesterberg, The Netherlands, May 22-24, 1985)).
101. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 3, (citing United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Executive Committee, Refugee Women and International Protection Report of the 36th Sess., at
38, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/673 (1985)).
102. Neal, supra note 24, at 231 n.151.
103. Id. at 231 nn.153 & 154.
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Another document addressing gender-based violence was the 1985
Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women
which was initiated by the World Conference to Review and Appraise the
Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women. °4 It urged states
to address the end of violence against women by providing assistance to its
victims, increasing public awareness of the problem, and establishing
policies and procedures to prevent the continuance of such abuse. 05
In 1991 the UNHCR issued guidelines which specifically recognize
the unique circumstances of some women seeking asylum.' °6 These
guidelines call for states to recognize women who fear severe
discrimination or gender-based persecution as members of a particular
social group for asylum determination.' 7 The 1991 UNHCR Guidelines
also state a subgroup of women can be recognized based on their exposure
or vulnerability to violence, including domestic violence, when their
governments deny them protection from such persecution, particularly
when their vulnerability is a result of their gender.'°8
In 1993 the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women condemned acts of gender-based violence as a
per se violation of human rights.'°0 Such violence includes physical,
sexual, or psychological harm occurring in public or private life,
specifically domestic battering and female genital mutilation.110
Following the lead of the United Nations, Germany was one of the
first countries to recognize women as a particular social group for asylum
purposes. Several Iranian nationals applied for asylum in the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1986, one claiming that as a woman she was
104. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 198 n.18 (referring to Report of the World
Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women:
Equality, Development and Peace, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 116/28/Rev. 1 at 6 (1986)). The Decade
for Women ran from January 1976 through December 1986, and urged the equality of men and
women. Id.
105. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 199 n.207.
106. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 3 (citing UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF
REFUGEE WOMEN (Geneva, July 1991)).
107. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 596 n. 176.
108. Id. at 596 n.178. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 1993,
U.N. Dept. of Public Information DPI/1394-39399-Aug. 1993-20M, which emerged as a result of
the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, also recognizes violence against women
as a violation of human rights. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 5.
109. In re M.K., A-72-374-558 (citing to Declaration on the Elimination of Violence




subject to special persecution." l' While all of the applicants were granted
asylum on the basis of their political activities, the German Federal Office
held the woman was a member of a social group of Iranian women subject
to persecution "specific to women."" 2  The Office stated that "the
ideology based power of men over women results in a general political
repression of women in defiance of their individual liberties and human
rights. "I"
Continuing its trend, in 1992 the German Federal Office granted
asylum to a Romanian woman who had been abducted and sexually abused
by a town mayor." 4  The Office found persecution is political when
associated with an immutable characteristic, and since gender is an
immutable characteristic, any gender-based persecution is "political
persecution."'"5
Canada has also changed its guidelines, acknowledging the
increasing international support for the application of the particular social
group category to women claiming asylum based on fear of persecution
because of their gender." 6  The Canadian guidelines, released by the
Immigration and Refugee Board in March 1992,"' and enacted into law in
1993, state that women who are unable to obtain government protection
from spousal abuse, who are subject to violence by public officials, or who
fear persecution for violating discriminatory laws, traditions or customs,
will be given special consideration for refugee status.' These violations
can include choosing a spouse rather than accepting an arranged marriage,
wearing make-up, or wearing the clothing of her choice." 9 The guidelines
also recognize the unique persecution of women in the form of infanticide,
bride burning, compulsory sterilization, and genital mutilation."2
111. Bower, supra note 11, at 200 (referring to Seven Case Abstracts (IJRL/0222), 1 INT'L
J. REFUGEE L. 566(1989)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Bower, supra note 11, at 201 (citing Ref. No. AN17K91.44245 Feb. 19, 1992,
UNHCR REFCAS database).
115. Id.
116. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 596.
117. Stevens, supra note 15, at 197.
118. Kristine M. Fox, Gender Persecution: Canadian Guidelines Offer a Model for
Refugee Determination in the United States, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 118 n.20 (1994)
(citing Alan Thompson, Canada First in Recognizing Abused Women as Refugees, TORONTO
STAR, Mar. 10, 1993, at A2).
119. Kelly, supra note 1, at 662.
120. Stevens, supra note 15, at 197.
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Unlike the United States,' 2' Canada does not require that the social
group be "internally cohesive" and states the size of the particular social
group is irrelevant, 2 2 The Canadian guidelines state that the only relevant
consideration is whether the group "suffers or fears to suffer severe
discrimination or harsh and inhuman treatment that is distinguished from
the situation of the general population, or from other women."23
Canadian case law has dealt with several asylum claims of women
seeking refuge from gender-based persecution and, unlike the United
States, has granted these women asylum based on their membership in a
particular social group. In August 1987, the Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board held that a woman living alone in a Muslim country which
requires females to live under the protection of a male family member was
subject to persecution and constituted a particular social group. 24
In Mayers v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, the
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal reviewed the decision of an
administrative panel which found a Trinidadian woman could be
considered a refugee."25 While the court did not determine if the particular
woman qualified for asylum, it held Trinidadian women subject to spousal
abuse may constitute a particular social group when the government fails
to intercede on their behalf, and that such abuse may constitute
persecution. 2 6
Also in 1992, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board
granted asylum to a woman from Zimbabwe who had been forced to marry
at age fifteen, and had suffered continual abuse, including rape, at the
hands of her husband. 27 The court found that the applicant had proven
"good grounds for fear of persecution" based on her membership in a
"particular social group of Zimbabwean women and girls, forced to marry
according to the customary laws of Kurzvarira and Lobola. "28
Canada has also granted asylum to women facing forced
121. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
122. Goldberg, supra note 25, at 596.
123. Id.
124. Kelly, supra note 19, at 528 (citing to Incirciyan v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration, Immigration Appeal Board Decision M87-1541X (Aug. 10 1987)).
125. Goldberg & Kelly, supra note 9, at 208 n.72 (referring to Ministry of Employment
and Immigration v. Marcel Mayers, Federal Court of Appeals, #A544-92, Toronto (Nov. 8,
1992)).
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (Refugee Division), Decision
U92-06668, heard Nov. 13, 1992 (Can.)).
128. Kelly, supra note 19, at 670.
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sterilization in China. In Chung v. M.E.L ,129 the court held that women
who bear more than one child and face forced sterilization are members of
a particular social group. 3 ' The court stated these women are a group of
people who share different views from their government, have a similar
basic characteristic in common, and are identified by the common purpose
of reproduction so fundamental to their human dignity, that they should not
be required to forsake it."'
While there are recognizable problems when addressing gender-
based persecution claims, 32 particularly intimate abuse, these problems
can be overcome, as demonstrated by Germany and Canada. Further,
while concern for the respect warranted by other societies' traditions and
cultures should definitely be a consideration, there are some situations
when respect for human life and dignity outweigh diplomatic protocol. 3
The main fear in the United States is expanding the definition of the
particular social group to include women seeking asylum from gender-
based persecution would open the flood-gates for asylum claims. 134  This
fear is unfounded. 35  Even if a woman can establish membership in a
129. Mawani, supra note 12, at 246 (citing Cheung v. M.E.I., No. A-785-91, Linden,
Mahony, Stone (Apr. 1, 1993)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Many women are afraid to testify about intimate sexual abuse. Further, such abuse is
often difficult to prove.
133. In In re Oluloro, the court found that after reviewing the evidence regarding female
genital mutilation, although it attempted to respect the traditions and cultures of other societies, it
considered the practice cruel and serving no known medical purpose. No. A72-147-491, (U.S.
Immigr. Ct. Seattle, Wash. Mar. 23, 1994) (unpublished I.J. decision). "While it could possibly
have had some purpose in ancient cultures, whatever the utility the practice might have ever had,
it no longer exists." Id.
134. Asylum advocates, as well as its detractors, have raised concerns about expanding the
definition of refugee to recognized gender-based persecution. See Deborah Sontag, Women
Asking U.S. Asylum Expand Definition of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993, at C8. This fear
is based on a belief that the number of asylum applicants will increase, adding to the current
antiimmigrant movement and creating hardships for the refugees and immigrants currently
residing in the United States, as well as leading to new restrictions in immigration policies. Id.;
see also Kelly, supra note 19, at 627. Federal Courts have also indicated a fear of expanding the
definition of particular social group. In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, concerning Salvadoran males
fleeing to avoid persecution for failing to join the military, the court stated "this class of young
working class urban males may be so broad and encompass so many variables that to recognize
any person who might conceivably establish that he was a member of this class and is entitled to
asylum . . . would render the meaning of refugee meaningless." 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (1986).
135. "Despite the propaganda about America being overwhelmed with immigrants, the rate
of immigration is about one-third what it was at the beginning of the century. . . . [Wlithout
immigration, America would not long have existed. Now, without immigration it cannot exist as
a world power." A.M. Rosenthal, Are We 'America the Mingy?' Halting Immigration is Blind
Folly, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 27, 1995, at I1A.
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particular social group she must still demonstrate state involvement in the
persecution, through action or inaction. She must also meet both the
subjective and objective prongs of a well-founded fear of persecution, as
well as establishing the only form of relief available to her is asylum. As
demonstrated in Canada and Germany, expanding the definition of a
particular social group to include women fleeing gender-based persecution
has not opened the flood-gates.
V. Two GROUND-BREAKING CASES
A. In re A and Z
In a potentially ground-breaking case, a United States immigration
judge granted asylum to a Jordanian woman fleeing intimate abuse, finding
her eligible for asylum under both the political opinion and particular
social group categories, noting that the two categories may be
interchangeable. 36
The petitioner was a woman who fled Jordan in 1990 with her
child, requesting asylum on the basis of spousal abuse. She presented
evidence establishing ongoing abuse at the hands of her husband over a
thirty year period of time. Testifying and presenting corroborating
witnesses and documents, the petitioner proved that her husband had
beaten her in front of others, even during pregnancy. One incident
occurred when she attempted to obtain her high school diploma. Also, on
several occasions he placed her under house arrest, refusing to let her step
out of the house. She was also not permitted to work, or to have friends,
or her own bank account. Her husband would not even give her gas
money. Further, it was established that the petitioner's husband beat her
just to "keep her in line."
In May 1990, the petitioner's husband threatened her with a gun,
firing it into a room where she and her child were located. It was then that
she decided to leave. Under Jordanian policy, however, the petitioner
could not travel without the consent of her husband. He refused to consent
and obtained a detainment court order to prevent her from leaving. Her
husband finally permitted her to come to the United States, where they
owned a home, during the summer of 1990. The petitioner's husband
followed her to the United States where the abuse continued. When he
finally realized that the petitioner would not return to Jordan with him, he
stopped giving the petitioner and her child financial support.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service argued the case
136. In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893, No. A72-793-219 (U.S. Immigr. Ct. Arlington,
Va. Dec. 20, 1994) (unpublished I.J. decision).
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concerned personal marital abuse, but the court disagreed. 3 7  The
petitioner presented evidence establishing not only that she could not
receive protection from the Jordanian government, but that such abuse was
traditionally accepted and it is a cultural norm not to seek police assistance
for domestic abuse. 1
38
The court found that the petitioner was a member of a particular
social "group of women who are challenging the traditions of the
Jordanian government and society. "139 It found that by fleeing her
husband, thus challenging her husband's power to abuse her, she also
challenged the system of submission of women in Jordan by espousing her
feminist beliefs.'" Citing Fatin v. INS,' 41 the court also held that feminism
qualifies as a political opinion. 42
The court found the abuse suffered by the petitioner demonstrated
that she was willing to suffer the consequences for asserting her beliefs.' 43
Furthermore, she showed she was unwilling to accept any further abuse
because her Western feminist beliefs collided with traditional Jordanian
values.'44 The court concluded that the petitioner's social group is basic to
her political opinion and they are interchangeable. 45 Based on the
Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1992, it found that there are few legal avenues for redress of intimate
abuse in Jordan, and the actions of the petitioner's husband are
traditionally accepted."6 As such, the court concluded that although the
persecution was done on a private level, the government was a
collaborator by its inaction in preventing it."47 Based on the husband's past
actions and the government's inaction, the court found a clear probability
the petitioner would be subject to persecution if she returned to Jordan.' 41
In granting her request for relief from deportation, the court stated the
petitioner was eligible for asylum under both the political opinion and
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 29,
140. Id. at 30.
141. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993).
142. In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893, No. A72-793-219, at 30.
143. Id. at 31.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 29.
146. Id. at 30.
147. In re A and Z, No. A72-190-893, No. A72-793-219, at 30.
148. Id.
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particular social group categories.149
B. In re M.K.
In a more recent decision out of the same immigration court, a
twenty-nine year old woman from Sierra Leone was granted asylum on
three bases: persecution relating to her resistance to, but forcibly
imposed, genital mutilation; persecution through spousal abuse as a result
of her attempts to assert her feminine views; and persecution because of
her political opinion. 150
The court noted that although it considered the issue of female
genital mutilation a case of first impression concerning a claim for asylum,
the same issue was addressed in the context of a suspension of deportation
hearing by an immigration judge sitting in Seattle, Washington.' 5
The respondent, M. K., entered the United States in August 1991
on a visitor's visa. She applied for asylum when the INS instituted
deportation proceedings against her for remaining in the United States
without authorization and she was found to be deportable. 5 2
M.K. is twenty-nine, married, and a native and citizen of Sierra
Leone. She has a high school level education and is trained and employed
as a nursing assistant. At the age of fifteen the respondent's mother began
pressing her to submit to female gentile mutilation.'53 She continuously
refused, at the risk of becoming an outcast, treated as a nonadult, or
shunned, 54 because three of her friends had died as a result of the practice
and numerous others suffered pain because of the mutilation. At the age
149. Id. at 29.
150. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558. The court's rationale concerning the third category of
political opinion will not be discussed in this article.
151. Id. at 2 (referring to Oluloro and a suspension of deportation proceeding under
Immigration & Nationality Act §244). In order to qualify for suspension of deportation, an
applicant must have been present in the United States for seven years immediately preceding the
application, be a person of good moral character, and that deportation would result in extreme
hardship to the alien, her United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent or
child. Immigration & Nationality Act §244(a)(1). The burden of proof is on the alien to
establish eligibility for suspension of deportation. Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960). In
Oluloro, the court granted the suspension on the basis of potential hardship to the respondent's
two minor female children who would be subject to female genital mutilation if the respondent
was deported to Nigeria. Oluloro No. A72-147-491 at 17.
152. In re M.K., No. A72-374-558 at 2.
153. Female genital mutilation is a traditional practice in Sierra Leone (with the exception
of the Creoles, who make up 20% of the population) and approximately 80% of the female
population of that country undergo some form of this mutilation. Id. at 5.
154. According to the testimony of Susan Rich, an expert on African family planning, in
Bundo Society a social stigma attaches to the woman who refuses to undergo the mutilation. Id.
at 7.
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of twenty-one the respondent ran away from home when her mother told
her she would be forced to undergo the procedure, returning only when
her mother promised her she would not be forced.
However, in January 1989, after the birth of her child, the
respondent was abducted from her parents home, blind folded and bound,
and taken against her will to a place in the jungle called the "Bundo Bash."
There her "initiation" into the Bundo Society was performed.115  She was
stripped of her clothes and bound while an elder woman, using an
unsterilized razor, cut away her clitoris and labia minor. She was not
given anything to ease the pain. Six women sang to disguise the screams
of the respondent and six other victims.
As a result of the "operation" the respondent bled for five hours
and lost consciousness, but the group refused to take her to the hospital for
fear the Bundo secret would be revealed.' A woman doctor was called in
to stop the bleeding. Following the mutilation the respondent received two
weeks of instruction on a woman's role in society and was forced by threat
of death to take an oath of silence concerning the ritual and her mutilation.
The court accepted testimony that there is no legal recourse
regarding female genital mutilation in Sierra Leone, reasoning it is a
traditional practice and police would inform the Bundo Society should
anyone reveal the "secret" by lodging a complaint. 157  As a result, the
court concluded the government was either unable or unwilling to stop the
persecution, finding genital mutilation mandated for all non-Creole women
in Sierra Leone. 5
Recognizing forced female genital mutilation as a form of
persecution, 159 the court held the respondent warranted asylum on the basis
of either "persecution on account of political opinion" for her resistance
to, and complaints about, female genital mutilation; or "persecution on
155. Expert testimony at the respondent's hearing established that "initiation" into the
Bundo Society, of which the respondent's family were members and which all women are
required to join, is to inculcate young women on their socially-imposed roles. In re M.K., No.
A72-374-558 at 6. Female genital mutilation is part of the initiation and is performed by a
Digba, a women elder, using a razor blade or broken glass to perform the surgery. Id. While
the Digba is permitted to drink intoxicants, the victims are given nothing to relieve the pain. In
re M.K., No. A72-374-558 at 6 (referring to the testimony of Susan Rich and Dr. Gary S.
Eglinton, an Associate professor and Director of Maternal-Fetal Medicine in the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology at Georgetown University School of Medicine).
156. The respondent's long term health has also been affected. Id. She suffers from
discomfort, a chronic rash, and has endured a miscarriage as a result of an infection caused by
the mutilation. Id.
157. Id. at 8.
158. Id. at 13.
159. In re M.K., No. A-72-374-558 at 19.
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account of membership in the social group that consists of women who are
forced to undergo female genital mutilation."" ° The court also granted
asylum based on the respondent's "past attempts to assert her individual
autonomy, resulting in physical spousal abuse, and because of her fear of
future harm, given the threat of her husband to kill her." 6'
The respondent married her husband in 1985. Since 1988 he
abused her both verbally and physically, beating her with his fists and feet
approximately every two months because she was mouthy. 62 On three
occasions respondent complained to the police about the abuse and on each
occasion was told the police could do nothing because it was a domestic
matter.'63  The respondent's husband beat her, even during her two
pregnancies, so she refused to bear him any more children, further
angering him. The beatings continued until 1990 when the respondent left
him.'" At the time of the hearing the respondent was in the process of
divorcing her husband. As a result, he has threatened to kill her because
she refuses to bear him more children, refuses to relinquish custody of
their two children, and is carrying out her threat to divorce him.'1
On the basis of this testimony, the court also granted the
respondent asylum because of spousal abuse stating that such abuse could
be "classified as either: 'persecution on account of political opinion' for
her resistance to mandated female subservience and complaints about
physical spousal abuse; or 'persecution on account of membership in the
social group that consists of women who have been punished with physical
spousal abuse for attempting to assert their individual autonomy.'""
These cases are significant for two reasons. In re A and Z is
believed to be the first decision by an immigration judge in which a
woman was granted asylum based on intimate abuse because such abuse
was found to constitute persecution. In re M.K. is the first case to hold
female genital mutilation is a form of persecution meriting asylum.
Second, both cases identify women who have faced and are facing gender-
160. Id. at 14. "In addition, Respondent is eligible for asylum on humanitarian grounds
because of the horror of being forced to undergo female genital mutilation." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 9.
163. Testimony by Susan Rich confirmed that in Sierra Leone men are considered head of
the house and a wife's disrespect or disobedience justifies her punishment. In re M.K., No. A72-
374-558, at 9. The court noted, referring to the report, State Department Sierra Leone Human
Rights Practices 1994, that wife-beating is common and rarely results in court action because it is
not recognized as a societal problem. d. at 10.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 15.
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based persecution as members of a particular social group. These cases
should be upheld. Furthermore, they should be followed and expanded
upon.
The particular social group category was added as a ground for
refugee status in recognition of the potential failure of the other categories
to include all forms of persecution. 67 Both the definition of refugee and
the inclusion of the category for a particular social group indicate that it
was meant to cover groups, such as women who face gender-based
persecution, that are not covered by the other categories. Furthermore,
the United States was a contracting party to the Protocol, 68 and as a
member should follow the UNHCR guidelines which call on states to
recognize women fleeing gender-based persecution as members of a
particular social group. 6
9
While the petitioners in both the In re A and Z and In re M.K.
were able to establish persecution because of their political opinion as well
as because they were members of a particular social group, other women
are targeted for persecution specifically because of their gender. The
United States needs to establish immigration policies recognizing that fact.
The flood-gates will not open. Canada and Germany are proof that fear
will not be realized.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an age where women's rights and equality are both recognized
and demanded, the United States should amend its immigration policies to
reflect the changes occurring world-wide. In a country that prides itself on
equality, the discrimination against refugee women should be
acknowledged and eliminated. The United States immigration laws and
policies were not carved in stone, but the words of Emma Lazarus were.
Those are the words that should be followed-and those words were meant
to include women.
167. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (1982).
168. See In re M.K., No. A72-374-558.
169. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Politicians get away with murder! This common statement tends to
reflect how many feel about the privileged class of people who make and
enforce the law. Nevertheless, the litigious nature of the United States has
caught up with the current President of the United States, Bill Clinton. He
is accused of several state and federal civil rights violations' allegedly
committed against Paula Corbin Jones, a former Arkansas state employee.2
President Clinton was given leave to argue the ruling in Nixon v.
* B.A., 1992, University of South Florida; M.A., 1993, Nova University; Candidate for
Juris Doctor, 1996, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. The author would
like to thank Roslyn Greenfield and Ruth Wilder for their advice and encouragement during the
preparation of this article.
I. Jones' action alleges that Clinton, while Governor of Arkansas, violated her civil and due
process rights by sexually harassing and assaulting her in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985
(1988). She also claims that Clinton violated Arkansas state laws by committing defamation and
outrage. See Jones v. Clinton 869 F. Supp. 690, 691 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
2. Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
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Fitzgerald' gives him absolute immunity from being sued while holding
office, so that Jones' suit should be dismissed without prejudice until after
he leaves office. The district court did not agree and held that the
President is subject to discovery but the initial trial may be delayed until
after he leaves office.4
On January 9, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, with Judge Bowman writing for the majority, ruled in a
two to one decision that the President is subject to the same rules which
apply to every American citizen.5 The court held that since the actions
alleged were not "official acts," Nixon v. Fitzgerald could not provide the
President any type of immunity in this instance and the pretrial discovery
could proceed.6 The Circuit Court based its opinion on a strict reading of
Nixon v. Fitzgerald.7 The District Court based much of its decision on
what it called the "English Legacy," and on Supreme Court decisions
(mainly Fitzgerald) to conclude President Clinton does not have full
immunity from suit.'
The District Court's comparison of English law and history
concerning the issue of immunity was used to aid the court in interpreting
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution and was thus given more
weight than it deserved. On the other hand, the circuit court never
touched upon the "English Legacy."
This article will discuss and analyze the fundamental differences
between executive immunity in the United States and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The first part of this article will
discuss the "American position." This section will analyze the historical
development the courts have taken concerning the constitutionality of
enjoining, subpoenaing, and suing the President of the United States for
actions committed during his term and even before his term commenced.
After discussing the American position, the second part of this article,
titled, "The British Counterpart", will discuss the formation and role of the
modern monarchy, and its retention of certain powers and privileges since
the formation of Parliament. The section will also address the civil and
criminal immunity the monarch always enjoys and how that immunity can,
at times, protect members of the Crown in the course of their executive
3. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (giving the President of the United States
absolute immunity for official actions within the outer perimeter of his duties of office).
4. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 698-99.
5. Jones v Clinton, Nos. 95-1050, 95-1167, 1996 WL 5658, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 1996).
6. Id.
7. Id. at *3,
8. Id. at *1.
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duties. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the differences between the
British monarch and the American President and allow the reader to
determine if the discussed immunity is necessary in today's day and age.
II. THE AMERICAN POSITION
It is often stated the United States is the most litigious nation in the
world. This belief is evident by the number of law suits filed and litigated
in American courts each year. By 1990, the legal profession became a
ninety-one billion dollar a year industry and employed nearly one million
people.9 The profession has helped give the average person the ability to
file suit against anyone, even against the President of the United States.
Until the final days of Richard Nixon's tenure in office, it was
believed the President of the United States enjoyed complete immunity
from suit.'0 This belief changed over time. In a series of decisions, the
President's omnipotent status has been eroded. Nevertheless, the courts
have continuously had difficulty in balancing presidential immunity with
the need of the judicial branch to administer justice. Several important
court decisions have helped shed light on how far the judicial branch may
go to exercise its jurisdiction over a president. The following cases
indicate the President is subject to some legal process, and is not above the
laws of the United States.
III. THE COURT'S SUBPOENA POWER OVER THE PRESIDENT
In United States v. Burr;" the trial court subpoenaed President
Thomas Jefferson. Aaron Burr12 wanted Jefferson to provide a letter
which Burr intended to use as evidence to help defend a charge of treason.
The government conceded Burr's right to serve the President with a
subpoena to testify, but decided that a subpoena duces tecum cannot be
served on the President because a request for documents could disclose
confidential communications which only the President is entitled to read.' 3
With Chief Justice John Marshall presiding, the trial court recognized that
9. ROBERT MACCRATE, THE PROFESSION FOR WHICH LAWYERS MUST PREPARE-A
VISION OF THE SKILLS AND VALUES NEW LAWYERS SHOULD SEEK TO ACQUIRE 5 (1992) (quoting
U.S. Industrial Outlook 1991, Professional Services: Legal Services (SIC81), at 52-54).
10. Laura K. Ray, From Prerogative to Accountability: The Amenability of the President to
Suit, 80 KY. L.J. 739 (1991).
11. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,629d).
12, Aaron Burr (1756-1836) was the third Vice President of the United States (1801-1805)
under Thomas Jefferson. Burr was accused of trying to raise an army against Spain and conspiring
to divide the Union.
13. Ray, supra note 10, at 744.
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a subpoena duces tecum might jeopardize public safety, but held the
President must hand over the letter.'4 The court added that portions of the
letter may be withheld in the interest of national security. 5 More
interesting, Marshall ruled the courts cannot proceed against the President
as an ordinary individual. 6 Marshall's decision was revisited when a
federal district court ordered President James Monroe to submit to a
subpoena and serve as a witness in a court-martial hearing. 7 The Attorney
General believed Monroe had a legal duty to cooperate with a subpoena."
Claiming he could not leave his official duties, Monroe answered a series
of interrogatories which the court sent by mail.' 9
Perhaps the most significant case recognizing the courts' power to
subpoena the President, thus legitimizing Marshall's decision was United
States v. Nixon."° President Nixon challenged a subpoena ordering him to
turn over tape recordings of his discussions which were needed for a
criminal trial.2 ' Nixon argued that the separation of powers doctrine
precluded the court from exercising its jurisdiction over the executive
branch.2 In a unanimous decision (without Justice Rehnquist's
participation), the Supreme Court held the doctrine of separation of powers
and confidentiality do not give the President an unqualified privilege of
immunity from the judicial process.' The Court noted that unless
President Nixon could show the released communications would jeopardize
military, diplomatic, or national security interests, his arguments could not
prevail over the fair administration of criminal justice.24
14. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 34-35. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the following: "A subpoena
duces tecum, then, may issue to any person to whom an ordinary subpoena may issue, directing him
to bring any appear of which the party praying it has a right to avail himself as testimony." Id. at
34-35.
15. Ray, supra note 10, at 750; see Id. at 752 n.69 (explaining Burr's concession the
"constitutional officer" has a right to withhold certain documents from the public); see also Burr, 25
F. Cas. at 35.
16. Ray, supra note 10, at 753 (citing United States v. Burr II, 25 F. Cas. at 192).




20. United States v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 706.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 713.
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IV. THE COURTS' INJUNCTION POWER OVER THE PRESIDENT
The Reconstruction Act of 18672' set the battleground for the
Supreme Court to hear Mississippi v. Johnson.26 Mississippi attempted to
enjoin President Andrew Johnson27 from enforcing the Reconstruction Act
of 1867.28 The Supreme Court unanimously held a state cannot sue the
President to block enforcement of a statute it believes is unconstitutional.29
Furthermore, the court stated that the separation of powers doctrine
precludes the courts from exercising its jurisdiction over the executive
branch and the Reconstruction Act was purely executive and political."
Nevertheless, the decision in Mississippi v. Johnson did not necessarily
preclude the courts from enjoining the President in his performance of
ministerial duties or hearing a suit against the President for noninjunctive
relief.3 '
It was not until the 1950s when the Supreme Court heard
arguments in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer3 2 that Mississippi v.
Johnson was revisited. President Harry Truman ordered his Commerce
Secretary to seize the nation's steel mills when management and labor
were unable to resolve a wage dispute which threatened to close down the
industry in the middle of the Korean War.3 3 In a hearing before the United
States District Court, the government argued the precedent in Mississippi
v. Johnson prohibited the court from exercising its jurisdiction over the
President or his agents. 34 The District Court ruled against the government
but distinguished the current case from Johnson on the grounds that the
25. Reconstruction, which lasted from about 1865 to 1877, was the era following the
American Civil War (1861-1864) in which the states of South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida,
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee were
reinstated into the Union.
26. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 475 (1868).
27. Andrew Johnson was the seventeenth President of the United States who succeeded to the
Presidency upon the assassination of Abraham Lincoln in 1865. A lifetime member of the
Democratic party, Johnson was selected by Lincoln, a member of the Republican party, to give the
ticket a non-partisan character. Johnson and the Republican-controlled Congress were constantly at
odds with each other, especially where reconstruction was at issue. As a result, Andrew Johnson
became the only President to be impeached. The opposition failed by one vote to gain his
conviction; thus, Johnson was able to finish out his term in office, which ended in 1869.
28. Ray, supra note 10, at 753.
29. Johnson, 71 U.S. at 475.
30. Id. at 499, 500.
31. Id. at 499.
32. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
33. Id. at 582.
34. Ray, supra note 10, at 760.
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complaint named the Commerce Secretary and not President Truman. 5
When the case reached the Supreme Court, council for the steel mills
argued that Johnson did not pertain to presidential subordinates and thus an
injunction would be permissible.36 The majority opinion did not address
whether Youngstown was actually a suit against the President; but at the
very least it established that one can challenge a presidential order if the
named defendant is a presidential agent.37 In the end, the Supreme Court
invalidated Truman's executive order stating the Constitution does not
authorize the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to seize private
property.3" Eventually, the ability to enjoin a presidential order by directly
naming the President instead of a "named agent" became acceptable in the
eyes of the Court, but it is nevertheless difficult to achieve. 9 The same
can be said for a writ of mandamus, though difficult to obtain, it is not
legally impossible.'
V. SUIT AGAINST THE PRESIDENT-NIXON V. FITZGERALD
In 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the
Department of the Air Force, testified before a congressional
subcommittee about cost overruns and technical difficulties concerning the
development of the C-5A air-transport.4 When Richard Nixon assumed
the presidency in 1969, Fitzgerald's position was eliminated.42 Fitzgerald
believed his dismissal was politically motivated and challenged his
termination before the Civil Service Commission.43 The Commission
found Fitzgerald's termination was not in retaliation for his congressional
35. Id.
36. Id. at 761.
37. Id. at 763.
38. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588; see also Ray, supra note 10, at 761-63.
39. See National Ass'n of Internal Revenue Employees v. Nixon, 349 F. Supp. 18 (D.C.
1972) (holding that plaintiffs' failed to show that a preliminary injunction to require the President to
adjust wages of federal employees was in the public interest); see also Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 1141 (D.C. 1990) (holding that members of Congress were not entitled to a preliminary
injunction directed to the President prohibiting him from initiating military action against Iraq
because the issue was not ripe for consideration).
40. See San Francisco Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971)
(holding that no proposition has been found to suggest that a United States District Court may
compel the head of the Executive Branch of government to take any action whatsoever). But see
Hourigan v. Carter, 478 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. III. 1979) (holding that mandamus can only be used to
compel ministerial and non-discretionary duties).
41. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit at 4, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, (No. 79-1738), cen. denied (1980).




appearance, but that it did involve "personal factors unique to him. "" The
Commission ordered him reinstated in another position equivalent to the
one he held plus back pay; Fitzgerald was not satisfied with what he
believed was an inadequate ruling. 5 Fitzgerald filed suit against several
Nixon White House staff members and eventually, in 1978, amended his
complaint to include President Nixon.' President Nixon's motion for
summary judgment (claiming presidential immunity) was denied, giving
him the opportunity to make a collateral appeal which was dismissed
summarily.47  The Supreme Court of the United States heard arguments,
and eventually ruled that the President enjoys absolute immunity for
official actions he commits while President .4 The Court developed its
rationale using precedent and history. The ruling in Fitzgerald can be
summed up as follows:
Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind,
we hold that the petitioner, as a former President of the
United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from
damages predicated on his official acts. We consider the
immunity a functionally mandated incident of the
President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional
tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our
49history ....
The Court examined the powers and responsibilities of the President and
held that the President's powers are unique as compared to other executive
officers because the President has the responsibility to execute the nation's
laws as well as shape United States foreign policy.5" Fitzgerald argued that
the only immunity mentioned in the Constitution is reserved for
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id.
46. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit at 6, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, (No. 79-1738), cert. denied (1980). Fitzgerald also filed
suit against Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, two of Nixon's top aides. The Supreme Court
ruled in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S 800 (1982), that cabinet members and aides are only entitled
to qualified immunity, which would be denied only if the official reasonably should have known that
his or her act was a violation of law. See Aviva Orenstein, Recent Development, Presidential
Immunity From Civil Liability, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 236, 240-42 (1983).
47. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 731.
48. Id. at 749.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 749-50; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that executive
officials are usually entitled only to qualified immunity).
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Congressman and presidential immunity must not have been considered.5'
The Court did not agree and listed several reasons why Fitzgerald had to
be wrong. First, because presidential immunity is not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution does not mean it does not exist. 2 The Court
noted judges have immunity even though the Constitution does not
specifically grant such a privilege. 3  Second, the Court already has
extended to certain executive branch officials (i.e., prosecutors) absolute
immunity. 4 Finally, there is historical evidence that the Framers assumed
the President has immunity.55 Senator Ellsworth and Vice President John
Adams, both delegates to the Constitutional Convention, believed the
President was not subject to the Court's jurisdiction.56  Alexander
Hamilton, noted in the Federalist, that an executive who is not independent
will equate to a weak government.57 Thomas Jefferson, the nation's third
President, wrote the following to the prosecutors in Aaron Burr's trial:
The leading principle of our Constitution is the
independence of the legislature, executive and judiciary.
But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if
he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to
imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could
bandy him from pillar to post, help him constantly
trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw
him entirely from his constitutional duties?"8
To summarize its position, the Court quoted Joseph Story, a nineteenth
century commentator, who observed:
There are incidental powers belonging to the executive
department which are necessarily implied from the nature
of the functions which are confided to it. Among these
must necessarily be included the power to perform them
51. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 750; see U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 6 (guaranteeing immunity in all cases,
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, from arrest during a congressional session).




56. Id. at 751 n.31. For more historical commentary on immunity, see Memorandum
(Attachment) in Support of President Clinton's Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Presidential
Immunity at 1, Jones v. Fitzgerald (No. LR-C-94-290) (1994) [hereinafter President's Attachment].
57. President's Attachment, supra note 56, at 4-5.




without any obstruction whatsoever. The President
cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or
detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his
office, and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in
civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability.59
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Paula Corbin Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed suit
against President Clinton claiming that while governor of Arkansas,
Clinton violated her equal protection and due process rights by making
"noncoercive sexual advances."' Jones claims that she rebuffed Governor
Clinton's advances and as a result, her superiors treated her in a "hostile
and rude manner" and she was denied merit pay raises.61 Jones voluntarily
left her state job in 1993.62 She filed her complaint one day short of the
three year statute of limitations, which incidentally was the year and a half
point of Bill Clinton's presidential term.6
3
President Clinton moved to dismiss the complaint arguing the
precedent of Nixon v. Fitzgerald gave the President absolute immunity
from civil suit. 64 The district court ruled that since the actions allegedly
committed by the President occurred before his term of office commenced,
the President, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, is
only entitled to "limited or temporary" immunity from immediate trial but
discovery and deposition may proceed against the President. 65 In January
59. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 418-19
(lst ed. 1833); see Nixon, 457 U.S. at 776-77.
60. Memorandum in Support of President Clinton's Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of
Presidential Immunity at 15, Jones v. Ferguson (No. LR-C-94-290) (1994) [hereinafter President's
Memorandum].
61. Id. at 16.
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id. at 63.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 697-99. Prior to this case, there have only been three Presidents
sued for actions they allegedly committed before they assumed office. People ex rel. Hurley v.
Roosevelt, 179 N.Y. 544 (1904). In Hurley, Theodore Roosevelt, was a member of the Board of
Police for the New York City Police Department before he assumed the Presidency. A suit was filed
against Roosevelt and the other members when a patrolman believed that he was unjustly dismissed.
The suit was resolved in the Board's favor. The New York Court of Appeals, without opinion,
affirmed the lower court's decision. In Devault v. Truman, 194 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1946), President
Harry Truman was sued because of a decision he made as a state court judge in 1931. The dispute
was resolved in Truman's favor with no mention of presidential immunity. In Bailey v. Kennedy,
No. 757,200 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1962), President John Kennedy was sued when delegates to the prior
Democratic Party Convention used a car they claimed was given to them by high ranking members
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of 1996, this decision was reversed in part by an appeals court, which
ruled that Fitzgerald does not protect actions outside the outer perimeter of
the President's office and thus Bill Clinton, individually, is subject to trial
for actions he allegedly committed before he became president. 6 As such,
the absolute immunity Fitzgerald provided the President has at least, for
the time being, been strictly applied to provide immunity only for official
actions committed while in office.
Before discussing Fitzgerald, the District Court spent a significant
amount of time discussing the "English Legacy." The Court believed that
the question concerning immunity lies within English law.67 The Court
noted English law, which is the cornerstone of American law, eventually
stood for the proposition the king is under no man, but under God and the
law.68 At the same time, the Court noted the Petition of Rights,69 signed
by King Charles I, made it apparent the king's prerogative was limited and
he would be subject to the law.7' Examining the steady decline of the
king's divine right, the Court concluded that through the reception statutes
which allowed, as of a certain date, English common law and acts of
parliament to be received in new independent states, the rights of the
President would by implication not exceed the rights of the weakened
monarch in the early seventeenth century."
of the Democratic Convention. The plaintiffs argued they were injured when the defendant's
"agents" negligently operated the car. President Kennedy made a motion to stay the proceedings on
the basis of the Soldier and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940, which gives serviceman the right to stay
proceedings while on active duty. He argued that as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, he
also enjoyed such a privilege. The trial court denied his motion and the case was settled out of court.
See Statement of Interest of the United States, Brief of Solicitor General at 1, Jones v. Clinton, 869
F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark 1994) (No. LR-C-94-290) (Solicitor Gen. Brief 1994).
66. Jones v. Clinton, Nos. 95-1050, 95-1167 1996 WL 5658 at *6 (8th Cir. Ark.). President
Clinton's lawyers plan to appeal to the full appeals court whose decision will possibly be reviewed
by the United States Supreme Court. See Mimi Hall, Court: Paula Jones' Suit Can Go to Trial,
USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 1996, at 4A.
67. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 692.
68. Id. at 693.
69. The Petition of Rights was a further restraint on arbitrary government. The Petition
condemned taxation without Parliament's consent, imprisonment without showing cause, quartering
of soldiers, and the misuse of martial law. By 1689, the Bill of Rights was passed by Parliament.
See A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA-TEXT AND COMMENTARY 26-27 (1964).
70. Id.
71. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 693. The court stated the following:
The events of this period in English legal and political history were conclusive in
determining the end of 'the divine rights of Kings' and subjecting the King to the law.
This is historically important to us in that the founding fathers cast very little light
(outside the impeachment provision) upon suits against the President, and this matter
was never addressed by Congress in passing laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution.
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The "English Legacy" helped the Court determine the extent of
Presidential immunity. The lofty Seventeenth Century English statement
that "the King ought to be under no man, but under God and the law"'
appears to coincide with the modern American proposition the President is
not above the law. 7' Though both statements are egalitarian, to some they
may appear to be ludicrous and simply naive. Was the Monarch ever held
to the law? As a result of the "down-sizing" of the Monarch's divine right
during the Seventeenth Century, the Court reached the conclusion that if
the monarch is not above the law, neither is the President. 74 Though it is
true that the monarch's divine right has been effectively abrogated, it can
not be accurately stated the British Monarch is entirely under the law.
VII. THE BRITISH COUNTERPART 7"
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a
nation immersed in stately tradition preceding the Constitution of the
United States by hundreds of years. The formation of Great Britain's legal
system can be traced to the passage of the Magna Carta.76 The Magna
"It must be assumed that the rights of the President do not rise above the rights of an
English monarch in the early 17th Century."(emphasis added).
Id. at 693-94 n.1. But see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 (1982). The court stated the
following:
Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law,
any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional
heritage and structure. .. . This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be
considered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a system structured to
achieve effective government under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
Id. The Supreme Court apparently wanted to de-emphasize the importance of English political
tradition, a tradition which the Founding Fathers no doubt wanted to abandon. The Founding
Fathers instead created a system of government that mandates that the three branches be separate
in identity, but equal in power. The United Kingdom does not adhere to such a concept. This is
evident, as explained later, by the fact the executive powers of the United Kingdom are exercised
by the governing party in Parliament.
72. Statement was originally coined by Henry Bracton, a 13,h Century legal scholar. Sir
Edward Coke, who served as Queen Elizabeth's attorney and was later Chief Justice of the King's
Bench, stated to King James I that "Bracton saith, Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub deo
et lege" [That the King ought not to be under any man, but under God and the law]. See Jones, 869
F. Supp. at 693 n. 1 (quoting DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 203 (1963)).
73. See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 758 n.41
74. Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 696.
75. Many Commonwealth nations have laws regarding immunity and for a discussion on these
similarities and differences, see COLIN McNARIN, GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 3 (1977).
76. BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF
ENGLAND 5 (1899).
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Carta is one of the most significant documents ever introduced to the
people of England,77 who had no rights except for what the king saw fit to
give.78 The Magna Carta, which was approved by King John in 1215, 79
guaranteed certain rights to the barons and eventually to all the people of
England. 0 On that fateful day, the principle was established that the king
cannot override the law; 8 thus the king's tyrannical right to rule by
arbitrary decisions ended.
By 1688, the English Parliament, which did not exist when the
Magna Carta was signed in 1215, became the supreme law making body of
England.82 Though Parliament's ascendance overshadowed the powers of
the monarch, there was an aspect of the monarch's divine right that has
always remained, despite what others may believe. This "holdover" has
given the Queen,83 and the Crown as a whole, unique privileges, which the
United States President will never have.
VIII. THE EXECUTIVE POWERS OF THE CROWN
The American system of government is based upon the concept of
separation of powers. The United States Constitution mandates that the
77. Representing eighty percent of the population of the United Kingdom, England is simply
one country out of four that comprises the United Kingdom. Wales came under the rule of the
English Crown in the thirteenth century and formally entered the union by 1536. Scotland, which
shared the same king of England since 1603, formally joined the United Kingdom of Great Britain in
1707. Ruled by the English Crown since the twelfth century, Ireland formally joined the union in
1800. In 1922, the Irish Free State separated from the United Kingdom. The six counties of the
North (Northern Ireland) remained a part of the United Kingdom. See COLIN C. TURPIN, BRITISH
GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 218-39 (2d ed. 1990).
78. BARRINGTON, supra note 76, at 5
79. King John (1167-1216) ruled England upon the death of his brother Richard in 1199.
John, who was involved in a war with France, levied heavy taxes in order to support his military
efforts. In 1214 John returned to England after being defeated by France. With widespread
discontent by his barons (who renounced their allegiance to John), as well as by the Church of
England, John agreed to accept the demands of his barons and had his seal affixed to the Magna
Carta on June 19, 1215. See HOWARD, supra note 69, at 8-9.
80. HOWARD, supra note 69, at 8-10. The Magna Carta granted such important rights as tax
relief from the king (chapter 12), the location of courts in certain jurisdictions (chapter 17),
reasonable fines and punishments (chapter 20), compensation for taking private property (chapter
28), a free person will not be punished except by lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the
land (chapter 39), availability of justice (chapter 40), and freedom to leave and re-enter the kingdom
(chapter 42).
81. NORMAN WILDING & PHILIP LAUNDY, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PARLIAMENT 379 (1961).
82. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 24. The Bill of Rights required the consent of Parliament
before taxes were levied. See HOWARD, supra note 69, at 26.
83. The current Queen, Elizabeth II, has been Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland since the death of her father, King George VI, in 1952. The Queen, as well as
past queens and kings, is also known as the Monarch or Sovereign.
528
Wilder
executive, legislature, and the judiciary have mutually exclusive members,
and at times, mutually exclusive responsibilities which prohibit one branch
from encroaching upon the powers of another. In the United Kingdom,
this concept is not as definite. The legislative body of Parliament makes
the laws, the Crown, headed symbolically by the monarch and steered by
specific members of Parliament, has the authority and power to enforce the
laws. Specifically, the Crown consists of the Monarch, ministers, who are
usually sitting members of Parliament, the Central Governmental
Departments (civil service), and the armed forces.' The Monarch is the
incarnation of the Crown and could not be separated from that body. The
Crown's powers include the prerogative powers of the Monarch, the
executive powers exercised by her ministers, the civil service, and the
armed forces.
The United Kingdom without a king or queen would be like the
United States without a president; the nation would not function within its
constitutional system of government. Though the current Queen is
perceived as a symbolic figure of days long gone, her role in certain
matters is constitutionally mandated. The Queen is given the prerogative
power 6 to dismiss her ministers, 7 or the Prime Minister, if either were to
lose the support of the government.88 Similarly, the Queen is also given
the opportunity to appoint the Prime Minister, but such selection is
governed by convention which mandates that she appoint the person who
can command the confidence of the majority party in the House of
Commons, usually the party leader.89 The Queen is the only person who
84. See DAVID C. M. YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38
(5TH ed. 1978). In several Commonwealth nations, the term Crown is also used in the same
manner. For purposes of this article, unless otherwise noted, the term Crown will be used to refer
only to the executive branch in the United Kingdom.
85. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 150-5 1.
86. Common law powers, not already delegated by Parliament, may only be exercised by the
Sovereign. Such powers would include, among other things, the power to make treaties, recognize
foreign governments, grant a royal pardon, etc. See Blackburn v. Attorney-General [1971] I WLR
1037 (CA).
87. A minister is a member of the Prime Minister's cabinet. The Prime Minister and cabinet
ministers are collectively referred to as the "Crown's Ministers."
88. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 150-51. Though the Queen is given such powers, in political
reality and necessity, the Prime Minster would offer his resignation or call for a dissolution of
Parliament.
89. Id. at 146. The queen cannot appoint anyone she wants to the office of Prime Minster,
but in 1957 and 1963 she was given the rare opportunity to solely appoint a prime minister when the
majority party did not have an apparent leader. Today this opportunity would be diminished by
internal party rules which guide the Queen in her selection. Since 1957, Labor party rules prohibit a
member of the Labor Party to sit as prime minister without first being elected party leader. See
PETER BROMHEAD, BRITAIN'S DEVELOPING CONSTITUTION 27-29 (1974).
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may dissolve Parliament, but such action may only be taken if the Prime
Minister requests a dissolution.90 Nevertheless, it has been asserted by
British Constitutional experts9O ' that the Queen may have the right to refuse
a Prime Minister's request for dissolution.' Though Governor-Generals93
in several commonwealth nations have refused Prime Ministerial requests
for dissolution, the Sovereign in the United Kingdom has not refused one
since the passage of the Reform Act of 1832.' 4 The Queen has the power
to dismiss her ministers, and it appears that convention would allow her to
do so if she felt that it were necessary but in practice the Prime Minister is
the one who actually dismisses a minister.95
The Queen does not have the power to alter the law, but she does
retain a prerogative power by Order of Council" to legislate and regulate
matters not already governed by statute.' The Crown may extend its
sovereignty and jurisdiction to areas of land or sea which it has not
90. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 155. The Prime Minister would seek a dissolution of
Parliament if he or she no longer commanded the confidence of their party.
91. GEOFFREY MARSHALL ET AL., SOME PROBLEMS OF THE CONSTITUTION 40-41 (5TH ED.
1971) quoted in TIJRPIN, supra note 77, at 156.
92. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 155-56.
93. In commonwealth nations that recognize the Queen as their Sovereign, the Governor-
General is the person, usually appointed by the Prime Minister, who wields the power of the Crown
in the Queen's absence. See WILDING, supra note 81, at 272-73.
94. TuRPIN, supra note 77, at 155-56 (relying on Sir Peter Rawlinson, Dissolution in the
United Kingdom, 58 THE PARLIAMENTARIAN 1, 2 (1977)).
95. TuRPIN, supra note 77, at 150-51. Since the passage of the Reform Act of 1832, no
Sovereign has ever dismissed a Prime Minister in the United Kingdom. In 1975, the Governor-
General of Australia, Sir John Kerr, acting in the name of the Queen, dismissed the Prime Minister
and all ministers in the Labor government when they no longer could govern effectively. The
Governor-General wrote the Prime Minister the following:
In accordance with section 64 of the Constitution I hereby determine you appointment
as my Chief Advisor and Head of government. It follows that I also hereby determine
the appointments of all the Ministers in your Government. You have previously told
me that you would never resign an election.. .or a double dissolution and that the only
way in which such an election could be obtained would be by my dismissal of you and
your ministerial colleagues. You have persisted in your attitude and I have accordingly
acted as indicated. I propose to send for the Leader of the Opposition and to
commission him to form a new caretaker government until an election can be held.
Id. at 152.
96. Orders of Council are made by the Privy Council. Privy Council membership is partly
governed by convention. Conventional council members include past and present Ministers, the
Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Speaker of the House of Commons, and any other
distinguished person who the Queen may appoint. Membership is for life. The Council, which has
several hundred members, meets in full upon the death or coronation of the Monarch. Smaller
committees meet when they need to exercise the Monarch's Royal Prerogative. Membership in the
council is for life. YARDLEY, supra note 84, at 43-44.
97. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 382-83.
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previously claimed or exercised sovereignty or jurisdictions.9 During the
Falkland Island conflict in 1982, the government used the prerogative of
the Crown to requisition ships in "any of the Channel Islands, any colony,
any country outside Her Majesty's dominions in which Her Majesty has
jurisdiction in right of the Government of the United Kingdom."99 But
perhaps the most important power the Queen retains is the right to refuse
to assent to legislation passed by Parliament, However, this veto power
has not been exercised by a monarch in over two hundred years."
The monarch, though no longer omnipotent, has enough power if
used unwisely to halt the workings of the government and cause a
constitutional crisis. The executive powers formally exercised by the
sovereign alone are now in the hands of the ministers of the Crown,
namely the Prime Minister.' 0
The Prime Minister is usually a member of the House of
Commons. 2 As such, his discretion and powers are for the most part
unlimited. The British Constitution gives the Prime Minister the power to
request a dissolution of Parliament and call a general election." 3 The
Prime Minister, who is an elected member of Parliament, chairs the
cabinet meetings, appoints ministers,'O° and has the authority to intervene
in virtually all matters of government and foreign relations.0 5 Whereas
the President of the United States has the unfettered discretion to dominate
the executive branch and matters of foreign policy, the Prime Minister, by
Great Britain's formal lack of separation of powers, occupies a dual role
which allows the office holder to dominate the executive as well as
legislative functions of government. Though some may want to call the
Prime Minister a "first among equals," in fact the Prime Minister could
easily be considered a "constitutionally elected dictator."
As shown, the Queen has a considerable amount of constitutional
power. Yet, unlike the President of the United States, the Queen can do
98. Post Office v. Estuary Radio Ltd., [1968] 2 QB 740, 753.
99. TURPiN, supra note 77, at 383-84.
100. Id. at 96. See also RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 189-90 (1994).
101. Id. at 158.
102. Id. at 176.
103. RICHARD ROSE, PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS 8 (Richard Rose & Ezra A.
Suleiman, eds., 1980). Section 7 of the Parliament Act, 1911, mandates that Parliament will
automatically dissolve in exactly five years from the last general election if the monarch has not
dissolved Parliament sooner. See YARDLEY, supra note 84, at 14.
104. ROSE, supra note 103, at 22.
105. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 176.
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no wrong.' 06 This ancient maxim, which stems from the days when the
monarch ruled by divine right, persists today,1 7 but now although the
Queen can do no wrong, her ministers personally, as well as the
government can.' 08
The Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 "°9 played a significant role in
allowing suits to be brought against the Crown."0 Prior to the Act, no
proceedings for criminal or civil actions could be brought against the
Crown."' Thus, a servant of the Crown who committed an illegal action
pursuant to duty, would bear the sole responsibility for that action because
"the Crown can neither commit nor authorize nor be responsible for any
wrongdoing .... ""2 The 1947 Act allowed civil proceedings by and
against the Crown or governmental agencies," 3 whereas prior to the act,
one used a petition of right" 4 to seek relief against the Crown. Presently,
one may directly sue the Crown via an appropriate governmental
department or agency by permitting actions to be brought against the
Crown for torts committed by its servants or agents for any breach of its
106. See M. v. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. 537, 551; SIR DAVID LINDSAY KIER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 528-29 (9th ed. 1969); see also
R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303, 305, 307 (1959); W.S.
Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 LAW Q. REV. 280, 293 (1922).
107. See Home Office, [1993] 3 ALL E.R. at 540.
108. H.W.R. Wade, Injunctive Relief Against the Crown and Ministers, 104 LAW Q. REV. 4,
5 (Jan. 1991).
109. For purposes of the immediate discussion, the pertinent parts of this act are as follows:
Section one allows a subject to sue the Crown directly except for actions which the Crown remains
privileged from legal action for damages, for the recovery of a liquidated sum, for specific
performance, and for contracts dependent on money from Parliament. As such, no soldier may sue
the Crown because the control of the armed forces are still under the prerogative power of the
Crown. Section two permits actions to be brought against the Crown for torts committed by servants
or agents for any breach of its duties. Section two did not remove the right to sue the actual
tortfeasor. Section seventeen provides for the minister of the Civil Service to publish a list of
authorized government departments so that civil proceedings against the Crown may be brought
against the appropriate department or if no department exists, the Attorney General. Section forty of
the act preserves the monarch's personal immunity from civil actions. See Home Office, [1993] 3
All E.R. 537, 554; YARDLEY, supra note 84, at 129-30.
110. KIER, supra note 106, at 528.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 528-29.
113. Id. at529.
114. A petition of right is a method by which an aggrieved subject would petition the Crown
for relief. This method was at one time the only way to obtain relief and a judgment against the
Crown, which the Crown did not have to satisfy. The Crown Proceedings Act did away with this
method. It should be noted that the Crown has traditionally been cooperative in taking responsibility
for the actions of its servants and that the petition of right proceeding usually proceeded as ordinary
actions between subjects. See Id.; see also Holdsworth, supra note 107, at 290.
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duties that give rise to tortious liability." 5 At the same time, this Act does
not prevent a minister from being held personally liable for his own
tortious actions.' However, unlike the President of the United States, the
Queen, or the reigning monarch, can never be held personally responsible
in a civil court for torts committed by her." 7
IX. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CROWN
As in the United States, the powers of government are subject to
judicial control."' In the United Kingdom, executives are generally
immune from the control of the courts so long as their actions are within
the parameters of the law. "' As such, decisions by a minister or other
public authority are not subject to appeal, but a person may challenge the
exercise of a minister's powers by means of judicial review.' The courts
have the power to order a public authority to perform a duty, by a writ of
mandamus, or to refrain from unlawful action, by a writ of prohibition.
The courts also have the power to create an order which annuls a decision
made contrary to law, by a writ of certiorari, to make a declaration of a
party's legal rights, or impose an injunction,' which until recently was
not available against the Crown or ministers acting on behalf of the
Crown. "
The right to enjoin a minister of the Crown and hold that minister
or his department in contempt for violating an injunction was decided in
the benchmark case of M. v. Home Office. " M was a citizen of Zaire
who arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed political asylum.'2 After
several months of review, his claim was rejected by the Secretary of State
who made plans to deport M back to Zaire.'" M's solicitors made
application for leave to apply for judicial review. 26 On the evening M was
115. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 554; see also PETER W. HOGG, LIABILITY OF THE
CROWN, ifra note 161, at 7.
116. Home Office, [19931 3 All E.R. at 554 (citing § 2 of The Crown Proceedings Act of
1947).
117. YARDLEY, supra note 84, at 130; GRAY, supra note 105, at 307.
118. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 414.
119. LORD MACDERMOrr, PROTECTION FROM POWER UNDER ENGLISH LAW 81 (1986).
120. TURPIN, supra note 77 at 414.
121. Id. see also Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 558-60.
122. Home Office, [1993] 3 ALL ER at 558-560.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 542-43.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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to be deported, the judge indicated he believed that there was an arguable
point arising out of the application and that he wanted M to remain in the
United Kingdom so M's application could be made to a nominated
judge. 27 The judge adjourned the Court session believing that pending a
further hearing, M would not be removed from the United Kingdom.
2 1
Due to miscommunication between M's solicitors, the Home Office, and
the judge, M was deported against the wishes of the Court. 129
Proceedings were commenced on behalf of M against the Secretary
of State for contempt in failing to comply with the judge's order. 3 ' The
counsel for the Home Office argued an injunction could not be used
against ministers of the Crown in judicial review proceedings, and thus the
order of contempt which the Court of Appeals upheld against the Home
Secretary was in error.'31 The House of Lords unanimously found the
Home Office, and not the Home Secretary personally, in contempt because
the office inadvertently violated the judge's order not to deport M.'3 2 The
House of Lords, speaking through Lord Woolf, held language in Section
31(a) of the Supreme Court Act of 1981 gives the courts the right to make
coercive orders, such as injunctions, against ministers of the Crown in
judicial review proceedings. 13' Furthermore, under Rules of the Supreme
127. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. 537.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 546-47.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 541-42.
132. All E.R. Annual Review 1993, Contempt of Court 106.
133. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 538, 555-560; see also Supreme Court Act 1981, §
31, reprinted in 11 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 991 (4th ed. 1991). Relevant parts of § 31 read as
follows:
Application for judicial review-i) An application to the High Court for one or more of the
following forms of relief, namely-a) an order of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari; b) a
declaration or injunction under subsection 2; or c) an injunction under section 30
retraining a person not entitled to so from acting in an office to which that section applies,
shall be made in accordance with rules of court by a procedure to known as an application
for judicial review. 2) A declaration may be made or an injunction granted under this
subjection in any case where an application for judicial review, seeing that relief, has been
made and the High Court considers that, having regard to a) the nature of the matters in
respect of which relief may be granted by orders of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari;
b) the nature of the persons and bodies against whom relief may be granted by such
orders; and c) all the circumstances of the case, it would be just and convenient for the
declaration to be made or the injunction to be granted, as the case may be....
Id. But see Section 21(2) of the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, reprinted in 13 HALBURY'S
STATUES 20 (4th ed. 1991) which states the following:
The court shall not in any civil proceedings grant any injunction or make any order
against an officer of the Crown if the effect of granting the injunction or making the order
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Court Order 53, r 3(10), which was given statutory authority by Section
31 of the Supreme Court Act of 1981, the court can grant interim
injunctions against ministers as well as make a finding of contempt against
the minister or his government. 34
This decision directly conflicted with an earlier House of Lords
decision rendered by Lord Bridge in Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State
for Transport,'35 which refused to accept the notion that Section 3 1 allows
injunctions in judicial review proceedings to be made against the Crown or
a minister of the Crown acting in their official capacity. 136
Lord Bridge's decision was based partly on the notion that Section
31 of the Supreme Court Act did not expressly extend the right for a judge
to order an injunction against a minister of the Crown in judicial review
proceedings. 37  At the same time, his reasoning in Factortame relied
would be to give any relief against the Crown which could not have been obtained in
proceedings against the Crown.
Id.
134. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 563. R.S.C Ord. 53, r 3(10) states the following:
Where leave to apply for judicial review is granted, then (a) if the relief sought is an
order of a prohibition or certiorari and the court so directs, the grant shall operate as a
stay of the proceedings to which the application related until the determination of the
application or until the court otherwise orders; (b) if any other relief is sought, the
court may at any time grant in the proceedings such interim relief as could be granted
in an action begun by writ.
Id.
135. Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport, [19891 2 All E.R. 692, 703-08. The
European Economic Community attempted to conserve fish stock by means of national quotas. Not
a member of the EEC at the time, Spain fared poorly under the quota system. Several Spanish
fishing companies attempted to secure part of the British quota by buying pre-existing British fishing
vessels or re-registering their vessels under the British flag. To prevent, this "quota-hopping," the
Secretary of State for Transport promulgated regulations under which a fishing vessel could only
qualify for entry on the new British register if its legal title was at least 75% British owned. The
applicants, who believed that the nationality requirements were unjust and against Community Law,
applied for judicial review. The Divisional Court decided to obtain a preliminary ruling from the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), but such a ruling would take several years. The Divisional Court
granted interim relief ordering the regulations to be "disapplied." The House of Lords in
Factortame, held that the court did not have the power under English Law to make an interim order
displacing an act of Parliament. Nevertheless, the House of Lords referred the matter back to the
E.C.J.. Meanwhile, due to another proceeding challenging the regulations (see Case 246/89
Commission v. United Kingdom), the E.C.J. made an interim order that the Secretary's regulations
concerning the nationality requirements must be suspended. Subsequently, the E.C.J. ruled in
Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of Statefor Transport (No 2) Case c-213/89 [1991] 1 All E.R. 70 that a
national court was obliged to set aside a national law if such a law was sole obstacle preventing it
from granting relief under Community Law. See All E.R. Annual Review 1990, European
Comnunity Law 104-05; TURPIN, supra note 77, at 346-47.
136. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 561.
137. Id.
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heavily upon a lower court decision in Merricks v. Heathcoast-Amroy, 3 '
which seemed to suggest, contrary to the opinion of Lord Woolf, that a
minister can not be under a personal liability and subject to injunctive
relief for wrongs committed by a minister in his official capacity.' 3 9 Lord
Bridge's decision was further influenced by the Law Commission's 1976
report which recommended that Section 21 of the Crown Proceedings Act
of 1947 needed to be amended so courts may grant such injunctions against
the Crown.'40
Lord Woolf respectfully doubted Lord Bridge's reasoning in
Factortame and held the language of Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act
of 1981 allowed courts to render injunctions against the Crown in judicial
review proceedings and that RSC Ord 53, r 3(10) allowed the courts to
grant interim injunctions against the Crown. In an important caveat, Lord
Woolf stated an injunction still could not, pursuant to Section 21(2) of the
Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, be handed down to the Crown or a
minister of the Crown in civil suits. 141
Lord Woolf believed that just because judicial review was not
introduced through primary legislation, it does not necessarily limit the
scope of Section 31 of the 1981 Act. 42 Perhaps to avoid delay, England
and Wales decided that an amendment to the Rules of the Supreme Court
should precede primary statutory legislation. Thus, the Law Commission's
recommendation to amend Section 21 of the 1947 Act was effectively
abandoned. 43 At the same time, the need to amend Section 21 was not
necessary because it dealt with civil proceedings, not judicial review
proceedings.'" According to Lord Woolf, "order 53 undoubtedly
138. Memicks v. Heathcoast-Amroy, [1955] 2 All E.R. 453.
139. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R., at 557 (relying on Merricks v. Heathcoat-Amory,
[1955] 2 All E.R. 453). The plaintiff in Heathcoat sought an injunction against the Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food both in his personal and official capacity. The minister argued that
the court had no jurisdiction over him in his official capacity because the court was not allowed to
grant an injunction against a minister. The minister also argued that if he acted personally, the court
did not have jurisdiction over him because he was a member of Parliament and had parliamentary
privilege. The court agreed with his argument. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 557.
140. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R., at 561. The Law Commission's 1976 report preceded
RSC (Rules of the Supreme Court) Ord. 53, which was the precursor to the Section 31 of the
Supreme Court Act of 1981. The report suggested that the lack of jurisdiction by the courts should
be addressed by amending Section 21 of the 1947 Act. The report was never implemented and
instead the Rules of the Supreme Court were amended. Id.
141. Id. at 564. Lord Woolf noted that a declaration is still the appropriate remedy on an
application for judicial review involving officers of the Crown. Id.





extended the circumstances in which a declaration could be granted against
the appropriate representative of the Crown." 45 This was confirmed by
the passage of the Supreme Court Act of 1981.' Lord Woolf noted that
as a matter of construction, it would be difficult to treat Section 31 and
order 53 as not applying to ministers.' 47 To support that proposition, Lord
Woolf turned to the Northern Ireland Act of 1978, which was not
discussed in Factortame, which recognizes the limits of the 1947 Act, but
gives the court the ability to bind the Crown in non-civil proceedings (i.e.,
judicial review). 48  That Act gives the court a wide discretion to grant
interim relief, which would seem to confirm that injunctions in judicial
review proceedings may be granted against, ministers in Northern
Ireland. 149  By implication, such remedies would likely be available in
England and Wales.' ° Lord Woolf further reasoned the Rules of the
Supreme Court, order 53, r 3(10) have always been treated as giving the
Court jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions' which is linked to the
power of the court to grant final injunctions. 52 In sum, Lord Woolf wrote
the following:
I am, therefore, of the opinion, that the language of s 31
being unqualified in its terms, there is no warrant
restricting its application so that in respect of ministers and
other officers of the Crown alone the remedy of an
injunction, including an interim injunction, is not
available. In my view, the history of prerogative
proceedings against officers of the Crown supports such a
conclusion. .. .
Perhaps another reason the House of Lords ruled against the Home
Office was the fact that since the judgment of Factortame was rendered,
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 563.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Lord Woolf noted that Scotland's position would be different. See TURPIN, supra
note 77, at 415.
151. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 563 (relying on R. v. Kesington and Chelsea Royal
London BC, ex p Hammell, [1989] 1 All ER 1202, [1989] QB 518).
152. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 563-64 (relying on Supreme Court Act of 1981,
Section 37(1)): "The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction.
. in all cases which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so." Id.; see also Chelsea
Royal London BC, ex p Hammell, [1989] 1 All E.R. 1202, [1989] QB 518.
153. ld. at 564.
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the European Court of Justice ruled in Factortame 2154 that a national court
must set aside national legislative provisions if it was the sole obstacle in
granting interim relief in a case concerning community law.' It would
appear ironic to have one remedy available for domestic law and another
available for Community law. This is apparent by the statement made by
Lord Woolf in M v. Home Office: "It would be most regrettable if an
approach which is inconsistent with that which exists in community law
should be allowed to persist if this is not strictly necessary. "156
Though the constitutional aspects of Lord Woolf's decision are
tremendous, the practical effects are minimal because the Crown has
always been cooperative with court rulings. In the beginning of his
opinion, Lord Woolf stated, "[t]his was the first time that a minister of the
Crown had been found to be in contempt by a court.... ,, At the same
time, the above decision does not seem to directly affect the Queen since
most of her executive duties are in the hands of her ministers.
X. OTHER IMPORTANT PRIVILEGES
In the United Kingdom, laws passed by Parliament do not
personally apply to the Queen, or even the Crown as a whole, unless
otherwise specifically mentioned by express words or by necessary
implication. This means a statute would only bind the Crown if the intent
of the statute would be frustrated without the Crown being bound to its
provisions.'58 In Madras Electric. Supply Co. v. Boarland,5 9 the Privy
Council considered the liability of the appellant to pay income tax and
found it necessary to explain and uphold the Queen's, and the Crown's,
right not to pay income tax. 6° The qualified immunity from statute allows
154. Factortame Ltd. ,2, Case C-213/89 [1991] 1 All E.R. 70; see also Factortame Ltd., 2 All
E.R. 692.
155. Id. at 102. See also TIRPIN, supra note 77, at 346-47.
156. Home Office, [1993] 3 All E.R. at 564.
157. Id. at 541.
158. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 141 (relying on Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corp. of
Bombay, [1947] AC 58 (PC)).
159. Madras Elec. Supply Co. v. Boarland, [1955] AC 667 (PC).
160. The decision of this case is now moot. In 1992; the Queen voluntarily agreed to pay
income tax on her private holdings. See Prince Charles Wants to Reduce Royalty, USA TODAY,
Oct. 31, 1994, at 2D. Prince Charles, the Queen's son and heir to the throne, has also agreed to pay
tax (forty percent) on his main source of revenue, the Duchy of Cornwall. Charles was previously
paying only twenty-five percent tax on the Duchy. See Edward Verity & Richard Kay, Charles
Slices Back His Tax, DAILY MAIL, May 16, 1994, at 15. The above. changes have fueled a
movement in Canada for the Governor-General to pay income tax on his $97,375 salary. Since
1953, Governor-Generals in Canada have only paid tax on their private holdings. See Joan Bryden,
Reform Demands Tax Hike for Governor General, CALGARY HERALD, Feb. 8, 1995, at A3.
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the Queen, and the Crown, to escape the operation of certain laws, even
criminal laws. 161
The criminal prosecution of a defendant is handled by various
offices, notably the Crown Prosecution Service, and is tried in the Crown
Court. 62 At the same time, the maxim, "the Queen can do no wrong"
creates a legal fiction which would seemingly prevent any member of the
Crown from being tried in Crown courts. However, several courts in
other Commonwealth jurisdictions have determined it is legally possible
for the Crown to be prosecuted. 63 As discussed above, the Crown may be
held to the requirement of a statute if the statute specially applies to the
Crown.'" In a benchmark ruling handed down by the Australia High
Court, the Court ruled there is a strong presumption that the Crown is not
bound by the criminal laws.' 65 The same conclusion was reached in the
Canadian case Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Attorney General.'66
However, both cases suggest that a criminal statute may apply to the
Crown if the statute specially pertains to the Crown.'67 Nevertheless, it
appears the only sanctions that may be handed down are monetary because
the Crown cannot be imprisoned. 61 It should be noted that ministers of
the Crown are personally subject to all laws. 169  However, whereas
161. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 144; see PETER W. HOGG, LIABILITY OF THE CROWN 232-
234 (1989).
162. See FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, JUSTICE AND THE LAW 21-22 (MAY 1993).
163. HOGG, supra note 161, at 234.
164. See FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 162, at 55, see also TURPIN,
supra note 87, at 146. Certain public health authorities that once enjoyed Crown immunity may be
subject to criminal action for breach of public health legislation. See HOGG, supra note 161, at 234.
Though the Crown may be bound by statute through necessary implication, it is very rare due to the
narrow definition of "necessary implication" in Bombay (see note 150 above) and the fact that most
penal sanctions cannot be handed down to the Crown. See HOGG, supra note 161, at 234.
165. See MCNAIRN, supra note 77, at 87-89 (relying on Cain v. Doyle, 72 C.L.R. 409
(1946)); See also FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 162, at 55.
166. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Attorney General, [1959] S.C.R. 188.
167. HOGG, supra note 161, at 234. In some cases it may be inferred that a statute binds the
Crown through necessary implication. Very few statutes, however, bind the Crown in this manner
because of the narrow definition of necessary implication in Bombay, as well as the presence of penal
sanctions in a statute that make it nearly certain that the Crown is not to be bound. Id.
168. Id. at 235.
169. Home Office, [1993] 3 All ER at 540
[Jiudges cannot enforce the law against the Crown as monarch because the Crown as
monarch can do no wrong, but judges enforce the law against the Crown as executive
and against the individuals who from time to time represent the Crown . . . . If the
minister has personally broken the law, the litigant can sue the minister . . . . in his
personal capacity.
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ministers can personally be separated from the Crown and stand trial for
their unlawful acts which exceeds the scope of their office, the Queen can
not separate herself from the Crown because she is the personification of
the Crown. Thus, it appears, using the above rationale the Queen may be
subject to monetary criminal sanctions but she can never be imprisoned." 0
In the United States, statutes using the word "persons" are
construed to exclude the government.' Nevertheless, there is no
definitive and fast rule on the subject, and the conventional interpretation
of the word "person" may be disregarded if the scope and intent of the
statute is meant to attach to the government. 7 2  As such, the above rule
appears to be no different than the rule of law in the United Kingdom, but
there is one important difference in its application. No person in an
individual capacity is free from the requirements of the law. If the
President of the United States committed a crime, he would have to be
impeached before the government could conduct a criminal proceeding.'73
The structure of the British system would make the separation of monarch
from Crown constitutionally impossible to separate. Thus, the reigning
could theoretically break a law without incurring any serious legal
consequence. '4
XI. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the Queen, 5 unlike the President of the
United States, is personally immune from liability for all torts she
commits. Furthermore, section 40(2)(f) of the Crown Proceedings Act of
1947 establishes "Crown Immunity," which appears to establish a
170. See HoGG, supra note 161, at 233 ("But where a fine is an alternative penalty, or the
only penalty, then the provision could apply to the Crown, just as it could apply to a corporation
(which also can not be imprisoned")).
171. Will v. Michigan Dept. State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
172. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
173. See President's Attachment, supra note 57, at Section 10 (arguing that Vice President
Spiro Agnew did not have to be impeached before being indicted, former Solicitor General and
Appeals Court Judge Robert Bork cited the records of the Constitutional Convention which led to the
formation of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the United States Constitution which maintains that
only the President must be impeached before the courts hand down an indictment). President Clinton
perhaps used Bork's theory to show that if the President must be impeached before he is indicted,
then there is no possibility that the President has to stand trial in a mere civil suit.
174. The Crown, if it broke the law, would be subject to the pressure of adverse public
opinion, which could be more damaging than penal sanctions.
175. The rights the Queen enjoys are exclusive to her alone. Nevertheless, it could be
argued that governor-generals and lieutenant-governors, who fulfill the functions of the Sovereign
in Commonwealth nations, are beyond the reach of the courts for the duration of their term. See
Gray, supra note 106, at 308.
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rebuttable presumption that the Queen (and members of the Crown) have
personal immunity from the requirements of statute unless that statute
specifically states otherwise, or if the intent of the statute would be
frustrated if the Crown did not have to abide by it. 176 At the same time, it
appears that the Queen, and the Crown, enjoy immunity from most
criminal proceedings, but unlike the Prime Minister and other members of
the Crown, the Queen can never be imprisoned. The American President
does not enjoy these three privileges.
Though the Queen's divine right to rule has been irreversibly
weakened, it appears that she personally obeys the law, and perhaps
exceeds the requirements of the law as a matter of grace, and not through
the legal coercion the President is subjected too. Furthermore, unlike the
President, who cannot serve more than two four-year terms, the British
monarch rules for life. It is hard to reconcile the British position that the
"king is under no man, but under God and the law" when the monarch
enjoys such unique personal privileges. The same cannot be said about the
President, who must, at times, submit to the jurisdiction of the courts for
wrongful actions he commits outside the scope of his office. The
difference in the immunity given to the President and the Queen is
remarkable since the President holds the world's most powerful office.
Thus, it can easily be reconciled why the President deserves the immunity
that he is given, whereas the immunity afforded to the Queen appears only
the result of tradition which conflicts with the tenets of a modem
democratic society.
176. TURPIN, supra note 77, at 142. The Act states that it will not "affect any rules of
evidence or any presumption relating to the extent to which the Crown is bound by any Act of
Parliament." Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will attempt to make the case that the criminalization of
racist speech in the form of hate propaganda could survive a First
Amendment challenge. Section I examines the elemental harms caused by
hate propaganda and the compelling reasons why such speech should be
criminalized.
Section II gives a brief overview of the history of group libel and
defamation law. An examination of the history of group libel shows that
the concept of punishing speech that defames and disrupts society has been
well established since the formation of organized society.
Section III looks briefly at the response of the international
community to the problems associated with hate propaganda. Part A
examines the actions taken by the United Nations and the European
* J.D. Candidate Nova Southeastern University, May, 1996; Hons. B.A. University of
Western Ontario. The Author would like to thank Nova Southeastern University Professors Pearl
Goldman, Johnny C. Burris, John B. Anderson, Douglas L. Donoho, and Robert M. Jarvis, for
their guidance and insight into all aspects of the law.
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Community in their efforts to eliminate hate propaganda. Part B
examines, in depth, the Canadian response to hate propaganda. Canada's
free speech jurisprudence, along with its Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
is similar to that of the United States. Canada's multicultural society is
also comparable to the cultural make-up of American society. As a model
for the criminalization of hate propaganda, the United States could look to
the Canadian experience for guidance.
Part IV briefly examines the fundamental values of free speech
associated with the First Amendment. It then goes on to examine First
Amendment jurisprudence as pronounced by the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. By examining the holdings and dicta in the various
cases dealing with First Amendment issues, an argument can be made for
the constitutional criminalization of hate propaganda.
II. THE COMPELLING INTEREST IN CRIMINALIZING HATE SPEECH
Racially defamatory speech or hate propaganda, the precursor to
racial hatred and discrimination, should not be classified as constitutionally
protected speech. The value of such speech is so slight, it does not merit
the respect of the First Amendment. It is in fact "rotten fruit in the
marketplace of ideas.",
Racist expression harms the very marketplace of ideas that the
First Amendment is designed to foster. 2 Racist hate messages are rapidly
increasing and are widely distributed in the United States through a variety
of technologies and media.3 Race is a constant subtext of daily life in
America. The negative effects of hate messages are real and immediate
for its victims. "Victims of vicious hate propaganda have experienced
physiological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear, rapid
pulse rate, difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress
disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide."' The blows of racist
1. Thomas C. Jones, Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination and the First Amendment, 23 How. L.J. 429, 433 (1980).
2. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 265, 267 (1990).
3. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
1993. Congress considered the problem of hate crimes serious enough to pass the Hate Crime
Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1990), which required the Attorney General to collect and
publish data about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual
orientation, or ethnicity. Id.
4. Mar J. Matsuta, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) (reviewing the effects of racist speech from
the perspective of the victim).
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messages have been labeled "spirit murder" in recognition of the psychic
destruction Victims experience.- In recommending the need for criminal
and administrative sanctions for willfully promoting hatred against an
identifiable group, one must consider the tension between the First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. In an argument as to the
hierarchy of rights, ultimately, history has taught us that without equality,
freedom of speech is an illusion.
The threat of hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan, the Neo-Nazi
Skinheads, and the growing "White Aryan Resistance," goes beyond their
repeated acts of illegal violence. Their presence, and the active
dissemination of racist propaganda, means that citizens are denied personal
security and liberty as they go about their daily lives. "Violence is a
necessary and inevitable part of the structure of racism. It is the final
solution, as fascists know, barely held at bay while the tactical weapons of
segregation, disparagement, and hate propaganda do their work. "6 The
growth of the "Aryan Movement" and the "White Militias," coupled with
their recruitment of the youth of America, are real threats to the very
fabric of American society.
"The historical connection of all the tools of racism is a record
against which to consider a legal response to racist speech. "7 It is well
known that notions of racial superiority are commonly associated with
practical schemes for denying certain political or economic rights to
members of the group under attack., "In the political [and] economic
struggle, modem democracy operates through the interplay of group
activities. [Ilt is through participation in groups that persons contribute to
the social welfare and develop their individual capacities.",
Hate propaganda used to disparage identifiable groups are attacks
on the pluralistic forces which make up a democratic society and, by
inference, on the individual members of the group who associate or
identify with their group affiliations.'0 An attack on one group within a
society is an attack on the whole society. What is needed in this situation
is a series of public and institutional practices which can inculcate respect
5. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing
as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129 (1987).
6. Matsuta, supra note 4, at 2335.
7. Id.
8. See Graham Huges, Prohibiting Incitement to Racial Discrimination, 16 U. TORONTO.
L.J. 361 (1966).
9. David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 727, 731 (1942); see also Post, supra note 2 (discussing the effects of defamation).
10. Riesman, supra note 9, at 731.
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for the principle of equality and demonstrate that equality has a community
status superior to that of a pious slogan. The educational impact of the
criminal law can be of great value. In order to advance the argument for
proscribing the dissemination of hate propaganda, the legislature would
have to prove, among other things, the particular and distinct harms
caused by racist expression.
Richard Delgado, recognized the real harms caused by hate
propaganda, and suggested a tort remedy for injury from racist words."
Those who have suffered the emotional distress associated with the effects
of hate propaganda should have a remedy at law. However, this remedy
ignores the intrinsic harm caused to society as a whole by the
dissemination of hate propaganda.
One contemporary theory for regulating racist speech is that there
is an elemental wrongness associated with racist expression,
regardless of the presence or absence of particular
empirical consequences such as grievous, severe
psychological injury. The toleration of fascist expression
is inconsistent with respect to the principle of equality that
is at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the
Fourteenth Amendment is thought to enshrine an anti-
discrimination principle, then any speech which supports
racial prejudice or discrimination should be subject to
regulation. Ultimately, hate propaganda, as a class of
speech, communicates the message of racial inferiority.' 2
The key to criminalizing hate propaganda is to show that this type of
speech does not deserve the protection of the First Amendment.
Those who profess the view that free speech is an "absolute,"
never offer convincing reasons why keeping one's mouth shut, under pain
of punishment, should always be considered a greater evil than any
mischief which may result from publishing the words of hate. The danger
and mischief which the dissemination of hate propaganda and racial
superiority lead to are such that, as a class of speech, they deserve no
more protection than that offered to obscenity.
III. THE HISTORY OF GROUP LIBEL AND DEFAMATION LAW
Since Roman times the state has had an interest in controlling the
propagation of hate or libelous speech against individuals or groups.
11. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
12. Post, supra note 2, at 272.
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Whoever insulted the magistrate of the Roman republic made themselves
guilty of "laesio majestatis pipuli Romani. "" Later, the Emperor was
protected under the law of "libelli famosi" against "viros illustres, " and
such libel was punished with deportation or by capital punishment."1
"During the Middle Ages, defamation was largely a matter for the
ecclesiastical courts."" The provision for peaceful means of redress for
attacks on reputation seems to have originated with organized society.
Early Germanic laws such as the "Lex Salica" and the "Norman
Costumal" sought to prevent blood feuds which by their persistent violence
tore societies apart. 16
Attempts to prevent the propagation of scurrilous statements about
particular groups in the Anglo-American legal tradition are extremely old.
The Star Chamber took over prosecutions of scurrilous statements in 1488,
shortly after the development of the printing press and the corresponding
capacity for wide publication to the masses." The Star Chamber's focus
was on protecting the Christian Monarch as well as the protection of
private rights." Further, the Star Chamber wanted to suppress dueling,
and in order to accomplish this end, "it would punish defamatory libels on
private citizens who had suffered insult.-,9
"With the religious decline, as a result of the Renaissance and
Reformation, temporal attitudes toward defamation replaced ecclesiastical
ones. "20 Except for political offenses, the civil courts usurped the field of
defamation. In 1641, the Star Chamber was abolished and the Court of
King's Bench took over the criminal jurisdiction of the realm.2' In libel
actions, "the role of the jury was limited to . . . deciding whether the
defendant had published the statement in question, while its defamatory
character was a 'question of law' for the royally appointed judge. "22
The earliest instance where defamation or libel was made criminal
occurred in 1275, when the offense of "De Scandalis Magnatum" was
created. De Scandalis Magnatum prohibited "any false News or Tales,
13. Riesman, supra note 9, at 728.
14. Id. at 728 n.7.
15. Id. at 734.
16. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation 1, 3 COLUM.
L. REV. 546, 548 (1903).
17. Regina v. Zundel, 95 D.L.R.4th 202, 218 (Can. 1992).
18. Id.
19. J. R. Spencer, Criminal Libel: A Skeleton in the Cupboard, 1977 CRIM. L. REV. 383.
20. Riesman, supra note 9, at 734.
21. Zundel, 95 D.L.R.4th at 218.
22. Riesman, supra note 9, at 735.
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whereby discord, or occasion of discord or slander may grow between the
King and his People, or the Great Men of the Realm. "23 The aim of the
statute was to prevent false statements which could threaten the security of
the state in a society dominated by extremely powerful landowners. 2  De
Scandalis Magnatum was part of a system of remedies for defamation
available to all subjects.21 Queen Elizabeth I punished defamation with the
loss of an ear for spoken words and the loss of a hand for written words.2
De Scandalis Magnatum, however, was rarely employed, and was
abolished in England in 1888.2
The first known attempt to prosecute group libel was made in
London in 1700, in the case of King v. Alme & Nott.2 The defendants
were indicted for a libel entitled, "List of Adventures in the Ladies
Invention, being a Lottery." 29 The persons against whom the libel was
directed could not be determined. The King's Bench ruled that the
original indictment had been insufficient since the persons libeled were
unknown.0
The leading case of King v. Osborne, decided in 1732, has
traditionally been regarded as establishing the doctrine that group libel is
an indictable offense.3 ' In Osborne, a paper was published charging that
Portuguese Jews had burned to death a Jewish woman and her bastard
child whose father was a Christian, and that such instances were frequent.32
As a result, when mobs attacked and beat Jews in various parts of the city,
the peace was actually breached. The court ruled:
Though an information for criminal libel might be
improper, such defamatory accusations necessarily tend to
raise tumults and disorders among the people, and inflame
them with an universal spirit of barbarity against a whole
body of men, as if guilty of crimes scarce practicable and
23. 3 Edw. 1, ch. 34 (1275); see Sir William Holdsworth, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW,
Vol. III (5th ed. 1942); Zundel, 95 D.L.R.4th, at 217 (outlining a history of English libel law).
24. Holdsworth, supra note 23, at 409.
25. Vechten Veeder, supra note 16.
26. F.R. Scott, Publishing False News, 30 CAN. B. REV. 37, 38 (1952).
27. Id. at 39.
28. King v. Alme & Nott, 91 Eng. Rep. 1224 (1700); Joseph Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 267 (1950).
29. Tanenhaus, supra note 28, at 267.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 268; King v. Osborne, 94 Eng. Rep. 406 (1732).
32. Osborne, supra note 31, at 406.
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totally incredible, and deserves to be punished as
misdemeanors. 3
"The use of hate propaganda against racial and religious groups
not only hurts the groups as collectivities [sic], and the individual members
of such groups, but adversely affects the stability and welfare of the
community itself."34 The act of defaming a specific and identifiable group
has been given various labels over time: "group libel," "group
defamation," "racial defamation," "racist speech," and "hate
propaganda." The term hate propaganda is most appropriate. The
Supreme Court of Canada has defined the term "hate propaganda" to
denote "expression intended or likely to create or circulate extreme
feelings of opprobrium and enmity against a racial or religious group."3-
Group defamation in the form of hate propaganda is not the basic
cause of prejudice and intergroup tensions. Whether the hate-monger will
have any success in influencing other individuals depends to a large degree
on the potential responsiveness of the audience. History has taught that the
more often the message is repeated, the more likely it is to gain acceptance
and be acted upon.3 ' The case for or against racists' freedom of speech
depends on the utility of interference versus the utility of noninterference.
This in turn depends, at least in part, on the nature of the society in which
one lives and the particular situation with which one is confronted. The
international community, in recognizing this concept, historically and
presently has endeavored, through the United Nations, to overcome the
problem with a number of conventions and resolutions.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL PROSPECTIVE ON HATE PROPAGANDA
A. The United Nations
International legal norms within the international community
concerning hate speech began to crystallize shortly after the Second World
War. The memory of Nazi Germany's use of hate propaganda and the
Holocaust spurred the international community to eliminate racial
discrimination.31 Most nations have adopted legislation proscribing racial
33. Id. at 425.
34. Tanenhaus, supra note 28, at 261.
35. Canadian Human Rights Comm'n v. Taylor, 75 D.L.R.4th 557, 581 (Can. 1990).
36. Nazi Germany provides an excellent example of this phenomenon, as does modem day
Bosnia and Rwanda.
37. Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 171, 191 (1990).
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defamation and incitement of racial hatred.38  If the harm of racist hate
messages is significant, and the truth value marginal, the doctrinal space
for regulation of such speech is a fortiori. An emerging international
standard seizes this possibility. The international community has chosen to
address the issue by outlawing racist hate propaganda. 9
The Charter of the United Nations, in its first article, lists among
the aims of the organization, "promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, religion or language. "4 In 1948, the General Assembly adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights drafted by the Commission on
Human Rights without dissent.41 The Declaration is wide ranging in scope.
After listing a comprehensive catalogue of personal freedoms, the
Declaration makes the specification that all are entitled to those freedoms
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.42
The United Nations, following its founding principles, passed the
International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination which was signed by the United States on September 28,
1966.41 However, it has yet to be ratified by the United States. One
hundred countries have ratified the Racial Discrimination Convention."
Article 4 of the Racial Discrimination Convention provides:
State parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations
which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one
race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or
which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and
discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt
immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of such discrimination and to this
38. See generally Jones, supra note 1; Matsuta, supra note 4; Smolla, supra note 37
(providing an in-depth history of the United Nations' response to hate propaganda).
39. Smolla, supra note 37, at 191.
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
41. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc.
A/810, 71-77 (1948)[hereinafter Declaration].
42. Id.
43. United Nations International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan.
1969) [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention].
44. See Jones, supra note 1.
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end, with due regard to rights expressly set forth in Article
5 of this Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offense punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or
hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all
acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race
or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and
also the provision of any assistance to racist activities,
including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations,
and also organized and all other propaganda activities,
which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall
recognize participation in such organization or activities as
an offense punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public
institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial
discrimination. ' 5
Under this treaty, states are required to criminalize racial hate
messages. Recognizing the conflict in the values between the concepts of
free speech and prohibiting dissemination of ideas of racial superiority or
hatred, the treaty recognizes the rights of freedom of speech, association,
and conscience.46
The Preamble to the Racial Discrimination Convention states
explicitly that "any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is
scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous,
and that there is no justification for racial discrimination. "4 The
community of nations has thus made a commitment, with the support of
the United States, to the elimination of racism. The United Nations has
recognized that racist hate propaganda is illegitimate and properly subject
to control under the international law of human rights. The procedures for
signature and ratification allow reluctant states to reject antipropaganda
laws that would interfere with the right of free speech by specific
reservation of the article.
The response of the international community to the threat posed by
hate propaganda is evidenced by the passage of specific criminal
45. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 43.
46. Id. at art. 4, 5; see also Jones, supra note 1; Matsuta, supra note 4 (outlining the
history of the "hate propaganda" treaty).
47. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 43.
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legislation. The United Kingdom under the Race Relations Act, has
criminalized incitement to discrimination and incitement to racial hatred. 4
The Race Relations Act specifically prohibits racial defamation. The
requisite mens rea to complete the offense is the intention to "stir up
hatred" by the publishing of an utterance, or the utterance of words that
are racially defamatory.49 The actus reus consists of oral or written words
that are likely to stir up hatred against a particular segment of the
community on the basis of colour, race, ethnic or national origins."
Sweden also prohibits the defamation of a race:
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other
communication which is spread among the public threatens
or expresses contempt for a group of a certain race, skin
colour, national creed, he shall be sentenced for agitation
against ethnic group to imprisonment for at most two
years, or if the crime is petty, to a fine.-,
Other European nations have committed to antipropaganda
measures. Germany and Denmark have prohibited the dissemination of
hate propaganda. Under the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, "all European Community
states are required to eliminate hate propaganda."52
48. Race Relations Act of 1965, ch. 73, 6(1) (amended 1976 & 1986). Section 6(1) of the
Act provides:
A person shall be guilty of an offense under this section if, with intent to stir up hatred
against any section of the public in Great Britain distinguished by colour, race or ethnic
or national origin if:
(a) he publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting;
or,
(b) he uses in any public place or at any public meeting words which are threatening,
abusive, or insulting, being matter or words likely to stir up hatred against that section




51. Swedish Penal Code ch. 16 § 8 (1972), reprinted in Kenneth Lawson, Racial
Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11,
50 (1985).
52. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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B. Criminalization of Hate Propaganda in Canada
In order to prove the assertion that the application of criminal
sanctions against the propagation of hate propaganda would not impair free
speech rights to the point of undermining a fundamental concept of ordered
liberty, it is necessary to examine a jurisprudence comparable to the
United States. Canada's free speech jurisprudence allows for criminal
sanction for the dissemination of hate propaganda. By comparing the
rationale used in Canada, a jurisdiction with similar free speech
jurisprudence to that of the United States, it may be possible to extrapolate
a rule of law that would allow for the criminalization of hate speech in the
United States.
In 1982, Canada passed the Constitution Act, entrenching the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms into the Constitution of Canada. 3 The
relevant sections of the Charter that effect this discussion are:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and
expression, including freedom of the press and
other media communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association ....
15. Every individual is equal before and under the law
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit
of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability ....
27. This charter shall be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the
multicultural heritage of Canadians. m
53. Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.) 1982 c.Il (effective Apr. 17,
1982) [hereinafter Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms].
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The concept of freedom of speech has long been established in
Canadian jurisprudence. "The freedom to express oneself openly and fully
is of crucial importance in a free and democratic society and has been
recognized by Canadian courts prior to the enactment of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms."' Freedom of expression has been noted
by the Canadian Supreme Court as an essential value of Canadian
parliamentary democracy "well before the advent of the Canadian Bill of
Rights," which was passed by Parliament in 1960.m Freedom of speech
has been protected by the Canadian judiciary to the extent possible before
the specific freedom was entrenched in the Charter."
Canada has a history of attempts to prosecute libel as a crime.
However, the Criminal Code provisions "did not focus specifically upon
expression propagated with the intent of causing hatred against racial,
ethnic or religious groups."m Canadian "common law has long seen
defamation as a tortious action, but only where a litigant could show that
his reputation has been damaged by offending statements directed toward
himself as an individual."5 9
In 1966, in response to the increase of racist sentiment in Canada,
and mindful of its commitments to the United Nations, the Canadian
government appointed a special committee to study problems associated
with the spread of hate propaganda in Canada. The opening paragraph of
the report reflects the tone of the special committee.
This report is a study in the power of words to maim, and
what it is that a civilized society can do about it. Not
every abuse of human communication can or should be
controlled by law or custom. But every society from time
to time draws lines at the point where the intolerable and
the impermissible coincide. In a free society such as our
own, where the privilege of speech can induce ideas that
may change the very order itself, there is bias weighted
heavily in favour of the maximum of rhetoric whatever the
cost and consequences. But that bias stops this side of
54. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (U.K.) 1982 c.11 (effective Apr. 17,
1982).
55. Regina v. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d 1, 21 (Can. 1992).
56. Id.; see also Canadian Human Rights Comm'n v. Taylor, 75 D.L.R.4th 577 (Can.
1992); Regina v. Zundal, 95 D.L.R.4th 202 (Can. 1992) (giving a history of free speech issues in
Canada).
57. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 22.




injury to the community itself and to individual members
or identifiable groups innocently caught in verbal cross-fire
that goes beyond legitimate debate.60
In light of the special committee report, the Canadian government
realized a need to prevent the dissemination of hate propaganda without
unduly infringing freedom of expression. With this concept in mind, the
Canadian government passed amendments to the Canadian Criminal Code
which covered the advocation of genocide, public incitement of hatred
likely to lead to a breach of peace, and the willful promotion of hatred.6'
Section 319(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada provides that "everyone
who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation,
willfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of an
offense. "6 Subsection (3) allows for a number of defenses, in particular
3(a), which provides that "the accused shall not be convicted if he
establishes that the statements communicated were true. "6 3
In Regina v. Keegstra, the Canadian Supreme Court announced
their base line rationale for constitutional decision making associated with
challenges to the regulation of hate propaganda." Keegstra, a secondary
school teacher was charged with the offense of willfully promoting hatred
against an identifiable group contrary to section 319(2) of the Canadian
Criminal Code. The charges arose out of his anti-Semitic teachings in the
classroom in Eckville, Alberta. The evidence established that he had
systematically denigrated Jews and Judaism in his classes. He described
Jews by such epithets as "subversive, sadistic, money loving, power
hungry, and child killers as well as teaching that Jewish people seek to
destroy Christianity, and are responsible for depressions, anarchy, chaos,
wars, and revolution. "6 He advised his students they must accept his
views as true unless they were able to contradict them, and expected his
60. Id. at 20.
61. Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 §§ 318, 319(1)&(2).
62. Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 § 319(2)[hereinafter Hate Propaganda Statute].
63. Id. The reverse onus provision providing for the accused to prove the truth of the
statement as an affirmative defense was also upheld by the Supreme Court. Keegstra, 61
C.C.C.3d at 72. Paragraph 3(b) and (d) refer to good faith expression of arguments on a
religious subject, statements relevant to any subject of public interest for the public benefit and
where the accused in good faith intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, matters
producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred. This language in the statute takes care of
concerns about "slippery slope," "overbreadth" and "underbreadth" arguments.
64. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d 1.
65. Id. at 12.
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students to recite these notions in essays and examinations if they were to
receive good grades."
The values of free speech to Canadian society announced in
Keegstra are similar to those values expressed in the United States and
protected by the First Amendment. "Freedom of expression was
entrenched in the Charter so as to ensure that everyone can manifest their
thoughts, opinions, beliefs, . . . however unpopular, distasteful or contrary
to the mainstream."67 "Such protection is . . . fundamental because in a
free, pluralistic and democratic society [Canadians] prize [the] diversity of
ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the community and to
the individual. "68
In upholding the constitutionality of the hate propaganda
regulation, the Court engaged in a two-part analysis similar to the analysis
used by the United States Supreme Court when it decides First
Amendment challenges to governmental regulations. The Court first
examined the regulation to determine whether it infringed the Charter
guarantee of freedom of expression. It then determined if the regulation
could be saved by Section 1 of the Charter.
In answering the first question, the Court asked "does the coverage
of Section 2(b) [of the Charter] extend to the public and willful promotion
of hatred against an identifiable group?"" The Court found that the reach
of the free speech clause was wide, and that expression deserves protection
if it serves individual and societal values in a free and democratic society. 0
In this "application analysis," the Court asked whether the Charter
guarantee of freedom of expression applied to the Hate Propaganda
Statute. The Court examined whether the regulation was
"content/viewpoint based" or "content neutral" in regard to its effect and
on its face. In this sense, the inquiry is similar between the two
jurisdictions. The Court stated "if the activity that is to be regulated
conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and
prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee."" The term
"expression as used in ... the Charter embraces all content of expression,
irrespective of the particular meaning or message sought to be
conveyed."' 2 In other words, is the purpose of the statute in question a
66. Id.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id.
69. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 21.
70. Id. at 22.




regulation of speech or does it regulate conduct? The United States
Supreme Court uses a similar analysis in determining whether the purpose
of a governmental regulation reaches expression or only conduct."
In determining that the purpose of the regulation was to restrict the
content of the expression, the Court stated:
The guarantee of freedom of expression will necessarily be
infringed by government action having such a purpose. If,
however, it is the effect of the action, rather than the
purpose, that restricts an activity, [section] 2(b) [of the
Charter] is not brought into play unless it can be
demonstrated by the party alleging an infringement that the
activity supports rather than undermines the principles and
values upon which freedom of expression is based.74
It appears that if the Court had found the purpose of the regulation was to
restrict conduct solely, and that free expression was only incidentally
affected, the free speech section of the Charter would not be applicable,
and the challenge to the statute would have failed. This analysis is similar
to American courts when it refers to over-inclusiveness and the chilling
effects of regulations on the freedom of expression."
Based on the express language of the statute and its direct effect on
expression, the Court found that Parliament's purpose behind the Hate
Propaganda Statute was to prohibit those communications which are
intended to promote hatred against identifiable groups. The purpose of the
government was to regulate expression, and that purpose was based on the
content of the communication. Therefore, the Court determined the hate
speech statute did in fact infringe on the free speech section of the
Charter. 6
In dicta, the Court examined the nature of hate propaganda, and
rejected any notion that hate propaganda was analogous to a direct threat
73. See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding draft card
burning regulation as a restraint on conduct); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (banning school children from wearing arm bands struck down as
regulation of expression); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down state flag
burning statute as a restraint on expression); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)
(striking down federal flag burning statute as a restraint on expression). In each case the Supreme
Court's threshold question was whether the regulation was directed at conduct or the expressive
intent in the conduct.
74. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 24.
75. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (outlining the Court's
most recent analysis on over-inclusive and under-inclusive regulations dealing with hate speech
and the enhanced penalty statute).
76. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 25.
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of violence." In Canada, as in the United States, violence as a form of
expression receives no protection. The Court declined to exclude the
protection of the guarantee of freedom of expression to hate propaganda
via this line of reasoning. 8
The Court declared all activities conveying or attempting to
convey meaning are considered expression for the purpose of the Charter.7 9
"The content of expression is irrelevant in determining the scope of the
Charter provision.",* The Hate Propaganda Statute prohibits the
communication of meaning which is repugnant, but the repugnance stems
from the content of the message as opposed to its form. In the view of the
Court, hate propaganda is categorized as expression, bringing it within the
coverage of the free expression clause of the Charter.
Since the Court determined that the Hate Propaganda Statute did
come within the ambit of the free expression clause, the second part of the
analysis was to determine whether the statute could be saved by Section 1
of the Charter. Section 1 of the Charter states: "the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 81 This section of
the Charter allows for a limit on a right or freedom if the government can
establish that the impugned state action has an objective of "pressing" and
"substantial" concern in a free and democratic society. "Only such an
objective is of sufficient stature to warrant overriding a constitutionally
protected right or freedom."9 In order to justify a limit on a right or
freedom in a free and democratic society, the government must establish
that the impugned state action has an objective of pressing and substantial
concern, and that the regulation is within "proportion" between the
demonstrated objective and the impugned measure.83 In effect, Section 1
of the Charter entrenches a level of scrutiny that falls between the strict
scrutiny standard and the intermediate scrutiny standard used in United
States' courts.
United States' courts have developed differing "levels of scrutiny"
in deciding governmental actions and constitutional questions. "The
general rule is legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if




81. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 53.




the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest."" This level of scrutiny has been labeled "rational basis
scrutiny" or "weak scrutiny." However, when legislation is based on
discrimination or when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by
the Constitution, "[such] laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be
sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."" To satisfy strict scrutiny, the state must show that the statute
furthers "a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means
available.
United States' courts use intermediate scrutiny in analyzing the
constitutionality in such instances as gender based discrimination or
commercial speech restrictions." In Craig v. Boren, the Court introduced
intermediate scrutiny when it stated "[t]o withstand constitutional
challenge, . . . classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives."8 Therefore, depending on the effect of the state
action under question, the United States' courts will use a different type of
scrutiny in examining the constitutional validity of the state action.
Values and principles essential to a free and democratic society
guided the Canadian Supreme Court in determining whether the
government had a pressing and substantial interest in restricting hate
propaganda. Those principles embody ". . . respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality,
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group
identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the
participation of individuals and groups in society."19
The principles the Court relied on in determining a pressing and
substantial governmental interest in terms of freedom of expression,
widened the scope in which the Canadian government may infringe upon
fundamental freedoms as opposed to the United States' model. Courts in
84. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Justice
White analyzed the three levels of scrutiny courts use in determining constitutional questions. Id.
The dissent of Justice Marshall in which he outlines the use and need for intermediate scrutiny is
most enlightening. Id. at 455 (Marshall J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 440.
86. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
87. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating Oklahoma statute which
prohibited the sale of nonintoxicating beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to females
under the age of eighteen); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (invalidating restriction on advertising).
88. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.
89. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 29.
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the United States restrict content based infringements upon freedom of
expression to situations where the government has a compelling interest.
The Canadian Court concluded Parliament's purpose in enacting the
legislation was to prevent the harm caused by hate-promoting expression.
The Court came to this conclusion based on its examination of the
information before Parliament.
In comparison to American jurisprudence, the Court required the
Crown, as prosecutor, to prove it in fact, Section 1 of the Charter applied
to the regulation in question. However, the Court also examined
Parliament's motives for passing the legislation. Therefore, the Court
must find that it was reasonable to believe, in light of the information
before Parliament, that the regulation was necessary to achieve the
government's substantial and pressing interest. Again, the Canadian Court
applied a hybrid analysis used by American courts. The Court used a
heightened level of factual analysis, which requires the Crown to "prove it
in fact" that the government has a pressing and substantial interest in
overriding the fundamental freedom. In addition, it examined whether it
was reasonable to believe that Parliament had a substantial and pressing
concern based on the information before the legislature.,*
In determining Parliament's pressing and substantial concern in
enacting the Hate Propaganda Statute, the Court also addressed other
Charter provisions and international agreements to which Canada is a
party.91 The Court gave special attention to Canada's obligations under the
many International Conventions dealing with the regulation of hate
propaganda, especially those embodied in the United Nations Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.9 In light of
those commitments the Court stated "the prohibition of hate-promoting
expression is considered to be not only compatible with a signatory
nation's guarantee of human rights, but is as well an obligatory aspect of
this guarantee."93
In Keegstra, the Court examined other sections of the Charter,
specifically Sections 15 and 27.94 These sections represent a strong
90. See generally Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)
(outlining three levels of factual analysis that United States' courts use in analyzing the necessary
levels of proof the government must meet in determining the elements of each constitutional
"scrutiny" test).
91. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 39, 43.
92. Id. at 39; See also International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
93. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 42.
94. Id. at 43; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 53.
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commitment to the values of equality and multiculturalism, and underline
the great importance of Parliament's objective in prohibiting hate
propaganda. Section 15 of the Charter can be equated with the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. "The purpose of Section 15
is to ensure equality in the formulation and application of the law. "9
The promotion of equality entails the promotion of a society in
which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as
human beings equally deserving concern, respect, and consideration. The
Court reasoned that government sponsored hatred on group grounds would
violate Section 15 of the Charter. "Parliament promotes equality and
moves against inequality when it prohibits the willful public promotion of
group hatred on these grounds. It follows government action against
group hate, because it promotes social equality as guaranteed by the
Charter, deserves special constitutional consideration under Section 15."9
After finding the measure in question was of a pressing and substantial
concern, the second part of the test involved assessing the
"proportionality" between the governmental objective and the impugned
measure. It is interesting to note the United States Supreme Court used a
proportional standard in In re R.M.J., finding the state may regulate
commercial speech if it shows it has "a substantial interest and the
interference with speech [is] in proportion to the interest served. "9
In determining the proportionality of the measure the Canadian
Supreme Court applied a three-part test first established in Regina v.
Oakes.91 First, the government must prove the measure, adopted is
"carefully designed to achieve the objective in question; [the measure]
must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. "9 In
other words, the measure cannot raise to the level of a pretext. Second,
even if there is a pressing and substantial governmental interest, "the
means . . . should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in
question . . . ."'0 This test can be equated to the concept of overbreadth
and vagueness as employed by American courts. Third, "there must be a
proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible
for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been
identified as of 'sufficient importance."'101 The inquiry into the
95. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 43.
96. Id. at 44.
97. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1987).
98. Regina v. Oakes, 26 D.L.R.4th 200 (Can. 1986).
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proportionality of the measure can be compared with the "most narrowly
tailored" standard in the United States under a strict scrutiny standard. In
Keegstra, the Court found the means used by Parliament to further the
objective of prohibiting hate propaganda were proportional to its ends.
Although guaranteed, the freedoms known throughout Canadian
society are limited by Section 1 of the Charter. The underlying values of
Canada's free and democratic society guarantee both the rights in the
Charter and, in appropriate circumstances, justify limitations upon those
rights. Therefore, the Court recognized in the case of hate propaganda,
even though it infringed upon the guarantee of freedom of expression, the
government had a substantial and pressing interest in criminalizing this
type of expression. The Court held the statute was not irrational and was
connected to the stated substantial governmental interest. The Court also
found the Hate Propaganda Statute was "narrowly tailored" or in
"proportion" to the substantial governmental interest.
In order for Section 1 of the Charter to "save" a particular
regulation, the Crown must prove its case in fact. Canadian courts will
also examine the basis for the legislature's motive in passing regulations
which infringe on Charter rights. Therefore, in sustaining a regulation
which infringes on a Charter right or freedom, the objective of the
limitation must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a
constitutionally protected right or freedom.
To prevent trivial justification, such objectives must relate to
concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic
society. The imposition must meet the qualifications of rational
connection, minimum impairment, and a proportionality of purpose and
effects. The measures must be carefully designed to achieve the objective
in question and must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational
considerations. The means should impair as little as possible on the right
in question, and there must be a proportionality between the effects of the
limiting measure and the objective. The more severe the damaging effects
of the measure, the more important the objective must be. 10
In addressing the overbreadth and vagueness concerns of the
proportionality test, the Court, in a detailed analysis, concluded that the
trier of fact, with proper instruction from the judge, could make the
necessary inferences to meet these concerns. 3 The Court also found the
terms of the offense possessed definitional limits which acted as safeguards
102. See generally Regina v. Ladouceur, O.A.C. LEXIS 179 at *1 (Ont. 1987) available
in LEXIS, Canada library, Ont file (using the same analysis in relation to arbitrary police
detention and unconstitutional search and seizures, as decided by the Ontario Appellate Court).
103. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 61.
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to Parliament's objective. "Hatred is not a word of casual connotation.
To promote hatred is to instill detestation, enmity, ill-will, and
malevolence in another."",
In Regina v. Andrews, a companion case heard at the same time as
Keegstra, the Court upheld the Hate Propaganda Statute as it impacted on
the distribution of literature.0  The accused, a member of a white
supremacist organization known as "the Nationalist Party of Canada," was
convicted of distributing anti-Semitic literature.'10 The Court did not give
any special significance to the so-called political status claimed by the
accused.
In Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Taylor, the Court
upheld a contempt order against an accused for instituting a telephone
message service where members of the public could dial a telephone
number and listen to a prerecorded message which "exposed persons
identifiable on the basis of race and religion to hatred or contempt." °
Under the Canadian Human Rights Act, it is a "discriminatory practice for
a person to use the telephone to communicate repeatedly any matter likely
to expose persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that those
persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of
discrimination. " 1°8 Using the same reasoning as in Keegstra, the Taylor
Court upheld the trial court's finding that the "Western Guard" failed to
comply with the Human Rights Commission's cease and desist order.°0
The Supreme Court, however, drew the line when it came to the
prohibition of publishing false news in Regina v. Zundel."0 Zundel was
charged with "willfully publishing a statement, tale or news that he knows
is false and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public
interest.""' Zundel published and distributed a pamphlet which questioned
104. Regina v. Andrews, 77 D.L.R.4th 128, 137 (Can. 1990). This case was a companion
appeal heard along with the Keegstra case. Id. at 130.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 132.
Pursuant to a search warrant, eighty-nine materials were seized from the home of the
appellants. Included in these materials were copies of the Nationalist Reporter, letters
written by subscribers, subscription lists and mimeographed sticker cards containing
such messages as "Nigger go home," "Hoax on the Holocaust," "Israel stinks" and
"Hitler was right Communism is Jewish."
Id.
107. Canadian Human Rights Comm'n v. Taylor" 75 D.L.R.4th 577, 582 (Can. 1992).
108. Canadian Human Rights Act. S.N.S. § 13(1) (1969).
109. Taylor, 75 D.L.R.4th at 612.
110. Regina v. Zundel, 95 D.L.R.4th 202 (Can. 1992).
111. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch.C-46, § 181.
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the occurrence of the Holocaust. The Court held that in this case the
statute could not pass the proportionality test as announced in Keegstra."2
The Court found the statute vague and overbroad in its scope and difficult
to determine the meaning of "a statement" as worded in the Code."' The
Court also could not determine whether the statement was false, with
sufficient accuracy to make falsity a fair criteria for denial of constitutional
protection."4  The chilling effect of the statute on legitimate expression
"outweighs its minimal benefit given the alternative means of prosecution
of speech detrimental to racial tolerance [available to Parliament]. "'
It can be seen from the examination of the Canadian experience
and those of the international community that it is possible and reasonable
for a free and democratic society to criminalize hate propaganda. The
fundamental concept of ordered liberty associated with the rights to self-
expression are neither diminished nor chilled. In light of the multicultural
nature of society, it has been recognized by the international community
that the need to protect the fundamental rights of equality require a
minimal infringement on the right of free speech.
V. HATE PROPAGANDA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
It is interesting to note in each of the above cited Canadian cases
that the Canadian Supreme Court examined American First Amendment
jurisprudence in relation to hate speech. The Canadian Supreme Court, in
comparing Canadian constitutional history to that of the United States,
examined the relevant American case law and the academic literature and
concluded that ". . . the precedents are somewhat mixed, but the
relaxation of the prohibition against content-based regulation of expression
in certain areas indicates that American courts are not loath to permit the
suppression of ideas in some circumstances. "116 The international reaction
to hate speech may seem broad, but every western democracy draws a
distinction in their laws between hate propaganda and other speech. The
United States stands alone in the degree to which it has decided legally to
tolerate racist rhetoric. "7
112. Zundel, 95 D.L.R.4th at 278.
113. Id. at 257, 258, 272.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 275.
116. Keegstra, 61 C.C.C.3d at 34, 35.
117. See Kent Greenwald, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS
L.J. 287, 303 (1990). There are group libel statutes in the criminal codes of five states. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-57 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 para.27-1 (Smith-Hurd 1961);
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In order to make the case for criminalizing the dissemination of
hate propaganda in the United States it is necessary to touch upon the
fundamental values associated with the First Amendment. Thomas
Emerson has grouped the values sought by society in protecting the right
to freedom of expression into four broad categories.", The first value is
one of "individual self-fulfillment. "119 The right to freedom of expression
is justified because it allows for individuals to attain and realize their true
potential as human beings. Second, free expression is necessary as a
means of attaining the truth. 2 In theory, rational judgment is arrived at by
considering all the facts and arguments which can be put forth in any
proposition.,,, Third, freedom of speech allows an individual to participate
as members of society in social and political decision making." The right
of all individuals to freely communicate with others is regarded as an
essential principle of a democratically organized society.', Finally,
freedom of expression maintains the balance between stability and change
in society.1lu Open discussion is a method of achieving an adaptable and
more stable community, and maintains the balance between differences of
opinion and general consensus."'
Hate propaganda has no place in relation to the fundamental values
that Emerson expounds. Disseminators of hate propaganda do not attain,
nor do they realize their true potential as human beings. In fact, those
people who promote hate propaganda inhibit their victims from attaining
their true potential as human beings. Hate propaganda has no bearing on
the attainment of truth. It often dissuades individuals from participating as
full members of society. It creates instability and discord in society. As
far as promoting change in society, the true goal of hate propaganda is to
roll back the gains minorities have made over the past forty years.
Prevailing First Amendment dogma maintains that speech may not
be penalized merely because its content is racist. Conventional American
free speech jurisprudence holds racist speech qualifies for the very highest
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272 § 98c (West 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212 (1983); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200-510 (1983).
118. Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963).
119. Id. at 879.
120. Id. at 880.
121. Id. at 882.
122. Id. at 883.
123. Emerson, supra note 118, at 884.
124. Id. at 886.
125. Id. at 887.
19961
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
levels of First Amendment protection, perhaps even absolute protection,
because it is thought of as "opinion" or "viewpoint."1 26 Even if racist
speech communicates little in the way of intellectual argument, the
prevailing dogma refuses to continence any distinction between the
cognitive and the emotive elements of speech, and the communicative
thought and feeling are equally protected.
Membership in groups which advocate racist positions may not be
made illegal, and advocacy of ideas such as racial or religious genocide
may not be outlawed. Only if such speech is on the very verge of ripening
into immediate violence may the speech be penalized. ,2, If hate violence
comes from the reactions of others to the hate-filled speech, American
orthodoxy is that the hecklers must be arrested, not the speakers. In
However, considering the global response to hate propaganda, a
reevaluation of hate propaganda in relation to the ideals of the First and the
Fourteenth Amendments may lead to a conclusion contrary to the
prevailing First Amendment dogma.
Racial equality and tolerance are not just good ideas but the law of
the land, the declared public policy of the United States.'2 9 Thomas Hobbs
stated, "'that the actions of men proceed from their opinions', and racist
opinions lead to an atmosphere of race-hate, an insensitivity that fosters
acts of palpable violence and discrimination. "110 "Even John Stuart Mill
permits the state to intrude on individual liberty when its exercise will
injure another."'31
In the context of First Amendment jurisprudence the Supreme
Court has created a dichotomy of approaches to constitutional decision
making. American courts must decide whether speech or conduct is
involved. Does the speech communicate thought or emotion? Does the
regulation affect the statement of facts or opinions? Is the regulation
content-based or content-neutral? Is the government property a forum or a
nonforum? Is the speech political or nonpolitical, commercial or
noncommercial, for children or adults? In Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., the
Supreme Court stated "under the First Amendment there is no such thing
as a false idea."' 32 But Justice Powell also stated in the next sentence
"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact, [n]either the
126. Smolla, supra note 37, at 172.
127. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
128. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
129. Smolla, supra note 37, at 174.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 175.
132. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
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intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest
in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues."'"
In striking down Louisiana's criminal defamation statute, the Court
stated in Garrison v. Louisiana the use of calculated falsehood would put
a different cast on the constitutional question."- Justice Brennan, as did
Justice Powell in Gertz, cited Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire asserting:
[clalculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances
which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Hence the knowingly false statement and the false
statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not
enjoy constitutional protection. 5
Clearly, any regulation which criminalized hate propaganda would
be one that was content based, and when challenged, as it surely would be,
would be subject to strict scrutiny. The key to advancing the argument for
applying criminal sanctions against those who promote hate propaganda is
to place such propaganda in the unprotected speech category. In effect, if
hate speech can be put into the same category as pure falsehood, or
analogized as an obscenity then it could be constitutionally criminalized.
Hate propaganda is a calculated falsehood of such slight social value that it
does not deserve constitutional protection.
In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court established the "fighting words
doctrine."'1' Since then, the Court has followed a course of categorizing
different levels of speech and providing different tests as to the level of
protection afforded each category. A review of relevant case law as
developed by the Supreme Court's decisions on issues affecting the First
Amendment will illustrate a possible rationale for constitutionally
criminalizing hate propaganda.
In 1949, the Court in Terniniello v. City of Chicago3 overturned a
disorderly conduct conviction which resulted when Terminiello's oratory
caused a riot. Terminiello was found guilty of disorderly conduct arising
out of an address he delivered to over eight hundred persons in an
auditorium. Over a thousand people had gathered outside the auditorium
133. Id. at 340.
134. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
135. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
136. Id.
137. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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to protest the meeting. Terminiello, in his speech, condemned the
conduct of the crowd outside and vigorously criticized various political and
racial groups whose activities he denounced as "inimical to the nation's
welfare. " I's The facts show that between the two groups a riot almost
ensued.'3 9 Justice Jackson in his vigorous dissent, and after a lengthy
recitation of the facts found that the resulting violence was a riot."'4
The Court took exception to the charge of the jury, in which
breach of the peace was defined as, "speech that stirs the public to anger,
invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a
disturbance.""' The Court declared the very function of free speech under
the American system of government is to invite dispute.142 Because the
ordinance, as construed by the trial court, permitted the conviction of
Terminiello if his speech stirred people to anger or invited public dispute,
the conviction could not stand."13  The Court reasoned the statute was
applied more broadly than the "fighting word doctrine" first announced in
Chaplinsky.'" Realizing the implications of the Court's holding, Justice
Jackson, admonished the Court "to take heed lest we walk into a well from
looking at the stars."14
Two years later however, in Feiner v. New York the Court upheld
New York State's disorderly conduct statute under similar circumstances
as Terminiello."6 Feiner was arrested because the content of his speech
was creating the possibility of a riot on a street corner in Syracuse, New
York. Feiner, using a loud speaker, was making derogatory remarks
concerning President Truman, the American Legion, and other local
political officials."7 He was also, "endeavoring to arouse the Negro people
against the whites, urging that they rise up in arms and fight for equal
rights.""i3 The New York statute was very similar to that of the City of
Chicago's statute."
138. id. at 2.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 17 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 4.
142. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 14 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
146. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
147. Id. at 317.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 319 n. 1 (providing the wording of the New York State statute under question).
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The Court in upholding Feiner's conviction did not cite to
Tenniniello. The Court declared "[a] state may not unduly suppress free
communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving
desirable conditions."'0 However, "when the speaker passes the bounds of
argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot the police are not
powerless to prevent a breach of the peace."", The Court's finding in
Feiner is almost in complete opposition to Terminiello. The Court
determined the deliberate defiance by the petitioner to the police by not
stopping his speech convinced the Court they could not reverse this
"conviction in the name of free speech.'1 2 The only constant in the
Supreme Court's approach to First Amendment adjudication is its
"pendulum" approach in determining the constitutionality of regulations
that concern freedom of expression.
Group libel as a category of speech has seldom been tested by the
Supreme Court." 3 In Beauharnais v. Illinois the Court upheld an Illinois
group libel statute."" Illinois' statute made it a crime to, "exhibit in any
public place any publication which portrays depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed
or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy."" Beauharnais distributed a
leaflet that called for, "a halt to further encroachment, harassment and
invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by
the Negro." '
The Court stated:
[t]here are certain well defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, libelous, and the insulting or fighting words
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.'
150. Id. at 320.
151. Feiner, 340 U.S. 321.
152. Id.
153. Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt In,
23 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 108 (1984).
154. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 para. 471 (1949).
156. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 256.
157. Id. at 255-56.
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The Court rejected the argument that prohibiting libel of a creed or of a
racial group, "is but a step from prohibiting libel of a political party."'1
The Court answered, "even though a power may be abused it is not a
reason for denying Illinois the power to adopt measures against criminal
libels sanctioned by centuries of Anglo-American law. '"9 Justice
Frankfurter equated such libelous utterances as being in the same class as
obscene speech.' 6
The dissents in Beauharnais are as significant as Justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion. Justice Reed assumed the power of the
state to pass group libel laws, but dissented on the ground that the statute
in question was too vague. 1 61 Justice Jackson agreed group libel laws fall
within the power of the states, but that in this case the defendant had no
opportunity to prove a defense, such as fair comment, truth, or privilege.1 62
Justice Douglas suggested that defamatory conduct directed at a race or
group in the United States could be made an indictable offense, since like
picketing, it would be free speech plus. However, he would have required
either a conspiracy or a clear and present danger to support an
indictment. 61 Based on Beauharnais it appears that the criminalization of
hate speech could be found constitutional.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has never overruled
Beauharnais. In fact, the Court has continued to cite to it favorably,
particularly in obscenity cases.'" Commentators assert that New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,'65 overruled the Court's finding in Beauharnais.'6
The Court in Sullivan held that the Constitution limits state power in civil
actions brought by a public official for criticism of his official conduct. 67
Damages would be awarded only for a false statement "made with actual
malice."'16 The statements had to be made with knowledge that they were
158. Id.
159. Id. at 263.
160. Id. at 266.
161. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 283 (Reed, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 294 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 302 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
164. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 754 (1982).
165. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); See Lasson, supra note 153,
at 35.
166. Lasson, supra note 153, at 35.
167. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
168. ld. at 279, 280.
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false or with reckless disregard for the truth of the matter.69 However,
Sullivan was expressly limited to actions brought by public officials against
critics of their official conduct. The Court stated that no category of
speech falls completely outside of the First Amendment, 10 but the Court
was simply ensuring that a state could not remove speech from judicial
scrutiny merely by putting a label on it.
The Court in Garrison v. Louisiana expanded the scope of the
Sullivan standard by invalidating Louisiana's criminal libel statute.'7' In
reversing Garrison's criminal conviction, the Court still expressed some
limits to the scope afforded free speech by First Amendment protection.
The Court stated:
[t]hat speech used as a tool for political ends does not
automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the
Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a tool is at
once at odds with the premises of democratic government,
and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or
political change is to be effected. 17 1
The Court cited the same language it used in Chaplinsky.'" The Court also
reiterated in Sullivan, that both a knowingly false statement, and the false
statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection. 7 4  It is difficult to imagine any circumstance
which an opinion or message expressed in hate propaganda could possibly
be construed as anything but falsehood made with a reckless disregard for
the truth.
Cases that lend support to the contention that the criminalization of
hate propaganda would be constitutional are those concerning obscenity. It
can be argued not only that hate propaganda rises to the same level of
obscenity but also, it is in fact, an obscenity. However, in examining the
obscenity cases, what the Court says in its opinions does not necessarily
reflect the law which emerges.
In addressing the level of protection afforded obscenity under the
First Amendment, the Court in Roth v. United States'" stated, "[iln the
light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the
169. Id.
170, Id. at 269.
171. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
172. Id. at 75.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
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First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance."176 Roth had
been convicted of mailing material that was obscene, lewd, lascivious, or a
filthy publication, contrary to a federal statute.'" In upholding Roth's
conviction, the Court cited Beauharnais with approval. It concluded that
since obscenity is not protected, constitutional guarantees were not violated
in this case merely because it was not proved the obscene material would
perceptibly create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, or
induce its recipients to such conduct. 78
In Roth, the Court conducted an extensive review of the historical
treatment by the states of obscenity. It also acknowledged the international
community's treatment of obscenity. The Court concluded that obscenity is
not within the area of constitutional protection, 7 9 finding:
[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance . . . have the full protection of the guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
area of more important interest. But implicit in the history
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance. This
rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal
judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in
the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the
obscenity laws of all of the 48 states, and in the 20
obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956
180
Thus, the Court is not reluctant to survey international law as well as state
law when it looks for legal guidance. In light of the present day treatment
of hate propaganda by the international community, any examination of the
law of the international community by the Court would show hate
propaganda is not worthy of constitutional protection.
If it can be proven that hate propaganda has no redeeming social
importance, and that it encroaches upon the limited area of a more
important interest, then clearly hate propaganda also would not merit First
Amendment protection. If, as the Court held, obscenity is afforded no
constitutional protection, the discussion would have ended. However, in
an attempt to avoid the "slippery slope" of having its holding spread to
176. Id. at 48.
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1956).
178. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483.
179. Id. at 481.
180. Id. at 484, 485 (emphasis added).
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legitimate material worthy of First Amendment protection, the Court went
on to announce a test for determining what constitutes obscenity. By
announcing a standard for judging obscenity the Court in effect, gave
obscenity a modicum of First Amendment protection.
In 1973, the Court modified its test for obscenity regulation in the
case of Miller v. California.'8 The major effect of the decision was to
tighten the definitional elements of what constitutes obscenity and how the
lower courts were to apply those standards. The test announced in Miller
required the states to ensure that their legislation be narrowly drawn and
very specific as to what constituted obscene material. However, the Court
was consistent in maintaining obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment. What this means to those who would draft regulations
concerning hate propaganda is that the definitional elements of the
regulation would have to be very specific and narrowly construed.
The Supreme Court has been willing to abridge constitutional
protections when governments attempt to legislate for the welfare of
children. The Court "[has] sustained legislation aimed at protecting the
physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have
operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights."", If it
could be proven in fact that hate propaganda bears heavily and pervasively
on the welfare of children then it would be permissible to consider
messages of hate without First Amendment protection.' 83 In New York v.
Ferber, the Court held that when it came to children and obscenity, the
standard used for adults was not satisfactory.184 The Court recognized and
classified child pornography as a category of material outside the First
Amendment's protection.' 8 The Court stated "[wihen a definable class of
material ... bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children.
. . the balance of competing interest is clearly struck and that it is
permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the
First Amendment."'18 The Court was concerned with safeguarding the
physical and psychological welfare of children, and considered such state
interest compelling.'8
181. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
182. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (1982) (citing to Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 168 (1944), which sustained a statute prohibiting use of a child to distribute literature
on the street notwithstanding the statute's effect on a First Amendment activity).
183. d. at 764.
184. Id. at 756.
185. Id. at 763.
186. Id. at 764.
187. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756.
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In upholding New York's child pornography statute, the Court
stated, "it is the content of an utterance that determines whether it is a
protected epithet or an unprotected 'fighting comment.'"l' The Court
reiterated its holding in Beauharnais that libelous publication is not
protected by the Constitution and further stated: "[I]t is not rare that a
content-based classification of speech has been accepted because it may be
appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given
classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the
expressive interest ... at stake . . ."' The dicta used by the Court
leads one to believe, if it can be proven in fact the physical, emotional,
and psychological welfare of children can be and is irreparably harmed by
exposure to hate propaganda, it could be classified as speech not protected
by the First Amendment.
The Court in Ginsberg v. New York, sustained a law protecting
children from exposure to nonobscene literature.'19 In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, the Court held the Government's interest in the well-being of
its youth justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting received by
adults as well as children.' 9'
The Court has not limited the abridgment of fundamental rights
solely when obscenity affects the welfare of children. In New Jersey v.
T.L. 0., the Court, in balancing the school's legitimate need to maintain an
environment in which learning can take place with that of the school
child's legitimate expectations of privacy, required some easing of the
restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.1'9
The Court has also allowed school authorities to suppress student
newspapers, and the content of speech in the school setting. 93
The dissemination of hate propaganda through commercial
telephone services, on-line computer services, and printed material is
pervasive in American society. Hate propaganda reaches both the adult
and juvenile population of the United States equally. The psychological
harm caused by exposure to messages of hate is both palpable and
invidious. By being exposed, and having access to hate propaganda the
youth of America are being sent a message that such ideas are tolerable
188. Id. at 763.
189. Id.
190. Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
191. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
192. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
193. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (censoring of
student-run school newspaper allowed); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986) (censoring of sexual innuendo in student's campaign speech to a school assembly allowed).
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and acceptable. By criminalizing hate propaganda, and eventually
eliminating its wide spread dissemination, it may be possible to reduce the
levels of hate, distrust, and bigotry, which are pervasive in American
society. If as the Court has stated, the physical and psychological welfare
of children is a compelling state interest, then the criminalization of hate
propaganda is certainly justified.
The most serious objection raised to the constitutionality of
criminalizing hate propaganda is it would be a content based regulation. It
puts the state in the censorship business, with no means of assuring the
censor's hand will stop at hate speech and not pass into areas of legitimate
expression. The "slippery slope" argument arises most often when
legislatures or the Supreme Court do not carefully define the language they
use in their pronouncements. 94
Slippery slopes can best be countered by drafting legislation which
narrowly define exactly what constitutes hate propaganda. The Canadian
experience shows this is possible. The language of the Supreme Court in
past cases dealing with the First Amendment has shown that freedom of
expression is not an absolute. Regulations criminalizing hate propaganda,
if narrowly tailored and specific, can survive strict scrutiny. The
government can prove it in fact, that the harms associated with the
dissemination of hate propaganda are real, and the interest in eradicating
such hate speech is compelling.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the "New World Order" that is dawning, it is only
fitting the United States should join the international community in
recognizing the real harms created by hate propaganda. The best means of
accomplishing this is for Congress to ratify the International Convention of
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, without
reservations.
Any regulation which criminalizes the dissemination of hate
propaganda would be based on the content of the speech. Therefore, to
sustain a constitutional challenge such regulation must pass a strict scrutiny
test. The government would have to prove it in fact, the harms associated
with hate propaganda, rise to a level of a compelling state interest. Ample
evidence is available for any state to prove the inherent and real harm
caused by the dissemination of hate propaganda. The state can also show
the elimination of these harms is a compelling governmental interest based
on American history and the international response to hate propaganda.
194. See Frederick Shauer, Slippery Slopes. 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985) (discussing
slippery slope arguments as logical fallacies).
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The regulation would have to be narrowly tailored, such that there
could be no chance of finding it overinclusive, nor underinclusive. The
definitional terms as to what constitutes hate propaganda would have to be
very precise. Drafting such legislation is not impossible. The Canadian
and British statutes provide an excellent model. The regulation would
have to provide a provision for defenses. It should also express when a
breach of the statute does or does not occur. This would avoid a challenge
as to the vagueness or overbreadthness of the regulation.
Regulations that would criminalize hate propaganda pose no threat
to the fundamental values of free expression which are protected by the
First Amendment. Fundamental concepts of ordered liberty, would be
enhanced rather than being diminished. The values associated with the
modem application of the Fourteenth Amendment would be greatly
enhanced and would give those individuals who are the target of hate
propaganda a realization that American society is truly egalitarian. It is
time American society lived up to the immortal words of the Declaration
of Independence that truly all "people" are created equal.
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